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A COURSE OF LECTURES ON BIBLICAL CRITICISM

Second Edition, Revised and much Enlarged

THE PROPHETS OF ISRAEL

AND THEIR PLACE IN HISTORY TO THE CLOSE OF THE EIGHTH CENTURY B.C.

Second Edition

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ORIEL PROFESSOR OF THE INTERPRETATION OF HOLY SCRIPTURE AT OXFORD, CANON OF ROCHESTER

KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE IN EARLY ARABIA

NEW EDITION, WITH ADDITIONAL NOTES BY THE AUTHOR, AND BY

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PROFESSOR WILLIAM ROBERTSON SMITH (about 1891)

From a photograph by the late A. Dew Smith

LECTURES ON THE RELIGION OF THE SEMITES

THE FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTIONS

BY THE LATE

WILLIAM ROBERTSON SMITH, M.A., LL.D.

SIR THOMAS ADAMS'S PROFESSOR OF ARABIC IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

THIRD EDITION

WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND ADDITIONAL NOTES

BY

STANLEY A. COOK, LITT.D.

FELLOW OF GONVILLE AND CAIUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

UNIVERSITY LECTURER IN HEBREW AND ARAMAIC

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PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

THE continuous demand for the "Religion of the Semites" induced the publishers, when the necessity for another reprint drew near, to consider the possibility of a new edition. Many years have passed since the second edition, revised by Robertson Smith himself—the last of his labours—was seen through the press by his friend and subsequent biographer, the late Dr. John Sutherland Black (1894). *But for nearly three decades continental scholars have had, in Stübe's German translation, what is in several respects virtually a new edition; and for this and other reasons a mere reprint seemed undesirable. Needless to say, a work that in its day was regarded as epoch-making for the powerful stimulus it gave to the study of Semitic religion, and indeed of religion in general, could be revised only by its author. It touched upon so many delicate and controversial subjects, and the treatment was so incisive and characteristic, that what Robertson Smith thought and wrote must remain unchanged. Accordingly, apart from the correction of a few trifling misprints, the text has been left unaltered. In the footnotes references to various classical works (by Frazer, Wellhausen, and others) have been tacitly brought up to date, and a few new references added, with sundry other minor changes that could be made on the plates.*

Besides this, the present edition contains a number of new notes to which the attention of readers is drawn by asterisks in the margin of the text. For these and for the Introduction I

am wholly responsible. Naturally, the notes could have been enlarged and multiplied. What has been done was suggested (1) *by Robertson Smith's MS. notes in his copies of the first edition both of this work and of Wellhausen's great "Reste Arabischen Heidentums," now in the library of Christ's College, Cambridge*[1]*;* (2) *by the additions in the German translation*[2]*;* (3) *by the work of Baudissin, Frazer, Lagrange, and others since* 1894*; and* (4) *by what I conceive to be the trend of Robertson Smith's work.*

Criticism, since his day, has forced an entire reconsideration of his arguments and theories, and many of the topics with which he deals now appear in another light. This fact has shaped the Introduction and the Notes. Robertson Smith has often been regarded as the founder of the modern Comparative Study of Religion—he was, I venture to think, the founder of what I would call the Science and Theory of Religion. He opened up in a new way questions of religion and magic; of ritual, theology, and myth; of personality, human and divine; of sin and atonement; of sacramentalism, immanence, and transcendence; and even of production and property. Whereas theologians naturally discuss such subjects as these within the limits of Christian theology, Robertson Smith went farther afield, to the most essential ideas, and those not of Christianity alone. Western thought is throughout indebted to Christianity and to Greek and Roman civilization; Robertson Smith went down deeper, to the more primitive modes of thought of mankind. His temperament and his profound personal faith, coupled with marvellous erudition, gave him an insight into the funda-

[1] A certain amount of Robertson Smith's unpublished material was utilized in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*.

[2] R. Stübe, *Die Religion der Semiten*, with preface by E. Kautzsch; Freiburg i. B. 1899. This edition, with thirteen illustrations, modifies the "lecture" form and expands numerous references and citations; it has various additions and a few omissions. A Comparative Table of Pagination will be found at the end of this volume (p. 693).

mental theories of Religion which, it seems safe to affirm, has never been surpassed.

It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find elsewhere so stimulating an approach to the serious study of Religion; and if enthusiastic disciples have sometimes gone too far and wandered from the track he blazed, there is no doubt that his critics have not always understood either the man himself, or the problems of Religion as they presented themselves to him. It must, indeed, be frankly admitted that some of his arguments now appear too difficult, and are sometimes unnecessary for his position as a whole; but no less frankly may the belief be expressed that his position is far more significant than has often been thought, and that he has much to offer those who at the present day are interested in religious problems. It is with such convictions as these that the Introduction and Notes have been prepared.

In this task I have to express grateful thanks to many for advice and help, including Prof. A. A. Bevan (especially for the notes signed with his initials), Sir James Frazer (for the references on p. xli n.), Dr. Alan Gardner and Prof. Eric Peet (on some Egyptological points), Prof. Halliday (on some points of Greek religion), Mr. W. T. Vesey (for the information on p. 519 n. 1), Dr. A. S. Tritton, and Dr. and Mrs. Seligman. My indebtedness to the works of Stübe (viz. the German translation), Baudissin, Durkheim, Lagrange, G. F. Moore, Westermarck, and very many others, will be evident in the course of the notes.

The reproduction, after all these years, of a photograph of Robertson Smith will, it is hoped, gratify those to whom he is still more than a name.[1] *To me he and his work have been an unfailing inspiration since* 1894–5, *when I dimly began to feel that the "Religion of the Semites" revealed a new world*

[1] The original hangs in the Combination Room of Christ's College.

to be explored. Years of exploration have only convinced me that the study of Religion along the lines he laid down is destined in the future to inaugurate a new era in the history of religious thought; and if in this tribute to his memory an enthusiastic disciple has strayed from the path, the fault is not the master's.

STANLEY A. COOK.

CAMBRIDGE, *August* 1927.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

In April 1887 I was invited by the trustees of the Burnett Fund to deliver three courses of lectures at Aberdeen, in the three years from October 1888 to October 1891, on "The primitive religions of the Semitic peoples, viewed in relation to other ancient religions, and to the spiritual religion of the Old Testament and of Christianity." I gladly accepted this invitation; for the subject proposed had interested me for many years, and it seemed to me possible to treat it in a way that would not be uninteresting to the members of my old University, in whose hall the Burnett Lectures are delivered, and to the wider public to whom the gates of Marischal College are opened on the occasion.

In years gone by, when I was called upon to defend before the courts of my Church the rights of historical research, as applied to the Old Testament, I had reason to acknowledge with gratitude the fairness and independence of judgment which my fellow-townsmen of Aberdeen brought to the discussion of questions which in most countries are held to be reserved for the learned, and to be merely disturbing to the piety of the ordinary layman; and I was glad to have the opportunity of commending to the notice of a public so impartial and so intelligent the study of a branch of comparative religion which, as I venture to think, is indispensable to the future progress of Biblical research.

In Scotland, at least, no words need be wasted to prove that a right understanding of the religion of the Old Testament is the only way to a right understanding of the Christian faith; but it is not so fully recognised, except in the circle of professed scholars, that the doctrines and ordinances of the Old Testament cannot be thoroughly comprehended until they are put into comparison with the religions of the nations akin to the Israelites. The value of comparative studies for the study of the religion of the Bible was brought out very clearly, two hundred years ago, by one of the greatest of English theologians, Dr. John Spencer, Master of Corpus Christi College in Cambridge, whose Latin work on the ritual laws of the Hebrews may justly be said to have laid the foundations of the science of Comparative Religion, and in its special subject, in spite of certain defects that could hardly have been avoided at the time when it was composed, still remains by far the most important book on the religious antiquities of the Hebrews. But Spencer was so much before his time that his work was not followed up; it is often ignored by professed students of the Old Testament, and has hardly exercised any influence on the current ideas which are the common property of educated men interested in the Bible.

In modern times Comparative Religion has become in some degree a popular subject, and in our own country has been treated from various points of view by men of eminence who have the ear of the public; but nothing considerable has been done since Spencer's time, either in England or on the Continent, whether in learned or in popular form, towards a systematic comparison of the religion of the Hebrews, as a whole, with the beliefs and ritual practices of the other Semitic peoples. In matters of detail valuable work has been done; but this work has

been too special, and for the most part too technical, to help the circle to whom the Burnett Lectures are addressed, which I take to be a circle of cultivated and thinking men and women who have no special acquaintance with Semitic lore, but are interested in everything that throws light on their own religion, and are prepared to follow a sustained or even a severe argument, if the speaker on his part will remember that historical research can always be made intelligible to thinking people, when it is set forth with orderly method and in plain language.

There is a particular reason why some attempt in this direction should be made now. The first conditions of an effective comparison of Hebrew religion, as a whole, with the religion of the other Semites, were lacking so long as the historical order of the Old Testament documents, and especially of the documents of which the Pentateuch is made up, was unascertained or wrongly apprehended; but, thanks to the labours of a series of scholars (of whom it is sufficient to name Kuenen and Wellhausen, as the men whose acumen and research have carried this inquiry to a point where nothing of vital importance for the historical study of the Old Testament religion still remains uncertain), the growth of the Old Testament religion can now be followed from stage to stage, in a way that is hardly possible with any other religion of antiquity. And so it is now not only possible, but most necessary for further progress, to make a fair comparison between Hebrew religion in its various stages and the religions of the races with which the Hebrews were cognate by natural descent, and with which also they were historically in constant touch.

The plan which I have framed for my guidance in carrying out the desires of the Burnett trustees is explained in the first lecture. I begin with the institutions

of religion, and in the present series I discuss those institutions which may be called fundamental, particularly that of sacrifice, to which fully one half of the volume is devoted. It will readily be understood that, in the course of the argument, I have found it convenient to take up a good many things that are not fundamental, at the place where they could most naturally be explained; and, on the other hand, I daresay that students of the subject may sometimes be disposed to regard as fundamental certain matters which I have been compelled to defer. But on the whole I trust that the present volume will be found to justify its title, and to contain a fairly adequate analysis of the first principles of Semitic worship. It would indeed have been in some respects more satisfactory to myself to defer the publication of the first series of lectures till I could complete the whole subject of institutions, derivative as well as primary. But it seemed due to the hearers who may desire to attend the second series of lectures, to let them have before them in print the arguments and conclusions from which that series must start; and also, in a matter of this sort, when one has put forth a considerable number of new ideas, the value of which must be tested by criticism, one is anxious to have the judgment of scholars on the first part of one's work before going on to further developments.

I may explain that the lectures, as now printed, are considerably expanded from the form in which they were delivered; and that only nine lectures of the eleven were read in Aberdeen, the last two having been added to complete the discussion of sacrificial ritual.

In dealing with the multiplicity of scattered evidences on which the argument rests, I have derived great assistance from the researches of a number of scholars, to whom acknowledgment is made in the proper places. For Arabia

I have been able to refer throughout to my friend Wellhausen's excellent volume, *Reste arabischen Heidenthumes* (Berl. 1887), in which the extant material for this branch of Semitic heathenism is fully brought together, and criticised with the author's well-known acumen. For the other parts of Semitic heathenism there is no standard exposition of a systematic kind that can be referred to in the same way. In this country Movers's book on Phœnician religion is often regarded as a standard authority for the heathenism of the Northern Semites; but, with all its learning, it is a very unsafe guide, and does not supersede even so old a book as Selden, *De diis Syris*.

In analysing the origin of ritual institutions, I have often had occasion to consult analogies in the usages of early peoples beyond the Semitic field. In this part of the work I have had invaluable assistance from my friend, Mr. J. G. Frazer, who has given me free access to his unpublished collections on the superstitions and religious observances of primitive nations in all parts of the globe. I have sometimes referred to him by name, in the course of the book, but these references convey but an imperfect idea of my obligations to his learning and intimate familiarity with primitive habits of thought. In this connection I would also desire to make special acknowledgment of the value, to students of Semitic ritual and usage, of the comparative studies of Dr. Wilken of Leyden; which I mention in this place, because Dutch work is too apt to be overlooked in England.

In transcribing Oriental words, I have distinguished the emphatic consonants, so far as seemed necessary to preclude ambiguities, by the usual device of putting dots under the English letters that come nearest to them in sound. But instead of *k* (ṗ) I write *c*, following a precedent set by

eminent French Orientalists. In Eastern words both *c* and *g* are always to be pronounced hard. But where there is a conventional English form for a word I retain it; thus I write "Caaba," not "Ka'ba;" "Caliph," not "Khalīfa"; "Jehovah," not "Yahveh" or "Iahwé."[1] As regards the references in the notes, it may be useful to mention that *CIS.* means the Paris *Corpus Inscriptionem Semiticarum*, and *ZDMG.* the *Zeitschrift* of the German Oriental Society; that when Wellhausen is cited, without reference to the title of a book, his work on Arabian Heathenism is meant; and that *Kinship* means my book on *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia* (Cambridge, University Press, 1885).[2]

Finally, I have to express my thanks to my friend, Mr. J. S. Black, who has kindly read the whole book in proof, and made many valuable suggestions.

W. Robertson Smith.

Christ's College, Cambridge,
1*st October* 1889.

[1] [In the new notes *k* has commonly been employed in the place of *c*, and other spellings—*e.g.* Yahweh—adopted in conformity with modern usage.]

[2] [See now the List of Abbreviations, etc., on pp. xxi *sqq.*]

NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION

THE failure of Professor Smith's health from 1890 onwards made it impossible for him to prepare for publication the Second and Third Series of Burnett Lectures, delivered in March 1890 and December 1891; but the subject never ceased to interest him, and the comparatively manageable task of embodying in a new edition of the First Series the results of further reading and reflection, as well as of criticisms from other workers in the same field, was one of his latest occupations. On March 17th, only a fortnight before his lamented death, he handed over to my care the annotated print, and also the manuscript volume of new materials, with the remark that, apart from some adjustments in detail, which he hoped he might yet find strength to make as the work passed through the press, he believed the revision was practically complete. In making the adjustments referred to, it has been my endeavour to carry out with absolute fidelity the author's wishes so far as I knew or could divine them; and in the majority of instances the task has not been difficult. My best thanks are due to Mr. J. G. Frazer, and also to Professor Bevan (both of Cambridge), for much valuable help in correcting the proofs.

J. S. B.

EDINBURGH, *3rd October* 1894.

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This list is confined to an explanation of abbreviations and of works often cited in abbreviated form. Unless otherwise specified, English and French books are printed in London and Paris respectively.

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Agh.: *Kitāb al-Aghāni.* Bulac, 1285.

AR.: *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft.*

B.: Banū (sons) (p. 127, n. 1, etc.).

B. B: Bar Bahlūl.

B. B.: Bābā Bathrā (p. 102, n. 2).

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CIGr.: *Corpus Inscriptionum Græcarum.* Berlin, 1828.

CIL.: *C. Inscr. Latinarum.* Berlin, 1863.

CIS.: *C. Inscr. Semiticarum.* Paris, 1885. (Where the volume is not indicated, the reference is to Vol. I. Phœnician Inscriptions.)

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Fihrist: Ed. Flugel and Rödiger and P. Müller. Leipzig, 1871–2.
FOT.: See Frazer.
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JQR.: *Jewish Quarterly Review.*
JRAI.: *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.*
JRAS.: *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.*
JSOR.: *Journal of the Society of Oriental Research.*
JTS.: *Journal of Theological Studies.*

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OLZ.: *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung.*
OTJC.: See Smith, W. R.

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PEF.: *Palestine Exploration Fund.*
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PSBA.: *Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archæology.*
PW.: Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft.*

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WZKM.: *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes.*
Yakūt: *Geog. Wörterbuch*, ed. Wüstenfeld.
ZA.: *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie.*
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ZATW.: *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft.*
ZDMG.: *Z. der deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.*
ZDPV.: *Z. des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.*
ZNTW.: *Z. für d. neutestamentliche Wissenschaft.*

INTRODUCTION

THIS book grew out of a small monograph on "Animal Worship and Animal Tribes among the Arabs and in the Old Testament," published in 1880.[1] It was followed by lectures on *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia* (1885), and by an article on "Sacrifice" in the Ninth Edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (1886), wherein Robertson Smith began to develop those views which were to make the book a landmark.[2] *The Religion of the Semites* had an immediate effect upon the critical study of religion; and, exercising powerful influence upon a host of scholars—one may mention Sir James Frazer and Principal F. B. Jevons, Salomon Reinach in France, and the German scholar Stade—left its impression upon all subsequent literature, even where the name of the original author ceased to be mentioned. If Dr. John Spencer, once Master of Corpus Christi College, "may justly be said to have laid the foundations of the science of Comparative Religion" (p. xiv above), Robertson Smith, by reason of his comprehensive and stimulating treatment, came to be regarded in many quarters as one of the founders,

[1] Reprinted in *Lectures and Essays*, edited by J. S. Black and G. W. Chrystal, 1912.

[2] It is interesting to recall that already in *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church* (First Ed. 1881), his doctrine of sacrifice was recognized by one of his opponents as involving "a new theory of the essential character of the Old Testament religion," one which "cut away the basis on which the whole doctrine of salvation rests" (see *Life of W. R. Smith*, by Black & Chrystal, 1912, p. 417 *sq.*). Strangely enough, this was not pursued in the controversy which was then raging about his writings.

if not pre-eminently as *the* founder, of the modern study of Semitic and other religions.[1]

The volume, the first of a series, is admittedly incomplete. Originally three courses of lectures were planned, to culminate in an inquiry into the part played by Semitic religion in the general progress of humanity. The second series was delivered, from notes, in March 1890; and in three lectures covered Feasts, Priests, Prophecy, and Divination.[2] Publication was proposed, but failing health forbade all hopes. Of the third series (three lectures given in December 1891), apart from fragmentary notes and meagre press reports, little survived, but enough to emphasize the profound spiritual difference which he had always maintained between the Old Testament and other literature.[3] We know that in 1893 he was anxious to finish the second and third series of lectures, and "complete his argument," but this was not granted him. He lived to finish the preparation of the second edition of this volume, and perhaps the very considerable difference between the two editions and the more decisive exposition of his main principles which he was able to furnish may reconcile us to the loss of what one of the most powerful of intellects would have given had he been spared to round off his argument as he desired.

As it is, *The Religion of the Semites* is, as the biographers acknowledge—one of them a friend of many years' standing—a fragment. "The arrangement is not so methodical as could be wished, the canvas is overcrowded, and there are repetitions and digressions." The book contains, as its author says, "a considerable number of new ideas," and the biographers remark rightly: "He expected much help—

[1] Spencer's interpretation of the "Red Heifer" in *De Legibus Hebraeorum Ritualibus et earum Rationibus* (1685), marks an epoch. See H. P. Smith, *Essays in Biblical Interpretation* (Boston, U.S.A., 1921), pp. 106 *sqq.*

[2] See the Synopsis, *Life*, pp. 525 *sqq.*

[3] See *Life*, pp. 535 *sqq.*

perhaps more than he ultimately received—from his critics." Looking back, we are bound to admit that he laid down principles, some of which have hardly received the attention they deserve; he opened out a new field of research, or rather, he opened it out in a new manner; and his life-work, taken as a whole, has a significance which perhaps may be more readily understood now than when he wrote as a pioneer.[1] While, on the one hand, attention has commonly been directed to particular and more sensational theories—notably to sacramental communion as the fundamental idea in ancient sacrifice and its totemic origin; on the other, the problems with which he was occupied are now studied in the light of a far greater wealth of material than was accessible in his day. The whole subject has become more intricate, and the differences among experts, as concerns attitude, treatment, and conclusions, more confusing. The mass of data which he collected has been increased, and occasionally modified or corrected; his most conspicuous theories have been closely criticized, but—one may venture to assert—they have not been replaced by better ones. It is true that it would now be agreed that the course of religious development did not run so simply as he thought; but all theories of the evolution of culture are under consideration. Again, the problems of totemism no longer stand where they did when J. F. M'Lennan revealed to him the value of anthropological research; but totemism is immensely more complex than it once seemed. Robertson Smith's central theory of sacrifice as primarily a communion is sometimes felt to be exaggerated; but subsequent study on this subject has only shown that we are still far from an adequate treatment of the network of questions with which sacrifice is intertwined.

Robertson Smith's temperament, religion, and standpoint

[1] The present writer may refer in this connexion to his notice in the *Hibbert Journal*, xi. (1912) pp. 211 *sqq.*

are so characteristic of him as man and scholar that it is not easy, particularly for those who would not share his religious convictions, to understand either his attitude or the nature of his achievement. In the critical or scientific study of religions it is obvious that unprejudiced inquiry inevitably affects the growth of a man's religious or philosophical outlook; also, that a man's religious or philosophical convictions inevitably influence his attitude to and treatment of his data. This invariable interaction of personal conviction and the data of religion—which so often become data only as the result of a *bona fide* though subjective interpretation of the material—will, it may perhaps be found, explain Robertson Smith's most characteristic and most permanent work. Our most pressing task, then, is to understand him; and the aim of this Introduction is, in the first instance, to indicate what seems to be the genetic connexion between his life-work as a whole and his theories of religion.

In Robertson Smith there was a man of really astonishing erudition and acute speculative ability. Brilliant in conversation and dexterous in argument, his letters reveal that to the very end he was a man of the deepest religious feelings. Moreover, he was, at least as a young man, profoundly interested in theology. In *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church* (1881) he did more than any one else to interpret to English-speaking readers the new stage in Old Testament criticism, the importance of which for the study of Semitic religion he has described in his Preface (p. xv). In his highly technical studies, first on Semitic sociology, later on Semitic religion and religious institutions, he might seem to have outgrown the theologian and the biblical critic. Yet he attracted attention as much by his uncompromising treatment of the *minutiæ* of Israelite and Oriental life, seriously offending those who would sever the Bible from the world which gave birth to it and in which it grew up, as by his insistence to the

last upon the real difference between Biblical Religion and all else.

He was born in November 1846, and, when barely turned twenty-two, in a paper on "Christianity and the Supernatural" he comes before us as a keen reformer: "It is the business of Christianity to conquer the whole universe to itself and not least the universe of thought."[1] He desires a new Reformation, for, as he found occasion to complain, in many respects "the first promise of the Reformation was not fulfilled in the sequel" (p. 401). The Reformers gradually departed from their own principles and began to explain and justify themselves to themselves. But they had had a new way of looking at the Bible—in contrast to the unhistorical intellectualism of their opponents; and he upholds the "historical treatment" of Scripture, asserting that "just as it requires a historic sense to understand profane history, it requires a spiritual sense to understand sacred history." So he would restore the Reformation principles of Biblical criticism, and readers of *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church* will remember how, especially in his opening chapter, he is at pains to combine the principles of a thorough-going criticism with the principles which permeated Western Europe at the Reformation.

Throughout he takes his stand upon the Bible. The Bible is not a Book of Infallible Truth, nor is it mainly a Divine Body of Doctrine, or a supernatural communication of Doctrines. It has the Holy Spirit behind it; it is the historic manifestation of God in Christ, and speaks from the heart and to the heart: this is a cardinal point in the genuine Reformation which Protestant theology has almost forgotten (p. 406). The Bible when diligently studied is "the true manual of a Catholic religious life." He looked for a new Catholicity, and

[1] *Lectures*, p. 135, dated January 1869. The quotations that follow are, of course, of different dates.

by this he did not mean "toleration and compromise" (p. 332) —that would have been unlike the man he ever was! Current theology dissatisfied him. As early as 1869 he was asserting that it was necessary "frankly to recognize the need of progress in our theological conceptions," for to cling to an unchangeable dogma is to cease to cling to the Christ of the Gospels who transcends the theology of every age (pp. 151, 162).

Current theology, he complained, had not rightly defined its relation to Scripture and its relation to human thought; and, in a striking, though little known, essay on "The Place of Theology in the Work and Growth of the Church" (1875), he laments the lack of advance in the Church and the inability of theology to speak "any decisive and convincing word in the questions of the day." As he says in one of his trenchant remarks, "a Church which ceases to theologize ceases in the same moment to grow." He demands a "vigorous theology": "a religion without theology means, for the most part, a religion without God." Theology is a safeguard against the mysticism which regards with complacency a degree of ignorance in the laity which is inconsistent with truly moral growth. Loose unshaped knowledge is a hindrance, and side by side with Christian experience there must go "an exercise of real hard thought before our knowledge takes scientific shape and is really worthy to be called theology" (p. 160). Accordingly, a theology of permanent value is not to be shaped with reference to the present attitude of unbelief, the cause of which he finds in the "actual imperfection of the existent state of the Church" (p. 314, dated 1875).

He maintained that the relation between practical religion and theology requires serious consideration. Christian knowledge should be in direct contact with faith and practice; and if inarticulate, it is "deep inarticulate knowledge elaborated

in practice." The true function of theology is to make explicit and elaborate truths which "in the shape of practical tact and insight lie at the root of untheological wisdom" (pp. 321 *sqq.*). "The theology of a living Church," he had said earlier, "does not start from the mere outward form and vehicle of Christianity"; there can be no true theology where there is no true Christian life (pp. 152, 155; cf. 133). It is religious experience which makes us believe in the authority of Scripture and not the reverse. So writes the young theologian, insisting upon the difference between the practical religious life, on the one side, and on the other, the theology which once alive has become defective and moribund.

As we read his early addresses it is very difficult not to perceive that the way is being paved for his subsequent recognition of the superior significance, for the study of the world's religions, of the unspoken ideas embodied in traditional ritual (cf. below, pp. 25 foot, 26 top). Hence, just as theology is of varying value according to its relation to the circumstances of the age, so myth in turn is commonly of secondary importance.[1] The theology of a living Church, he had asserted (in 1869), comes when the Church is conscious that she holds the true substance of Christianity (*Lectures*, p. 155); and we shall miss the point of Robertson Smith's later researches if we ignore the fact that the man who hoped for a new Catholicity was, consciously or unconsciously, looking for the factors which are creative in religious development, and that in years to come he was to turn from the contrast between a living Christian faith and an imperfect theology to the contrast between the practical, working religion of primitive peoples and the secondary myths.

[1] We must recognize that sweeping condemnation of all myth is not intended, and that some myths may be of immediate value (see below, p. 501).

Theology, he declares, is needed in order to make Christianity a social thing; it implies a knowledge which can be put into words and imparted to a man who has not shared the experience of him who imparts it. It is a *social* bond; for a Christian society is not the sum of its individuals but an organic unity, and the fellowship or the corporate spirit which makes such a unity is a moral, not a physical fact. No outward sign but an invisible bond unites the Church invisible, the mystic body of Christ; and we cannot tell what partakers of the sacraments are true members of Christ.[1] Repeatedly he returns to the *personal* intercourse between God and man; and he quotes with approval Luther's saying that Faith unites the soul to Christ as a bride to her bridegroom (pp. 115, 225 *sq.*). This conviction of a close personal relationship is central in his early essays on Christian religion and theology, and it becomes of cardinal importance in *The Religion of the Semites*. It is, therefore, of the highest interest to perceive how the theologian was reaching out towards his pregnant generalization of the significance of the social unit—of the group and group-religion—which subsequent writers have developed further along different lines.

Hebrew Prophecy interested him from the first, and his great book on the *Prophets of Israel* (first ed. 1882; second ed. 1902) is still a great classic. True prophecy, he laid down, rests upon the conviction of a personal and living power, the utterance of a new life, which sprang from the infinite source of all life (*Lectures*, pp. 189, 365). In what he has to say of the prophets, of Christ, and of the Reformers, and in his own religious idealism—throughout there peers the germ of his fine theory that the consciousness of communion is the most vital phenomenon in all religion. Not that all

[1] Pp. 325 *sqq.*, cf. 275, 319. There is no grace *ex opere operato* (p. 223, cf. p. 152).

else is unessential, but that it vitalizes religion, and without it the progressive development of religion would be inexplicable. It is in this sense that the idea of communion is original or primary, and much confusion has been caused because this has not been fully realized.

Religion has its ebb and flow, and different stages have their distinctive criteria. The Reformation was marked by the new growth of the religious spirit, a new self-consciousness separates the Reformers from their fore-goers ; a new stage was reached, and it was of supreme importance for the dynamics of religion. From time to time there comes the stage when a distinction can be drawn between the sign and the signified, between the word and its real meaning, between the outward letter and the experiences demanding expression. " With the Reformation begins a great awakening into new self-conscious personal life " (p. 225). So it came to pass that while acknowledging himself a son of the Reformation, he was profoundly dissatisfied with the conditions in which he found himself, and gradually passed from his arresting treatment of current religion and theology to the inquiry into the systematic treatment of Semitic religion. The task of restating religious truths gave way to the distinctly specialised study of ancient religion, and almost at the close of his life we find this surely noteworthy admission, " I begin to think I never can have been a theologian " (*Life*, p. 535).

But throughout he placed the Bible by itself, and insisted that Christianity must be supernatural. Yet as early as 1869 he was saying that the significance of the supernatural falls away when man's redemption ceases to be imperfect (p. 119). More precisely, this means that the fellowship of God and Man, with its implication of divine " immanence," is accompanied with the consciousness of the gulf between the human and the divine. Prophets

were filled with the conviction of a "personal" communion with God; they were inspired by something distinct from themselves and not by "the immanent spirit of the universe working in their own hearts" (p. 365). Their supreme consciousness of the nearness and immediacy of the Divine was of "a transcendent," not an "immanent" power, and it is essential to remember that wholly characteristic of Robertson Smith's position is his denial of Semitic monotheism and his recognition that "immanence" no less than "transcendence" distinguishes Semitic religion generally. The significance of this has hardly been sufficiently realized, and demands a few words.

In a very notable essay on "Prophecy and Personality" January 1868) the young scholar pointed out how the prophet's personality builds up the vision which he sees (p. 98). The *subjective* side is vital—we have only to compare the "varieties of religious experience" and observe the difference in content and value due to the difference in training and temperament of each prophet, seer, or mystic. But, as he himself says a little later, "a consciousness originally subjective in character, is not . . . purely subjective in origin." There is no "dictation from on high of truths about God and man"; and he is as anxious to avoid false ideas of inspiration and revelation as to escape "the no less dangerous extreme of mysticism giving an unbounded play to an unrestrained subjectivity" (p. 157 *sq.*). In a remarkable essay on the "Poetry of the Old Testament," written in 1877, he takes a wider view of religion. Commenting upon the absence of calm, disciplined, and intellectual effort among primitive peoples, he lays stress upon the intensely practical nature of their religion. "All thought stands in immediate contact with living impressions and feelings, and so, if incapable of rising to the abstract, is prevented from sinking to the unreal." Religious truths

centre in human life and human interests. There was no "dreamy unpractical sentimentalism," and he has the profound observation that it is the preponderance of the emotional rather than of the rational part of a man's nature that makes a strong personality able to conquer all difficulties, whereas intellectual acuteness is often associated with a restlessness of purpose that can attain nothing great (p. 443). It is a remark which one is tempted to take as an unconscious self-revelation.

Now to the Semites and other primitive peoples the Universe is "a complex of living powers" with which man enters into a fellowship; he is awed by their might, or he boastfully bends them to his service. All nature is "instinct with life which vibrates responsive to each change in his personal feelings and spiritual relations" (p. 421 *sq.*). Everywhere man sees in nature life bearing directly upon him. All life has a meaning for man, the fascination for the Semitic mind of the idea of practical lordship over powers mightier than himself "finds a loftier and truer, but not less characteristic, expression in the Old Testament." His ethical monotheism alone saved the Israelite. In vivid sentences Robertson Smith paints "the nature-worship of the heathen Semites," the "religion of passionate emotion," the worship "of those inner powers, awful because unseen, of which outer things are only the symbol," the "sombre horror" and "wildest sensuality." "The very tone of mind which makes Semitic heathenism the most hideous of false worships, enabled the Hebrew nation to grasp with unparalleled tenacity and force the spiritual idea of Jehovah." These are weighty words, and they must be before us when some writers with the best intentions draw idyllic pictures of religion prior to the prophets, and unwittingly make of these majestic figures an unintelligible phenomenon in the history of religion, unintentionally accusing them of grossest exaggeration.

"To the Hebrew, force is life and life is personality" (*ib.*); and we come to perceive that what we call "religion" is, as it were, woven upon a texture of beliefs and customs which cannot be called by that name, and that a social-religious system is the safeguard against the dangerous kinship of Magic with Religion. The lofty spiritual heights of the Israelite prophets are a reaction against the crudest physical and material depths; and in the darkness, cruelty and coarsest orgies of the Semite—ever prone to extremes—it was left for the few to enunciate truths of spiritual intimacy with the Divine and of man's place in the Universe. One has only to read the pages on Hebrew poetry and on the Semite's sense of personal fellowship with the life of all that surrounds him—animate and inanimate—to realize how natural was the transition from the theologian writing in 1877 on the "Poetry of the Old Testament," to the anthropologist who, in July 1880, had begun to view the Old Testament and the Semites in the light of M'Lennan's researches on totemism.

The merit of M'Lennan's totem-hypothesis lies, according to Robertson Smith, in the fact that "it does justice to the intimate relation between religion and the fundamental structure of society which is so characteristic of the ancient world."[1] It threw new light upon the history of religion as a social system; and it is not surprising, when we consider his readiness to recognize both the lighter and darker sides of primitive religion, that his own theory of totem-sacrament seemed to him to provide the key to the development of religion from its lowest to its highest forms. The theory was justly called by Reinach "one of the most brilliant discoveries of modern science";[2] and in spite of

[1] *Kinship and Marriage*, p. 258 *sq.*

[2] S. Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, iv. 23 (cited in *Life*, p. 567). Reinach's well-known *mot* concerning Robertson Smith—"*genuit Frazerum*"

the extent to which totemism has been abused, this rudimentary type of cult still provides one of the most intricate problems of the modern study of religion.[1] The reasons for this can be briefly summarized. (1) There are the extremely difficult technical problems of distinguishing between the varieties of totemism and totemic, totemistic and theriomorphic beliefs and practices. (2) Animal deities and animal imagery prevail even among advanced peoples. (3) There is a persistence or recrudescence of the animal features (whether totemic or not) by the side of and in spite of distinctly high forms of cult. (4) Besides the obvious and essential points of contrast between totemic (and all related) features and anthropomorphic religion, there are no less essential points of contact and a genetic connexion can apparently be traced between them. At all events, no theory of the phenomena of religion can be entertained which does not do adequate justice to these beliefs and practices which seem to be so remote from our way of thinking. For (5) totemism involves a way of thinking which it is difficult or impossible for us to grasp ; and in the attempt to understand the true relation between it and higher modes of thought we immensely enlarge our knowledge of mental processes and the lines along which they have developed.

To put the fundamental problem otherwise, we have to determine (1) whether the most rudimentary types of religion were (*a*) anthropomorphic or (*b*) theriomorphic, and specifically totemic ; (2) whether the latter type (*b*) can reasonably be derived from the former (*a*) ; and (3) into what did the latter develop, if at all. If theriomorphism is, as at times it seems to be, a refuge from an inadequate or impoverished anthropomorphism, was it—was totemism—normal before

—can be supplemented by the remarks of his biographers in the *Life*, p. 494 *sq.*, and by Sir James Frazer's own Preface to *The Golden Bough*.

[1] See especially A. van Gennep, *L'État actuel du Problème Totémique* (1920). For a recent definition of totemism, see below, p. 535 n. 1.

there was anthropomorphic religion ? Such questions cannot be ignored by those who are interested in the line of development which religion has taken hitherto.

Sir James Frazer, who dedicated *The Golden Bough* to his friend Robertson Smith, "in gratitude and admiration," refers in the Preface of the Second Edition (1900) to the famous discoveries made in Central Australia by Sir Baldwin Spencer and Mr F. J. Gillen which revolutionized ideas of totemism, and indeed of rudimentary religion in general. He points out that while these have proved that there were indeed—as Robertson Smith had surmised—clans who killed and solemnly ate their totem animal, this fact did not make the rite either a universal one or the origin of animal sacrifice in general. More than that, the totem was not a god, but on a more equal relationship ; and the rites were not "religious" but "magical." Hence, if Robertson Smith's insight was thus triumphantly justified in some essential particulars, it now appeared that totemism was not the sort of cult that he had supposed. Naturally no one would wish to minimize the importance of Sir James Frazer's candid admissions in *The Golden Bough* and elsewhere, but several points have certainly to be taken into consideration. Jevons, Marett, and Durkheim, all most highly equipped and competent observers, and writing from rather different standpoints, do not agree that Robertson Smith is refuted by the character of the Australian evidence. And Malinowski, in the course of a valuable study of primitive religion, while speaking of Central Australian totemism as "a system of *magical* co-operation," emphasizes its survival value, and observes that "totemism appears . . . as a blessing bestowed by *religion* on primitive man's efforts in dealing with his useful surroundings." [1] Obviously

[1] In *Science, Religion and Reality* (ed. J. Needham, 1925), p. 46. The italics are ours.

our conceptions of " religion " and " magic " are at stake.

Further, the totem is not, after all, precisely the equal of man, and in totemism we find ruder forms of what is familiar in anthropomorphic religion: imitation of and identification with the sacred being, appeal to it, and value attached to its name. Nay, more, with his usual courtesy and invariable loyalty to facts, Sir James Frazer has drawn the attention of the present writer to certain cases where the totem is actually the object of a cult.[1] The importance of the new evidence is undeniable, and it brings to the front two urgent questions. The first is, is it desirable to have only the two pigeon-holes—*either* Religion *or* Magic—wherein to distribute the relevant data ? Do we not also need the description Magico-Religious ? The second concerns degrees of Religion and the varying quality of Deity. Even in anthropomorphic religion gods often stand in a very close relationship to their worshippers, and, as frequently in personal religion and mysticism, the attitude of dependence upon the god is by no means the only one. Again, there are both near and remote gods ; and they vary in status, even as at the present day saints or Eastern *welis* are not " gods " from the point of view of the orthodox and national religion, though they are apt to be very adequate deities from that of the inhabitant of the locality wherein they are commanding figures.

Further, as a general rule, religion is much more " practical " than is recognized by writers who have adversely criticized Robertson Smith's leading positions; and the

[1] In a letter of April 27, 1925, Sir James Frazer states that the cases which he had lately noticed of worship or sacrifices regularly offered to totems are (1) in the Bombay Presidency, R. E. Enthoven, *Folklore of Bombay* (Oxford, 1924), pp. 19, 209–211 ; (2) in the Ivory Coast, L. Tauxier, *Nègres Gouro et Gagou* (Paris, 1924), pp. 145, 160, 183, 205, 223, 256, 257 ; and (3) in the Solomon Islands, C. E. Fox, *The Threshold of the Pacific* (London, 1924), pp. 10 *sq.*, 72, 73, 74, 75, 275.

extent to which directness, intimacy, and a confidence verging on compulsion colour much that is remote from "magic," and can only be regarded as "religion," is as significant as it is surprising. Long ago an acute critic remarked that Robertson Smith's idea of a primitive communion "seemed too theologically abstract to be at the basis of savage rites of sacrifice."[1] But, as has been seen, Smith had already insisted upon the practical nature of primitive, and especially of Semitic religion.[2] The longing for Atonement and the rites which brought together gods and worshippers were ultimately for the "material" as for the "spiritual" well-being of men. This is both Biblical and primitive religion, and students, compelled to formulate the difference between Religion and Magic, and between degrees of Deity, may yet find themselves compelled to consider what shall be the criterion of "spiritual" religion (see pp. 676 *sqq.*).

If the objection just referred to appears to rest on the frequent confusion of the perception of metaphysical or theological facts with the capacity for metaphysical or theological reasoning—on which, see p. 655 and n.2—a more forcible criticism is that which objects, and not unjustly, that Robertson Smith carried simplification too far and formulated too simple a theory of the history of religion.[3]

In his theory of the totem-sacrament, while freely recognizing the prominence of the gift-idea in all religion, he gave the priority to the communion idea. The most recent study of the subject emphasizes the strength and persistence of the gift idea, but clearly recognizes that it does not explain all the data.[4] The eminent Dominican, Father Lagrange,

[1] Jos. Jacobs, *Studies in Biblical Archæology* (1894), p. 33 *sq.*

[2] Cf. *Lectures*, p. 443 (above, p. xxxvi *sq.*), and *Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 441 (cited below, p. 671).

[3] See *Life*, p. 517 *sq.*

[4] G. Buchanan Gray, *Sacrifice in the Old Testament* (Oxford, 1925), p. 352, etc. This posthumous volume covers a very wide field; and it is much to be deplored that so splendid a scholar, who made so many

author of a work which in many respects is scarcely less indispensable than *The Relgiion of the Semites*, makes many valuable criticisms; but he agrees that communion is a constitutive element in sacrifice, and that the *do ut des* element does not explain the *horror sacer*.[1] Rather is it that the author, like all pioneers, is deemed to have exaggerated the prevalence and significance of the communion idea. So, Hubert and Mauss in their important monograph on sacrifice, while agreeing with Robertson Smith's general treatment of taboos and the ideas of holy and unclean, decisively reject his genealogical explanation of the history of sacrifices.[2] And Durkheim, too, who perhaps more than any other writer has most powerfully supplemented his treatment of religion as a social institution, points out that ideas of gift, renunciation, and expiation are very early.[3]

Earnest heed must be paid to these criticisms; yet, when all has been said, is it not true that every profound religious act is, in a sense, an act of communion? So, as G. F. Moore has pointed out, the sacrificial feast at the sanctuary must have strengthened the bond of religion by the sense of God's presence and friendliness.[4] Malinowski speaks of the gifts of food to the gods as "communion in beneficent abundance."[5] To be sure, a more careful study might lead us to attempt to draw the lines between friendliness, fellowship, communion,

permanent contributions to Biblical Studies, was not spared to give unity and completeness to this admirable collection of lectures.

[1] *Études des Religions Sémitiques*, p. 267. The value of this work will be evident from the many references to it in the new notes to this edition. Its attitude can be gauged from the statement in the Preface that *The Religion of the Semites* "est constamment dominé par une idée fausse, l'importance exagérée du totémisme dans l'histoire de la religion."

[2] *Mélanges d'Hist. des Religions*, Preface, p. iv.

[3] *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life: a Study in Religious Sociology* (London, 1915), pp. 343, 406.

[4] *Ency. Biblica*, art. "Sacrifice" (§ 42 end); still the completest synopsis of the subject from the Biblical point of view.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 43.

and identity.[1] In this way it might be possible to discuss "the degree of at-one-ment present in the various Sacrifices," how far, for example, "any sense of Divine indwelling" was conveyed by the Jewish Peace Offering.[2] Buchanan Gray himself, in the volume already referred to, is at pains to discuss the different nuances of the sacrificial ceremonies. Undoubtedly much could be done along such lines. One could compare and contrast the relative psychological effect of sacred stones (and other inanimate objects), sacred animals (varying in utility or in character), and sacred men (ancestors, saints, divine rulers, etc.). One could consider the sort of ideas which would naturally be symbolized, suggested, or carried by each of these. One could discuss the possible place of each in the social group. In this way much light could be thrown upon the self-evident effects—social, moral, intellectual—which different sorts of sacred persons, things, or rites could have upon a religion and its vicissitudes. But there would remain ultimate problems which, even if they are not handled, cannot be dismissed.

The difficulty of interpreting rites is notorious ; they may not retain their apparently obvious meaning, and may perhaps have acquired a new one. The most solemn of rites may have only a transitory value for the worshipper, and the most simple of commemorative occasions may be charged with the profoundest meaning. Further, the study of the history of religion reveals the essential fact that at certain periods religion has lost that reality which had once made it a force in the life of a people ; or a line is drawn between the existing religion and new spiritual tendencies, and the standard of real and true religion is set so high that it cannot

[1] See the criticisms of M. H. Pinard de la Boullaye, S.J., in his elaborate work, *Étude Comparée des Religions : Essai Critique* (Paris, 1922 and 1925), ii. 58.

[2] S. C. Gayford, *Sacrifice and Priesthood* (London, 1914), pp. 33, 39.

be ignored in an estimate of religion in general. The inquiry into the vicissitudes of religious beliefs and practices is that into men's convictions concerning what to them were supreme realities, and it cannot be indifferent to the great periods which force the question whether and in what way the ultimate realities of the Universe are themselves involved in those convictions which are explicit or implicit in religion.

The student who has grasped the spirit of the Bible knows that in the last analysis no human being or human institution can determine the real value of convictions of the relations between man and God. Robertson Smith wrote in 1871 that men cannot judge who are true members of Christ (above, p. xxxiv). There are Biblical passages which imply that the Deity may be in fellowship with men who do not recognize Him, and that He does not necessarily operate in accordance with the ways in which He has been apprehended. Such are among the data of religion, and no impartial student can refuse to find a place for them in the final synthesis. It is this transcendence of the ultimate realities, and the knowledge that convictions and theories are approximations, and that the progress of thought enables us to test these approximations, which combine to make the newer study of the world's religions a landmark in the history of religion.

Views are extensively held to the effect that Magic is absolutely prior to Religion, that Fear is primary, and that Sacrifice served originally to propitiate gods and avert their anger—and so forth. One's own personal religion may make it impossible to accept such views; one's experience may convince one that familiarity certainly breeds indifference, and that it is natural to seek to placate the anger only of one who is *known*. But, quite apart from one's personal religion, it is puzzling to see how ideas could ever arise in the first instance of a supersensuous being with particular attributes; and the views in question labour under the double disadvan-

tage of surreptitiously introducing all the question-begging elements and of doing scanty justice to their rivals. On the other hand, on the assumption of the relative priority of Religion certain tendencies are seen to be normal and inevitable. On the assumption of certain conceptions of the Ultimate Realities the variation and vicissitudes of ideas of gods and men can be more or less intelligibly traced, and the interrelation between the religious (magical, etc.) and the non-religious spheres can be fruitfully studied. When what is called "religion," in its divers forms, makes its appearance in an individual's life and thought it becomes so fused with the "non-religious," that the really vital problem for modern research is not the Conflict of Science and Religion, so called, but the varying relations between the "religious" and "non-religious" phases of life and their mutual interaction. Thus there quickly arises the need for a more theoretical treatment of religion which is able to do justice to those views, on the one side or the other, which are pronounced improbable or impossible; and of this theoretical treatment Robertson Smith, because of his line of approach, may be claimed as the founder.

It is of the utmost importance that we should distinguish between actual historical origins and whatever inaugurates new lines of development. Robertson Smith is concerned with creative ideas, with those that recur and govern the evolution of faith and worship. It is an inquiry, as he himself admits, of real interest to the "philosophical student" (p. 15). And when he argues that the communion of the group with their god stands at the head of all developments it is easy to see how extraordinarily impressive the theory is from the theistic standpoint, but how delicate, directly we perceive that of the great variety of experiences which can be classed as "numinous," only some are of definite "religious" significance, and these, after what has been said, differ in

quality and value.[1] Now Robertson Smith is not merely concerned with creative ideas and creative experiences—the factors that make for new developments in religion—he takes a very definite Christian standpoint, and the question is really a very important one, whether this has prejudiced or facilitated his researches.

His peculiar interest in the Reformation and Protestantism, his desire for some new formulation of theology, and his pioneering work in the criticism of the Old Testament, in particular the function of the prophets, and finally his invariable distinction between "natural" and "supernatural" religion have recognizably influenced the lines he has taken. Accordingly, the ebb and flow of beliefs and the vicissitudes of cults are not so significant for him as that progressive development which would undoubtedly strike him as he looked back upon the "heathenism" of the Semites and the more rudimentary cults of primitive peoples, and looked forward to a further development in religion. The problems as they presented themselves to him were necessarily other than those that confront scholars whose main work has lain in other fields, or whose deepest sympathies are perchance differently directed. The training which might have encouraged the most hesitating and mediating of inquiries made him at all events the most uncompromising of investigators; and if *The Religion of the Semites* marks an epoch, it was because it came from the hands of a man who combined with unequalled knowledge a sympathetic insight into the most advanced and the most rudimentary religions in a way which has not been equalled by his successors, and whose genius saw new prospects opening out in the world of thought. With him: *la théorie c'est l'homme.*

[1] According to Hubert and Mauss the sacrifice establishes a communication between the sacred sphere and the profane (cf. Toy's summary, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, § 1049). This is much more generalized than Robertson Smith's theory of the communion of worshippers

That Robertson Smith's arguments were influenced by current evolutionary ideas was inevitable, and one can but say that the study of beliefs and customs as such can only be pursued along evolutionary lines, and that those writers who object to one theory of development usually prove to be cherishing another of their own. In point of fact, we pass from the "comparative" treatment of the data of religion to the best method of presenting them, and enter upon the most difficult part of the subject. In the first place, then, it may be observed that the main argument of *The Religion of the Semites* does not require us to believe that the communion idea is some absolutely prior abstraction. His recognition of aberration, degradation, etc. (pp. 354, 394), indicates that by the "origin" of sacrifice is not meant that which characterized the earliest prehistoric religion alone. It is rather that this idea, although it operated from the very first, lies at the back of the new and significant stages in the development of sacrificial ritual. On the same analogy, it can be seen that similar tendencies explain initiation, in one place into a tribal group, in another into important secret societies, and in a third into small guilds or unions (cf. p. 607 *sq.*). Further, revolutionary aims and methods, very similar in several respects, will differ everywhere according to current conditions. And even as regards the "animal" features in totemism, there are significant analogies not only in "totemistic" rites (those that are not strictly "totemic"), but also in those that can only be called "theriomorphic" (cf. p. 538 *sq.*). Thus, there are similar recurrent elements which take different forms peculiar to each age, land, and community, and a Science of Religion must do justice alike to the essential resemblances and the equally essential differences.

with their *god*; but less so than the more recent conception of experiences of the "numinous," see p. 554.

In the present state of knowledge, ambiguity and vagueness are here unavoidable. None the less we can understand Robertson Smith's meaning when he speaks of "the more ancient idea of a living communion" and its "element of permanent truth" (p. 396). He has in mind the recurrence of the idea at different stages; and its "truth" is proved by the fact that it is constantly reappearing, though reshaped, and evidently answers to some vital need. Again, when both ordinary and extraordinary sacrifices go back to the same principle (p. 312), we may use symbols and say that the *x* which is found in *l* reappears in *m* and *n*. But, we ask, do *n* and *m* go back to *l*, or to the common factor *x*? Analysis takes us back to what Buchanan Gray suggestively calls the "actual creative idea."[1] But instead of inaugural or creative ideas—or experiences—we can go back to an initiator or originator, to an *arkhē*.[2] Or else we arrive at the embodiment of an idea, or some system or some stage which, by reason of its evident primary position, is commonly regarded as the true "origin." Thus it is easy to see how confusion can arise when the attempt is made to account for recurring tendencies or to trace back things to their "beginnings."

Indeed, when sacrificial rites—or aught else for that matter—are traced back to a single ancestor, it is easier to criticize the fallaciousness of this simple procedure than to find a better one that is not too intricate.[3] We cannot intelligently conceive any absolute beginning: our most ancient data are relatively recent, considering the antiquity of man; the most primitive communities have a history behind them; and repeatedly it can be seen that ancient evidence is not necessarily prior—sociologically speaking—

[1] Gray, *Sacrifice*, p. 359 n.

[2] See especially J. L. Myres, *The Political Ideas of the Greeks* (1927), Index, *s.v.*

[3] Cf. p. 499. Instead of seeking a single ancestor, the attempt is often made to find a single ancestral home, cf. p. 497.

to that which is later. As a general rule one must be guided by a knowledge of actual known processes in the vicissitudes of religious and other thought, and by "methodological necessity"—the most effective treatment of the data. Many cases will be found in these pages where we gradually pass from mere "comparison" to "methodology," and problems arise which are much too technical for discussion here. Some of them may be mentioned as illustrations.

The theory of the absolute priority of mother-right—of which there are several varieties—was adopted by Robertson Smith, and after being under a cloud, has again become respectable. We must recognize that certain conditions would give mother-right prominence at certain periods and—what is no less interesting—they can also make the theory itself more attractive! Thus the Arabian evidence belongs on the whole to a transitional period, after the decline of the great cultures to which the South Arabian inscriptions testify; and while it is arguable that in prehistoric times mother-right would completely overshadow father-right, it is a little difficult to see why it should be given absolute priority.[1] Next, if we consider the theory of a primitive promiscuity—now fallen into the background—it can be argued that promiscuity is likely to lead to the inauguration of some social *régime*, even as rampant lawlessness will force the effort to institute order. Promiscuity and lawlessness can hardly be regarded as a stage of evolution "prior" to the "introduction" of social order and justice, but rather as a step leading thereto, and doubtless often following upon

[1] It may be noticed that the question of the relative priority of gods as "brothers" or as "fathers" (pp. 510, 512) is complicated by such an observation as Oswald Spengler's on the Russian tendency away from the Father-God to a fraternal relationship; see *Decline of the West*, i. 201 n. 2 ("Christ, even, is conceived as a Brother"). The tendencies which affect conceptions of (*a*) supreme gods, and (*b*) those near at hand and more closely associated with men, cannot be treated as stages in any single development.

the collapse of some earlier system. In other words, we can only deal effectively with systems, and although the social group is made up of individuals, the group rather than the *socius* is the more effective unit.

Individual religion and individual property are secondary (p. 247 *sq.*), though it is obvious that to men of personality all the great changes are due. Among rudimentary peoples both personal religion and personal property can be traced, but the cases are often irrelevant, just in the same way as the social equality which we discern among primitive peoples disappears on closer inspection, but the inequalities are negligible for the particular purpose of our initial inquiry. Again, in tracing back the development of life and thought, we go from our modern highly differentiated and specialized conditions to conditions so extremely simple as to appear absolutely undifferentiated. But the most homogeneous clan-units and the simplest elements which we reach prove to be integral parts of some larger system or organism. It is perfectly true that development is *towards* specialization and complexity; but the facts that can be adduced in support of this must be balanced with the facts that point back to societies or systems possessing a differentiation and specialization peculiar to themselves.[1] It would be safer to say that the process of development or evolution is from one *system* to another.

Some important developments may preferably be regarded as alternations, or as extreme forms of transition which are otherwise so normal as not to attract attention. Such, for example, is the change from happy (or confident) to gloomy (and pessimistic) types of religion. Some writers find evidence enough to prove that primitive man must

[1] For example, the dichotomies good and bad, the sacred and profane, and the supernatural and natural are clearly recognized, but the contents are differently arranged.

have lived in a state of fear, oppressed by unknown terrors; whereas Robertson Smith is more concerned with the creative moments, the confidence and assurance which make for progressive development (see p. 519 *sq.*). Again, while it is indubitably suggestive to conceive of an absolute development from the "childhood" of humanity to its adolescence or maturity (p. 257), there is an increase or growth of consciousness which is of immense importance for the history of separate peoples or of individuals, and this in turn differs qualitively from many less epoch-making changes. The transition from the "natural" to the "conscious" state will mark eras; but it is precisely the new awakening, awareness, and rebirth which cause discontinuity and shatter facile theories of a continuous development.[1]

The "childish unconsciousness" of inexorable laws (p. 257) is, unfortunately, by no means confined to primitive peoples, but it is only another example of a perfectly intelligible statement which is extremely helpful, though its limitations are evident. It is legitimate to speak of the "triumph of the gods over the demons" (p. 122), or to say that gods "become" demons, or that Baal was "changed" from a god of rain to one of springs, or even that totems "become" gods. The words express intelligibly enough certain vicissitudes in ideas concerning gods or supernatural beings; but it is necessary to observe that this simple terminology is really hindering more fruitful ways of handling the events in the world of thought, and that the alternative to this "mythology" would take us away from Comparative Religion to a department of Mental Science.[2]

[1] This is not to say that the "evolutionary" *façon de penser* is wrong, but that it stands in need of a more careful application.

[2] Instinctively, and surely with some justification, we said at the beginning of this Introduction that *The Religion of the Semites* "grew out" of certain preliminary work; but the process, it will now be seen, is much more complex and difficult to describe. On the other hand, the more

Next we observe that Robertson Smith's main theories have far-reaching implications which have yet to be worked out. His theory of the communion of gods and men leads back to the "naturally holy," to an inherent sanctity which is more primary than any process of sanctification. The unity of gods and men is primary, the unity is always being broken, and the compact or covenant is secondary. The unity is potential, and the rite which actualizes it really cements it afresh. The facts of aberration and deterioration, and the consciousness of a higher ideal from which one has lapsed, have gone to create the conception of a "Fall" as some original event in human history, as distinct from the many occasions when one is painfully conscious of one's lapses and of the terrible difference between the ordinary self and the harmony which, in theistic experience, is the fellowship of God and Man. Another similar translation of psychological experience into an historical event is the "Primitive Revelation." Without the consciousness of the Holy or Sacred there could be neither religion of social importance nor any great steps in the development of religion; but inasmuch as every experience of a Sacred Power will be determined by contemporary conditions of knowledge, mode of life, and so forth, the farther back we travel in human history, the more difficult is it to imagine the content of prehistoric religion. And though, from the solely intellectual point of view, "God" is also a methodological necessity and prior to all things, the meaning it had for the most primitive social-religious cult can be set down only in the most abstract terms.

We may agree with Robertson Smith that the terrestrial Baal is older than the cosmic, for ideas of the remote are

tangible and intelligible cases of development, such as the genesis of Robertson Smith's volume, may perhaps enable one to apprehend and illustrate those which are more complicated (cf. p. 499, near foot), and to discover that a similar sort of process rules throughout.

based upon a knowledge of the near. An experience of a transcendent power will bring about the development of the positive knowledge of the day; but such an experience will, in the first instance, be limited by ordinary experience. Ideas concerning the gods are influenced by men who themselves have been influenced by transcendent experiences; men have learnt that they must imitate the gods, but they have also had to learn what it was they had to imitate. A curious complexity manifests itself as we follow the mutual interaction of the religious and the non-religious spheres of life and thought; but the facts of social development and the facts of religious experience, when taken together, point to a development from the totem-stage upwards by the side of a gradually deepening theism under the influence of outstanding men and their more "ethical" ideas and "anthropomorphic" type of religion (see p. 670). In a word, the data of "theistic" development do not by any means exclude Robertson Smith's theory which takes back sacrifice to the "theriomorphic" totem-stage.

His theory of the unity of group and its god has another very important issue. This group-unit has its ordinary, secular or "profane" interests, and it can therefore be said that the social system includes within itself both the "sacred" (*e.g.* the gods, sacred ceremonies, etc.) and the "secular." The social group is a practical working system, a "natural" one, and the god and other supernatural beings form a "natural" part of it. Indeed, so much so is this the case that there is a tendency for men to take their gods for granted and the result is detrimental to the religious and social development of the group. The occasions when the group and gods come together, and usually for the practical purposes of life, are specifically "sacred," and—psychologically—they are essentially different from the "secular," even as the "sacred" and "secular" states of the individual are

two essentially different phases in one and the same individual. Hence the gods are a "natural" part of the social unit. But they are also "supernatural"; and at a higher stage of development it becomes more clear that the god is a natural part of the natural environment, and therefore "immanent." At the same time, he is felt to be on another and higher plane of existence, and the gulf between him and man makes him "transcendent." To the genuine theist God is a Transcendent Being, but He is also a natural part of the Universe (*i.e.* of the *ultimate* whole of which man knows only a part). Hence there are two senses of the "natural"—(*a*) that which is opposed to the supernatural, and (*b*) that which includes this dichotomy; and already in the primitive religions of the practical group-unit of gods and men there are implicit those paradoxical facts of personal experience which are fundamental for theology.

Analysis takes us back to personal experiences of a religious or spiritual order; but no less to impersonal processes which are self-vindicating, a power or a mechanism which men use or misuse, and agencies such that the failure to do right or the deed that is positively wrong has inevitable consequences. Again, we are led back to single origins; whence it comes to pass that religion is very often supposed to be derived from a single factor. But one also gets back to complementary ideas: Transcendence and Immanence, Rights and Duties; they are dynamic, and upon them our conception of the typical working social-religious unit can be constructed.[1] The familiar processes of scission, isolation, and disintegration, which we so readily trace in history, point back to a system; and a working social system can be regarded as a system of interrelated sentiments, ideas, and aims. With all this, however, it does not follow that

[1] See *Encyc. of Religion and Ethics*, art. "Religion," §§ 29, 31 (1).

the ideal system which we logically construct existed; but the system so constructed forms an ideal type whereby to evaluate social religious facts.[1]

Now in the course of differentiation of society and thought, new structures—whether sects or theories—are frequently built upon the narrowest bases, and at this point the question arises whether Robertson Smith has not been guilty of a gross methodological error in the use he has made of Nilus's Saracens. The student who is already acquainted with *The Religion of the Semites* will be aware of the prominence which is given to them and their bloody rite. Since Smith's day a little quiet fun has sometimes been poked at his Saracens, and we have to meet a typical criticism expressed in Lagrange's words that the rite is admittedly barbaric, but "*c'est trop isolé* pour qu'on tire de ce seul cas toute la théorie du sacrifice" (*Études*, p. 258). In reply to this, we are entitled at the outset to ask whether it is sound method to start from the normal rites, or at least those which correspond to ordinary instincts (*ib.* p. 259 n.). Are we to cry, "Mais cette sauvagerie n'a rien de religieux"? Are we to take our stand upon some definition: "When I mention religion, I mean . . ."? On the contrary, no science or philosophy of religion can start from any division into what is and what is not religious, even as science cannot at the outset rule out mongrels or weeds.

Further, although human sacrifice has been common enough, Robertson Smith treats it as exceptional (p. 394); whereas old Nilus, however isolated, gives us "a very typical embodiment of the main ideas that underlie Semitic sacrifices" (p. 345). And this is entirely justified if we analyse

[1] Inevitably one passes from "comparative" religion to the more theoretical treatment of the data; and the history of comparison in the world of organic life will warn us to avoid such an error as the single abstract generalized type conceived by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (E. W. Hobson, *The Domain of Natural Science*, p. 385 *sq.*).

the rite and observe the parallels which can be found for every element. A more careful reading of *The Religion of the Semites* should have shown opponents that the communion-theory is not based upon and does not start from Nilus—as we have seen, it has a much profounder inception. The unprejudiced reader will discover for himself that it is part of a network of ideas which are common to mankind, even as every religion can be viewed as a particular structure of the numerous beliefs and practices which make up the world of religion. It must, of course, be granted that Robertson Smith has given every prominence to Nilus, but the value of his work does not rest upon Nilus, and he and his Saracens are no longer so vital. His evidence is still extremely important, but we do not need it as a clue.[1] We are assured that "even in its details it probably comes nearer" the primitive form of Semitic sacrifice (see p. 345): that is to say, Robertson Smith, so far from starting from it, considers that he has found in it the most rudimentary embodiment of the main sacrificial ideas which he has discovered elsewhere.

Late and isolated Nilus may be, but an advanced stage of culture never excludes gross barbaric ideas, or rites, either outside or—at certain periods at least—within; nor does it exclude the emergence of "primitive" types of thought, however we may choose to evaluate them.[2] Hence while, on the one hand, the evidence of Nilus is an isolated example of a combination of tpyical ideas, human sacrifice, on the other hand, affords numerous examples of ideas which, for

[1] How a clue may come to be of secondary value is well seen in the literary criticism of the Pentateuch and the book of Joshua, where the difference in the Divine Names led to very important discoveries, which are of permanent value, whereas this particular criterion was soon found to be of relatively secondary importance.

[2] That is to say, the "primitive" is barbaric or it is spiritual, and it is a false conception of evolution which tends to regard it as necessarily the former.

reasons given, are not representative of the main development of religion. And here we have to remember the essential difference between Robertson Smith and some of his critics: human sacrifice, licentious cults, and so forth abound, and—like what Renan said of the Arabic Lexicon—the student of comparative religion can pick and choose the evidence for the theory he prefers; but from first to last Smith is concerned with the factors that make for the progressive development of religion, and he is distinguishing between a systematic arrangement of the mere *data* of religion and the crucial facts of the *history* of religion.[1]

Exceptional and isolated are also the peculiar ceremonies of the totem clans in Central Australia, which partly confirm Robertson Smith, while putting his problems in a new light (above, p. xl). They afford most rudimentary examples of the pregnant ideas that mark the higher religions—as Durkheim in particular has shown—and there is no necessity to suppose that they correspond to, or even in their details approximate primitive prehistoric cults. It seems impossible to conceive more primitive *systems*; and the totem cults bring to a head the problems of primitive religion in a way that is far more important for the Science of Religion than—and this must be admitted—for the ordinary theologian. The evidence is so remarkable as to demand some explanation. For, as "Mana" accounts for the unusual or abnormal (cf. p. 553), or as Religion is supposed, on one view, to fill the "gaps" in knowledge, so we are compelled to find a way of co-ordinating the more extraordinary phenomena of re-

[1] After all, Nilus is not quite isolated. Van Gennep (*Totémisme*, pp. 249 *sqq.*) cites from E. Doutté, *Les 'Aïssâoua à Tlemcen* (1900), who claims to have found a modern parallel. The evidence is certainly striking, and Van Gennep is hardly convincing when he disputes its value because of the interval of space and time which severs it from Nilus, and because the rite can be explained on the principles that actuate the brotherhood who practise it.

ligion and the more ordinary. The fact that various unusual, superstitious, or even abnormal beliefs seem to satisfy tribes is as important as the fact that the animal or plant species is, for very rudimentary peoples, a sufficient embodiment of profound ideas. Indeed, totemism enlarges the range of facts upon which we base our inductions, it widens our conception of the development of human personality; and it enables us to consider, on the one side, the place of rude stone cults in the development of religion, and, on the other, the relations between theriomorphic and anthropomorphic supernatural beings who stand in a personal relationship to men. Robertson Smith took totemism more seriously than most other workers in the field, and, to judge from the influence this volume has had upon the study of religions, most would agree that his insight more than justified itself.

There are phenomena in the history of religion that are of pre-eminent value to others than theologians. They raise questions which do not occur to the students of current theology and philosophy, but upon the answer to them the future development of theology and philosophy seems to rest. It commonly happens that as new religions arise they ignore—perhaps inevitably, perhaps rightly—beliefs and practices which had been of no little value and efficacy, and had been efficacious and "true" for normal men. But in religious as in other thought men will strike off on a new line, and only in course of time is it found necessary to come to terms with that which had been ignored, if not condemned. So, as regards the lengthy history of religion, when one has attentively read the work of Sir James Frazer on the sacred man and the slain god, or of MM. Hubert and Mauss on the function of sacrifice, or of M. Émile Durkheim on the significance of social religious systems for the vicissitudes of mental development, it is impossible to resist the conviction that, not only

the great religions of history other than the "highest," but even the very rudimentary religions, with their naïve experiences of the Universe, have something of permanent value to contribute to modern knowledge and western types of experience and thought (see pp. 683 *sqq.*).

Robertson Smith's insistence upon the social-religious unit, upon the working *systems* as distinct from less organized peoples—Pygmies and others, even with their "Supreme Gods"—is entirely characteristic of the man who in his early years demanded a *systematized* theology. He fully realized the necessity for organizing knowledge—as befitted an Editor of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*!—but he did not live to attempt the task of undertaking a fresh systematization of the results which he had reached. Such a task awaits the future. Questions arise concerning the relation between communion, fellowship, and the like (p. xliii *sq.* above), between totemic, totemistic, and theriomorphic cults, between gods (of varying degree of divinity), heroes, and saints, between friendly and unfriendly supernatural beings, between "religious," "magical," and "magico-religious" beliefs and practices. This is no exaggerated statement of the task that already confronts the student of the religions; and as he proceeds to systematize his definitions he will discover that the Science of Religion is reaching out towards, we will not say a "Theology," but, an interpretation of the data of religion far more "Catholic" than even Robertson Smith himself divined. Nor is this all. Repeatedly the interpretation of the evidence can only be "mystical," in the sense that a sympathetic understanding of religious and mystical types of experience alone enables one man to interpret and another to test the interpretation. This will be one of the difficulties—perhaps one of the embarrassments—of the future, for there is much that is ambiguous in religion, that *seems* "religious," or is only subjectively so;

and on this account less question-begging terms should perhaps be employed.[1]

Our Theology and Philosophy, if not specifically Christian, is Western, whereas Robertson Smith combined the keenest Christian sympathies with a profound knowledge of Semitic, or rather Oriental, modes of thought—and the consequences were far-reaching. Prediction is idle work, but whereas the rise of Christianity led to the theology and philosophy which characterize western thought, the tendency of the study of the world's religions is to lay new foundations upon which the thinkers and systematizers of the future will build. One need not commit oneself to the "phenomenology of religion," or any other specific school or tendency of to-day, but the deeper inquiry into the way in which we ourselves have come to think as we do and to hold the beliefs that we do, and of the relation between different types of thinking, is opening out new lines of research, and fashioning new and powerful tools for the future. More fundamental than any given religious or scientific inquiry is the inquiry into the processes of differentiation, development, and systematization of ideas, and at the present day the precise relationship between Religion and Science is of less *primary* importance than the critical study of the interrelation between religious and non-religious experience and expression.

The Religion of the Semites, when we consider the author and his work, is a veritable symptom. Some there are who do not find it difficult to foreshadow the "Decline of the West": the point has been reached where all that is creative has exhausted itself, serious thought has found itself in a

[1] Thus, M. Pinard de la Boullaye (ii. p. 11 *sq.*; see p. xliv n., above) suggests the terms *hierography* (the history of religion), *hierology* (comparative religion and scientific generalization of the data), and *hierosophy* (metaphysical speculation); cf. also Count Goblet d'Alviella (*Oxford Congress of Religions*, 1908, ii. p. 365), who proposes *hierography* (analysis and description) and *hierology* (synthesis).

cul-de-sac, and the confidence which beheld a world picture, a scheme of history culminating in one's own personal or national standpoint, has given place to the chill yet not unjust realization that a more objective survey of man, his history and his religion, must base its theology and philosophy upon a far wider synthesis. But Robertson Smith is concerned with the physiology rather than the morphology of cultures ; and, instinctively a prophet, he is dynamic, feeling out towards the future, to a Reformation, a Rebirth or a Renaissance. The past shows us dying and dead cultures, but also new developments and progress ; and those who realize that vast movements in history lie behind the Bible will agree that, although there can be no assurance that any particular line of development *must* be continued, there is no justification for the conviction that there can *not* be a further development embodying the best of all that has gone before and creating a new continuity with the past. And it may be claimed that when Robertson Smith, the theologian and the anthropologist, went down to primitive and ancient religion, he took up the past and carried it forward, indicating the lines upon which further progress might most fruitfully be made.

A vast amount has been written upon Semitic and other religions, but the independence of his position is still astonishing. Much of the literature does not touch the central problems of religion. Much is out of sympathy with the mystical or transcendental element in religion, which it is crass obscurantism to reject and intellectual suicide to accept uncritically. Again, much ignores the religions at either end of the scale. Not as slavish copyists of what Robertson Smith wrote, but as sympathetic and critical students of the greatest of all subjects, can one find in his life and work a new source of inspiration. And since a man is more than his theories, and this man's standpoint so eminently character-

istic, no more interesting subject for the study of personal evolution can well be found when we consider his life, his work, and his influence—for evolution in human personality and that in the world which the scientist has constructed cannot, on philosophical grounds, be ultimately separated.[1]

As explained in the Preface, Robertson Smith has been left to speak for himself, and for the new notes, which are printed apart by themselves, the present writer is entirely responsible. These notes give bibliographical information, and contain additional illustrative matter, especially from modern Palestine and the ancient surrounding civilizations. No attempt is made to refer to all available sources, the aim being merely to emphasize afresh the fact that Palestine and the Semites cannot be treated in isolation, and that the religion—or, as some would prefer to say, the religions—of the Semites must be viewed in the light of our knowledge of religion in general. Accordingly, attention is drawn to the close interrelation between the lower and the higher religions, between various types of religious and related experiences, and between the religious and non-religious spheres of life and thought. Some notice is taken of criticisms of Robertson Smith's theories, and fuller evidence has been given for the different sorts of beliefs and practices expressing contact, fellowship, communion, or at-one-ment with the supernatural or divine. The "practical" and often quasi-"magical" element in religion has been illustrated, in view of its importance for the development of ideas concerning man's place in and control over Nature, and for the relationship between the "physical" and "spiritual" phases in the history of

[1] The reference is to the Right Hon. J. C. Smuts on the importance of "personology," see *Holism and Evolution* (1926), pp. 284 *sqq.* The present writer may perhaps be permitted to refer to his *Study of Religions* (1914), pp. 64 *sqq.*, 338 *sq.*, and his review of the *Life of Robertson Smith* in the *Hibbert Journal*, xi. p. 214.

religion. The significance of group-units and systems has been developed, for the problem is not to explain the variation of belief and practice—this must be taken as given—but to co-ordinate the systematizing and regulating tendencies throughout the Cosmos. Further, as will have been seen in this Introduction, the immense importance of specifically "religious" data for studies which, in a sense, are "non-religious" can no longer be ignored, and the problem of "evolution" in the world of thought has become of the first importance for the presentation of the data of religion.

Owing partly to lack of space, archæological material has rarely been introduced; the writer hopes to utilize it in his Schweich Lectures on *The Religion of Palestine in the Light of Archæology*. Moreover, since the Second Edition of *The Religion of the Semites* omits on p. 414 a very striking paragraph which appeared in the First Edition, p. 393, on the death of the God-man and the "germ" of John xvii. 19,[1] it seemed undesirable to develop the bearing of comparative religion upon the interpretation of Christianity. But although Robertson Smith evidently preferred to omit the paragraph, his volume not merely opens out a treatment of religion more systematic than others which might be named, it also inaugurates a theoretical study of all religions, from the varieties of Christian belief and practice to the humblest cults of totemic and other rude communities, and it is, perhaps, no exaggeration to see in his work the foundation of the Science and Theory of Religion.

STANLEY A. COOK.

CAMBRIDGE, *August* 1927.

[1] On this omission, see also Sir James Frazer, in his essay on Robertson Smith, reprinted in *The Gorgon's Head and other Literary Pieces* (1927), pp. 278–290.

LECTURE I

INTRODUCTION: THE SUBJECT AND THE METHOD OF ENQUIRY

THE subject before us is the religion of the Semitic peoples, that is, of the group of kindred nations, including the Arabs, the Hebrews and Phœnicians, the Aramæans, the Babylonians and Assyrians, which in ancient times occupied the great Arabian Peninsula, with the more fertile lands of Syria Mesopotamia and Irac, from the Mediterranean coast to the base of the mountains of Iran and Armenia. Among these peoples three of the great faiths of the world had their origin, so that the Semites must always have a peculiar interest for the student of the history of religion. Our subject, however, is not the history of the several religions that have a Semitic origin, but Semitic religion as a whole in its common features and general type. Judaism, Christianity and Islam are *positive* religions, that is, they did not grow up like the systems of ancient heathenism, under the action of unconscious forces operating silently from age to age, but trace their origin to the teaching of great religious innovators, who spoke as the organs of a divine revelation, and deliberately departed from the traditions of the past. Behind these positive religions lies the old unconscious religious tradition, the

body of religious usage and belief which cannot be traced to the influence of individual minds, and was not propagated on individual authority, but formed part of that inheritance from the past into which successive generations of the Semitic race grew up as it were instinctively, taking it as a matter of course that they should believe and act as their fathers had done before them. The positive Semitic religions had to establish themselves on ground already occupied by these older beliefs and usages; they had to displace what they could not assimilate, and whether they rejected or absorbed the elements of the older religion, they had at every point to reckon with them and take up a definite attitude towards them. No positive religion that has moved men has been able to start with a *tabula rasa*, and express itself as if religion were beginning for the first time; in form, if not in substance, the new system must be in contact all along the line with the older ideas and practices which it finds in possession. A new scheme of faith can find a hearing only by appealing to religious instincts and susceptibilities that already exist in its audience, and it cannot reach these without taking account of the traditional forms in which all religious feeling is embodied, and without speaking a language which men accustomed to these old forms can understand. Thus to comprehend a system of positive religion thoroughly, to understand it in its historical origin and form as well as in its abstract principles, we must know the traditional religion that preceded it. It is from this point of view that I invite you to take an interest in the ancient religion of the Semitic peoples; the matter is not one of mere antiquarian curiosity, but has a direct and important bearing on the great problem of the origins of the spiritual religion of the Bible. Let me illustrate this by an example. You know how large a part of the teaching of the New

Testament and of all Christian theology turns on the ideas of sacrifice and priesthood. In what they have to say on these heads the New Testament writers presuppose, as the basis of their argument, the notion of sacrifice and priesthood current among the Jews and embodied in the ordinances of the Temple. But, again, the ritual of the Temple was not in its origin an entirely novel thing; the precepts of the Pentateuch did not create a priesthood and a sacrificial service on an altogether independent basis, but only reshaped and remodelled, in accordance with a more spiritual doctrine, institutions of an older type, which in many particulars were common to the Hebrews with their heathen neighbours. Every one who reads the Old Testament with attention is struck with the fact that the origin and *rationale* of sacrifice are nowhere fully explained; that sacrifice is an essential part of religion is taken for granted, as something which is not a doctrine peculiar to Israel but is universally admitted and acted on without as well as within the limits of the chosen people. Thus, when we wish thoroughly to study the New Testament doctrine of sacrifice, we are carried back step by step till we reach a point where we have to ask what sacrifice meant, not to the old Hebrews alone, but to the whole circle of nations of which they formed a part. By considerations of this sort we are led to the conclusion that no one of the religions of Semitic origin which still exercise so great an influence on the lives of men can be completely understood without enquiry into the older traditional religion of the Semitic race.

You observe that in this argument I take it for granted that, when we go back to the most ancient religious conceptions and usages of the Hebrews, we shall find them to be the common property of a group of kindred peoples, and not the exclusive possession of the

tribes of Israel. The proof that this is so will appear more clearly in the sequel; but, indeed, the thing will hardly be denied by any one who has read the Bible with care. In the history of old Israel before the captivity, nothing comes out more clearly than that the mass of the people found the greatest difficulty in keeping their national religion distinct from that of the surrounding nations. Those who had no grasp of spiritual principles, and knew the religion of Jehovah only as an affair of inherited usage, were not conscious of any great difference between themselves and their heathen neighbours, and fell into Canaanite and other foreign practices with the greatest facility. The significance of this fact is manifest if we consider how deeply the most untutored religious sensibilities are shocked by any kind of innovation. Nothing appeals so strongly as religion to the conservative instincts; and conservatism is the habitual attitude of Orientals The whole history of Israel is unintelligible if we suppose that the heathenism against which the prophets contended was a thing altogether alien to the religious traditions of the Hebrews. In principle there was all the difference in the world between the faith of Isaiah and that of an idolater. But the difference in principle, which seems so clear to us, was not clear to the average Judæan, and the reason of this was that it was obscured by the great similarity in many important points of religious tradition and ritual practice. The conservatism which refuses to look at principles, and has an eye only for tradition and usage, was against the prophets, and had no sympathy with their efforts to draw a sharp line between the religion of Jehovah and that of the foreign gods. This is a proof that what I may call the natural basis of Israel's worship was very closely akin to that of the neighbouring cults.

The conclusion on this point which is suggested by the facts of Old Testament history, may be accepted the more readily because it is confirmed by presumptive arguments of another kind. Traditional religion is handed down from father to child, and therefore is in great measure an affair of race. Nations sprung from a common stock will have a common inheritance of traditional belief and usage in things sacred as well as profane, and thus the evidence that the Hebrews and their neighbours had a large common stock of religious tradition falls in with the evidence which we have from other sources, that in point of race the people of Israel were nearly akin to the heathen nations of Syria and Arabia. The populations of this whole region constitute a well-marked ethnic unity, a fact which is usually expressed by giving to them the common name of Semites. The choice of this term was originally suggested by the tenth chapter of Genesis, in which most of the nations of the group with which we are concerned are represented as descended from Shem the son of Noah. But though modern historians and ethnographers have borrowed a name from the book of Genesis, it must be understood that they do not define the Semitic group as coextensive with the list of nations that are there reckoned to the children of Shem. Most recent interpreters are disposed to regard the classification of the families of mankind given in Genesis x. as founded on principles geographical or political rather than ethnographical; the Phœnicians and other Canaanites, for example, are made to be children of Ham and near cousins of the Egyptians. This arrangement corresponds to historical facts, for, at a period anterior to the Hebrew conquest, Canaan was for centuries an Egyptian dependency, and Phœnician religion and civilisation are permeated by Egyptian influence. But ethnographically the Canaanites were akin to the

Arabs and Syrians, and they spoke a language which is hardly different from Hebrew. On the other hand, Elam and Lud, that is Susiana and Lydia, are called children of Shem, though there is no reason to think that in either country the mass of the population belonged to the same stock as the Syrians and Arabs. Accordingly it must be remembered that when modern scholars use the term Semitic, they do not speak as interpreters of Scripture, but include all peoples whose distinctive ethnical characters assign them to the same group with the Hebrews, Syrians and Arabs.

The scientific definition of an ethnographical group depends on a variety of considerations; for direct historical evidence of an unimpeachable kind as to the original seats and kindred of ancient peoples is not generally to be had. The defects of historical tradition must therefore be supplied by observation, partly of inherited physical characteristics, and partly of mental characteristics, habits and attainments such as are usually transmitted from parent to child. Among the indirect criteria of kinship between nations, the most obvious, and the one which has hitherto been most carefully studied, is the criterion of language; for it is observed that the languages of mankind form a series of natural groups, and that within each group it is possible to arrange the several languages which it contains in what may be called a genealogical order, according to degrees of kinship. Now it may not always be true that people of the same or kindred speech are as closely related by actual descent as they seem to be from the language they speak; a Gaelic tribe, for example, may forget their ancient speech, and learn to speak a Teutonic dialect, without ceasing to be true Gaels by blood. But, in general, large groups of men do not readily change their language, but go on from generation to generation speaking

the ancestral dialect, with such gradual modification as the lapse of time brings about. As a rule, therefore, the classification of mankind by language, at least when applied to large masses, will approach pretty closely to a natural classification; and in a large proportion of cases the language of a mixed race will prove on examination to be that of the stock whose blood is predominant. Where this is not the case, where a minority has imposed its speech on a majority, we may safely conclude that it has done so in virtue of a natural pre-eminence, a power of shaping lower races in its own mould, which is not confined to the sphere of language, but extends to all parts of life. Where we find unity of language, we can at least say with certainty that we are dealing with a group of men who are subject to common influences of the most subtle and far-reaching kind; and where unity of speech has prevailed for many generations, we may be sure that the continued action of these influences has produced great uniformity of physical and mental type. When we come to deal with groups which have long had separate histories, and whose languages are therefore not identical but only cognate, the case is not so strong; but, on the whole, it remains true that the stock which is strong enough, whether by numbers or by genius, to impress its language on a nation, must also exercise a predominant influence on the national type in other respects; and to this extent the classification of races by language must be called natural and not artificial. Especially is this true for ancient times, when the absence of literature, and particularly of religious books, made it much more difficult than it has been in recent ages for a new language to establish itself in a race to which it was originally foreign. All Egypt now speaks Arabic—a Semitic tongue—and yet the population is very far from having assimilated itself to the Arabic type. But this

could not have happened without the Coran and the religion of the Coran.

The Semitic nations are classed together on the ground of similarity of language; but we have every reason to recognise their linguistic kinship as only one manifestation of a very marked general unity of type. The unity is not perfect; it would not, for example, be safe to make generalisations about the Semitic character from the Arabian nomads, and to apply them to the ancient Babylonians. And for this there are probably two reasons. On the one hand, the Semite of the Arabian desert and the Semite of the Babylonian alluvium lived under altogether different physical and moral conditions; the difference of environment is as complete as possible. And, on the other hand, it is pretty certain that the Arabs of the desert have been from time immemorial a race practically unmixed, while the Babylonians, and other members of the same family settled on the fringes of the Semitic land, were in all probability largely mingled with the blood of other races, and underwent a corresponding modification of type.

But when every allowance is made for demonstrable or possible variations of type within the Semitic field, it still remains true that the Semites form a singularly well marked and relatively speaking a very homogeneous group. So far as language goes the evidence to this effect is particularly strong. The Semitic tongues are so much alike that their affinity is recognised even by the untrained observer; and modern science has little difficulty in tracing them back to a single primitive speech, and determining in a general way what the features of that speech were. On the other hand, the differences between these languages and those spoken by other adjacent races are so fundamental and so wide, that little or nothing can be affirmed

with certainty as to the relation of the Semitic tongues to other linguistic stocks. Their nearest kinship seems to be with the languages of North Africa, but even here the common features are balanced by profound differences. The evidence of language therefore tends to show that the period during which the original and common Semitic speech existed apart, and developed its peculiar characters at a distance from languages of other stocks, must have been very long in comparison with the subsequent period during which the separate branches of the Semitic stock, such as Hebrew Aramaic and Arabic, were isolated from one another and developed into separate dialects. Or, to draw the historical inference from this, it would appear that before the Hebrews, the Aramæans, and the Arabs spread themselves over widely distant seats, and began their course of separate national development, there must have been long ages in which the ancestors of all these nations lived together and spoke with one tongue. And as this was in the infancy of mankind, the period of human history in which individuality went for nothing, and all common influences had a force which we moderns can with difficulty conceive, the various swarms which ultimately hived off from the common stock and formed the Semitic nations known to history, must have carried with them a strongly marked race character, and many common possessions of custom and idea, besides their common language.

And further, let us observe that the dispersion of the Semitic nations was never carried so far as the dispersion of the Aryans. If we leave out of account settlements made over the seas,—the South Arabian colonies in East Africa, and the Phœnician colonies on the coasts and isles of the Mediterranean,—we find that the region of Semitic occupation is continuous and compact. Its great immovable centre is the vast Arabian peninsula, a region naturally

isolated, and in virtue of its physical characters almost exempt from immigration or change of inhabitants. From this central stronghold, which the predominant opinion of modern scholars designates as the probable starting-point of the whole Semitic dispersion, the region of Semitic speech spreads out round the margin of the Syrian desert till it strikes against great natural boundaries, the Mediterranean, Mount Taurus, and the mountains of Armenia and Iran. From the earliest dawn of history all that lies within these limits was fully occupied by Semitic tribes speaking Semitic dialects, and the compactness of this settlement must necessarily have tended to maintain uniformity of type. The several Semitic nations, when they were not in direct contact with one another, were divided not by alien populations, but only by the natural barriers of mountain and desert. These natural barriers, indeed, were numerous, and served to break up the race into a number of small tribes or nations; but, like the mountains of Greece, they were not so formidable as to prevent the separate states from maintaining a great deal of intercourse, which, whether peaceful or warlike, tended to perpetuate the original community of type. Nor was the operation of these causes disturbed in ancient times by any great foreign immigration. The early Egyptian invasions of Syria were not followed by colonisation; and while the so-called Hittite monuments, which have given rise to so much speculation, may afford evidence that a non-Semitic people from Asia Minor at one time pushed its way into Northern Syria, it is pretty clear that the Hittites of the Bible, *i.e.* the non-Aramaic communities of Cœle-Syria, were a branch of the Canaanite stock, though they may for a time have been dominated by a non-Semitic aristocracy. At one time it was not uncommon to represent the Philistines as a non-Semitic people, but it is now generally recognised

that the arguments for this view are inadequate, and that, though they came into Palestine from across the sea, from Caphtor, *i.e.* probably from Crete, they were either mainly of Semitic blood, or at least were already thoroughly Semitised at the time of their immigration, alike in speech and in religion.

Coming down to later times, we find that the Assyrian Babylonian and Persian conquests made no considerable change in the general type of the population of the Semitic lands. National and tribal landmarks were removed, and there were considerable shiftings of population within the Semitic area, but no great incursion of new populations of alien stock. In the Greek and Roman periods, on the contrary, a large foreign element was introduced into the towns of Syria; but as the immigration was practically confined to the cities, hardly touching the rural districts, its effects in modifying racial type were, it would seem, of a very transitory character. For in Eastern cities the death-rate habitually exceeds the birth-rate, and the urban population is maintained only by constant recruital from the country, so that it is the blood of the peasantry which ultimately determines the type of the population. Thus it is to be explained that, after the Arab conquest of Syria, the Greek element in the population rapidly disappeared. Indeed, one of the most palpable proofs that the populations of all the old Semitic lands possessed a remarkable homogeneity of character, is the fact that in them, and in them alone, the Arabs and Arab influence took permanent root. The Moslem conquests extended far beyond these limits; but, except in the old Semitic countries, Islam speedily took new shapes, and the Arab dominations soon gave way before the reaction of the mass of its foreign subjects.

Thus the whole course of history, from the earliest date to which authentic knowledge extends down to the time of

the decay of the Caliphate, records no great permanent disturbance of population to affect the constancy of the Semitic type within its original seats, apart from the temporary Hellenisation of the great cities already spoken of. Such disturbances as did take place consisted partly of mere local displacements among the settled Semites, partly, and in a much greater degree, of the arrival and establishment in the cultivated lands of successive hordes of Semitic nomads from the Arabian wilderness, which on their settlement found themselves surrounded by populations so nearly of their own type that the complete fusion of the old and new inhabitants was effected without difficulty, and without modification of the general character of the race. If at any point in its settlements, except along the frontiers, the Semitic blood was largely modified by foreign admixture, this must have taken place in prehistoric times, or by fusion with other races which may have occupied the country before the arrival of the Semites. How far anything of this sort actually happened can only be matter of conjecture, for the special hypotheses which have sometimes been put forth—as, for example, that there was a considerable strain of pre-Semitic blood in the Phœnicians and Canaanites—rest on presumptions of no conclusive sort. What is certain is that the Semitic settlements in Asia were practically complete at the first dawn of history, and that the Semitic blood was constantly reinforced, from very early times, by fresh immigrations from the desert. There is hardly another part of the world where we have such good historical reasons for presuming that linguistic affinity will prove a safe indication of affinity in race, and in general physical and mental type. And this presumption is not belied by the results of nearer enquiry. Those who have busied themselves with the history and literature of the Semitic peoples, bear

uniform testimony to the close family likeness that runs through them all.

It is only natural that this homogeneity of type appears to be modified on the frontiers of the Semitic field. To the West, if we leave the transmarine colonies out of view, natural conditions drew a sharp line of local demarcation between the Semites and their alien neighbours. The Red Sea and the desert north of it formed a geographical barrier, which was often crossed by the expansive force of the Semitic race, but which appears to have effectually checked the advance into Asia of African populations. But on the East, the fertile basin of the Euphrates and Tigris seems in ancient as in modern times to have been a meeting-place of races. The preponderating opinion of Assyriologists is to the effect that the civilisation of Assyria and Babylonia was not purely Semitic, and that the ancient population of these parts contained a large pre-Semitic element, whose influence is especially to be recognised in religion and in the sacred literature of the cuneiform records.

If this be so, it is plain that the cuneiform material must be used with caution in our enquiry into the type of traditional religion characteristic of the ancient Semites. That Babylonia is the best starting-point for a comparative study of the sacred beliefs and practices of the Semitic peoples, is an idea which has lately had some vogue, and which at first sight appears plausible on account of the great antiquity of the monumental evidence. But, in matters of this sort, ancient and primitive are not synonymous terms; and we must not look for the most primitive form of Semitic faith in a region where society was not primitive. In Babylonia, it would seem, society and religion alike were based on a fusion of two races, and so were not primitive but complex. Moreover, the official system of Babylonian and Assyrian religion, as it is known

to us from priestly texts and public inscriptions, bears clear marks of being something more than a popular traditional faith; it has been artificially moulded by priestcraft and statecraft in much the same way as the official religion of Egypt; that is to say, it is in great measure an artificial combination, for imperial purposes, of elements drawn from a number of local worships. In all probability the actual religion of the masses was always much simpler than the official system; and in later times it would seem that, both in religion and in race, Assyria was little different from the adjacent Aramæan countries. These remarks are not meant to throw doubt on the great importance of cuneiform studies for the history of Semitic religion; the monumental data are valuable for comparison with what we know of the faith and worship of other Semitic peoples, and peculiarly valuable because, in religion as in other matters, the civilisation of the Euphrates-Tigris valley exercised a great historical influence on a large part of the Semitic field. But the right point of departure for a general study of Semitic religion must be sought in regions where, though our knowledge begins at a later date, it refers to a simpler state of society, and where accordingly the religious phenomena revealed to us are of an origin less doubtful and a character less complicated. In many respects the religion of heathen Arabia, though we have little information concerning it that is not of post-Christian date, displays an extremely primitive type, corresponding to the primitive and unchanging character of nomadic life. With what may be gathered from this source we must compare, above all, the invaluable notices, preserved in the Old Testament, of the religion of the small Palestinian states before their conquest by the great empires of the East. For this period, apart from the Assyrian monuments and a few precious fragments of other evidence from inscriptions, we

have no contemporary documents outside the Bible. At a later date the evidence from monuments is multiplied, and Greek literature begins to give important aid; but by this time also we have reached the period of religious syncretism—the period, that is, when different faiths and worships began to react on one another, and produce new and complex forms of religion. Here, therefore, we have to use the same precautions that are called for in dealing with the older syncretistic religion of Babylonia and Assyria; it is only by careful sifting and comparison that we can separate between ancient use and modern innovation, between the old religious inheritance of the Semites and things that came in from without.

Let it be understood from the outset that we have not the materials for anything like a complete comparative history of Semitic religions, and that nothing of the sort will be attempted in these Lectures. But a careful study and comparison of the various sources is sufficient to furnish a tolerably accurate view of a series of general features, which recur with striking uniformity in all parts of the Semitic field, and govern the evolution of faith and worship down to a late date. These widespread and permanent features form the real interest of Semitic religion to the philosophical student; it was in them, and not in the things that vary from place to place and from time to time, that the strength of Semitic religion lay, and it is to them therefore that we must look for help in the most important practical application of our studies, for light on the great question of the relation of the positive Semitic religions to the earlier faith of the race.

Before entering upon the particulars of our enquiry, I must still detain you with a few words about the method and order of investigation that seem to be prescribed by the nature of the subject. To get a true and well-defined

picture of the type of Semitic religion, we must not only study the parts separately, but must have clear views of the place and proportion of each part in its relation to the whole. And here we shall go very far wrong if we take it for granted that what is the most important and prominent side of religion to us was equally important in the ancient society with which we are to deal. In connection with every religion, whether ancient or modern, we find on the one hand certain beliefs, and on the other certain institutions ritual practices and rules of conduct. Our modern habit is to look at religion from the side of belief rather than of practice; for, down to comparatively recent times, almost the only forms of religion seriously studied in Europe have been those of the various Christian Churches, and all parts of Christendom are agreed that ritual is important only in connection with its interpretation. Thus the study of religion has meant mainly the study of Christian beliefs, and instruction in religion has habitually begun with the creed, religious duties being presented to the learner as flowing from the dogmatic truths he is taught to accept. All this seems to us so much a matter of course that, when we approach some strange or antique religion, we naturally assume that here also our first business is to search for a creed, and find in it the key to ritual and practice. But the antique religions had for the most part no creed; they consisted entirely of institutions and practices. No doubt men will not habitually follow certain practices without attaching a meaning to them; but as a rule we find that while the practice was rigorously fixed, the meaning attached to it was extremely vague, and the same rite was explained by different people in different ways, without any question of orthodoxy or heterodoxy arising in consequence. In ancient Greece, for example, certain things

were done at a temple, and people were agreed that it would be impious not to do them. But if you had asked why they were done, you would probably have had several mutually contradictory explanations from different persons, and no one would have thought it a matter of the least religious importance which of these you chose to adopt. Indeed, the explanations offered would not have been of a kind to stir any strong feeling; for in most cases they would have been merely different stories as to the circumstances under which the rite first came to be established, by the command or by the direct example of the god. The rite, in short, was connected not with a dogma but with a myth.

In all the antique religions, mythology takes the place of dogma; that is, the sacred lore of priests and people, so far as it does not consist of mere rules for the performance of religious acts, assumes the form of stories about the gods; and these stories afford the only explanation that is offered of the precepts of religion and the prescribed rules of ritual. But, strictly speaking, this mythology was no essential part of ancient religion, for it had no sacred sanction and no binding force on the worshippers. The myths connected with individual sanctuaries and ceremonies were merely part of the apparatus of the worship; they served to excite the fancy and sustain the interest of the worshipper; but he was often offered a choice of several accounts of the same thing, and, provided that he fulfilled the ritual with accuracy, no one cared what he believed about its origin. Belief in a certain series of myths was neither obligatory as a part of true religion, nor was it supposed that, by believing, a man acquired religious merit and conciliated the favour of the gods. What was obligatory or meritorious was the exact performance of certain sacred acts prescribed by

religious tradition. This being so, it follows that mythology ought not to take the prominent place that is too often assigned to it in the scientific study of ancient faiths. So far as myths consist of explanations of ritual, their value is altogether secondary, and it may be affirmed with confidence that in almost every case the myth was derived from the ritual, and not the ritual from the myth; for the ritual was fixed and the myth was variable, the ritual was obligatory and faith in the myth was at the discretion of the worshipper. Now by far the largest part of the myths of antique religions are connected with the ritual of particular shrines, or with the religious observances of particular tribes and districts. In all such cases it is probable, in most cases it is certain, that the myth is merely the explanation of a religious usage; and ordinarily it is such an explanation as could not have arisen till the original sense of the usage had more or less fallen into oblivion. As a rule the myth is no explanation of the origin of the ritual to any one who does not believe it to be a narrative of real occurrences, and the boldest mythologist will not believe that. But if it be not true, the myth itself requires to be explained, and every principle of philosophy and common sense demands that the explanation be sought, not in arbitrary allegorical theories, but in the actual facts of ritual or religious custom to which the myth attaches. The conclusion is, that in the study of ancient religions we must begin, not with myth, but with ritual and traditional usage.

Nor can it be fairly set against this conclusion, that there are certain myths which are not mere explanations of traditional practices, but exhibit the beginnings of larger religious speculation, or of an attempt to systematise and reduce to order the motley variety of local worships and beliefs. For in this case the secondary character of the

myths is still more clearly marked. They are either products of early philosophy, reflecting on the nature of the universe; or they are political in scope, being designed to supply a thread of union between the various worships of groups, originally distinct, which have been united into one social or political organism; or, finally, they are due to the free play of epic imagination. But philosophy politics and poetry are something more, or something less, than religion pure and simple.

There can be no doubt that, in the later stages of ancient religions, mythology acquired an increased importance. In the struggle of heathenism with scepticism on the one hand and Christianity on the other, the supporters of the old traditional religion were driven to search for ideas of a modern cast, which they could represent as the true inner meaning of the traditional rites. To this end they laid hold of the old myths, and applied to them an allegorical system of interpretation. Myth interpreted by the aid of allegory became the favourite means of infusing a new significance into ancient forms. But the theories thus developed are the falsest of false guides as to the original meaning of the old religions.

On the other hand, the ancient myths taken in their natural sense, without allegorical gloss, are plainly of great importance as testimonies to the views of the nature of the gods that were prevalent when they were formed. For though the mythical details had no dogmatic value and no binding authority over faith, it is to be supposed that nothing was put into a myth which people at that time were not prepared to believe without offence. But so far as the way of thinking expressed in the myth was not already expressed in the ritual itself, it had no properly religious sanction; the myth apart from the ritual affords only a doubtful and slippery kind of evidence. Before we

can handle myths with any confidence, we must have some definite hold of the ideas expressed in the ritual tradition, which embodied the only fixed and statutory elements of the religion.

All this, I hope, will become clearer to us as we proceed with our enquiry, and learn by practical example the use to be made of the different lines of evidence open to us. But it is of the first importance to realise clearly from the outset that ritual and practical usage were, strictly speaking, the sum-total of ancient religions. Religion in primitive times was not a system of belief with practical applications; it was a body of fixed traditional practices, to which every member of society conformed as a matter of course. Men would not be men if they agreed to do certain things without having a reason for their action; but in ancient religion the reason was
9 not first formulated as a doctrine and then expressed in practice, but conversely, practice preceded doctrinal theory. Men form general rules of conduct before they begin to express general principles in words; political institutions are older than political theories, and in like manner religious institutions are older than religious theories. This analogy is not arbitrarily chosen, for in fact the parallelism in ancient society between religious and political institutions is complete. In each sphere great importance was attached to form and precedent, but the explanation why the precedent was followed consisted merely of a legend as to its first establishment. That the precedent, once established, was authoritative did not appear to require any proof. The rules of society were based on precedent, and the continued existence of the society was sufficient reason why a precedent once set should continue to be followed.

Strictly speaking, indeed, I understate the case when

I say that the oldest religious and political institutions present a close analogy. It would be more correct to say that they were parts of one whole of social custom. Religion was a part of the organised social life into which a man was born, and to which he conformed through life in the same unconscious way in which men fall into any habitual practice of the society in which they live. Men took the gods and their worship for granted, just as they took the other usages of the state for granted, and if they reasoned or speculated about them, they did so on the presupposition that the traditional usages were fixed things, behind which their reasonings must not go, and which no reasoning could be allowed to overturn. To us moderns religion is above all a matter of individual conviction and reasoned belief, but to the ancients it was a part of the citizen's public life, reduced to fixed forms, which he was not bound to understand and was not at liberty to criticise or to neglect. Religious nonconformity was an offence against the state; for if sacred tradition was tampered with the bases of society were undermined, and the favour of the gods was forfeited. But so long as the prescribed forms were duly observed, a man was recognised as truly pious, and no one asked how his religion was rooted in his heart or affected his reason. Like political duty, of which indeed it was a part, religion was entirely comprehended in the observance of certain fixed rules of outward conduct.

The conclusion from all this as to the method of our investigation is obvious. When we study the political structure of an early society, we do not begin by asking what is recorded of the first legislators, or what theory men advanced as to the reason of their institutions; we try to understand what the institutions were, and how they shaped men's lives. In like manner, in the study of Semitic eligion, we must not begin by asking what was

told about the gods, but what the working religious institutions were, and how they shaped the lives of the worshippers. Our enquiry, therefore, will be directed to the religious institutions which governed the lives of men of Semitic race.

In following out this plan, however, we shall do well not to throw ourselves at once upon the multitudinous details of rite and ceremony, but to devote our attention to certain broad features of the sacred institutions which are sufficiently well marked to be realised at once. If we were called upon to examine the political institutions of antiquity, we should find it convenient to carry with us some general notion of the several types of government under which the multifarious institutions of ancient states arrange themselves. And in like manner it will be useful for us, when we examine the religious institutions of the Semites, to have first some general knowledge of the types of divine governance, the various ruling conceptions of the relations of the gods to man, which underlie the rites and ordinances of religion in different places and at different times. Such knowledge we can obtain in a provisional form, before entering on a mass of ritual details, mainly by considering the titles of honour by which men addressed their gods, and the language in which they expressed their dependence on them. From these we can see at once, in a broad, general way, what place the gods held in the social system of antiquity, and under what general categories their relations to their worshippers fell. The broad results thus reached must then be developed, and at the same time controlled and rendered more precise, by an examination in detail of the working institutions of religion.

The question of the metaphysical nature of the gods, as distinct from their social office and function, must be left

in the background till this whole investigation is completed. It is vain to ask what the gods are in themselves till we have studied them in what I may call their public life, that is, in the stated intercourse between them and their worshippers which was kept up by means of the prescribed forms of cultus. From the antique point of view, indeed, the question what the gods are in themselves is not a religious but a speculative one; what is requisite to religion is a practical acquaintance with the rules on which the deity acts and on which he expects his worshippers to frame their conduct—what in 2 Kings xvii. 26 is called the "manner" or rather the "customary law" (*mishpāṭ*) of the god of the land. This is true even of the religion of Israel. When the prophets speak of the knowledge of God, they always mean a practical knowledge of the laws and principles of His government in Israel,[1] and a summary expression for religion as a whole is "the knowledge and fear of Jehovah,"[2] *i.e.* the knowledge of what Jehovah prescribes, combined with a reverent obedience. An extreme scepticism towards all religious speculation is recommended in the Book of Ecclesiastes as the proper attitude of piety, for no amount of discussion can carry a man beyond the plain rule to "fear God and keep His commandments."[3] This counsel the author puts into the mouth of Solomon, and so represents it, not unjustly, as summing up the old view of religion, which in more modern days had unfortunately begun to be undermined.

The propriety of keeping back all metaphysical questions as to the nature of the gods till we have studied the practices of religion in detail, becomes very apparent if we consider for a moment what befel the later philosophers and theosophists of heathenism in their attempts to con-

[1] See especially Hosea, chap. iv. [2] Isa. xi. 2. [3] Eccles. xii. 13.

struct a theory of the traditional religion. None of these thinkers succeeded in giving an account of the nature of the gods from which all the received practices of worship could be rationally deduced, and those who had any pretensions to orthodoxy had recourse to violent allegorical interpretations in order to bring the established ritual into accordance with their theories.[1] The reason for this is obvious. The traditional usages of religion had grown up gradually in the course of many centuries, and reflected habits of thought characteristic of very diverse stages of man's intellectual and moral development. No one conception of the nature of the gods could possibly afford the clue to all parts of that motley complex of rites and ceremonies which the later paganism had received by inheritance, from a series of ancestors in every state of culture from pure savagery upwards. The record of the religious thought of mankind, as it is embodied in religious institutions, resembles the geological record of the history of the earth's crust; the new and the old are preserved side by side, or rather layer upon layer. The classification of ritual formations in their proper sequence is the first step towards their explanation, and that explanation itself must take the form, not of a speculative theory, but of a rational life-history.

I have already explained that, in attempting such a life-history of religious institutions, we must begin by forming some preliminary ideas of the practical relation in which the gods of antiquity stood to their worshippers. I have now to add, that we shall also find it necessary to have before us from the outset some elementary notions of the relations which early races of mankind conceived to subsist between gods and men on the one hand, and the material universe on the other. All acts of ancient

[1] See, for example, Plutarch's *Greek* and *Roman Questions*.

worship have a material embodiment, the form of which is determined by the consideration that gods and men alike stand in certain fixed relations to particular parts or aspects of physical nature. Certain places, certain things, even certain animal kinds are conceived as holy, *i.e.* as standing in a near relation to the gods, and claiming special reverence from men, and this conception plays a very large part in the development of religious institutions. Here again we have a problem that cannot be solved by *à priori* methods; it is only as we move onward from step to step in the analysis of the details of ritual observance that we can hope to gain full insight into the relations of the gods to physical nature. But there are certain broad features in the ancient conception of the universe, and of the relations of its parts to one another, which can be grasped at once, upon a merely preliminary survey, and we shall find it profitable to give attention to these at an early stage of our discussion.

I propose, therefore, to devote my second lecture to the nature of the antique religious community and the relations of the gods to their worshippers. After this we will proceed to consider the relations of the gods to physical nature, not in a complete or exhaustive way, but in a manner entirely preliminary and provisional, and only so far as is necessary to enable us to understand the material basis of ancient ritual. After these preliminary enquiries have furnished us with certain necessary points of view, we shall be in a position to take up the institutions of worship in an orderly manner, and make an attempt to work out their life-history. We shall find that the history of religious institutions is the history of ancient religion itself, as a practical force in the development of the human race, and that the articulate efforts of the antique intellect to comprehend the meaning of religion, the nature of the

gods, and the principles on which they deal with men, take their point of departure from the unspoken ideas embodied in the traditional forms of ritual praxis. Whether the conscious efforts of ancient religious thinkers took the shape of mythological invention or of speculative construction, the raw material of thought upon which they operated was derived from the common traditional stock of religious conceptions that was handed on from generation to generation, not in express words, but in the form of religious custom.

In accordance with the rules of the Burnett Trust, three courses of lectures, to be delivered in successive winters, are allowed me for the development of this great subject. When the work was first entrusted to me, I formed the plan of dividing my task into three distinct parts. In the first course of lectures I hoped to cover the whole field of practical religious institutions. In the second I proposed to myself to discuss the nature and origin of the gods of Semitic heathenism, their relations to one another, the myths that surround them, and the whole subject of religious belief, so far as it is not directly involved in the observances of daily religious life. The third winter would thus have been left free for an examination of the part which Semitic religion has played in universal history, and its influence on the general progress of humanity, whether in virtue of the early contact of Semitic faiths with other systems of antique religion, or—what is more important—in virtue of the influence, both positive and negative, that the common type of Semitic religion has exercised on the formulas and structure of the great monotheistic faiths that have gone forth from the Semitic lands. But the first division of the subject has grown under my hands, and I find that it will not be possible in a single winter to cover the whole field of

religious institutions in a way at all adequate to the fundamental importance of this part of the enquiry.

It will therefore be necessary to allow the first branch of the subject to run over into the second course, for which I reserve, among other matters of interest, the whole history of religious feasts and also that of the Semitic priesthoods. I hope, however, to give the present course a certain completeness in itself by carrying the investigation to the end of the great subject of sacrifice. The origin and meaning of sacrifice constitute the central problem of ancient religion, and when this problem has been disposed of we may naturally feel that we have reached a point of rest at which both speaker and hearers will be glad to make a pause.

LECTURE II

THE NATURE OF THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY, AND THE RELATION OF THE GODS TO THEIR WORSHIPPERS

We have seen that ancient faiths must be looked on as matters of institution rather than of dogma or formulated belief, and that the system of an antique religion was part of the social order under which its adherents lived; so that the word "system" must here be taken in a practical sense, as when we speak of a political system, and not in the sense of an organised body of ideas or theological opinions. Broadly speaking, religion was made up of a series of acts and observances, the correct performance of which was necessary or desirable to secure the favour of the gods or to avert their anger; and in these observances every member of society had a share, marked out for him either in virtue of his being born within a certain family and community, or in virtue of the station, within the family and community, that he had come to hold in the course of his life. A man did not choose his religion or frame it for himself; it came to him as part of the general scheme of social obligations and ordinances laid upon him, as a matter of course, by his position in the family and in the nation. Individual men were more or less religious, as men now are more or less patriotic; that is, they discharged their religious duties with a greater or less degree of zeal according to their character and temperament; but there was no such thing as an absolutely irreligious man. A certain

amount of religion was required of everybody; for the due performance of religious acts was a social obligation in which every one had his appointed share. Of intolerance in the modern sense of the word ancient society knew nothing; it never persecuted a man into particular beliefs for the good of his own soul. Religion did not exist for the saving of souls but for the preservation and welfare of society, and in all that was necessary to this end every man had to take his part, or break with the domestic and political community to which he belonged.

Perhaps the simplest way of putting the state of the case is this. Every human being, without choice on his own part, but simply in virtue of his birth and upbringing, becomes a member of what we call a *natural* society. He belongs, that is, to a certain family and a certain nation, and this membership lays upon him definite obligations and duties which he is called upon to fulfil as a matter of course, and on pain of social penalties and disabilities, while at the same time it confers upon him certain social rights and advantages. In this respect the ancient and modern worlds are alike; but there is this important difference, that the tribal or national societies of the ancient world were not strictly natural in the modern sense of the word, for the gods had their part and place in them equally with men. The circle into which a man was born was not simply a group of kinsfolk and fellow-citizens, but embraced also certain divine beings, the gods of the family and of the state, which to the ancient mind were as much a part of the particular community with which they stood connected as the human members of the social circle. The relation between the gods of antiquity and their worshippers was expressed in the language of human relationship, and this language was not taken in a figurative sense but with strict literality. If a god was spoken of as father and his wor-

shippers as his offspring, the meaning was that the worshippers were literally of his stock, that he and they made up one natural family with reciprocal family duties to one another. Or, again, if the god was addressed as king, and the worshippers called themselves his servants, they meant that the supreme guidance of the state was actually in his hands, and accordingly the organisation of the state included provision for consulting his will and obtaining his direction in all weighty matters, and also provision for approaching him as king with due homage and tribute.

Thus a man was born into a fixed relation to certain gods as surely as he was born into relation to his fellowmen; and his religion, that is, the part of conduct which was determined by his relation to the gods, was simply one side of the general scheme of conduct prescribed for him by his position as a member of society. There was no separation between the spheres of religion and of ordinary life. Every social act had a reference to the gods as well as to men, for the social body was not made up of men only, but of gods and men.

This account of the position of religion in the social system holds good, I believe, for all parts and races of the ancient world in the earlier stages of their history. The causes of so remarkable a uniformity lie hidden in the mists of prehistoric time, but must plainly have been of a general kind, operating on all parts of mankind without distinction of race and local environment; for in every region of the world, as soon as we find a nation or tribe emerging from prehistoric darkness into the light of authentic history, we find also that its religion conforms to the general type which has just been indicated. As time rolls on and society advances, modifications take place. In religion as in other matters the transition from the antique to the modern type of life is not sudden and unprepared, but is

gradually led up to by a continuous disintegration of the old structure of society, accompanied by the growth of new ideas and institutions. In Greece, for example, the intimate connection of religion with the organisation of the family and the state was modified and made less exclusive, at a relatively early date, by the Pan-Hellenic conceptions which find their theological expressions in Homer. If the Homeric poems were the Bible of the Greeks, as has so often been said, the true meaning of this phrase is that in these poems utterance was given to ideas about the gods which broke through the limitations of local and tribal worship, and held forth to all Greeks a certain common stock of religious ideas and motives, not hampered by the exclusiveness which in the earlier stages of society allows of no fellowship in religion that is not also a fellowship in the interests of a single kin or a single political group. In Italy there never was anything corresponding to the Pan-Hellenic ideas that operated in Greece, and accordingly the strict union of religion and the state, the solidarity of gods and men as parts of a single society with common interests and common aims, was characteristically exhibited in the institutions of Rome down to quite a late date. But in Greece as well as in Rome the ordinary traditional work-a-day religion of the masses never greatly departed from the primitive type. The final disintegration of antique religion in the countries of Græco-Italian civilisation was the work first of the philosophers and then of Christianity. But Christianity itself, in Southern Europe, has not altogether obliterated the original features of the paganism which it displaced. The Spanish peasants who insult the Madonna of the neighbouring village, and come to blows over the merits of rival local saints, still do homage to the same antique conception of religion which in Egypt animated the feuds of Ombos and Tentyra, and made hatred for each ⋆

other's gods the formula that summed up all the local jealousies of the two towns.

The principle that the fundamental conception of ancient religion is the solidarity of the gods and their worshippers as part of one organic society, carries with it important consequences, which I propose to examine in some detail, with special reference to the group of religions that forms the proper subject of these lectures. But though my facts and illustrations will be drawn from the Semitic sphere, a great part of what I shall have to say in the present lecture might be applied, with very trifling modifications, to the early religion of any other part of mankind. The differences between Semitic and Aryan religion, for example, are not so primitive or fundamental as is often imagined. Not only in matters of worship, but in social organisation generally—and we have seen that ancient religion is but a part of the general social order which embraces gods and men alike—the two races, Aryans and Semites, began on lines which are so much alike as to be almost indistinguishable, and the divergence between their paths, which becomes more and more apparent in the course of ages, was not altogether an affair of race and innate tendency, but depended in a great measure on the operation of special local and historical causes.

In both races the first steps of social and religious development took place in small communities, which at the dawn of history had a political system based on the principle of kinship, and were mainly held together by the tie of blood, the only social bond which then had absolute and undisputed strength, being enforced by the law of blood revenge. As a rule, however, men of several clans lived side by side, forming communities which did not possess the absolute homogeneity of blood brotherhood, and yet were united by common interests and the habit

of friendly association. The origin of such associations, which are found all over the world at a very early stage of society, need not occupy us now. It is enough to note the fact that they existed, and were not maintained by the feeling of kindred, but by habit and community of interests. These local communities of men of different clans, who lived together on a footing of amity, and had often to unite in common action, especially in war, but also in affairs of polity and justice, were the origin of the antique state. There is probably no case in ancient history where a state was simply the development of a single homogeneous clan or gens, although the several clans which united to form a state often came in course of time to suppose themselves to be only branches of one great ancestral brotherhood, and were thus knit together in a closer unity of sentiment and action. But in the beginning, the union of several clans for common political action was not sustained either by an effective sentiment of kinship (the law of blood revenge uniting only members of the same clan) or by any close political organisation, but was produced by the pressure of practical necessity, and always tended towards dissolution when this practical pressure was withdrawn. The only organisation for common action was that the leading men of the clans consulted together in time of need, and their influence led the masses with them. Out of these conferences arose the senates of elders found in the ancient states of Semitic and Aryan antiquity alike. The kingship, again, as we find it in most antique states, appears to have ordinarily arisen in the way which is so well illustrated by the history of Israel. In time of war an individual leader is indispensable; in a time of prolonged danger the temporary authority of an approved captain easily passes into the lifelong leadership at home as well as in the field, which

was exercised by such a judge as Gideon; and at length the advantages of having a permanent head, both as a leader of the army and as a restraint on the perennial feuds and jealousies of clans that constantly threaten the solidity of the state, are recognised in the institution of the kingship, which again tends to become hereditary, as in the case of the house of David, simply because the king's house naturally becomes greater and richer than other houses, and so better able to sustain the burden of power.

Up to this point the progress of society was much alike in the East and in the West, and the progress of religion, as we shall see in the sequel, followed that of society in general. But while in Greece and Rome the early period of the kings lies in the far background of tradition, and only forms the starting-point of the long development with which the historian of these countries is mainly occupied, the independent evolution of Semitic society was arrested at an early stage. In the case of the nomadic Arabs, shut up in their wildernesses of rock and sand, Nature herself barred the way of progress. The life of the desert does not furnish the material conditions for permanent advance beyond the tribal system, and we find that the religious development of the Arabs was proportionally retarded, so that at the advent of Islam the ancient heathenism, like the ancient tribal structure of society, had become effete without having ever ceased to be barbarous.

The northern Semites, on the other hand, whose progress up to the eighth century before Christ certainly did not lag behind that of the Greeks, were deprived of political independence, and so cut short in their natural development, by the advance from the Tigris to the Mediterranean of the great Assyrian monarchs, who, drawing from the

rich and broad alluvium of the Two Rivers resources which none of their neighbours could rival, went on from conquest to conquest till all the small states of Syria and Palestine had gone down before them. The Assyrians were conquerors of the most brutal and destructive kind, and wherever they came the whole structure of ancient society was dissolved. From this time onwards the difference between the Syrian or Palestinian and the Greek was not one of race alone; it was the difference between a free citizen and a slave of an Oriental despotism. Religion as well as civil society was profoundly affected by the catastrophe of the old free communities of the northern Semitic lands; the society of one and the same religion was no longer identical with the state, and the old solidarity of civil and religious life continued to exist only in a modified form. It is not therefore surprising that from the eighth century onwards the history of Semitic religion runs a very different course from that which we observe on the other side of the Mediterranean.

The ancient Semitic communities were small, and were separated from each other by incessant feuds. Hence, on the principle of solidarity between gods and their worshippers, the particularism characteristic of political society could not but reappear in the sphere of religion. In the same measure as the god of a clan or town had indisputable claim to the reverence and service of the community to which he belonged, he was necessarily an enemy to their enemies and a stranger to those to whom they were strangers. Of this there are sufficient evidences in the way in which the Old Testament speaks about the relation of the nations to their gods. When David in the bitterness of his heart complains of those who "have driven him out from connection with the heritage of Jehovah," he represents them as saying to

him, "Go, serve other gods."[1] In driving him to seek refuge in another land and another nationality, they compel him to change his religion, for a man's religion is part of his political connection. "Thy sister," says Naomi to Ruth, "is gone back unto her people and untc her gods"; and Ruth replies, "Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God":[2] the change of nationality involves a change of cult. Jeremiah, in the full consciousness of the falsehood of all religions except that of Israel, remarks that no nation changes its gods although they be no gods:[3] a nation's worship remains as constant as its political identity. The Book of Deuteronomy, speaking in like manner from the standpoint of monotheism, reconciles the sovereignty of Jehovah with the actual facts of heathenism, by saying that He has "allotted" the various objects of false worship "unto all nations under the whole heaven."[4] The "allotment" of false gods among the nations, as property is allotted, expresses with precision the idea that each god had his own determinate circle of worshippers, to whom he stood in a peculiar and exclusive relation.

The exclusiveness of which I have just spoken naturally finds its most pronounced expression in the share taken by the gods in the feuds and wars of their worshippers. The enemies of the god and the enemies of his people are identical; even in the Old Testament "the enemies of Jehovah" are originally nothing else than the enemies of Israel.[5] In battle each god fights for his own people, and to his aid success is ascribed; Chemosh gives victory to Moab, and Asshur to Assyria;[6] and often the divine

[1] 1 Sam. xxvi. 19.
[2] Ruth i. 14 *sqq.*
[3] Jer. ii. 11.
[4] Deut. iv. 19.
[5] 1 Sam. xxx. 26, "the spoil of the enemies of Jehovah"; Judg. v. 31.
[6] See the inscription of King Mesha on the so-called Moabite Stone, and the Assyrian inscriptions, *passim*.

image or symbol accompanies the host to battle. When the ark was brought into the camp of Israel, the Philistines said, "Gods are come into the camp; who can deliver us from the hand of these mighty gods?"[1] They judged from their own practice, for when David defeated them at Baal-perazim, part of the booty consisted in their idols which had been carried into the field.[2] When the Carthaginians, in their treaty with Philip of Macedon,[3] speak of "the gods that take part in the campaign," they doubtless refer to the inmates of the sacred tent which was pitched in time ★ of war beside the tent of the general, and before which prisoners were sacrificed after a victory.[4] Similarly an Arabic poet says, "Yaghūth went forth with us against Morād";[5] that is, the image of the god Yaghūth was carried into the fray. You observe how literal and realistic was the conception of the part taken by the deity in the wars of his worshippers.

When the gods of the several Semitic communities took part in this way in the ancestral feuds of their worshippers, it was impossible for an individual to change his religion without changing his nationality, and a whole community could hardly change its religion at all without being absorbed into another stock or nation. Religious like political ties were transmitted from father to son; for a man could not choose a new god at will; the gods of his fathers were the only deities on whom he could count as friendly and ready to accept his homage, unless he forswore his own kindred and was received into a new

[1] 1 Sam. iv. 7 *sqq.*
[2] 2 Sam. v. 21.
[3] Polybius, vii. 9.
[4] Diodorus, xx. 65.
[5] Yācūt, iv. 1023. A survival of the same idea is seen in the portable tabernacle of the Carmathians (Ibn al-Jauzī, *ap.* De Goeje, *Carmathes* [1886], pp. 180 220 *sq.*) from which victory was believed to descend. De Goeje compares the portable sanctuary of Mokhtār (Ṭabari, ii. 702 *sqq.*) and the *'otfa* still used by Bedouin tribes (Burckhardt, *Bed. and Wah.* i. 145; Lady Anne Blunt, *Bedouin Tribes*, ii. 146; Doughty, i. 61, ii. 304).

circle of civil as well as religious life. In the old times hardly any but outlaws changed their religion; ceremonies of initiation, by which a man was received into a new religious circle, became important, as we shall see by and by, only after the breaking up of the old political life of the small Semitic commonwealths.

On the other hand, all social fusion between two communities tended to bring about a religious fusion also. This might take place in two ways. Sometimes two gods were themselves fused into one, as when the mass of the Israelites in their local worship of Jehovah identified Him with the Baalim of the Canaanite high places, and carried over into His worship the ritual of the Canaanite shrines, not deeming that in so doing they were less truly Jehovah-worshippers than before. This process was greatly facilitated by the extreme similarity in the attributes ascribed to different local or tribal gods, and the frequent identity of the divine titles.[1] One Baal hardly differed from another, except in being connected with a different kindred or a different place, and when the kindreds were fused by intermarriage, or lived together in one village on a footing of social amity, there was nothing to keep their gods permanently distinct. In other cases, where the several deities brought together by the union of their worshippers into one state were too distinct to lose their individuality, they continued to be worshipped side by side as allied

[1] It will appear in the sequel that the worship of the greater Semitic deities was closely associated with the reverence which all primitive pastoral tribes pay to their flocks and herds. To a tribe whose herds consisted of kine and oxen, the cow and the ox were sacred beings, which in the oldest times were never killed or eaten except sacrificially. The tribal deities themselves were conceived as closely akin to the sacred species of domestic animals, and their images were often made in the likeness of steers or heifers in cow-keeping tribes, or of rams and ewes in shepherd tribes. It is easy to see how this facilitated the fusion of tribal worships, and how deities originally distinct might come to be identified on account of the similarity of their images and of the sacrifices offered to them. See p. 297 *sqq.*

divine powers, and it is to this kind of process that we must apparently ascribe the development of a Semitic pantheon or polytheistic system. A pantheon, or organised commonwealth of gods, such as we find in the state religion of Egypt or in the Homeric poems, is not the primitive type of heathenism, and little trace of such a thing appears in the oldest documents of the religion of the smaller Semitic communities. The old Semites believed in the existence of many gods, for they accepted as real the gods of their enemies as well as their own, but they did not worship the strange gods from whom they had no favour to expect, and on whom their gifts and offerings would have been thrown away. When every small community was on terms of frequent hostility with all its neighbours, the formation of a polytheistic system was impossible. Each group had its own god, or perhaps a god and a goddess, to whom the other gods bore no relation whatever. It was only as the small groups coalesced into larger unities, that a society and kinship of many gods began to be formed, on the model of the alliance or fusion of their respective worshippers; and indeed the chief part in the development of a systematic hierarchy or commonwealth of Semitic deities is due to the Babylonians and Assyrians, among whom the labours of statesmen to build up a consolidated empire out of a multitude of local communities, originally independent, were seconded by the efforts of the priests to give a corresponding unity of scheme to the multiplicity of local worships.[1]

Thus far we have looked only at the general fact, that in a Semitic community men and their gods formed a social and political as well as a religious whole. But to

[1] In the eighth century B.C. some of the Western Semitic states had a considerable pantheon, as appears most clearly from the notices of the "gods of Ya'di" on the inscriptions found (in 1890) at Zenjirli in North-West Syria, at the foot of Mount Amanus. See Cooke, Nos. 61–63.

make our conceptions more concrete we must consider what place in this whole was occupied by the divine element of the social partnership. And here we find that the two leading conceptions of the relation of the god to his people are those of fatherhood and of kingship. We have learned to look on Semitic society as built up on two bases—on kinship, which is the foundation of the system of clans or gentes, and on the union of kins, living intermingled or side by side, and bound together by common interests, which is the foundation of the state. We now see that the clan and the state are both represented in religion: as father the god belongs to the family or clan, as king he belongs to the state; and in each sphere of the social order he holds the position of highest dignity. Both these conceptions deserve to be looked at and illustrated in some detail.

The relation of a father to his children has a moral as well as a physical aspect, and each of these must be taken into account in considering what the fatherhood of the tribal deity meant in ancient religion. In the physical aspect the father is the being to whom the child owes his life, and through whom he traces kinship with the other members of his family or clan. The antique conception of kinship is participation in one blood, which passes from parent to child and circulates in the veins of every member of the family. The unity of the family or clan is viewed as a physical unity, for the blood is the life,—an idea familiar to us from the Old Testament,[1]—and it is the same

[1] Gen. ix. 4; Deut. xii. 23. Among the Arabs also *nafs* is used of the life-blood. When a man dies a natural death his life departs through the nostrils (*māta ḥatfa anfihi*), but when he is slain in battle "his life flows on the spear point" (Ḥamāsa, p. 52). Similarly *lā nafsa lahu sāilatun* means *lā dama lahu yajrī* (*Miṣbāḥ*, *s.v.*). To the use of *nafs* in the sense of blood, the Arabian philologists refer such expressions as *nifās*, childbirth; *nafsā*, puerpera. The use of *nafisat* or *nufisat* in the sense of *ḥādat* (Bokhārī, i. 72, l. 10) appears to justify their explanation.

blood and therefore the same life that is shared by every descendant of the common ancestor. The idea that the race has a life of its own, of which individual lives are only parts, is expressed even more clearly by picturing the race as a tree, of which the ancestor is the root or stem and the descendants the branches. This figure is used by all the Semites, and is very common both in the Old Testament and in the Arabian poets.

The moral aspect of fatherhood, again, lies in the social relations and obligations which flow from the physical relationship—in the sanctity of the tie of blood which binds together the whole family, and in the particular modification of this tie in the case of parent and child, the parent protecting and nourishing the child, while the child owes obedience and service to his parent.

In Christianity, and already in the spiritual religion of the Hebrews, the idea of divine fatherhood is entirely dissociated from the physical basis of natural fatherhood. Man was created in the image of God, but he was not begotten; God-sonship is not a thing of nature but a thing of grace. In the Old Testament, Israel is Jehovah's son, and Jehovah is his father who created him;[1] but this creation is not a physical act, it refers to the series of gracious deeds by which Israel was shaped into a nation. And so, though it may be said of the Israelites as a whole, "Ye are the children of Jehovah your God,"[2] this sonship is national, not personal, and the individual Israelite has not the right to call himself Jehovah's son.

But in heathen religions the fatherhood of the gods is physical fatherhood. Among the Greeks, for example, the idea that the gods fashioned men out of clay, as potters fashion images, is relatively modern. The older conception is that the races of men have gods for their ancestors, or

[1] Hos. xi. 1; Deut. xxxii. 6. [2] Deut. xiv. 1.

are the children of the earth, the common mother of gods and men, so that men are really of the stock or kin of the gods.[1] That the same conception was familiar to the older Semites appears from the Bible. Jeremiah describes idolaters as saying to a stock, Thou art my father; and to a stone, Thou hast brought me forth.[2] In the ancient poem, Num. xxi. 29, the Moabites are called the sons and daughters of Chemosh, and at a much more recent date the prophet Malachi calls a heathen woman "the daughter of a strange god."[3] These phrases are doubtless accommodations to the language which the heathen neighbours of Israel used about themselves; they belong to an age when society in Syria and Palestine was still mainly organised on the tribal system, so that each clan, or even each complex of clans forming a small independent people, traced back its origin to a great first father; and they indicate that, just as in Greece, this father or ἀρχηγέτης of the race was commonly identified with the god of the race. With this it accords that in the judgment of most modern enquirers several names of deities appear in the old genealogies of nations in the Book of Genesis. Edom, for example, the progenitor of the Edomites, was identified by the Hebrews with Esau the brother of Jacob, but to the heathen he was a god, as appears from the theophorous proper name Obededom, "worshipper of Edom."[4] The remains of such

[1] See details and references in Preller-Robert, *Griechische Mythol.* (1887) i. 78 *sqq.*

[2] Jer. ii. 27. [3] Mal. ii. 11.

[4] Bäthgen, *Beiträge zur Semitischen Religionsg.* p. 10, objects that not all names compounded with עבד are theophorous. And it is true that on the Nabatæan inscriptions we find names of this form in which the second element is the name of a king; but this is in a state of society where the king was revered as at least quasi-divine, and where the apotheosis of dead kings was not unknown. Cf. Wellh. p. 2 *sq.*; Euting, *Nabat. Inschr.* p. 32 *sq.*; and especially Clermont-Ganneau, *Rec. d'Archéol. Or.* i. 39 *sqq.* It must, however, be admitted that in questions of the history of religion, arguments derived from names are apt to be somewhat inconclusive; it is

mythology are naturally few in records which have come to us through the monotheistic Hebrews. On the other hand, the extant fragments of Phœnician and Babylonian cosmogonies date from a time when tribal religion and the connection of individual gods with particular kindreds was forgotten or had fallen into the background. But in a generalised form the notion that men are the offspring of the gods still held its ground. In the Phœnician cosmogony of Philo Byblius it does so in a confused shape, due to the author's euhemerism, that is, to his theory that deities are nothing more than deified men who had been great benefactors to their species. But euhemerism itself can arise, as an explanation of popular religion, only where the old gods are regarded as akin to men, and where, therefore, the deification of human benefactors does not involve any such patent absurdity as on our way of thinking. Again, in the Chaldæan legend preserved by Berosus,[1] the belief that men are of the blood of the gods is expressed in a form too crude not to be very ancient; for animals as well as men are said to have been formed out of clay mingled with the blood of a decapitated deity. Here we have a blood-kinship

possible, though surely very improbable, that the national name אדום (always written *plene*) means "men," Arabic *anām*, and is different from the god-name אדם; see Nöldeke in *ZDMG.* xlii. 470.

As examples of god-names in the genealogies of Genesis, I have elsewhere adduced Uz (Gen. xxii. 21, xxxvi. 28; LXX, Ωζ, Ωξ, Ωσ: and in Job i. 1, Αὐσιτις)='Auḍ (*Kin.* 59–61) and Yeush (Gen. xxxvi. 14)=Yaghūth. The second of these identifications is accepted by Nöldeke, but rejected by Lagarde, *Mitth.* ii. 77, *Bildung der Nomina*, p. 124. The other has been criticised by Nöldeke, *ZDMG.* xl. 184, but his remarks do not seem to me to be conclusive. That the Arabian god is a mere personification of Time is a hard saying, and the view that *'auḍo* or *'auḍa* in the line of al-A'shā is derived from the name of the god, which Nöldeke finds to be "doch etwas bizarr," has at least the authority of Ibn al-Kalbī as cited by Jauharī, and more clearly in the *Lisān.* A god קינן bearing the same name as the antediluvian Cainan (Gen. v. 9) appears in Himyaritic inscriptions: *ZDMG.* xxxi. 86; *CIS.* iv. p. 20.

[1] Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* ii. 497 *sq.*

of gods men and beasts, a belief which has points of contact with the lowest forms of savage religion.

It is obvious that the idea of a physical affinity between the gods and men in general is more modern than that of affinity between particular gods and their worshippers; and the survival of the idea in a generalised form, after men's religion had ceased to be strictly dependent on tribal connection, is in itself a proof that belief in their descent from the blood of the gods was not confined to this or that clan, but was a widespread feature in the old tribal religions of the Semites, too deeply interwoven with the whole system of faith and practice to be altogether thrown aside when the community of the same worship ceased to be purely one of kinship.

That this was really the case will be seen more clearly when we come to speak of the common features of Semitic ritual, and especially of the ritual use of blood, which is the primitive symbol of kinship. Meantime let us observe that there is yet another form in which the idea of divine descent survived the breaking up of the tribal system among the northern Semites. When this took place, the worshippers of one god, being now men of different kindreds, united by political bonds instead of bonds of blood, could not be all thought of as children of the god. He was no longer their father but their king. But as the deities of a mixed community were in their origin the old deities of the more influential families, the members of these families might still trace their origin to the family god, and find in this pedigree matter of aristocratic pride. Thus royal and noble houses among the Greeks long continued to trace their stem back to a divine forefather, and the same thing appears among the Semites. We are told by Virgil and Silius Italicus,[1] that the royal house of Tyre

[1] *Æn.* i. 729; *Punica*, i. 87.

and the noblest families of Carthage claimed descent from the Tyrian Baal; among the Aramæan sovereigns of Damascus, mentioned in the Bible, we find more than one Ben-hadad, "son of the god Hadad," and at Zenjirli the king Bar-RKB seems from his name to claim descent from the god RKB-EL.[1] Among the later Aramæans names like Barlāhā, "son of God," Barba'shmīn, "son of the Lord of Heaven," Barate, "son of Ate," are not uncommon. At Palmyra we have Barnebo, "son of Nebo," Barshamsh, "son of the Sun-god"; and in Ezra ii. the eponym of a family of temple slaves is Barkos, "son of the god Caus." Whether any definite idea was attached to such names in later times is doubtful; perhaps their diffusion was due to the constant tendency of the masses to copy aristocratic names, which is as prevalent in the East as among ourselves.[2]

[1] For the god-sonship of Assyrian monarchs, see Tiele, *Babylonisch-Assyr. Gesch.* p. 492.

[2] Among the Hebrews and Phœnicians personal names of this type do not appear; we have, however, the woman's name בתבעל, "daughter of Baal," *CIS.* pt. i. Nos. 469, 727, etc. On the other hand, the worshipper is called brother (that is, kinsman) or sister of the god in such names as the Phœnician חמלך, חמלכת, חרם; חתמלך, חתמלכת, חתמלקרת, חחלת, חתנת, "sister of Tanith," and the Hebrew חיאל, אחיה. A singular and puzzling class of theophorous names are those which have the form of an Arabic *konya*; as Abibaal, "father of Baal." It has been common to evade the difficulty by rendering "my father is Baal"; but this view breaks down before such a woman's name as אמאשמן (*CIS.* No. 881), "mother of the god Eshmun." See Nöldeke in *ZDMG.* xlii. (1888) p. 480, who seems disposed to believe that "father" has here some metaphorical sense, comparing Gen. xlv. 8. For my own part I hazard the conjecture that the *konya* was in practice used as equivalent to the patronymic; the custom of calling the eldest son after the grandfather was so widespread that M, son of N, was pretty sure to be known also as M, father of N, and the latter, as the more polite form of address, might very well come to supersede the patronymic altogether. I think there are some traces of this in Arabic; the poet 'Amr b. Kolthum addresses the king 'Amr b. Hind as Abu Hind (Moall. l. 23). In Hebrew the prefixes אבי, אחי, חמו are used in forming names of women as well as men, and so in Phœnician Abibaal may be a woman's name (*CIS.* No. 378), as אבעלי, אבמלך are in Ḥimyaritic (*CIS.* pt. iv. Nos. 6, 85); but for this linguistic peculiarity Nöldeke has adduced satisfactory analogies.

The belief that all the members of a clan are sons and daughters of its god, might naturally be expected to survive longest in Arabia, where the tribe was never lost in the state, and kinship continued down to the time of Mohammed to be the one sacred bond of social unity. In point of fact many Arabian tribes bear the names of gods, or of celestial bodies worshipped as gods, and their members are styled "sons of Hobal," "sons of the Full Moon," and the like.[1] There is no adequate reason for refusing to explain these names, or at least the older ones among them, on the analogy of the similar clan-names found among the northern Semites; for Arabian ritual, as well as that of Palestine and Syria, involves in its origin a belief in the kinship of the god and his worshippers. In the later ages of Arabian heathenism, however, of which alone we have any full accounts, religion had come to be very much dissociated from tribal feeling, mainly, it would seem, in consequence of the extensive migrations which took place in the first centuries of our era, and carried tribes far away from the fixed sanctuaries of the gods of their fathers.[2] Men forgot their old worship, and as the names of gods were also used as individual proper names, the divine ancestor, even before Islam, had generally sunk to the rank of a mere man. But though the later Arabs worshipped gods that were not the gods of their fathers, and tribes of alien blood were often found gathered together on festival

[1] See *Kinship*, p. 241 *sqq.*, and Wellhausen, *Heidenthum*, p. 7 *sqq.*, who explains all such names as due to omission of the prefix *'Abd* or the like. In some cases this probably is so, but it must not be assumed that because the same tribe is called (for example) 'Auf or 'Abd 'Auf indifferently, Banu 'Auf is a contraction of Banu 'Abd 'Auf. It is quite logical that the sons of 'Auf form the collective body of his worshippers; cf. Mal. iii. 17; and for the collective use of *'abd* cf. *Ḥamāsa*, p. 312, first verse. Personal names indicating god-sonship are lacking in Arabia; see on supposed Sabæan examples, D. H. Müller, *ZDMG.* xxxvii. 12 *sq.*, 15.

[2] See Wellhausen, *ut supra*, p. 215 *sq.*, and compare 1 Sam. xxvi. 19.

occasions at the great pilgrim shrines, there are many evidences that all Arabic deities were originally the gods of particular kins, and that the bond of religion was originally coextensive with the bond of blood.

A main proof of this lies in the fact that the duties of blood were the only duties of absolute and indefeasible sanctity. The Arab warrior in the ages immediately preceding Islam was very deficient in religion in the ordinary sense of the word; he was little occupied with the things of the gods and negligent in matters of ritual worship. But he had a truly religious reverence for his clan, and a kinsman's blood was to him a thing holy and inviolable. This apparent paradox becomes at once intelligible when we view it in the light of the antique conception, that the god and his worshippers make up a society in which the same character of sanctity is impressed on the relations of the worshippers to one another as on their relations to their god. The original religious society was the kindred group, and all the duties of kinship were part of religion. And so even when the clan-god had fallen into the background and was little remembered, the type of a clan-religion was still maintained in the enduring sanctity of the kindred bond.[1]

Again, the primitive connection of religion with kindred is attested by the existence of priesthoods confined to men of one clan or family, which in many cases was of a

[1] When the oracle at Tabāla forbade the poet Imraulcais to make war on the slayers of his father, he broke the lot and dashed the pieces in the face of the god, exclaiming with a gross and insulting expletive, "If it had been thy father that was killed, thou wouldst not have refused me vengeance." The respect for the sanctity of blood overrides respect for a god who, by taking no interest in the poet's blood-feud, has shown that he has no feeling of kindred for the murdered man and his son. Imraulcais's act does not show that he was impious, but only that kinship was the principle of his religion. That with such principles he consulted the oracle of a strange god at all, is perhaps to be explained by the fact that his army was a miscellaneous band of hirelings and broken men of various tribes.

different blood from the class of the worshippers. Cases of this sort are common, not only among the Arabs,[1] but among the other Semites also, and generally throughout the ancient world. In such cases the priestly clan may often represent the original kindred group which was once in exclusive possession of the *sacra* of the god, and continued to administer them after worshippers from without were admitted to the religion.

And further, it will appear when we come to the subject of sacrifice, that when tribes of different blood worshipped at the same sanctuary and adored the same god, they yet held themselves apart from one another and did not engage in any common act that united them in religious fellowship. The circle of worship was still the kin, though the deity worshipped was not of the kin, and the only way in which two kindreds could form a religious fusion was by a covenant ceremony, in which it was symbolically set forth that they were no longer twain, but of one blood. It is clear, therefore, that among the Arabs the circle of religious solidarity was originally the group of kinsmen, and it needs no proof that, this being so, the god himself must have been conceived as united to his worshippers by the bond of blood, as their great kinsman, or more specifically as their great ancestor.

It is often said that the original Semitic conception of the godhead was abstract and transcendental; that while Aryan religion with its poetic mythology drew the gods down into the sphere of nature and of human life, Semitic religion always showed an opposite tendency, that it sought to remove the gods as far as possible from man, and even contained within itself from the first the seeds of an abstract deism. According to this view, the anthropomorphisms of Semitic religion, that is, all expres-

[1] Wellhausen, p. 130 *sq.*

sions which in their literal sense imply that the gods have a physical nature cognate to that of man, are explained away as mere allegory, and it is urged, in proof of the fundamental distinction between the Aryan and Semitic conceptions of the divine nature, that myths like those of the Aryans, in which gods act like men, mingle with men and in fact live a common life with mankind, have little or no place in Semitic religion. But all this is mere unfounded assumption. It is true that the remains of ancient Semitic mythology are not very numerous; but mythology cannot be preserved without literature, and an early literature of Semitic heathenism does not exist. The one exception is the cuneiform literature of Babylonia, and in it we find fragments of a copious mythology. It is true, also, that there is not much mythology in the poetry of heathen Arabia; but Arabian poetry has little to do with religion at all: it dates from the extreme decadence of the old heathenism, and is preserved to us only in the collections formed by Mohammedan scholars, who were careful to avoid or obliterate as far as possible the traces of their fathers' idolatry. That the Semites never had a mythological epic poetry comparable to that of the Greeks is admitted; but the character of the Semitic genius, which is deficient in plastic power and in the faculty of sustained and orderly effort, is enough to account for the fact. We cannot draw inferences for religion from the absence of an elaborate mythology; the question is whether there are not traces, in however crude a form, of the mythological point of view. And this question must be answered in the affirmative. I must not turn aside now to speak at large of Semitic myths, but it is to the point to observe that there do exist remains of myths, and not only of myths but of sacred usages, involving a conception of the divine beings and their relation with man which entirely

justifies us in taking the kinship of men with gods in its literal and physical sense, exactly as in Greece. In Greece the loves of the gods with the daughters of men were referred to remote antiquity, but in Babylon the god Bel was still, in the time of Herodotus, provided with a human wife, who spent the night in his temple and with whom
★ he was believed to share his couch.[1] In one of the few fragments of old mythology which have been transplanted unaltered into the Hebrew Scriptures, we read of the sons of gods who took wives of the daughters of men, and became the fathers of the renowned heroes of ancient days. Such a hero is the Gilgamesh of Babylonian myth, to whom the great goddess Ishtar did not disdain to offer her hand. Arabian tradition presents similar legends. The clan of ʿAmr b. Yarbūʿ was descended from a *siʾlāt*, or she-demon, who became the wife of their human father, but suddenly disappeared from him on seeing a flash of lightning.[2] In this connection the distinction between gods and demi-gods is immaterial; the demi-gods are of divine kind, though they have not attained to the full position of deities with a recognised circle of worshippers.[3]

There is then a great variety of evidence to show that the type of religion which is founded on kinship, and in which the deity and his worshippers make up a society united by the bond of blood, was widely prevalent, and

[1] Herod. i. 181 *sq.* This is not more realistic than the custom of providing the Hercules (Baal) of Sanbulos with a horse, on which he rode out to hunt by night (Tac. *Ann.* xii. 13; cf. *Gaz. Archéol.* 1879, p. 178 *sqq.*).

[2] Ibn Doreid, *Kitāb al-ishticāc*, p. 139. It is implied that the demoniac wife was of lightning kind. Elsewhere also the *siʾlāt* seems to be a fiery scorching being. In Ibn Hishām, p. 27, l. 14, the Abyssinian hosts resemble *Saʿālī* because they ravage the country with fire, and the green trees are scorched up before them. See also Rasmussen, *Addit.* p. 71, l. 19 of the Ar. text.

[3] Modern legends of marriage or courtship between men and jinn, Doughty, ii. 191 *sq.*; *ZDPV.* x. 84. Whether such marriages are lawful is solemnly discussed by Mohammedan jurists.

that at an early date, among all the Semitic peoples. But the force of the evidence goes further, and leaves no reasonable doubt that among the Semites this was the original type of religion, out of which all other types grew. That it was so is particularly clear as regards Arabia, where we have found the conception of the circle of worship and the circle of kindred as identical to be so deeply rooted that it dominated the practical side of religion, even after men worshipped deities that were not kindred gods. But among the other branches of the Semites also, the connection between religion and kinship is often manifested in forms that cannot be explained except by reference to a primitive stage of society, in which the circle of blood relations was also the circle of all religious and social unity. Nations, as distinguished from mere clans, are not constructed on the principle of kinship, and yet the Semitic nations habitually feigned themselves to be of one kin, and their national religions are deeply imbued, both in legend and in ritual, with the idea that the god and his worshippers are of one stock. This, I apprehend, is good evidence that the fundamental lines of all Semitic religion were laid down, long before the beginnings of authentic history, in that earliest stage of society when kinship was the only recognised type of permanent friendly relation between man and man, and therefore the only type on which it was possible to frame the conception of a permanent friendly relation between a group of men and a supernatural being. That all human societies have been developed from this stage is now generally recognised; and the evidence shows that amongst the Semites the historical forms of religion can be traced back to such a stage.

Recent researches into the history of the family render

it in the highest degree improbable that the physical kinship between the god and his worshippers, of which traces are found all over the Semitic area, was originally conceived as fatherhood. It was the mother's, not the father's, blood which formed the original bond of kinship among the Semites as among other early peoples, and in this stage of society, if the tribal deity was thought of as the parent of the stock, a goddess, not a god, would necessarily have been the object of worship. In point of fact, goddesses play a great part in Semitic religion, and that not merely in the subordinate *rôle* of wives of the gods; it is also noticeable that in various parts of the Semitic field we find deities originally female changing their sex and becoming gods, as if with the change in the rule of human kinship.[1] So long as kinship was traced through the mother alone, a male deity of common stock with his worshippers could only be their cousin, or, in the language of that stage of society, their brother. This in fact is the relationship between gods and men asserted by Pindar, when he ascribes to both alike a common mother Earth, and among the Semites a trace of the same point of view may be seen in the class of proper names which designate their bearers as "brother" or "sister" of a deity.[2] If this be so, we must distinguish the religious significance belonging to the wider and older conception of kinship between the deity and the race that worshipped him, from the special and more advanced ideas, conformed to a higher stage of social development, that were added when the kindred god came to be revered as a father.

Some of the most notable and constant features of all ancient heathenism, and indeed of all nature-religions,

[1] See *Kinship*, p. 298 *sqq.*, note E. I hope to return to this subject on a future opportunity.

[2] See above, p. 45, note 2.

from the totemism of savages upward, find their sufficient explanation in the physical kinship that unites the human and superhuman members of the same religious and social community, without reference to the special doctrine of divine fatherhood. From this point of view the natural solidarity of the god and his worshippers, which has been already enlarged upon as characteristic of antique religion, at once becomes intelligible; the indissoluble bond that unites men to their god is the same bond of blood-fellowship which in early society is the one binding link between man and man, and the one sacred principle of moral obligation. And thus we see that even in its rudest forms religion was a moral force; the powers that man reveres were on the side of social order and tribal law; and the fear of the gods was a motive to enforce the laws of society, which were also the laws of morality.

But though the earliest nature-religion was fully identified with the earliest morality, it was not fitted to raise morality towards higher ideals; and instead of leading the way in social and ethical progress, it was often content to follow or even to lag behind. Religious feeling is naturally conservative, for it is bound up with old custom and usage; and the gods, who are approached only in traditional ritual, and invoked as giving sanction to long-established principles of conduct, seem always to be on the side of those who are averse to change. Among the Semites, as among other races, religion often came to work against a higher morality, not because it was in its essence a power for evil, but because it clung to the obsolete ethical standard of a bygone stage of society. To our better judgment, for example, one of the most offensive features in tribal religion is its particularism; a man is held answerable to his god for wrong done to

a member of his own kindred or political community, but he may deceive, rob, or kill an alien without offence to religion; the deity cares only for his own kinsfolk. This is a very narrow morality, and we are tempted to call it sheer immorality. But such a judgment would be altogether false from an historical point of view. The larger morality which embraces all mankind has its basis in habits of loyalty, love, and self-sacrifice, which were originally formed and grew strong in the narrower circle of the family or the clan; and the part which the religion of kinship played in the development and maintenance of these habits, is one of the greatest services it has done to human progress. This service it was able to render because the gods were themselves members of the kin, and the man who was untrue to kindred duty had to reckon with them as with his human clansmen.

An eloquent French writer has recently quoted with approval, and applied to the beginnings of Semitic religion, ★ the words of Statius, *Primus in orbe deos fecit timor*,[1] "Man fancied himself surrounded by enemies whom he sought to appease." But however true it is that savage man feels himself to be environed by innumerable dangers which he does not understand, and so personifies as invisible or mysterious enemies of more than human power, it is not true that the attempt to appease these powers is the foundation of religion. From the earliest times, religion, as distinct from magic or sorcery, addresses itself to kindred and friendly beings, who may indeed be angry with their people for a time, but are always placable except to the enemies of their worshippers or to renegade members of the community. It is not with a vague fear of unknown powers, but with a loving reverence for known gods who are knit to their worshippers by strong bonds of kinship, that

[1] Renan, *Hist. d'Israel*, i. 29.

religion in the only true sense of the word begins. Religion in this sense is not the child of terror; and the difference between it and the savage's dread of unseen foes is as absolute and fundamental in the earliest as in the latest stages of development. It is only in times of social dissolution, as in the last age of the small Semitic states, when men and their gods were alike powerless before the advance of the Assyrians, that magical superstitions based on mere terror, or rites designed to conciliate alien gods, invade the sphere of tribal or national religion. In better times the religion of the tribe or state has nothing in common with the private and foreign superstitions or magical rites that savage terror may dictate to the individual. Religion is not an arbitrary relation of the individual man to a supernatural power, it is a relation of all the members of a community to a power that has the good of the community at heart, and protects its law and moral order. This distinction seems to have escaped some modern theorists, but it was plain enough to the common sense of antiquity, in which private and magical superstitions were habitually regarded as offences against morals and the state. It is not only in Israel that we find the suppression of magical rites to be one of the first cares of the founder of the kingdom, or see the introduction of foreign worships treated as a heinous crime. In both respects the law of Israel is the law of every well-ordered ancient community.

In the historical stage of Semitic religion the kinship of the deity with his or her people is specified as fatherhood or motherhood, the former conception predominating, in accordance with the later rule that assigned the son to his father's stock. Under the law of male kinship woman takes a subordinate place; the father is the natural head

of the family, and superior to the mother, and accordingly the chief place in religion usually belongs, not to a mother-goddess, but to a father-god. At the same time the conception of the goddess-mother was not unknown, and seems to be attached to cults which go back to the ages of polyandry and female kinship. The Babylonian Ishtar in her oldest form is such a mother-goddess, unmarried, or rather choosing her temporary partners at will, the queen head and firstborn of all gods.[1] She is the mother of the gods and also the mother of men, who, in the Chaldæan flood-legends, mourns over the death of her offspring. In like manner the Carthaginians worshipped a "great mother," who seems to be identical with Tanith-Artemis, the "heavenly virgin,"[2] and the Arabian Lāt was
★ worshipped by the Nabatæans as mother of the gods, and must be identified with the virgin-mother, whose worship at Petra is described by Epiphanius.[3]

[1] Tiele, *Babylonisch-Assyrische Gesch.* p. 528.

[2] אם רבת, *CIS.* Nos. 195, 380; cf. No. 177. The identification of Tanith with Artemis appears from No. 116, where עברתנת = Ἀρτεμίδωρος, and is confirmed by the prominence of the *virgo cœlestis* or *numen virginale* in the later cults of Punic Africa. The identification of the mother of the gods with the heavenly virgin, *i.e.* the unmarried goddess, is confirmed if not absolutely demanded by Aug. *Civ. Dei*, ii. 4. At Carthage she seems also to be identical with Dido, of whom as a goddess more in another connection. See Hoffmann, *Ueb. einige Phœn. Inschrr.* p. 32 *sq.* The foul type of worship corresponding to the conception of the goddess as polyandrous prevailed at Sicca Veneria, and Augustin speaks with indignation of the incredible obscenity of the songs that accompanied the worship of the Carthaginian mother-goddess; but perhaps this is not wholly to be set down as of Punic origin, for the general laxity on the point of female chastity in which such a type of worship originates has always been characteristic of North Africa (see Tissot, *La Prov. d'Afrique*, i. 477).

[3] De Vogüé, *Syr. Centr.* Inscr. Nab. No. 8; Epiph., *Panarium* 51 (ii. 483, Dind.), see *Kinship*, p. 298 *sq.* I am not able to follow the argument by which Wellh.[1], pp. 40, 46, seeks to invalidate the evidence as to the worship of a mother-goddess by the Nabatæans. He supposes that the Χαάβου, which Epiphanius represents as the virgin-mother of Dusares, is really nothing more than the cippus, or betyl, out of which the god was supposed to have been born, *i.e.* the image of the god himself, not a distinct deity. But from the time of Herodotus downwards, al-Lāt was worshipped in these regions

Originally, since men are of one stock with their gods, the mother of the gods must also have been, like Ishtar, the mother of men; but except in Babylonia and Assyria, where the kings at least continued to speak of themselves as the progeny of Ishtar, it is not clear that this idea was present to the Semitic worshipper when he addressed his goddess as the great mother. But if we may judge from analogy, and even from such modern analogies as are supplied by the cult of the Virgin Mary, we can hardly doubt that the use of a name appropriated to the tenderest and truest of human relationships was associated in acts of worship with feelings of peculiar warmth and trustful devotion. "Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the son of her womb? Yea, they may forget, yet will I not forget thee."[1] That such thoughts were not wholly foreign to Semitic heathenism appears, to give a single instance, from the

side by side with a god, and the evidence of De Vogüé's inscription and that of Epiphanius agree in making Lāt the mother and the god her son. Epiphanius implies that the virgin-mother was worshipped also at Elusa; and here Jerome, in his life of S. Hilarion, knows a temple of a goddess whom he calls Venus, and who was worshipped "ob Luciferum," on account of her connection with the morning star. Wellhausen takes this to mean that the goddess of Elusa was identified with the morning star; but that is impossible, for, in his comm. on Amos v., Jerome plainly indicates that the morning star was worshipped as a god, not as a goddess. This is the old Semitic conception; see Isa. xiv. 12, "Lucifer, son of the Dawn"; and in the Arabian poets, also, the planet Venus is masculine, as Wellhausen himself observes. I see no reason to believe that the Arabs of Nilus worshipped the morning star as a goddess; nor perhaps does the worship of this planet as a goddess (Al-'Ozzā) appear anywhere in Arabia, except among the Eastern tribes who came under the influence of the Assyrian Ishtar-worship, as it survived among the Aramæans. This point was not clear to me when I wrote my *Kinship*, and want of attention to it has brought some confusion into the argument. That the goddess of Elusa was Al-'Ozzā, as Wellh., p. 48, supposes, is thus very doubtful. Whether, as Tuch thought, her local name was Khalaṣa is also doubtful, but we must not reject the identification of Elusa with the place still called Khalaṣa; see Palmer, *Desert of the Exodus*, p. 423, compared with p. 550 *sqq.*

[1] Isa. xlix. 15.

language in which Assurbanipal appeals to Ishtar in his time of need, and in the oracle she sends to comfort him.[1]

But in this, as in all its aspects, heathenism shows its fundamental weakness, in its inability to separate the ethical motives of religion from their source in a merely naturalistic conception of the godhead and its relation to man. Divine motherhood, like the kinship of men and gods in general, was to the heathen Semites a physical fact, and the development of the corresponding cults and myths laid more stress on the physical than on the ethical side of maternity, and gave a prominence to sexual ideas which was never edifying, and often repulsive. Especially was this the case when the change in the law of kinship deprived the mother of her old pre-eminence in the family, and transferred to the father the greater part of her authority and dignity. This change, as we know, went
★ hand in hand with the abolition of the old polyandry; and as women lost the right to choose their own partners at will, the wife became subject to her husband's lordship, and her freedom of action was restrained by his jealousy, at the same time that her children became, for all purposes of inheritance and all duties of blood, members of his and not of her kin. So far as religion kept pace with the new laws of social morality due to this development, the independent divine mother necessarily became the subordinate partner of a male deity; and so the old polyandrous Ishtar reappears in Canaan and elsewhere as Astarte, the wife of the supreme Baal. Or if the supremacy of the goddess was too well established to be thus undermined, she might change her sex, as in Southern Arabia, where Ishtar is transformed into the masculine

★ [1] George Smith, *Assurbanipal*, p. 117 *sqq.*; *Records of the Past*, ix. 51 *sqq.*

'Athtar. But not seldom religious tradition refused to move forward with the progress of society; the goddess retained her old character as a mother who was not a wife bound to fidelity to her husband, and at her sanctuary she protected, under the name of religion, the sexual licence of savage society, or even demanded of the daughters of her worshippers a shameful sacrifice of their chastity, before they were permitted to bind themselves for the rest of their lives to that conjugal fidelity which their goddess despised.

The emotional side of Semitic heathenism was always very much connected with the worship of female deities, partly through the associations of maternity, which appealed to the purest and tenderest feelings, and partly through other associations connected with woman, which too often appealed to the sensuality so strongly developed in the Semitic race. The feelings called forth when the deity was conceived as a father were on the whole of an austerer kind, for the distinctive note of fatherhood, as distinguished from kinship in general, lay mainly in the parental authority, in the father's claim to be honoured and served by his son. The honour which the fifth commandment requires children to pay to their fathers is named in Mal. i. 6 along with that which a servant owes to his master, and the same prophet (iii. 17) speaks of the considerate regard which a father shows for "the son that serveth him." To this day the grown-up son in Arabia serves his father in much the same offices as the domestic slave, and approaches him with much the same degree of reverence and even of constraint. It is only with his little children that the father is effusively affectionate and on quite easy terms. On the other hand, the father's authority had not a despotic character. He had no such power of life and death over his sons as

Roman law recognised,[1] and indeed, after they passed beyond childhood, had no means of enforcing his authority if they refused to respect it. Paradoxical as this may seem, it is quite in harmony with the general spirit of Semitic institutions that authority should exist and be generally acknowledged without having any force behind it except the pressure of public opinion. The authority of an Arab sheikh is in the same position; and when an Arab judge pronounces sentence on a culprit, it is at the option of the latter whether he will pay the fine, which is the invariable form of penalty, or continue in feud with his accuser.

Thus, while the conception of the tribal god as father ★ introduces into religion the idea of divine authority, of reverence and service due from the worshipper to the deity, it does not carry with it any idea of the strict and rigid enforcement of divine commands by supernatural sanctions. The respect paid by the Semite to his father is but the respect which he pays to kindred, focussed upon a single representative person, and the father's authority is only a special manifestation of the authority of the kin, which can go no further than the whole kin is prepared to back it. Thus, in the sphere of religion, the god, as father, stands by the majority of the tribe in enforcing tribal law against refractory members: outlawry, which is the only punishment ordinarily applicable to a clansman, carries with it excommunication from religious communion, and the man who defies tribal law has to fear

[1] See Deut. xxi. 18, where the word "chastened" should rather be "admonished." The powerlessness of Jacob to restrain his grown-up sons is not related as a proof that he was weak, but shows that a father had no means of enforcing his authority. The law of Deuteronomy can hardly have been carried into practice. In Prov. xxx. 17 disobedience to parents is cited as a thing which brings a man to a bad end, not as a thing punished by law. That an Arab father could do no more than argue with his son, and bring tribal opinion to bear on him, appears from *Agh.* xix 102 *sq.*

the god as well as his fellow-men. But in all minor matters, where outlawry is out of the question, the long-suffering tolerance which tribesmen in early society habitually extend to the offences of their fellow-tribesmen is ascribed also to the god; he does not willingly break with any of his worshippers, and accordingly a bold and wilful man does not hesitate to take considerable liberties with the paternal deity. As regards his worshippers at large, it appears scarcely conceivable, from the point of view of tribal religion, that the god can be so much displeased with anything they do that his anger can go beyond a temporary estrangement, which is readily terminated by their repentance, or even by a mere change of humour on the part of the god, when his permanent affection for his own gets the better of his momentary displeasure, as it is pretty sure to do if he sees them to be in straits, *e.g.* to be hard pressed by their and his enemies. On the whole, men live on very easy terms with their tribal god, and his paternal authority is neither strict nor exacting.

This is a very characteristic feature of heathen religion, and one which does not disappear when the god of the community comes to be thought of as king rather than as father. The inscription of King Mesha, for example, tells us that Chemosh was angry with his people, and suffered Israel to oppress Moab; and then again that Chemosh fought for Moab, and delivered it from the foe. There is no explanation offered of the god's change of mind; it appears to be simply taken for granted that he was tired of seeing his people put to the worse. In like manner the mass of the Hebrews before the exile received with blank incredulity the prophetic teaching, that Jehovah was ready to enforce His law of righteousness even by the destruction of the sinful commonwealth of Israel. To the

prophets Jehovah's long-suffering meant the patience with which He offers repeated calls to repentance, and defers punishment while there is hope of amendment; but to the heathen, and to the heathenly-minded in Israel, the long-suffering of the gods meant a disposition to overlook the offences of their worshippers.

To reconcile the forgiving goodness of God with His absolute justice, is one of the highest problems of spiritual religion, which in Christianity is solved by the doctrine of the atonement. It is important to realise that in heathenism this problem never arose in the form in which the New Testament deals with it, not because the gods of the heathen were not conceived as good and gracious, but because they were not absolutely just. This lack of strict justice, however, is not to be taken as meaning that the gods were in their nature unjust, when measured by the existing standards of social righteousness; as a rule they were conceived as sympathising with right conduct, but not as rigidly enforcing it in every case. To us, who are accustomed to take an abstract view of the divine attributes, this is difficult to conceive, but it seemed perfectly natural when the divine sovereignty was conceived as a kingship precisely similar to human kingship.

In its beginnings, human kingship was as little absolute as the authority of the fathers and elders of the clan, for it was not supported by an executive organisation sufficient to carry out the king's sentence of justice or constrain obedience to his decrees. The authority of the prince was moral rather than physical; his business was to guide rather than to dictate the conduct of his free subjects, to declare what was just rather than to enforce it.[1]

[1] In Aramaic the root MLK (from which the common Semitic word for "king" is derived) means "to advise"; and in Arabic the word *Amîr*, "commander," "prince," also means "adviser"; 'Orwa b. al-Ward, i. 16, and *schol.*

Thus the limitations of royal power went on quite an opposite principle from that which underlies a modern limited monarchy. With us the king or his government is armed with the fullest authority to enforce law and justice, and the limitations of his power lie in the independence of the legislature and the judicial courts. The old Semitic king, on the contrary, was supreme judge, and his decrees were laws, but neither his sentences nor his decrees could take effect unless they were supported by forces over which he had very imperfect control. He simply threw his weight into the scale, a weight which was partly due to the moral effect of his sentence, and partly to the material resources which he commanded, not so much *quâ* king as in the character of a great noble and the head of a powerful circle of kinsfolk and clients. An energetic sovereign, who had gained wealth and prestige by successful wars, or inherited the resources accumulated by a line of kingly ancestors, might wield almost despotic power, and in a stable dynasty the tendency was towards the gradual establishment of absolute monarchy, especially if the royal house was able to maintain a standing army devoted to its interests. But a pure despotism of the modern Eastern type probably had not been reached by any of the small kingdoms that were crushed by the Assyrian empire, and certainly the ideas which underlay the conception of divine sovereignty date from an age when the human kingship was still in a rudimentary state, when its executive strength was very limited, and the sovereign was in no way held responsible for the constant maintenance of law and order in all parts of his realm. In most matters of internal order he was not expected to interfere unless directly appealed to by one or other party in a dispute, and even then it was not certain that the party in whose favour he decided would

not be left to make good his rights with the aid of his own family connections. So loose a system of administration did not offer a pattern on which to frame the conception of a constant unremitting divine providence, overlooking no injustice and suffering no right to be crushed; the national god might be good and just, but was not continually active or omnipresent in his activity. But we are not to suppose that this remissness was felt to be a defect in the divine character. The Semitic nature is impatient of control, and has no desire to be strictly governed either by human or by divine authority. A god who could be reached when he was wanted, but usually left men pretty much to themselves, was far more acceptable than one whose ever watchful eye can neither be avoided nor deceived. What the Semitic communities asked, and believed themselves to receive, from their god as king lay mainly in three things: help against their enemies, counsel by oracles or soothsayers in matters of national difficulty, and a sentence of justice when a case was too hard for human decision. The valour, the wisdom, and the justice of the nation looked to him as their head, and were strengthened by his support in time of need. For the rest it was not expected that he should always be busy righting human affairs. In ordinary matters it was men's business to help themselves and their own kinsfolk, though the sense that the god was always near, and could be called upon at need, was a moral force continually working in some degree for the maintenance of social righteousness and order. The strength of this moral force was indeed very uncertain, for it was always possible for the evil-doer to flatter himself that his offence would be overlooked; but even so uncertain an influence of religion over conduct was of no little use in the slow and difficult process of the consolidation of an orderly society out of barbarism.

As a social and political force, in the earlier stages of Semitic society, antique religion cannot be said to have failed in its mission; but it was too closely modelled on the traditional organisation of the family and the nation to retain a healthful vitality when the social system was violently shattered. Among the northern Semites the age of Assyrian conquest proved as critical for religious as for civil history, for from that time forward the old religion was quite out of touch with the actualities of social life, and became almost wholly mischievous. But apart from the Assyrian catastrophe, there are good reasons to think that in the eighth century B.C. the national religion of the northern Semites had already passed its prime, and was sinking into decadence. The moral springs of conduct which it touched were mainly connected with the first needs of a rude society, with the community's instinct of self-preservation. The enthusiasm of religion was seen only in times of peril, when the nation, under its divine head, was struggling for national existence. In times of peace and prosperity, religion had little force to raise man above sensuality and kindle him to right and noble deeds. Except when the nation was in danger, it called for no self-denial, and rather encouraged an easy sluggish indulgence in the good things that were enjoyed under the protection of the national god. The evils that slowly sap society, the vices that at first sight seem too private to be matters of national concern, the disorders that accompany the increase and unequal distribution of wealth, the relaxation of moral fibre produced by luxury and sensuality, were things that religion hardly touched at all, and that the easy, indulgent god could hardly be thought to take note of. The God who could deal with such evils was the God of the prophets, no mere Oriental king raised to a throne in heaven, but the just and jealous

God, whose eyes are in every place, beholding the evil and the good, who is of purer eyes than to behold evil, and cannot look upon iniquity.[1]

In what precedes I have thought it convenient to assume for the moment, without breaking the argument by pausing to offer proof, that among the Semitic peoples which got beyond the mere tribal stage and developed a tolerably organised state, the supreme deity was habitually thought of as king. The definitive proof that this was really so must be sought in the details of religious practice, to which we shall come by and by, and in which we shall find indicated a most realistic conception of the divine kingship. Meantime some proofs of a different character may be briefly indicated. In the Old Testament the kingship of Jehovah is often set forth as the glory of Israel, but never in such terms as to suggest that the idea of divine kingship was peculiar to the Hebrews. On the contrary, other nations are "the kingdoms of the false gods."[2] In two exceptional cases a pious judge or a prophet appears to express the opinion that Jehovah's sovereignty is inconsistent with human kingship,[3] such as existed in the surrounding nations; but this difficulty was never felt by the mass of the Israelites, nor even by the prophets in the regal period, and it was certainly not felt by Israel's neighbours. If a son could be crowned in the lifetime of his father, as was done in the case of Solomon, or could act for his father as Jotham acted for Uzziah,[4] there was no difficulty in looking on the human king as the viceroy of the divine sovereign, who, as we have seen, was often believed to be the father of the royal race, and so to lend a certain sanctity to the dynasty. Accordingly we find that the Tyrian Baal bears the title of Melcarth, "king of

[1] Prov. xv. 3; Hab. i. 13.
[2] Isa. x. 10.
[3] Judg. viii. 23; 1 Sam. xii. 12.
[4] 1 Kings i. 32 *sqq.*; 2 Kings xv. 5.

the city," or more fully, "our lord Melcarth, the Baal of Tyre,"[1] and this sovereignty was acknowledged by the Carthaginian colonists when they paid tithes at his temple in the mother city; for in the East tithes are the king's due.[2] Similarly the supreme god of the Ammonites was Milkom or Malkam, which is only a variation of Melek, "king." The familiar Moloch or Molech is the same thing in a distorted pronunciation, due to the scruples of the later Jews, who furnished the consonants of the word MLK with the vowels of *bosheth*, "shameful thing," whenever it was to be understood as the title of a false god. In Babylonia and Assyria the application of royal titles to deities is too common to call for special exemplification. Again, we have Malakhbel, "King Bel," as the great god of the Aramæans of Palmyra; but in this and other examples of later date it is perhaps open to suppose that the kingship of the supreme deity means his sovereignty over other gods rather than over his worshippers. On the other hand, a large mass of evidence can be drawn from proper names of religious significance, in which the god of the worshipper is designated as king. Such names were as common among the Phœnicians and Assyrians as they were among the Israelites,[3] and are

[1] *CIS.* No. 122.

[2] Diod. xx. 14; and for the payment of tithes to the king, 1 Sam. viii. 15, 17; Aristotle, *Œcon.* ii. p. 1352 *b* of the Berlin ed., cf. p. 1345 *b*.

[3] אהלמלך, *CIS.* No. 50, cf. אהלבעל, No. 54; יחומלך, King of Byblus, No. 1, cf. יחובעל, No. 69; מלכיתן, Nos. 10, 16, etc., cf. בעליתן, No. 78; רשפיתן, No. 44; עבדמלך, No. 46, cf. עבדאסר, עבדאשמן, etc.; עזמלך, Nos. 189, 219, 386, cf. עזבעל, on a coin of Byblus, Head, p. 668. The title of מלכת, "queen," for Astarte is seen probably in חמלכת, חתמלכת (*supra*, p. 45, note 2), and more certainly in מתמלכת, "handmaid of the queen," cf. מתעשתרת, No. 83, and in נעמלכת, "favour of the queen," No. 41. For Assyrian names of similar type see Schrader in *ZDMG.* xxvi. 140 *sqq.*, where also an Edomite king's name on a cylinder of Sennacherib is read Malik-ramu, "the (divine) king, is exalted." ★

found even among the Arabs of the Syrian and Egyptian frontier.[1]

Where the god is conceived as a king, he will naturally be addressed as lord, and his worshippers will be spoken of as his subjects, and so we find as divine titles Adōn, "lord" (whence Adonis = the god Tammuz), and Rabbath, "lady" (as a title of Tanith), among the Phœnicians, with corresponding phrases among other nations,[2] while in all parts of the Semitic field the worshipper calls himself the servant or slave (*ʿabd*, *ʿebed*) of his god, just as a subject does in addressing his king. The designation "servant" is much affected by worshippers, and forms the basis of a large number of theophorous proper names—ʿAbd-Eshmun "servant of Eshmun," ʿAbd-Baal, ʿAbd-Osir, etc. At first sight this designation seems to point to a more rigid conception of divine kingship than I have presented, for it is only under a strict despotism that the subject is the slave of the monarch; nay, it has been taken as a fundamental distinction between Semitic religion and that of the Greeks, that in the one case the relation of man to his god is servile, while in the other it is not so. But this conclusion rests on the neglect of a nicety of language, a refinement of Semitic politeness. When a man addresses any superior he calls him "my lord," and speaks of himself and others as "thy servants,"[3] and this form of politeness is

[1] *E.g.* Κοσμαλαχος, Ἑλμαλαχος, "Cos, El is king," *Rev. Arch.* 1870, pp. 115, 117; Schrader (see *KAT.* p. 473) reads Kausmalak as the name of an Edomite king on an inscription of Tiglathpileser. For the god Caus, or Cos, see Wellhausen, *Heidenthum*, p. 67; cf. *ZDMG.* 1887, p. 714.

[2] *E.g.* Nabatæan *Rab*, "Lord," in the proper name רבאל (Euting, 21. 3, 21. 14; Waddington, 2152, 2189, 2298), and at Gaza the god Marna, that is, "our Lord," both on coins (Head, p. 680), and in M. Diaconus, *Vita Porphyrii*, § 19; also at Kerak, Wadd. 2412 *g*.

[3] This holds good for Hebrew and Aramaic; also for Phœnician (Schröder, *Phön. Spr.* p. 18, n. 5); and even in Arabia an old poet says: "I am the slave of my guest as long as he is with me, but save in this there is no trace of the slave in my nature" (*Ḥamāsa*, p. 727).

naturally *de rigueur* in presence of the king; but where the king is not addressed, his "servants" mean his courtiers that are in personal attendance on him, or such of his subjects as are actually engaged in his service, for example, his soldiers. In the Old Testament this usage is constant, and the king's servants are often distinguished from the people at large. And so the servants of Jehovah are sometimes the prophets, who hold a special commission from Him; at other times, as often in the Psalms, His worshipping people assembled at the temple; and at other times, as in Deutero-Isaiah, His true servants as distinguished from the natural Israel, who are His subjects only in name. In short, both in the political and in the religious sphere, the designation *'abd*, *'ebed*, "servant," is strictly correlated with the verb *'abad*, "to do service, homage, or religious worship," a word which, as we have already seen, is sufficiently elastic to cover the service which a son does for his father, as well as that which a master requires from his slave.[1] Thus, when a man is named the servant of a god, the implication appears to be, not merely that he belongs to the community of which the god is king, but that he is specially devoted to his service and worship. Like other theophorous names, compounds with *'abd* seem to have been originally most common in royal and priestly families, whose members naturally claimed a special interest in religion and a constant nearness to the god; and in later times, when a man's particular worship was not rigidly defined by his national connection, they served to specify the cult to which he was particularly attached, or the patron to whom his parents dedicated him. That the use of such names was not connected with the

[1] *Supra*, p. 60. Primarily עבד is "to work," and in Aramaic "to make, to do." Ancient worship is viewed as work or service, because it consists in material operations (sacrifice). The same connection of ideas appears in the root פלח and in the Greek *ῥίζαν δοῦναι*.

idea of slavery to a divine despot is pretty clear from their frequency among the Arabs, who had very loose ideas of all authority, whether human or divine. Among the Arabs, indeed, as among the old Hebrews, the relation of the subject to his divine chief is often expressed by names of another class. Of King Saul's sons two were named Ishbaal and Meribaal, both meaning "man of Baal," *i.e.* of Jehovah, who in these early days was called Baal without offence; among the Arabs of the Syrian frontier we have Amriel, "man of El," Amrishams, "man of the Sun-god," and others like them;[1] and in Arabia proper Imraulcais, "the man of Cais," Shai' al-Lāt, "follower, comrade of Lāt," Anas al-Lāt, all expressive of the relation of the free warrior to his chief.

That the Arabs, like their northern congeners, thought of deity as lordship or chieftainship is proved not only by such proper names, and by the titles *rab*, *rabbi*, "lord," "lady," given to their gods and goddesses, but especially by the history of the foundation of Islam. In his quality of prophet, Mohammed became a judge, lawgiver, and captain, not of his own initiative, but because the Arabs of different clans were willing to refer to a divine authority questions of right and precedence in which they would not yield to one another.[2] They brought their difficulties to the prophet as the Israelites did to Moses, and his decisions became the law of Islam, as those of Moses were the foundation of the Hebrew Torah. But up to the time of the prophet the practical development of the idea of divine kingship among the nomadic Arabs was very elementary and inadequate, as was to be expected in a society which had never taken kindly to the institution of human king-

[1] Nöldeke, *Sitzungsb. Berl. Ak.* 1880, p. 768; Wellhausen, *Heidenthum*, p. 5.

[2] For the god as giver of decisions, compare the name *farrād*, borne by an idol of the Sa'd al-'ashīra (Ibn Sa'd, ed. Wellh. No. 124 *b*).

ship. In the prosperous days of Arabian commerce, when the precious wares of the far East reached the Mediterranean chiefly by caravan from Southern Arabia, there were settled kingdoms in several parts of the peninsula. But after the sea-route to India was opened, these kingdoms were broken up and almost the whole country fell back into anarchy. The nomads proper often felt the want of a controlling authority that would put an end to the incessant tribal and clan feuds, but their pride and impatience of control never permitted them to be long faithful to the authority of a stranger; while, on the other hand, the exaggerated feeling for kindred made it quite certain that a chief chosen at home would not deal with an even hand between his own kinsman and a person of different blood. Thus, after the fall of the Yemenite and Nabatæan kingdoms, which drew their strength from commerce, there was no permanently successful attempt to consolidate a body of several tribes into a homogeneous state, except under Roman or Persian suzerainty. The decay of the power of religion in the peninsula in the last days of Arab heathenism presents a natural parallel to this condition of political disintegration. The wild tribesmen had lost the feeling of kinship with their tribal gods, and had not learned to yield steady submission and obedience to any power dissociated from kinship. Their religion sat as loose on them as their allegiance to this or that human king whom for a season they might find it convenient to obey, and they were as ready to renounce their deities in a moment of petulance and disgust as to transfer their service from one petty sovereign to another.[1]

[1] Religion had more strength in towns like Mecca and Ṭāif, where there was a sanctuary, and the deity lived in the midst of his people, and was honoured by stated and frequent acts of worship. So under Islam, the Bedouins have never taken kindly to the laws of the Coran, and live in entire neglect of the most simple ordinances of religion, while the townsmen

Up to this point we have considered the conception, or rather the institution, of divine sovereignty as based on the fundamental type of Semitic kingship, when the nation was still made up of free tribesmen, retaining their tribal organisation and possessing the sense of personal dignity and independence engendered by the tribal system, where all clansmen are brothers, and where each man feels that his brethren need him and that he can count on the help of his brethren. There is no principle so levelling as the law of blood-revenge, which is the basis of the tribal system, for here the law is man for man, whether in defence or in offence, without respect of persons. In such a society the king is a guiding and moderating force rather than an imperial power; he is the leader under whom men of several tribes unite for common action, and the arbiter in cases of difficulty or of irreconcilable dispute between two kindreds, when neither will humble itself before the other. The kingship, and therefore the godhead, is not a principle of absolute order and justice, but it is a principle of higher order and more impartial justice than can be realised where there is no other law than the obligation of blood. As the king waxes stronger, and is better able to enforce his will by active interference in his subjects' quarrels, the standard of right is gradually raised above the consideration which disputant has the strongest kin to back him, for it is the glory of the sovereign to vindicate the cause of the weak, if only because by so doing he shows himself to be stronger than the strong. And as the god, though not conceived as omnipotent, is at least conceived as much stronger than man, he becomes in a special measure the champion of right against might, the protector

are in their way very devout. Much of this religion is hypocrisy; but so it was, to judge by the accounts of the conversion of the Thaqīf at Ṭāif, even in the time of Mohammed. Religion was a matter of custom, of keeping up appearances.

of the poor, the widow and the fatherless, of the man who has no helper on earth.

Now it is matter of constant observation in early history that the primitive equality of the tribal system tends in progress of time to transform itself into an aristocracy of the more powerful kins, or of the more powerful families within one kin. That is, the smaller and weaker kins are content to place themselves in a position of dependence on their more powerful neighbours in order to secure their protection; or even within one and the same kin men distinguish between their nearer and more distant cousins, and, as wealth begins to be unequally distributed, the great man's distant and poor relation has to be content with a distant and supercilious patronage, and sinks into a position of inferiority. The kingship is the one social force that works against this tendency, for it is the king's interest to maintain a balance of power, and prevent the excessive aggrandisement of noble families that might compete with his own authority. Thus even for selfish reasons the sovereign is more and more brought into the position of the champion of the weak against the strong, of the masses against the aristocracy. Generally speaking, the struggle between king and nobles to which these conditions give rise ended differently in the East and in the West. In Greece and Rome the kingship fell before the aristocracy; in Asia the kingship held its own, till in the larger states it developed into despotism, or in the smaller ones it was crushed by a foreign despotism. This diversity of political fortune is reflected in the diversity of religious development. For as the national god did not at first supersede tribal and family deities any more than the king superseded tribal and family institutions, the tendency of the West, where the kingship succumbed, was towards a divine aristocracy of many gods, only modified by a weak

reminiscence of the old kingship in the not very effective sovereignty of Zeus, while in the East the national god tended to acquire a really monarchic sway. What is often described as the natural tendency of Semitic religion
★ towards ethical monotheism, is in the main nothing more than a consequence of the alliance of religion with monarchy. For however corrupt the actual kingships of the East became, the ideal of the kingship as a source of even-handed justice throughout the whole nation, without respect of persons, was higher than the ideal of aristocracy, in which each noble is expected to favour his own family even at the expense of the state or of justice; and it is on the ideal, rather than on the actual, that religious conceptions are based, if not in ordinary minds, at least in the minds of more thoughtful and pious men. At the same time the idea of absolute and ever-watchful divine justice, as we find it in the prophets, is no more natural to the East than to the West, for even the ideal Semitic king is, as we have seen, a very imperfect earthly providence, and moreover he has a different standard of right for his own people and for strangers. The prophetic idea that Jehovah will vindicate the right even in the destruction of His own people of Israel, involves an ethical standard as foreign to Semitic as to Aryan tradition. Thus, as regards their ethical tendency, the difference between Eastern and Western religion is one of degree rather than of principle; all that we can say is that the East was better prepared to receive the idea of a god of absolute righteousness, because its political institutions and history, and, not least, the enormous gulf between the ideal and the reality of human sovereignty, directed men's minds to appreciate the need of righteousness more strongly, and accustomed them to look to a power of monarchic character as its necessary source. A similar judgment must be passed on the supposed mono-

theistic tendency of the Semitic as opposed to the Hellenic or Aryan system of religion. Neither system, in its natural development, can fairly be said to have come near to monotheism; the difference touched only the equality or subordination of divine powers. But while in Greece the idea of the unity of God was a philosophical speculation, without any definite point of attachment to actual religion, the monotheism of the Hebrew prophets kept touch with the ideas and institutions of the Semitic race by conceiving the one true God as the king of absolute justice, the national God of Israel, who at the same time was, or rather was destined to become, the God of all the earth, not merely because His power was world-wide, but because as the perfect ruler He could not fail to draw all nations to do Him homage (Isa. ii. 2 *sqq.*).

When I speak of the way in which the prophets conceived of Jehovah's sovereignty, as destined to extend itself beyond Israel and over all the earth, I touch on a feature common to all Semitic religions, which must be explained and defined before we can properly understand wherein the prophets transcended the common sphere of Semitic thought, and which indeed is necessary to complete our view of the ultimate development of the Semitic religions as tribal and national institutions.

From a very early date the Semitic communities embraced, in addition to the free tribesmen of pure blood (Heb. *ezrāḥ*, Arab. *ṣarīḥ*) with their families and slaves, a class of men who were personally free but had no political rights, viz. the protected strangers (Heb. *gērīm*, sing. *gēr*; Arab. *jīrān*, sing. *jār*), of whom mention is so often made both in the Old Testament and in early Arabic literature. The *gēr* was a man of another tribe or district, who, coming to sojourn in a place where he was not strengthened by the presence of his own kin, put himself under the pro-

tection of a clan or of a powerful chief. From the earliest times of Semitic life the lawlessness of the desert, in which every stranger is an enemy, has been tempered by the principle that the guest is inviolable. A man is safe in the midst of enemies as soon as he enters a tent or even touches the tent rope.[1] To harm a guest, or to refuse him hospitality, is an offence against honour, which covers the perpetrator with indelible shame. The bond of hospitality among the Arabs is temporary; the guest is entertained for a night or at most for three days,[2] and the protection which the host owes to him expires after three days more.[3] But more permanent protection is seldom refused to a stranger who asks for it,[4] and when granted by any tribesman it binds the whole tribe. The obligation thus constituted is one of honour, and not enforced by any human sanction except public opinion, for if the stranger is wronged he has no kinsmen to fight for him. And for this very reason it is a sacred obligation, which among the old Arabs was often confirmed by oath at a sanctuary, and could not be renounced except by a formal act at the same holy place,[5] so that the god himself became the protector of the stranger's cause. The protected stranger did not necessarily give up his old worship any more than he gave up his old kindred, and in the earliest times it is not to be supposed that he was admitted to full communion in the religion of his protectors, for religion went with political rights. But it was natural that he should acknowledge in some degree the god of the land in which he lived, and indeed, since the stated exercises of religion were confined

★ [1] See further, *Kinship*, pp. 48–52.

[2] This is the space prescribed by the traditions of the prophet, Harīrī (De Sacy's 2nd ed. p. 177; cf. Sharīshī, i. 242). A viaticum sufficient for a day's journey should be added; all beyond this is not duty but alms.

[3] Burckhardt, *Bedouins and Wahábys*, i. 336.

[4] Burckhardt, *op. cit.* i. 174.

[5] Ibn Hishām, p. 243 *sqq.*; *Kinship*, p. 51.

to certain fixed sanctuaries, the man who was far from his old home was also far from his own god, and sooner or later could hardly fail to become a dependent adherent of the cult of his patrons, though not with rights equal to theirs. Sometimes, indeed, the god was the direct patron of the *gēr*, a thing easily understood when we consider that a common motive for seeking foreign protection was the fear of the avenger of blood, and that there was a right of asylum at sanctuaries. From a Phœnician inscription found near Larnaca, which gives the monthly accounts of a temple, we learn that the *gērīm* formed a distinct class in the *personnel* of the sanctuary, and received certain allowances,[1] just as we know from Ezek. xliv. that much of the service of the first temple was done by uncircumcised foreigners. This notion of the temple-client, the man who lives in the precincts of the sanctuary under the special protection of the god, is used in a figurative sense in Ps. xv., "Who shall sojourn (*yāgūr*, *i.e.* live as a *gēr*) in Thy tabernacle?" and similarly the Arabs give the title of *jār allāh* to one who resides in Mecca beside the Caaba.

The importance of this occasional reception of strangers was not great so long as the old national divisions remained untouched, and the proportion of foreigners in any community was small. But the case became very different when the boundaries of nations were changed by the migration of tribes, or by the wholesale deportations that were part of the policy of the Assyrians towards conquered countries where their arms had met with strenuous resistance. In such circumstances it was natural for the newcomers to seek admission to the sanctuaries of the "god of the land,"[2] which they were able to do by presenting themselves as his clients. In such a case the clients of

[1] *CIS.* No. 86.

[2] 2 Kings xvii. 26.

the god were not necessarily in a position of political dependence on his old worshippers, and the religious sense of the term *gēr* became detached from the idea of social inferiority. But the relation of the new worshippers to the god was no longer the same as on the old purely national system. It was more dependent and less permanent; it was constituted, not by nature and inherited privilege, but by submission on the worshipper's side and free bounty on the side of the god; and in every way it tended to make the relation between man and god more distant, to make men fear the god more and throw more servility into their homage, while at the same time the higher feelings of devotion were quickened by the thought that the protection and favour of the god was a thing of free grace and not of national right. How important this change was may be judged from the Old Testament, where the idea that the Israelites are Jehovah's clients, sojourning in a land where they have no rights of their own, but are absolutely dependent on His bounty, is one of the most characteristic notes of the new and more timid type of piety that distinguishes post-exilic Judaism from the religion of Old Israel.[1] In the old national religions a man felt sure of his standing with the national god, unless he forfeited it by a distinct breach of social law; but the client is accepted, so to speak, on his good behaviour, an idea which precisely accords with the anxious legality of Judaism after the captivity.

In Judaism the spirit of legality was allied with genuine moral earnestness, as we see in the noble description of the character that befits Jehovah's *gēr* drawn in Ps. xv.; but among the heathen Semites we find the same spirit of legalism, the same timid uncertainty as to a man's standing

[1] Lev. xxv. 23; Ps. xxxix. 12 [Heb. 13]; Ps. cxix. 19; 1 Chron. xxix. 15.

with the god whose protection he seeks, while the conception of what is pleasing to the deity has not attained the same ethical elevation. The extent to which, in the disintegration of the old nationalities of the East and the constant movements of population due to political disturbance, men's religion detached itself from their local and national connections, is seen by the prevalence of names in which a man is designated the client of the god. In Phœnician inscriptions we find a whole series of men's names compounded with *Gēr*,—Germelkarth, Gerastart, and so forth,—and the same type recurs among the Arabs of Syria in the name Gairelos or Gerelos, "client of El."[1] In ★ Arabia proper, where the relation of protector and protected had a great development, and whole clans were wont to attach themselves as dependants to a more powerful tribe, the conception of god and worshipper as patron and client appears to have been specially predominant, not merely because dependent clans took up the religion of the patrons with whom they took refuge, but because of the frequent shiftings of the tribes. Wellhausen has noted that the hereditary priesthoods of Arabian sanctuaries were often in the hands of families that did not belong to the tribe of the worshippers, but apparently were descended from older inhabitants;[2] and in such cases the modern worshippers were really only clients of a foreign god. So, in fact, at the great Sabæan pilgrimage shrine of Riyām, the god Ta'lab is adored as "patron," and his worshippers are called his clients.[3] To the same conception may be assigned the proper name Salm, "submission," shortened from such theophorous forms as the Palmyrene Salm al-Lāt, "sub-

[1] See Nöldeke, *Sitzungsb. Berl. Ak.* 1880, p. 765.

[2] Wellhausen, *Heidenthum*, p. 131; cf. p. 215.

[3] Mordtmann u. Müller, *Sab. Denkm.* p. 22, No. 5, l. 2 *sq.* (שימהמו), l. 8 *sq.* (אדמהו) *etc.* Cf. No. 13, l. 12, אדמה, the clients of the goddess Shams.

mission to Lat,"[1] and corresponding to the religious use of the verb *istalama*, "he made his peace," to designate the ceremony of kissing, stroking, or embracing the sacred stone at the Caaba;[2] and perhaps also the numerous names compounded with *taim*, which, if we may judge by the profane use of the word *motayyam*, applied to a deeply attached lover, seems to have some such sense as "devotee."[3] But above all, the prevalence of religion based on clientship and voluntary homage is seen in the growth of the practice of pilgrimage to distant shrines, which is so prominent a feature in later Semitic heathenism. Almost all Arabia met at Mecca, and the shrine at Hierapolis drew visitors from the whole Semitic world. These pilgrims were the guests of the god, and were received as such by the inhabitants of the holy places. They approached the god as strangers, not with the old joyous confidence of national worship, but with atoning ceremonies and rites of self-mortification, and their acts of worship were carefully prescribed for them by qualified instructors,[4] the prototypes of the modern Meccan *Motawwif*. The

[1] De Vogüé, No. 54.

[2] Ibn Doraid, *Kit. al-ishticāc*, p. 22. The same idea of a religion accepted by voluntary submission is expressed in the name *Islām*. We shall see later that much the same idea underlies the designation of the Christian religion as a "mystery."

[3] *Taim* is generally taken to be a mere synonym of *'Abd*; but in Arabic the word is quite obsolete, except as an element in old theophorous names, and the other forms derived from the root give no clear insight into its original sense. In the dialect of the Sinaitic inscriptions, where proper names like Taimallāhī, Taimdhūsharā are common, *taim* seems to occur as a common noun in Euting, *Sinaitische Inschriften*, No. 431, where the editor renders תימה by "sein Knecht." But the Arabic uses of the root seem to point to a somewhat more special sense, perhaps "captive," which might be figuratively applied to a devotee, or, when the name compounded with *taim* is a clan-name, as is the usual Arabian case, to a subject tribe that had adopted the worship of their conquerors. On the other hand, *tīma* is a sheep not sent forth to pasture, but kept at the homestead to be milked, and on this analogy *taim* may mean *domestic*.

[4] Lucian, *De Dea Syria*, lvi.

progress of heathenism towards universalism, as it is displayed in these usages, seemed only to widen the gulf between the deity and man, to destroy the naïve trustfulness of the old religion without substituting a better way for man to be at one with his god, to weaken the moral ideas of nationality without bringing in a higher morality of universal obligation, to transform the divine kingship into a mere court pageant of priestly ceremonies without permanent influence on the order of society and daily life. The Hebrew ideal of a divine kingship that must one day draw all men to do it homage offered better things than these, not in virtue of any feature that it possessed in common with the Semitic religions as a whole, but solely through the unique conception of Jehovah as a God whose love for His people was conditioned by a law of absolute righteousness. In other nations individual thinkers rose to lofty conceptions of a supreme deity, but in Israel, and in Israel alone, these conceptions were incorporated in the accepted worship of the national god. And so of all the gods of the nations Jehovah alone was fitted to become the God of the whole earth.

At the end of these remarks on the relations of the gods to their worshippers, it may not be amiss to advert to an objection to the whole course of our investigation that will possibly occur to some readers. Most enquirers into Semitic religion have made it their first business to discuss the nature of the gods, and with this view have sought to determine a particular class of natural phenomena or moral actions over which each deity presides. Persons trained in this school may remark on reading the foregoing pages that they are not a whit the better for knowing that the gods

were conceived as parents kings or patrons, since these relationships do not help us to understand what the gods could do for their worshippers. The ancients prayed to their gods for rain and fruitful seasons, for children, for health and long life, for the multiplication of their flocks and herds, and for many other things that no child asked from his father, no subject from his king. Hence it may be argued that fathership and kingship in religion are mere forms of words; the essence of the thing is to know why the gods were deemed able to do for their worshippers things that kings and fathers cannot do. So far as this objection is a general challenge to the method of the present volume, I must leave the sequel to answer it; but the point that the gods did for their worshippers things that human fathers kings and patrons were not expected to do, demands and may receive some elucidation at the present point. And first I will remark that the help of the gods was sought in all matters, without distinction, that were objects of desire and could not certainly be attained by the worshipper's unaided efforts. Further, it appears that help in all these matters was sought by the worshipper from whatever god he had a right to appeal to. If a Semitic worshipper was sick he called upon his national or tribal god, and the same god was addressed if he desired rain or victory over enemies. The power of a god was not conceived as unlimited, but it was very great, and applied to all sorts of things that men could desire. So far as primitive Semitic heathenism is concerned, it is quite a mistake to suppose that a god to whom men prayed for rain was necessarily a god of clouds, while another deity was the god of flocks, and the proper recipient of prayers for increase in the sheepfold. The gods had their physical limitations, as we shall see in the next lecture, but not in the sense that each deity presided over

a distinct department of nature; that is a conception much too abstract for the primitive mind, and proper to an advanced stage of polytheism which most of the Semitic nations never fully reached. In early heathenism the really vital question is not what a god has power to do, but whether I can get him to do it for me, and this depends on the relation in which he stands to me. If I have a god who is my king, I ask him for things that I do not ask from a human chief, simply because he is able to do them, and as his subject I have a claim to his help in all matters where my welfare belongs to the welfare of the state over which he presides. And in fact it is by no means true that in asking the god for rain the Semites went quite beyond what could be asked of a human king; for, strange as it may seem to us, almost all primitive peoples believe that rain-making is an art to which men can attain, and some of them expect their kings to exercise it.[1] To peoples in this stage of development a rainmaker is not a cosmical power, but merely a person, human or divine, possessed of a certain art or charm. To say that a god who can make rain is necessarily an elemental power associated with the clouds and the sky, is as absurd as to say that Hera was the goddess of Love when she borrowed the girdle of Aphrodite. This is a very obvious remark, but it knocks on the head a great deal that has been written about Semitic religion.

[1] Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, i. 247 *sqq.*, 342 *sqq.*, 396, 416, gives sufficient proofs of this. See below, p. 231.

LECTURE III

THE RELATIONS OF THE GODS TO NATURAL THINGS—HOLY PLACES—THE JINN

In the last lecture I endeavoured to sketch in broad outline the general features of the religious institutions of the Semites in so far as they rest on the idea that gods and men, or rather the god and his own proper worshippers, make up a single community, and that the place of the god in the community is interpreted on the analogy of human relationships. We are now to follow out this point of view through the details of sacred rite and observance, and to consider how the various acts and offices of religion stand related to the place assigned to the deity in the community of his worshippers. But as soon as we begin to enter on these details, we find it necessary to take account of a new series of relations connecting man on the one hand, and his god on the other, with physical nature and material objects. All acts of ancient worship have a material embodiment, which is not left to the choice of the worshipper but is limited by fixed rules. They must be performed at certain places and at certain times, with the aid of certain material appliances and according to certain mechanical forms. These rules import that the intercourse between the deity and his worshippers is subject to physical conditions of a definite kind, and this

again implies that the relations between gods and men are not independent of the material environment. The relations of a man to his fellow-men are limited by physical conditions, because man, on the side of his bodily organism, is himself a part of the material universe; and when we find that the relations of a man to his god are limited in the same way, we are led to conclude that the gods too are in some sense conceived to be a part of the natural universe, and that this is the reason why men can hold converse with them only by the aid of certain material things. It is true that in some of the higher forms of antique religion the material restrictions imposed on the legitimate intercourse between gods and men were conceived to be not natural but positive, that is they were not held to be dependent on the nature of the gods, but were looked upon as arbitrary rules laid down by the free will of the deity. But in the ordinary forms of heathenism it appears quite plainly that the gods themselves are not exempt from the general limitations of physical existence; indeed, we have already seen that where the relation of the deity to his worshippers is conceived as a relation of kinship, the kinship is taken to have a physical as well as a moral sense, so that the worshipped and the worshippers are parts not only of one social community but of one physical unity of life.

It is important that we should realise to ourselves with some definiteness the primitive view of the universe in which this conception arose, and in which it has its natural place. It dates from a time when men had not learned to draw sharp distinctions between the nature of one thing and another. Savages, we know, are not only incapable of separating in thought between phenomenal and noumenal existence, but habitually ignore the distinctions, which to us seem obvious, between organic and

inorganic nature, or within the former region between animals and plants. Arguing altogether by analogy, and concluding from the known to the unknown with the freedom of men who do not know the difference between the imagination and the reason, they ascribe to all material objects a life analogous to that which their own self-consciousness reveals to them. They see that men are liker to one another than beasts are to men, that men are liker to beasts than they are to plants, and to plants than they are to stones; but all things appear to them to live, and the more incomprehensible any form of life seems to them the more wonderful and worthy of reverence do they take it to be. Now this attitude of savage man to the natural things by which he is surrounded is the very attitude attested to us for ancient times by some of the most salient features of antique religion. Among races which have attained to a certain degree of culture, the predominant conception of the gods is anthropomorphic; that is, they are supposed on the whole to resemble men and act like men, and the artistic imagination, whether in poetry or in sculpture and painting, draws them after the similitude of man. But at the same time the list of deities includes a variety of natural objects of all kinds, the sun moon and stars, the heavens and the earth, animals and trees, or even sacred stones. And all these gods, without distinction of their several natures, are conceived as entering into the same kind of relation to man, are approached in ritual of the same type, and excite the same kind of hopes and fears in the breasts of their worshippers. It is of course easy to say that the gods were not identified with these natural objects, that they were only supposed to inhabit them; but for our present purpose this distinction is not valid. A certain crude distinction between soul and body, combined with the idea that the soul may act where the body is not,

is suggested to the most savage races by familiar psychical phenomena, particularly by those of dreams; and the unbounded use of analogy characteristic of pre-scientific thought extends this conception to all parts of nature which becomes to the savage mind full of spiritual forces, more or less detached in their movements and action from the material objects to which they are supposed properly to belong. But the detachment of the invisible life from its visible embodiment is never complete. A man after all is not a ghost or phantom, a life or soul without a body, but a body with its life, and in like manner the unseen life that inhabits the plant, tree, or sacred stone makes the sacred object itself be conceived as a living being. And in ritual the sacred object was spoken of and treated as the god himself; it was not merely his symbol but his embodiment, the permanent centre of his activity in the same sense in which the human body is the permanent centre of man's activity. In short, the whole conception belongs in its origin to a stage of thought in which there was no more difficulty in ascribing living powers and personality to a stone, tree, or animal, than to a being of human or superhuman build.

The same lack of any sharp distinction between the nature of different kinds of visible beings appears in the oldest myths, in which all kinds of objects, animate and inanimate, organic and inorganic, appear as cognate with one another, with men, and with the gods. The kinship between gods and men which we have already discussed is only one part of a larger kinship which embraces the lower creation. In the Babylonian legend beasts as well as man are formed of earth mingled with the life-blood of a god; in Greece the stories of the descent of men from gods stand side by side with ancient legends of men sprung from trees or rocks, or of races whose mother was a tree

and their father a god.[1] Similar myths, connecting both men and gods with animals plants and rocks, are found all over the world, and were not lacking among the Semites. To this day the legend of the country explains the name of the Beni Sokhr tribe by making them the offspring of the sandstone rocks about Madāin Ṣālih.[2] To the same stage of thought belong the stories of transformations of men into animals, which are not infrequent in Arabian legend. Mohammed would not eat lizards because he fancied them to be the offspring of a metamorphosed clan of Israelites.[3] Macrīzī relates of the Ṣeiʿar in Ḥaḍramaut that in time of drought part of the tribe change themselves into ravening were-wolves. They have a magical means of assuming and again casting off the wolf shape.[4] Other Hadramites changed themselves into vultures or kites.[5] In the Sinai Peninsula the hyrax and the panther are believed to have been originally men.[6] Among the northern Semites transformation myths are not uncommon, though they have generally been preserved to us only in Greek forms. The pregnant mother of Adonis was changed into a myrrh tree, and in the tenth month the tree burst open and the infant god came forth.[7] The metamorphosis of Derceto into a fish was related both at Ascalon and at Bambyce, and so forth. In the same spirit is conceived the Assyrian myth which includes the lion, the eagle, and the war-horse among the lovers of

[1] *Odyssey*, xviii. 163; Preller-Robert, i. 79 *sq.*

[2] Doughty, *Travels in Arabia*, i. 17; see Ibn Doraid, p. 329, l. 20. Conversely, many stones and rocks in Arabia were believed to be transformed men, but especially women. Dozy, *Israeliten te Mekka*, p. 201, gives examples. See also Yācūt, i. 123.

[3] Damīrī, ii. 87; cf. Doughty, i. 326. A similar *ḥadīth* about the mouse, Damīrī, ii. 218.

[4] *De valle Hadhramaut* (Bonn 1866), p. 19 *sq.*

[5] *Ibid.* p. 20. See also Ibn Mojāwir in Sprenger, *Post-routen*, p. 142.

[6] See *Kinship*, p. 238 *sq.*, where I give other evidences on the point.

[7] Apollodorus, iii. 14. 3; Servius on *Æn* v. 72.

Ishtar, while in the region of plastic art the absence of any sharp line of distinction between gods and men on the one hand and the lower creation on the other is displayed in the predilection for fantastic monsters, half human half bestial, which began with the oldest Chaldæan engraved cylinders, gave Phœnicia its cherubim griffins and sphinxes,[1] and continued to characterise the sacred art of the Babylonians down to the time of Berosus.[2] Of course most of these things can be explained away as allegories, and are so explained to this day by persons who shut their eyes to the obvious difference between primitive thought, which treats all nature as a kindred unity because it has not yet differentiated things into their kinds, and modern monistic philosophy, in which the universe of things, after having been realised in its multiplicity of kinds, is again brought into unity by a metaphysical synthesis. But by what process of allegory can we explain away the belief in werewolves? When the same person is believed to be now a man and now a wolf, the difference which we recognise between a man and a wild beast is certainly not yet perceived. And such a belief as this cannot be a mere isolated extravagance of the fancy; it points to a view of nature as a whole which is, in fact, the ordinary view of savages in all parts of the world, and everywhere produces just such a confusion between the several orders of natural and supernatural beings as we find to have existed among the early Semites.

The influence of these ideas on early systems of religion may be considered under two aspects: (1) On the one hand, the range of the supernatural is so wide that no

[1] See Menant, *Glyptique Orientale*, vol. i.

[2] Berosus (*Fr. Hist. Gr.* ii. 497) refers to the images at the temple of Bel which preserved the forms of the strange monsters that lived in the time of chaos. But the peculiar prevalence of such figures on the oldest gems shows that the chaos in question is only the chaotic imagination of early man.

antique religion attempts to deal with all its manifestations. The simplest proof of this is that magic and sorcery, though they lay outside of religion and were forbidden arts in all the civilised states of antiquity, were yet never regarded as mere imposture. It was not denied that there were supernatural agencies at work in the world of which the public religion took no account. Religion dealt only with the gods, *i.e.* with a definite circle of great supernatural powers whose relations to man were established on a regular friendly basis and maintained by stated rites and fixed institutions. Beyond the circle of gods there lay a vast and undetermined mass of minor supernatural agencies, some of which were half-incorporated in religion under the name of demi-gods, while others were altogether ignored except in private popular superstition, or by those who professed the art of constraining demoniac powers to do them service and obey their commands. (2) On the other hand, the gods proper were not sharply marked off, *as regards their nature*, from the lower orders of demoniac beings, or even from such physical objects as were believed to possess demoniac attributes. Their distinctive mark lay in their relations with man, or, more exactly, with a definite circle of men, their habitual worshippers. As these relations were known and stable, they gave rise to an orderly and fixed series of religious institutions. But the forms of religious service were not determined merely by the fact that the god was considered in one case as the father, in another as the king, in yet another as the patron of his worshippers. In determining how the god was to be approached, and how his help could be most fully realised, it was necessary to take account of the fact that he was not an omnipotent and omnipresent being standing wholly outside of nature, but was himself linked to the physical world by a series of affinities con-

necting him not merely with man but with beasts trees and inanimate things. In antique religion gods as well as men have a physical environment, on and through which they act, and by which their activity is conditioned.

The influence of this idea on ancient religion is very far-reaching and often difficult to analyse. But there is one aspect of it that is both easily grasped and of fundamental importance; I mean the connection of particular gods with particular places. The most general term to express the relation of natural things to the gods which our language affords is the word "holy"; thus when we speak of holy places, holy things, holy persons, holy times, we imply that the places things persons and times stand in some special relation to the godhead or to its manifestation. But the word "holy" has had a long and complicated history, and has various shades of meaning according to the connection in which it is used. It is not possible, by mere analysis of the modern use of the word, to arrive at a single definite conception of the meaning of holiness; nor is it possible to fix on any one of the modern aspects of the conception, and say that it represents the fundamental idea from which all other modifications of the idea can be deduced. The primitive conception of holiness, to which the modern variations of the idea must be traced back, belonged to a habit of thought with which we have lost touch, and we cannot hope to understand it by the aid of logical discussion, but only by studying it on its own ground as it is exhibited in the actual working of early religion. It would be idle, therefore, at this stage to attempt any general definition, or to seek for a comprehensive formula covering all the relations of the gods to natural things. The problem must be attacked in detail and for many reasons the most suitable point of attack will be found in the connection that ancient religion con-

ceived to exist between particular deities and particular "holy" places. This topic is of fundamental importance, because all complete acts of ancient worship were necessarily performed at a holy place, and thus the local connections of the gods are involved, explicitly or implicitly, in every function of religion.

The local relations of the gods may be considered under two heads. In the first place the activity power and dominion of the gods were conceived as bounded by certain local limits, and in the second place they were conceived as having their residences and homes at certain fixed sanctuaries. These two conceptions are not of course independent, for generally speaking the region of divine authority and influence surrounds the sanctuary which is the god's principal seat; but for convenience of exposition we shall look first at the god's *land* and then at his *sanctuary* or dwelling-place.

Broadly speaking, the land of a god corresponds with the land of his worshippers; Canaan is Jehovah's land as Israel is Jehovah's people.[1] In like manner the land of Assyria (Asshur) has its name from the god Asshur,[2] and in general the deities of the heathen are called indifferently the gods of the nations and the gods of the lands.[3] Our natural impulse is to connect these expressions with the divine kingship, which in modern states of feudal origin is a sovereignty over land as well as men. But the older Semitic kingdoms were not feudal, and before the captivity we shall hardly find an example of a Semitic sovereign being called king of a land.[4] In fact the relations of

[1] Hos. ix. 3; cf. Reland, *Palæstina*, vol. i. p. 16 *sqq.*

[2] Schrader, *KAT.* 3rd ed. p. 351; cf. Micah v. 6 (Heb. 5), where the "land of Asshur" stands in parallelism with "land of Nimrod." Nimrod ★ is a god, see his article in *Enc. Brit.*, 9th ed., and Wellhausen, *Hexateuch* (2nd ed. 1889), p. 308 *sqq.*

[3] 2 Kings xviii. 33 *sqq.*

[4] The Hebrews say "king of Asshur" (Assyria), Edom, Aram (Syria), etc.,

a god to his land were not merely political, or dependent on his relation to the inhabitants. The Aramæans and Babylonians whom the king of Assyria planted in northern Israel brought their own gods with them, but when they were attacked by lions they felt that they must call in the aid of "the god of the land," who, we must infer, had in his own region power over beasts as well as men.[1] Similarly the Aramæans of Damascus, after their defeat in the hill-country of Samaria, argue that the gods of Israel are gods of the hills and will have no power in the plains; the power of the gods has physical and local limitations. So too the conception that a god cannot be worshipped outside of his own land, which we find applied even to the worship of Jehovah,[2] does not simply mean that there can be no worship of a god where he has no sanctuary, but that the land of a strange god is not a fit place to erect a sanctuary. In the language of the Old Testament foreign countries are unclean,[3] so that Naaman, when he desires to worship the God of Israel at Damascus, has to beg for two mules' burden of the soil of Canaan, to make a sort of enclave of Jehovah's land in his Aramæan dwelling-place.

In Semitic religion the relation of the gods to particular places which are special seats of their power is usually expressed by the title Baal (pl. *Baalim*, fem. *Baalath*).

but these are names of nations, the countries being properly the "land of Asshur," etc. The local designation of a king is taken from his capital, or royal seat. Thus the king of Israel is king of Samaria (1 Kings xxi. 1), Sihon, king of the Amorites, is king of Heshbon (Deut. iii. 6). Hiram, whom the Bible calls king of Tyre, appears on the oldest of Phœnician ✶ inscriptions (*CIS.* No. 5) as king of the Sidonians, *i.e.* the Phœnicians (cf. 1 Kings xvi. 31), Nebuchadrezzar is king of Babylon, and so forth. The only exception to this rule in old Hebrew is, I think, Og, king of Bashan (Deut. i. 4; 1 Kings iv. 19), who is a mythical figure, presumably an old god of the region.

[1] 2 Kings xvii. 24 *sqq.* [2] 1 Sam. xxvi. 19; Hos. ix. 4.

[3] Amos vii. 17; Josh. xxii. 19.

★ As applied to men *baal* means the master of a house, the owner of a field cattle or the like; or in the plural the *baalim* of a city are its freeholders and full citizens.[1] In a secondary sense, in which alone the word is ordinarily used in Arabic, *baal* means husband; but it is not used of the relation of a master to his slave, or of a superior to his inferior, and it is incorrect to regard it, when employed as a divine title, as a mere synonym of the titles implying lordship over men which came before us in the last lecture. When a god is simply called "the Baal," the meaning is not "the lord of the worshipper" but the possessor of some place or district, and each of the multitude of local Baalim is distinguished by adding the name of his own place.[2] Melcarth is the Baal of Tyre, Astarte the Baalath of Byblus;[3] there was a Baal of Lebanon,[4] of Mount Hermon,[5] of Mount Peor, and so forth. In Southern Arabia Baal constantly occurs in similar local connections, *e.g.* Dhū Samāwī is the Baal of the district Bācir, ʿAthtar the Baal of Gumdān, and the sun-goddess the Baalath of several places or regions.[6]

[1] So often in the Old Testament, and also in Phœnician. *Baalath* is used of a female citizen (*CIS.* No. 120).

[2] Cf. Stade in *ZATW.* 1886, p. 303.

[3] *CIS.* Nos. 1, 122. [4] *CIS.* No. 5.

[5] See Judg. iii. 3, where this mountain is called the mountain of the Baal of Hermon. Hermon properly means a sacred place. In the Old Testament place-names like Baal-peor, Baal-meon are shortened from Beth Baal Peor, "house or sanctuary of the Baal of Mount Peor," etc.

[6] Hence we read in the Himyaritic inscriptions of sun-goddesses in the plural (*e.g.* אשמסהמו, *CIS.* pt. iv. No. 46), as in Canaan we have a plurality of local Baalim. Special forms of Baal occur which are defined not by the name of a place or region but in some other way, *e.g.* by the name of a sacred object, as Baal-tamar, "lord of the palm-tree," preserved to us only in the name of a town, Judg. xx. 33. So too Baal-hammān, on the Carthaginian Tanith inscriptions, may be primarily "lord of the sun-pillar"; yet compare אל חמן, "the divinity of (the place) Hammōn" (*CIS.* No. 8, and the inscr. of Maʿṣūb); see G. Hoffmann in the *Abhandlungen* of the Göttingen Academy, vol. xxxvi. (4 May 1889). Baal-zebub, the god of Ekron, is "owner of flies," rather than Βάαλ Μυῖα, the fly-god. In one or two cases the title of Baal

As the heathen gods are never conceived as ubiquitous and can act only where they or their ministers are present, the sphere of their permanent authority and influence is naturally regarded as their residence. It will be observed that the local titles which I have cited are generally derived either from towns where the god had a temple, or (as the Semites say) a house, or else from mountains, which are constantly conceived as the dwelling-places of deities. The notion of personal property in land is a thing that grows up gradually in human society, and is first applied to a man's homestead. Pasture land is common property,[1] but a man acquires rights in the soil by building a house, or by "quickening" a waste place, *i.e.* bringing it under cultiva-

seems to be prefixed to the name of a god; thus we have Baal-zephon as a place-name on the frontiers of Egypt, and also a god צפן (*CIS.* Nos. 108, 265). Similarly the second element in Baal-gad, a town at the foot of Mount Hermon, is the name of an ancient Semitic god. The grammatical explanation of these forms is not clear to me. Another peculiar form is Baal-berith at Shechem, which in ordinary Hebrew simply means "possessor of covenant," *i.e.* "covenant ally," but may here signify the Baal who presides over covenants, or rather over the special covenant by which the neighbouring Israelites were bound to the Canaanite inhabitants of the city. Peculiar also is the more modern Baal-marcod, κοίρανος κωμῶν (near Bairūt), known from inscriptions (Wadd. Nos. 1855, 1856; Ganneau, *Rec. d'Arch. Or.* i. 95, 103). The Semitic form is supposed to be בעל מרקד, "lord of dancing," *i.e.* he to whom dancing is due as an act of homage; cf. for the construction, Prov. iii. 27. In later times Baal or Bel became a proper name, especially in connection with the cult of the Babylonian Bel, and entered into compounds of a new kind like the Aglibol and Malakhbel of Palmyra. Baal Shamaim, "the lord of heaven," belongs to the class of titles taken from the region of nature in which the god dwells or has sway. בעל מרפא (*CIS.* No. 41) and בעלת החררת (*ibid.* No. 177) are of doubtful interpretation. In the Panamu inscription of Zenjirli, l. 22, בעל בית can hardly mean "patron of the royal family," as Sachau takes it, but rather designates RKB-El as the local Baal of the sanctuary, or perhaps of the royal city. On the whole there is nothing in these peculiar forms to shake the general conclusion that Baal is primarily the title of a god as inhabitant or owner of a place.

[1] Common, that is, to a tribe, for the tribes are very jealous of encroachments on their pastures. But, as we have here to do with the personal rights of the Baal within his own community, the question of intertribal rights does not come in.

tion. Originally, that is, private rights over land are a mere consequence of rights over what is produced by private labour upon the land.[1] The ideas of building and cultivation are closely connected—the Arabic *'amara*, like the German *bauen*, covers both—and the word for house or homestead is extended to include the dependent fields or territory. Thus in Syriac "the house of Antioch" is the territory dependent on the town, and in the Old Testament the land of Canaan is called not only Jehovah's land but his house.[2] If the relation of the Baal to his district is to be judged on these analogies, the land is his, first because he inhabits it, and then because he "quickens" it, and makes it productive.

That this is the true account of the relations of the name Baal appears from what Hosea tells us of the religious conceptions of his idolatrous contemporaries, whose nominal Jehovah worship was merged in the numerous local cults of the Canaanite Baalim. To the Baalim they ascribed all the natural gifts of the land, the corn the wine and the oil, the wool and the flax, the vines and fig-trees,[3] and we shall see by and by that the whole ritual of feasts and sacrifices was imbued with this conception. We can, however, go a step further, and trace the idea to an earlier form, by the aid of a fragment of old heathen phraseology which has survived in the language of Jewish and Arabian agriculture. In the system of Mohammedan taxation land irrigated by the water-wheel or other laborious methods pays five per cent. of its produce in the name of charity-tax, whereas land

[1] The law of Islam is that land which has never been cultivated or occupied by houses becomes private property by being "quickened" (*bil-iḥyā*). See Nawawī, *Minhāj*, ed. Van den Berg, ii. 171. This is in accordance with pre-Islamic custom. Cf. Wellhausen, *Heidenthum*, p. 108.

[2] Hos. viii. 1, ix. 15, compared with ix. 8.

[3] Hos. ii. 8 *sqq.*

that does not require laborious irrigation pays a full tithe. The latter, according to Arabian jurists, is of various kinds, which are designated by special names; but all these are summed up in the general expression "what the sky waters and what the Ba'l waters." Similarly the Mishna and Talmud draw a distinction between land artificially irrigated and land naturally moist, calling the latter the "house of Baal" or "field of the house of Baal." It must be remembered that in the East the success of agriculture depends more on the supply of water than on anything else, and the "quickening of dead ground" (*iḥyā al-mawāt*), which, as we have seen, creates ownership, has reference mainly to irrigation.[1] Accordingly what the husbandman irrigates is his own property, but what is naturally watered he regards as irrigated by a god and as the field or property of this god, who is thus looked upon as the Baal or owner of the spot.

It has generally been assumed that Baal's land, in the sense in which it is opposed to irrigated fields, means land watered by the rains of heaven, "the waters of the sky" as the Arabs call them, and from this again it has been inferred that the Baal who gives his name to land naturally moist and fertile is the god of the sky (*Baal-shamaim*), who plays so great a part in later Semitic religion, and is identified by Philo Byblius with the sun. But, strictly regarded, this view, which is natural in our climate and with our meteorological notions, appears to be inconsistent with the conditions of vegetable growth in most parts of the Semitic lands, where the rainfall is precarious or confined to certain seasons, so that the face of the earth is bare and lifeless for the greater part of the year except where it is kept fresh by irrigation or by the natural

[1] See, for example, Abū Yūsuf Ya'cūb, *Kitāb al-Kharāj*, Cairo, A.H. 1302, p. 37.

percolation of underground water. To us, of course, it is plain that all fertility is ultimately due to the rains which feed the springs and watery bottoms, as well as the broad corn-fields; but this is a knowledge beyond the science of the oldest Semites;[1] while on the other hand the distinction between favoured spots that are always green and fruitful and the less favoured fields that are useless during the rainless season, is alike obvious and essential to the most primitive systems of husbandry.

In Arabia the rainfall is all-important for pasture,[2] but except in the far south, which comes within the skirts of the monsoon region, it is too irregular to form a basis for agriculture. An occasional crop of gourds or melons may be raised in certain places after copious showers; and on low-lying plains, where the rain sinks into a heavy soil and cannot flow away, the palm-tree will sometimes live and produce a dry tough fruit of little value.[3] But on the whole the contrast between land naturally productive and land artificially fertilised, as it presents itself to the Arabian husbandman, has no direct connection with rainfall, but depends on the depth of the ground-water. Where the roots of the date-palm can reach the subterranean flow, or where a fountain sends forth a stream whose branches fertilise an oasis without the toil of the

[1] Cf. the remarks of Dillmann in his comm. on Gen. i. 6–8.

[2] Ibn Sa'd, No. 80. Here Wellhausen introduces a reference to agriculture, but in rendering *janābunā*, "our palm gardens," he departs from the traditional interpretation. (See Lane.)

[3] Such palms and the land they grow on are called *'idhy*, pl. *a'dhā*; the dates are *saḥḥ* or *casb*; see Al-Azharī's luminous account of the different kinds of date-palms in the *Lisān*, s.v. *ba'l*. In the traditions that require a whole tithe to be paid on crops watered by rain the *'idhy* seems to be mainly contemplated; for in Ibn Sa'd, No. 68, the prophet exacts no tithe on such precarious crops as cucumbers raised on ground watered by rain. I rode in 1880 through a desolate plain of heavy soil some miles to the S.-E. of Mecca, and was told that after good rain the waste would be covered with patches of melons and the like. (See *Lectures and Essays*, p. 508 *sqq.*)

water-wheel, the ground is naturally fertile, and such land is "watered by the Ba'l." The best Arabian authorities say expressly that ba'l palm-trees are such as drink by their roots, without artificial irrigation and without rain, "from the water which God has created beneath the earth,"[1] and in an exact specification of what is liable to the full tithe the *ba'l* and the sky are mentioned together, not used interchangeably.[2]

[1] Al-Aṣma'ī and Al-Azharī in the *Lisān*, s.v. *ba'l*. This article and the materials collected in the Glossary to De Goeje's *Belādhorī* give almost all the evidence. I may add a ref. to Ibn Sa'd, No. 119, compared with No. 73, and Macrīzī *Khiṭaṭ*, ii. 129, and in the next note I will cite some of the leading traditions, which are very inaccurately given by Sprenger in *ZDMG.* xviii.

[2] The fullest expressions are, Bokhārī, ii. 122 (Būlāc vocalised ed.), "what is watered by the sky and the fountains or is *'atharī*"; *Mowaṭṭa* (Tunis ed.), p. 94, "what is watered by the sky and the fountains and the *ba'l*"; *ibid.* p. 95, "what is watered by the sky and the fountains or is *ba'l*." Shorter phrases are, *Belādh.* p. 70, "what is watered by the *ba'l* and what is watered by the sky," with such variants as "the surface flow [*ghaīl*, *saih*] ★ and the sky" (*ib.* p. 71), "the fountains and the sky" (B. Hishām, 956), "the rivers and the clouds" (Moslim, ed. of A.H. 1290, i. 268). These variations are intelligible if we bear in mind the aspect of the cultivated patches in such a valley as the Baṭn Marr. The valley is a great water-course, but for the most part the water flows underground, breaking out in powerful springs where there is a sharp fall in the ground, and sometimes flowing for a few hundred yards in a visible stream, which is soon led off in many branches through the palms and tiny corn-fields and presently disappears again under the sand and stones. Where the hard bottom is level and near the surface, the palms can drink from their roots where there is no visible stream; but where the bottom lies deep (as in the neighbourhood of Ṭāif) cultivation is possible only by the use of the water-wheel, and then the tithe is reduced to 5 per cent. Where irrigation can be effected by gravitation through a pipe or channel, without pumping, the land is still regarded as naturally fertile and pays full tithe; see *Gl. Bel.* and Ibn Sa'd, No. 119. According to one interpretation, the obscure word *'atharī*, which I have not met with in any tradition except that cited above, means land watered by an artificial channel (*'āthūr*). This may be a mere guess, for the oldest and best Arabian scholars seem to have had no clear understanding of the word; but at least it is preferable to the view which identifies *'atharī* and *'idhy*. For a comparison of the traditions given above indicates that *'atharī* is either a synonym for *ba'l* or some species thereof; moreover, the oasis in W. Sirḥān which Guarmani (p. 209) calls Etera, and Lady Anne Blunt (*Nejd*, i. 89 *sqq.*) writes Itheri, can hardly be anything else than *'Atharī* in a modern pronunciation. (Huber writes it with initial *alif*, but his ortho-

The Arabian evidence therefore leads us to associate the life-giving operation of the Ba'l or Baal, not with the rains of heaven, but with springs, streams and underground flow. On the other hand it is clear (*e.g.* from Hosea) that among the agricultural peoples of Canaan the Baalim were looked upon as the authors of all fertility, including the corn crops, which are wholly dependent on rain in most parts of Palestine. And it is here that we find the sky-Baal (*Baal-shamaim*) with such local forms as Marna "the lord of rains" at Gaza.[1] Thus the question arises whether the original Semitic conception of the sphere of the Baal's activity has been modified in Arabia to suit its special climate, or whether, on the other hand, the notion of the Baal as lord of rain is of later growth.

It would be easier to answer this question if we knew with certainty whether the use of Baal (Ba'l) as a divine title is indigenous to Arabia or borrowed from the agricultural Semites beyond the peninsula. On the former alternative, which is accepted by some of the first scholars of our day, such as Wellhausen and Nöldeke, Baal-worship must be held to be older than the Semitic dispersion, and

graphy, as the editors warn us, is not greatly to be trusted.) 'Atharī, for which some good authorities give also *'aththarī* (see *Lisān*), seems to mean "belonging to Athtar," the S. Arabian god, who corresponds in name, but not in sex, to the Babylonian Ishtar, the Phœnician Astarte, and the Aramaic 'Attar or Athar. Athtar is one of the S. Arabian gods who preside ★ over irrigation (*CIS.* pt. 4; cf. *ZDMG.* xxxvii. 371); cf. also the place 'Aththar, described as a jungly haunt of lions (*Bānat Sō'ād*, 46).

The crops dependent on rain are so unimportant in most parts of Arabia that some of the prophet's decrees pass them by altogether, and simply say that the *saiḥ* pays full tithe (Ibn Sa'd, No. 68). Thus it is easy to understand how, in less precise speech, the term *ba'l* is applied *à potiori* to all crops not artificially irrigated; and so, when the empire of Islam was extended to lands of more copious rain, confusion arose and the true meaning of *ba'l* was obscured. The corn crops of Palestine, which strictly speaking are *a'dhā* (Abulf. ed. Reinaud, p. 227), and those near Alexandria, which are sown on the retiring of the Nile, are alike said by Mocaddasī to be "on the *ba'l*"; but this is not in accordance with the old classical usage.

[1] Procopius of Gaza, iii. 19, in Galland, vol. ix.—"dominus imbrium."

to belong to an age when all the Semites were still nomadic. And in that case it can hardly be doubted that the Arabs, as the nearest representatives of ancient Semitic life, held most closely to the original conception of the Baal. Personally I think it most probable that Baal as a divine title entered Arabia with the date-palm, whose culture is certainly not indigenous to the peninsula. There is direct proof from inscriptions of the worship of "the Baal" among the Nabatæans of the Sinaitic desert to the north, and among the Sabæans and Himyarites in the south of the peninsula; but for central Arabia Baal-worship is only an inference from certain points of language, of which the most important is the phrase we have been considering.[1] Thus, to say the least, it is possible that Baal-worship was never known to the pastoral Bedouins except in so far as they came under the influence of the denizens of the agricultural oases, who had borrowed their art from Syria or Irac, and, according to all analogy, could not have failed to borrow at the same time so much of the foreign religion as was deemed necessary to secure the success of their husbandry. But even on this hypothesis I conceive it to be in the highest degree improbable that Baal on entering Arabia was changed from a god of rain to a god of springs and watery bottoms. We have here to do mainly with the culture of the date-palm, and I find no evidence that this tree was largely grown on land watered by rain alone in any part of the Semitic area. And even in Palestine, which is the typical case of a Semitic country dependent on rain, there is so vast a difference between the productiveness of lands that are watered by rain alone and those which enjoy natural or artificial irrigation, that we can hardly conceive the idea of natural fertility, expressed

[1] See Nöldeke in *ZDMG.* xl. 174; and Wellhausen[1], p. 170.

by the term Baal's land, to have been originally connected with the former. For my own part I have no doubt that Semitic agriculture began, as it has always most flourished, in places naturally watered by springs and streams, and that the language of agricultural religion was fixed by the conditions prevailing in such places.[1]

I see an important confirmation of this view in the *local character* of the Baalim, which has always been a hopeless puzzle to those who begin with the conception of the Baal as a sky god, but is at once intelligible if the seats of the gods were originally sought in spots of natural fertility, by springs and river-banks, in the groves and tangled thickets and green tree-shaded glades of mountain hollows and deep watercourses. All the Semites, as we shall presently see, attached a certain sanctity to such places quite apart from agriculture; and as agriculture must have begun in naturally productive spots, it is inevitable to infer that agricultural religion took its starting-point from the sanctity already attaching to waters groves and meadows.[2] The difficulty which we

[1] A good conception of the material conditions of Palestinian agriculture may be got from an article by Anderlind in *ZDPV.* ix. (1886). The following illustration from *Belādhorī*, p. 151, may be helpful. The district of Bāho (Baibalissus) was dependent on rain alone, and paid the usual tithes. The inhabitants proposed to Maslama that he should make them an irrigation canal from the Euphrates, and offered to pay him one-third of their crops in addition to the tithe.

[2] In this argument I have not ventured to lay any weight on the Mishnic use of the term, "Baal's field." In Palestine, many centuries before the Mishna was composed, the Baalim were certainly regarded as fertilising the corn crops, and must therefore have been viewed as givers of rain; thus it is only natural that Baal's land, as opposed to land artificially irrigated, should include corn-lands wholly dependent on rain, as it plainly does in *B. B.* iii. 1. On the other hand, there are clear indications that even in Palestine the word was sometimes used in a sense corresponding to the Arabic usage; in other words, that crops which cannot be raised in Palestine except in spots naturally moist or artificially watered are divided into בעל and שקי. This distinction, for example, is applied to such vegetables as onions and cabbages (*Terūm.* x. 11; *Shebī.* ii. 9), and in *Suc.* iii. 3 we read of a water-willow (*populus Euphratica*) grown on the *ba'l.* Moreover, in *Shebī.* ii. 9 there is a

feel in accepting this view arises mainly from the totally different climate in which we live. When a man has journeyed in the Arabian wilderness, traversing day after day stony plateaus, black volcanic fields, or arid sands walled in by hot mountains of bare rock and relieved by no other vegetation than a few grey and thorny acacias or scanty tufts of parched herbage, till suddenly, at a turn of the road, he emerges on a Wady where the ground-water rises to the surface, and passes as if by magic into a new world, where the ground is carpeted with verdure, and a grove of stately palm-trees spreads forth its canopy of shade against the hot and angry heaven, he does not find it difficult to realise that to early man such a spot was verily a garden and habitation of the gods. In Syria the contrasts are less glaring than in the desert; but only in the spring time, and in many parts of the country not even then, is the general fertility such that a fountain or a marshy bottom with its greensward and thicket of natural wood can fail strongly to impress the imagination. Nor are the religious associations of such a scene felt only by heathen barbarians. "The trees of the Lord drink their fill, the cedars of Lebanon which He hath planted: Where the birds make their nests; as for the stork, the fir-trees are her house" (Ps. civ. 16). This might pass for the description of the natural sanctuary of the Baal of Lebanon, but who does not feel its solemn grandeur? Or who will condemn the touch of primitive naturalism

clear statement that vegetables grown on the *ba'l* were irrigated, so that the contrast with שקי can only be maintained by supposing that the latter term, as is the case in Arabia, is restricted to laborious irrigation (*e.g.* by water drawn from a cistern), and that vegetable gardens lying beneath a spring on the hillside, such as still common in Palestine, were reckoned to the *ba'l*. The only vegetables that were and are commonly grown in Palestine on the open field before the summer sun has dried up the ground are those of the gourd and cucumber kind; see *Shebī.* ii. 1; Klein in *ZDPV.* iv. 82, and cf. Isa. i. 8.

that colours the comparison in the first Psalm: "He shall be like a tree planted by watercourses, that bringeth forth his fruit in his season; his leaf also shall not wither, and whatsoever he doeth shall prosper" (Ps. i. 3)?

When the conception of Baal's land is thus narrowed to its oldest form, and limited to certain favoured spots that seem to be planted and watered by the hand of the gods,[1] we are on the point of passing from the idea of the land of the god to that of his homestead and sanctuary. But before we take this step it will be convenient for us to glance rapidly at the way in which the primitive idea was widened and extended. Ultimately, as we see from Hosea, all agricultural produce was regarded as the gift of the Baalim, and all the worshippers who frequented a particular sanctuary brought a tribute of first-fruits to the local god, whether their crops grew on land naturally moist and fertile, or on land laboriously irrigated, or on fields watered by the rain of heaven. The god therefore had acquired certain proprietary rights, or at least certain rights of suzerainty, over the whole district inhabited by his worshippers, far beyond the limits of the original Baal's land.

The first step in this process is easily understood from the fundamental principles of Semitic land-law. Property in water is older and more important than property in land. In nomadic Arabia there is no property, strictly so called, in desert pastures, but certain families or tribes hold the watering-places without which the right of pasture is useless. Or, again, if a man digs a well he has a preferential right to water his camels at it before other camels are admitted; and he has an absolute right to prevent others from using the water for agricultural purposes unless they buy it from him. This is Moslem law; but

[1] To the same circle of ideas belongs the conception of the Garden of Eden, planted by God, and watered not by rain but by rivers.

it is broadly in accordance with old Arabian custom, and indeed with general Semitic custom, as appears from many passages of the Old Testament.[1] On these principles it is clear that even in the nomadic stage of society the god of the waters may be held to exercise certain vague rights over the adjoining pasture lands, the use of which depends on access to the watering-places. And with the introduction of agriculture these rights become definite. All irrigated lands are dependent on him for the water that makes them fertile, and pay him first-fruits or tithes in acknowledgment of his bounty. So far all is clear, and in many parts of the Semitic area—notably in the alluvium of the Euphrates and Tigris, the granary of the ancient East—agriculture is so completely dependent on irrigation that no more than this is needed to bring all habitable land within the domain of the gods who send forth from the storehouse of subterranean waters, fountains and rivers to quicken the dead soil, and so are the authors of all growth and fertility. But in Palestine the corn crops, which form a chief source of agricultural wealth, are mainly grown without irrigation on land watered by rain alone. Yet in Hosea's time the first-fruits of corn were offered at the shrines of the Baalim, who had therefore become, in Canaan, the givers of rain as well as the lords of terrestrial waters. The explanation of this fact must be sought in the uncontrolled use of analogy characteristic of early thought. The idea that the Baalim were the authors of all fertility can only have taken shape among communities whose agriculture was essentially dependent on irrigation. But a little consideration will convince

[1] Gen. xxi. 25 *sqq.*, xxvi. 17 *sqq.*; Judg. i. 15; joint ownership in a well, Gen. xxix. 8; Ex. ii. 16. Traces of a water law stricter than that of Islam appear in Deut. ii. 6, 28; but the Arabian law, that the wayfarer and his beasts were allowed to drink freely, but not to anticipate the owners of the water, must always have been the general rule. (Cf. *Lectures*, p. 520.)

us that even in Palestine the earliest agriculture was necessarily of this type. Cultivation begins in the most fertile spots, which in that climate means the spots watered by streams and fountains. In such places agricultural villages must have existed, each with its worship of the local Baal, while the broad plains of Sharon or Esdraelon were still abandoned to wandering herdsmen. As husbandry spread from these centres and gradually covered the whole land, the worship of the Baalim spread with it; the gods of the springs extended their domain over the lands watered by the sky, and gradually added to their old attributes the new character of "lords of rain." The physical notions of the early Semites lent themselves readily enough to this development. Men saw with their own eyes that clouds rise from the sea (1 Kings xviii. 44) or from "the ends of the earth," *i.e.* the distant horizon (Jer. x. 13; Ps. cxxxv. 7), and so they had no reason to doubt that the rain came from the same storehouse as the fountains and streams of the Baalim.[1] In the oldest poetry of the Hebrews, when Jehovah rides over His land in the thunderstorm, His starting-point is not heaven but Mount Sinai; a natural conception, for in mountainous regions storms gather round the highest summits. And on this analogy we may infer that when the rainclouds lay heavy on the upland glens and wooded crown of Lebanon, where the great Baalim of Phœnicia had their most famous seats at the sources of sacred

[1] I cannot follow Dillmann in regarding the cosmology of Gen. i., with its twofold storehouse of water above and beneath the firmament, as more primitive than the simpler conception of rising clouds (נשׂיאים). The cosmology of Gen. i. is confined to post-exilic writings (for 2 Kings vii. 2, 19 is not to the point), and involves a certain amount of abstract thought; while the other view merely represents things as they appear to the eye. It is quite a mistake to find a doctrine of evaporation in passages like Jer. x. 13; the epithet *nesī'īm* refers to the visible movements of the clouds; cf. such Arabic epithets as *ḥabī*, "a cloud crouching on the horizon."

streams, their worshippers would see a visible proof that the gods of the fountains and rivers were also the givers of rain. In the latest stage of Phœnician religion, when all deities were habitually thought of as heavenly or astral beings, the holiest sanctuaries were still those of the primitive fountains and river gods, and both ritual and legend continued to bear witness to the original character of these deities. Many examples of this will come before us in due course; for the present, it may suffice to cite the case of Aphaca, where the Urania or heaven goddess was worshipped by casting gifts into the sacred pool, and where it was fabled that once a year the goddess descended into the waters in the shape of a falling star.[1]

Finally the life-giving power of the god was not limited to vegetative nature, but to him also was ascribed the increase of animal life, the multiplication of flocks and herds, and, not least, of the human inhabitants of the land. For the increase of animate nature is obviously conditioned, in the last resort, by the fertility of the soil, and primitive races, which have not learned to differentiate the various kinds of life with precision, think of animate as well as vegetable life as rooted in the earth and sprung from it. The earth is the great mother of all things in most mythological philosophies, and the comparison of the life of mankind, or of a stock of men, with the life of a tree, which is so common in Semitic as in other primitive poetry, is not in its origin a mere figure. Thus where the growth of vegetation is ascribed to a particular divine power, the same power receives the thanks and homage of his worshippers for the increase of cattle and of men. Firstlings as well as first-fruits were offered at the shrines

[1] Sozomen, ii. 5; cf. the fallen star which Astarte is said to have consecrated at the holy isle of Tyre (Philo Byblius in *Fr. Hist. Gr.* iii. 569).

of the Baalim,[1] and one of the commonest classes of personal names given by parents to their sons or daughters designates the child as the gift of the god.[2]

In this rapid sketch of the development of the idea of the local Baalim I have left many things to be confirmed or filled out in detail by subsequent reference to the particulars of their ritual, and I abstain altogether from entering at this stage into the influence which the conception of the Baalim as productive and reproductive powers exercised on the development of a highly sensual mythology, especially when the gods were divided into sexes, and the Baal was conceived as the male principle of reproduction, the husband of the land which he ★ fertilised,[3] for this belongs rather to the discussion of the nature of the gods.

[1] We shall see as we proceed that the sacrifice of firstlings is older than agricultural religion, and was not originally a tribute like the first-fruits. But in religions of the Baal type firstlings and first-fruits were brought under the same general conception.

[2] To this class belong primarily the numerous Hebrew and Phœnician names compounded with forms of the root נתן or יתן, "to give" (Heb. Jonathan, Phœn. Baaliathon; Heb. Mattaniah, Phœn. Mutumbal [masc. and fem.], etc.; Nabatæan, Cosnathan [Euting, No. 12]); and Arabic names formed by adding the god's name to Wahb, Zaid (perhaps also Aus), "gift of." Cognate to these are the names in which the birth of a son is recognised as a proof of the divine favour (Heb. Hananiah, Johanan; Phœn. Hannibal, No'ammilkat [*CIS.* No. 41], etc.; Edomite, Baal-Hanan [Gen. xxxvi. 38]; Ar. Ναμηλη [Wadd. 2143], "favour of El," Auf-el, "[good] augury from El," Ουαδδηλος [Wadd. 2372], "love of El"), or which express the idea that he has helped the parents or heard their prayers (Heb. Azariah, Shemaiah; Phœn. Asdrubal, Eshmunazar, etc.); cf. Gen. xxix. xxx., 1 Sam. i. Finally there is a long series of names such as Yehavbaal (*CIS.* No. 69), Kemoshyehī (De Vogüé, *Mélanges*, p. 89), "Baal, Chemosh gives life." The great variety of gods referred to in Phœnician names of these forms shows that the gift of children was ascribed to all Baalim, each in his own sphere; cf. Hosea, chap. i.

[3] This conception appears in Hosea and underlies the figure in Isa. lxii. 4, where married land (be'ūlāh) is contrasted with wilderness; Wellhausen, *Heidenthum*[1], p. 170. It is a conception which might arise naturally enough from the ideas above developed, but was no doubt favoured by the use of *baal* to mean "husband." How *baal* comes to mean husband is not

You will observe also that the sequence of ideas which I have proposed is applicable in its entirety only to agricultural populations, such as those of Canaan, Syria, and Irac on the one hand and of Yemen on the other. It is in these parts of the Semitic field that the conception of the local gods as Baalim is predominant, though traces of Ba'l as a divine title are found in Central Arabia in various forms.[1]

In the central parts of Arabia agriculture was confined to oases, and the vocabulary connected with it is mainly borrowed from the northern Semites.[2] Many centuries before the date of the oldest Arabic literature, when the desert was the great highway of Eastern commerce, colonies of the settled Semites, Yemenites, and Aramæans occupied the oases and watering-places in the desert that were suitable for commercial stations, and to these immigrants must be ascribed the introduction of agriculture and even of the date-palm itself. The most developed cults of Arabia belong not to the pure nomads, but to these agricultural and trading settlements, which the Bedouins visited only as pilgrims, not to pay stated homage to the lord of the land from which they drew their life, but in fulfilment of vows. As most of our knowledge about Arabian cults refers to pilgrimages and the visits of the Bedouins, the impression is produced that all offerings were vows, and that fixed tribute of the fruits of the earth, such as was paid in the settled lands

perfectly clear; the name is certainly associated with monandry and the appropriation of the wife to her husband, but it does not imply a servile relation, for the slave-girl does not call her master *ba'l*. Probably the key is to be found in the notion that the wife is her husband's tillage (Coran ii. 233), in which case private rights over land were older than exclusive marital rights.

[1] For the evidence see Nöldeke in *ZDMG.* vol. xl. (1886) p. 174; and Wellhausen, *Heidenthum*[1], p. 170; [2] p. 146.

[2] Fränkel, *Aram. Fremdww.* p. 125.

to local Baalim, was unknown; but this impression is not accurate. From the Coran (vi. 137) and other sources we have sufficient evidence that the settled Arabs paid to the god a regular tribute from their fields, apparently by marking off as his a certain portion of the irrigated and cultivated ground.[1] Thus as regards the settled Arabs the parallelism with the other Semites is complete, and the only question is whether cults of the Baal type and the name of Baal itself were not borrowed, along with agriculture, from the northern Semitic peoples.

This question I am disposed to answer in the affirmative; for I find nothing in the Arabic use of the word *ba'l* and its derivatives which is inconsistent with the view that they had their origin in the cultivated oases, and much that strongly favours such a view. The phrase "land which the Baal waters" has no sense till it is opposed to "land which the hand of man waters," and irrigation is certainly not older than agriculture. It is questionable whether the idea of the godhead as the permanent or immanent source of life and fertility—a very different

[1] All the evidence on this point has been confused by an early misunderstanding of the passage in the Coran: "They set apart for Allāh a portion of the tilth or the cattle he has created, and say, This is Allāh's—as they fancy—and this belongs to our partners (idols); but what is assigned to idols does not reach Allāh, and what is assigned to Allāh really goes to the idols." It is plain that the heathen said indifferently "this belongs to Allāh," meaning the local god (cf. Wellh. *Heid.* p. 217 *sq.*), or this belongs to such and such a deity (naming him), and Mohammed argues, exactly as Hosea does in speaking of the homage paid by his contemporaries to local Baalim, whom they identified with Jehovah, that whether they say "Allah" or "Hobal," the real object of their homage is a false god. But the traditional interpretation of the text is that one part was set aside for the supreme Allah and another for the idols, and this distortion has coloured all accounts of what the Arabs actually did, for of course historical tradition must be corrected by the Coran. Allowance being made for this error, which made the second half of the verse say that Allah was habitually cheated out of his share in favour of the idols, the notices in Ibn Hishām, p. 53, Sprenger, *Leb. Moh.* iii. 358, Pocock, *Specimen*, p. 112, may be accepted as based upon fact. In Pocock's citation from the *Nazm al-durr* it appears that irrigated land is referred to.

thing from the belief that the god is the ancestor of his worshippers—had any place in the old tribal religion of the nomadic Arabs. To the nomad, who does not practise irrigation, the source of life and fertility is the rain that quickens the desert pastures, and there is no evidence that rain was ascribed to tribal deities. The Arabs regard rain as depending on the constellations, *i.e.* on the seasons, which affect all tribes alike within a wide range; and so when the showers of heaven are ascribed to a god, that god is Allah, the supreme and non-tribal deity.[1] It is to be noted also that among the Arabs the theophorous proper names that express religious ideas most akin to those of the settled Semites are derived from deities whose worship was widespread and not confined to the nomads. Further it will appear in a later lecture that the fundamental type of Arabian sacrifice does not take the form of a tribute to the god, but is simply an act of communion with him. The gift of firstlings, indeed, which has so prominent a place in Canaanite religion, is not unknown in Arabia. But this aspect of sacrifice has very little prominence; we find no approach to the payment of stated tribute to the gods, and the festal sacrifices at fixed seasons, which are characteristic of religions that regard the gods as the source of the annual renovation of fertility in nature, seem to have been confined to the great sanctuaries at which the nomads appeared only as pilgrims before a foreign god.[2] In these pilgrimages the nomadic Arabs might learn the name of Baal, but they

[1] Wellhausen, *Heid.* p. 210; cf. Ibn Sa'd, No. 80; *Diw. Hodh.* cxiii. 18. Note also that rain is not one of the boons prayed for at 'Arafa (Agh. iii. 4; cf. xix. 132. 6), though charms to produce rain were used (Wellh. p. 167). These evidences do not prove that the gods were never appealed to as rain-makers, but they render it very improbable that they were habitually thought of as such.

[2] Cf. Wellhausen, *Heid.*[1] p. 116; [2] p. 121 *sq.*

could not assimilate the conception of the god as a land-owner and apply it to their own tribal deities, for the simple reason that in the desert private property in land was unknown and the right of water and of pasturage was common to every member of the tribe.[1] But in estimating the influence on Arabian religion of agriculture and the ideas connected with settled life, we must remember how completely, in the centuries before Mohammed, the gods of the *madar* ("glebe," *i.e.* villagers and townsfolk) had superseded the gods of the *wabar* ("hair," *i.e.* dwellers in haircloth tents). Much the most important part of the religious practices of the nomads consisted in pilgrimages to the great shrines of the town Arabs, and even the minor sanctuaries, which were frequented only by particular tribes, seem to have been often fixed at spots where there was some commencement of settled life. Where the god had a house or temple we recognise the work of men who were no longer pure nomads, but had begun to form fixed homes; and indeed modern observation shows that, when an Arab tribe begins to settle down, it acquires the elements of husbandry before it gives up its tents and learns to erect immovable houses. Again there were sanctuaries without temples, but even at these the god had his treasure in a cave, and a priest who took care of his possessions, and there is no reason to think that the priest was an isolated hermit. The presumption is that

[1] We shall see in the next lecture that the institution of the *ḥimā* or sacred pasture-land is not based on the idea of property but on a principle of taboo. A main argument for the antiquity of Baal religion in Arabia is drawn from the denominative verb *ba'ila* = *aliha*, which means "to be in a state of helpless panic and perplexity," literally "to be Baal-struck." But such results are more naturally to be ascribed to the influence of an alien god than of a tribal divinity, and the word may well be supposed to have primarily expressed the confusion and mazed perplexity of the nomad when he finds himself at some great feast at a pilgrim shrine, amidst the strange habits and worship of a settled population; cf. Æthiopic *ba'āl*, feast."

almost every holy place at the time of Mohammed was a little centre of settled agricultural life, and so also a centre of ideas foreign to the purely nomadic worshippers that frequented it.[1]

The final result of this long discussion is that the conception of the local god as Baal or lord of the land, the source of its fertility and the giver of all the good things of life enjoyed by its inhabitants, is intimately bound up with the growth of agricultural society, and involves a series of ideas unknown to the primitive life of the savage huntsman or the pure pastoral nomad. But we have also seen that the original idea of Baal's land was limited to certain favoured spots that seem to be planted and watered by the hand of the god, and to form, as it were, his homestead. Thus in its beginnings the idea of the land of the god appears to be only a development, in accordance with the type of agricultural life, of the more primitive idea that the god has a special home or haunt on earth. Agricultural habits teach men to look on this home as a garden of God, cultivated and fertilised by the hand of deity, but it was not agriculture that created the conception that certain places were the special haunts of

[1] In Arabia one section of a tribe is often nomadic while another is agricultural, but in spite of their kinship the two sections feel themselves very far apart in life and ways of thought, and a nomad girl often refuses to stay with a village husband. In this connection the traditions of the foreign origin of the cult at Mecca deserve more attention than is generally paid to them, though not in the line of Dozy's speculations. To the tribes of the desert the religion of the towns was foreign in spirit and contrasted in many ways with their old nomadic habits; moreover, as we have seen, it was probably coloured from the first by Syrian and Nabatæan influences. Yet it exercised a great attraction, mainly by appealing to the sensual part of the Bedouin's nature; the feasts were connected with the markets, and at them there was much jollity and good cheer. They began to be looked on as making up the sum of religion, and the cult of the gods came to be almost entirely dissociated from daily life, and from the customs associated with the sanctity of kinship, which at one time made up the chief part of nomad religion. Cf. Wellh., *Heid.* p. 215 *sq.*

superhuman powers. That the gods are not ubiquitous but subject to limitations of time and space, and that they can act only where they or their messengers are present, is the universal idea of antiquity and needs no explanation. In no region of thought do men begin with transcendental ideas and conceive of existences raised above space and time. Thus whatever the nature of the gods, they were doubtless conceived from the first as having their proper homes or haunts, which they went forth from and returned to, and where they were to be found by the worshippers with whom they had fixed relations. We are not entitled to say *à priori* that this home would necessarily be a spot on the surface of the earth, for, just as there are fowls of the heaven and fish of the sea as well as beasts of the field, there might be, and in fact were, celestial gods and gods of the waters under the earth as well as gods terrestrial. In later times celestial gods predominate, as we see from the prevalence of sacrifice by fire, in which the homage of the worshipper is directed upwards in the pillar of savoury smoke that rises from the altar towards the seat of the godhead in the sky. But all sacrifices are not made by fire. The Greeks, especially in older times, buried the sacrifices devoted to gods of the underworld, and threw into the water gifts destined for the gods of seas and rivers. Both these forms of fireless ritual are found also among the Semites; and indeed among the Arabs sacrifices by fire were almost unknown, and the gift of the worshipper was conveyed to the deity simply by being laid on sacred ground, hung on a sacred tree, or, in the case of liquid offerings and sacrificial blood, poured over a sacred stone. In such cases we have the idea of locality connected with the godhead in the simplest form. There is a fixed place on the earth's surface, marked by a sacred tree or a sacred stone, where the god is wont to

be found, and offerings deposited there have reached their address.

In later times the home or sanctuary of a god was a temple, or, as the Semites call it, a "house" or "palace." But as a rule the sanctuary is older than the house, and the god did not take up his residence in a place because a house had been provided for him, but, on the contrary, when men had learned to build houses for themselves, they also set up a house for their god in the place which was already known as his home. Of course, as population increased and temples were multiplied, means were found to evade this rule, and new sanctuaries were constituted in the places most convenient for the worshippers; but even in such cases forms were observed which implied that a temple could not fitly be erected except in a place affected by the deity, and the greatest and holiest sanctuaries were those which, according to undisputed tradition, he had been known to frequent from time immemorial.

That the gods haunted certain spots, which in consequence of this were holy places and fit places of worship, was to the ancients not a theory but a matter of fact, handed down by tradition from one generation to another, and accepted with unquestioning faith. Accordingly we find that new sanctuaries can be formed and new altars or temples erected, only where the godhead has given unmistakable evidence of his presence. All that is necessary to constitute a Semitic sanctuary is a precedent; it is assumed that where the god has once manifested himself and shown favour to his worshippers he will do so again, and when the precedent has been strengthened by frequent repetition the holiness of the place is fully established. Thus in the earlier parts of the Old Testament a theophany is always taken to be a good reason for sacrificing on the spot. The deity has manifested himself either visibly or

by some mighty deed, and therefore an act of worship cannot be out of place. Saul builds an altar on the site of his victory over the Philistines,[1] the patriarchs found sanctuaries on the spot where the deity has appeared to them,[2] Gideon and Manoah present an offering where they have received a divine message.[3] Even in the Hebrew religion God is not equally near at all places and all times, and when a man is brought face to face with Him he seizes the opportunity for an act of ritual homage. But the ordinary practices of religion are not dependent on extraordinary manifestations of the divine presence; they proceed on the assumption that there are fixed places where the deity has appeared in the past and may be expected to appear again. When Jacob has his dream of a divine apparition at Bethel, he concludes not merely that Jehovah is present there at the moment, but that the place is "the house of God, the gate of heaven." And accordingly Bethel continued to be regarded as a sanctuary of the first class down to the captivity. In like manner all the places where the patriarchs were recorded to have worshipped or where God appeared to them, figure as traditional holy places in the later history, and at least one of them, that of Mamre, was a notable sanctuary down to Christian times. We are entitled to use these facts as illustrative of Semitic religion in general, and not of the distinctive features of the spiritual religion of the Old Testament; for the worship of Bethel, Shechem, Beer-sheba, and the other patriarchal holy places, was mingled with Canaanite elements and is regarded as idolatrous by the prophets; and the later ritual at Mamre, which was put down by the Christian emperors, was purely heathenish.

[1] 1 Sam. xiv. 35.

[2] Gen. xii. 7, xxii. 14, xxviii. 18 *sqq.*; cf. Ex. xvii. 15.

[3] Judg. vi. 20, xiii. 19.

[4] The evidence is collected by Reland, *Palæstina*, p. 711 *sqq.*

This law of precedent as forming a safe rule for ritual institutions is common to the Old Testament religion and to the surrounding heathenism; the difference lies in the interpretation put on it. And even in this respect all parts of the Old Testament are not on the same level By a prophet like Isaiah the residence of Jehovah in Zion is almost wholly dematerialised. Isaiah has not risen to the full height of the New Testament conception that God, who is spirit and is to be worshipped spiritually, makes no distinction of spot with regard to His worship, and is equally near to receive men's prayers in every place; but he falls short of this view, not out of regard for ritual tradition, but because, conceiving Jehovah as the king of Israel, the supreme director of its national polity, he necessarily conceives His kingly activity as going forth from the capital of the nation. The ordinary conception of the Old Testament, in the historical books and in the Law, is not so subtle as this. Jehovah is not tied to one place more than another, but He is not to be found except in the places where "He has set a memorial of His name," and in these He "comes to His worshippers and blesses them" (Ex. xx. 24). Even this view rises above the current ideas of the older Hebrews in so far as it represents the establishment of fixed sanctuaries as an accommodation to the necessities of man. It is obvious that in the history of Jacob's vision the idea is not that Jehovah came to Jacob, but that Jacob was unconsciously guided to the place where there already was a ladder set between earth and heaven, and where, therefore, the godhead was peculiarly accessible. Precisely similar to this is the old Hebrew conception of Sinai or Horeb, "the Mount of God." It is clear that in Ex. iii. the ground about the burning bush does not become holy because God has appeared to Moses. On the contrary, the theophany takes place there because

it is holy ground, Jehovah's habitual dwelling-place. In Ex. xix. 4, when Jehovah at Sinai says that He has brought the Israelites unto Himself, the meaning is that He has brought them to the Mount of God; and long after the establishment of the Hebrews in Canaan, poets and prophets describe Jehovah, when He comes to help His people, as marching from Sinai in thundercloud and storm.[1]

This point of view, which in the Old Testament appears only as an occasional survival of primitive thought, corresponds to the ordinary ideas of Semitic heathenism. The local relations of the gods are natural relations; men worship at a particular spot because it is the natural home or haunt of the god. Holy places in this sense are older than temples, and even older than the beginnings of settled life. The nomad shepherd or the savage hunter has no fixed home, and cannot think of his god as having one, but he has a district or beat to which his wanderings are usually confined, and within it again he has his favourite lairs or camping-places. And on this analogy he can imagine for himself tracts of sacred ground habitually frequented by the gods, and special points within these tracts which the deity particularly affects. By and by, under the influence of agriculture and settled life, the sacred tract becomes the estate of the god, and the special sacred points within it become his temples; but originally the former is only a mountain or glade in the unenclosed wilderness, and the latter are merely spots in the desert defined by some natural landmark, a cave, a rock, a fountain or a tree.

We have seen that, when a sanctuary was once constituted, the mere force of tradition and precedent, the

[1] Deut. xxxiii. 2; Judg. v. 4 *sqq.*; Hab. iii. 3. That the sanctity of Sinai is derived from the law-giving there is not the primitive idea. This appears most clearly from the critical analysis of the Pentateuch, but is sufficiently evident from the facts cited above.

continuous custom of worshipping at it, were sufficient to maintain its character. At the more developed sanctuaries the temple, the image of the god, the whole apparatus of ritual, the miraculous legends recounted by the priests, and the marvels that were actually displayed before the eyes of the worshippers, were to an uncritical age sufficient confirmation of the belief that the place was indeed a house of God. But in the most primitive sanctuaries there were no such artificial aids to faith, and it is not so easy to realise the process by which the traditional belief that a spot in the wilderness was the sacred ground of a particular deity became firmly established. Ultimately, as we have seen, the proof that the deity frequents a particular place lies in the fact that he manifests himself there, and the proof is cumulative in proportion to the frequency of the manifestations. The difficulty about this line of proof is not that which naturally suggests itself to our minds. We find it hard to think of a visible manifestation of the godhead as an actual occurrence, but all primitive peoples believe in frequent theophanies, or at least in frequent occasions of personal contact between men and superhuman powers. When all nature is mysterious and full of unknown activities, any natural object or occurrence which appeals strongly to the imagination, or excites sentiments of awe and reverence, is readily taken for a manifestation of divine or demoniac life. But a supernatural being as such is not a god, he becomes a god only when he enters into stated relations with man, or rather with a community of men. In the belief of the heathen Arabs, for example, nature is full of living beings of superhuman kind, the *Jinn* or demons.[1] These *jinn* are not pure spirits but ★

[1] For details as to the *jinn* in ancient times, see Wellhausen, *Heidenthum*, p. 148 *sqq.* The later form of the belief in such beings, much modified by

corporeal beings, more like beasts than men, for they are ordinarily represented as hairy, or have some other animal shape, as that of an ostrich or a snake. Their bodies are not phantasms, for if a *jinnī* is killed a solid carcase remains; but they have certain mysterious powers of appearing and disappearing, or even of changing their aspect and temporarily assuming human form, and when they are offended they can avenge themselves in a supernatural way, *e.g.* by sending disease or madness. Like the wild beasts, they have, for the most part, no friendly or stated relations with men, but are outside the pale of man's society, and frequent savage and deserted places far from the wonted tread of men.[1] It appears from several poetical passages of the Old Testament that the northern Semites believed in demons of a precisely similar kind, hairy beings (*sĕʿīrīm*), nocturnal monsters (*līlīth*), which haunted waste and desolate places, in fellowship with jackals and ostriches and other animals that shun the abodes of man.[2]

In Islam the gods of heathenism are degraded into *jinn*, just as the gods of north Semitic heathenism are called *sĕʿīrīm*[3] in Lev. xvii. 7, or as the gods of Greece and Rome became devils to the early Christians. In all these cases the adherents of a higher faith were not prepared to deny that the heathen gods really existed, and

Islam, is illustrated by Lane in Note 21 of the Introduction to his version of the *Arabian Nights*. In the old translation of the *Arabian Nights* they are called Genii. See also Van Vloten in *Vienna Or. Jour.* 1893, p. 169 *sqq.*, from Al-Jāḥiẓ.

[1] Certain kinds of them, however, frequent trees and even human habitations, and these were identified with the serpents which appear and disappear so mysteriously about walls and the roots of trees. See Nöldeke, *Ztschr. f. Völkerpsych.* 1860, p. 412 *sqq.*; Wellh. *ut sup.* p. 152 *sq.* For the snake as the form of the *jinn* of trees, see Rasmussen, *Addit.* p. 71, compared with Jauharī and the *Lisān*, *s. rad.* جنّ.

[2] Isa. xiii. 21, xxxiv. 14; cf. Luke xi. 24.

[3] "Hairy demons," E.V. "devils," but in Isa. xiii. 21 "satyrs."

did the things recorded of them; the difference between gods and demons lies not in their nature and power—for the heathen themselves did not rate the power of their gods at omnipotence—but in their relations to man. The *jinn* would make very passable gods, for the cruder forms of heathenism, if they only had a circle of human dependants and worshippers; and conversely a god who loses his worshippers falls back into the ranks of the demons, as a being of vague and indeterminate powers who, having no fixed personal relations to men, is on the whole to be regarded as an enemy. The demons, like the gods, have their particular haunts which are regarded as awful and dangerous places. But the haunt of the *jinn* differs from a sanctuary as the *jinn* themselves differ from gods. The one is feared and avoided, the other is approached, not indeed without awe, but yet with hopeful confidence; for though there is no essential physical distinction between demons and gods, there is the fundamental moral difference that the *jinn* are strangers and so, by the law of the desert, enemies, while the god, to the worshippers who frequent his sanctuary, is a known and friendly power. In fact the earth may be said to be parcelled out between demons and wild beasts on the one hand, and gods and men on the other.[1] To the former belong the untrodden wilderness with all its unknown perils, the wastes and jungles that lie outside the familiar tracks and pasture grounds of the tribe, and which only the boldest men venture upon without terror; to the latter belong the regions that man knows and habitually frequents, and within which he has established relations, not only with his human neighbours, but with the super-

[1] The close association between demons and wild beasts is well brought out in a scholion to Ibn Hishām (ii. 9, l. 20, 23), where wild beasts and serpents swarm round a ruin, and every one who seeks to carry anything away from it is stricken by the *jinn*. ★

natural beings that have their haunts side by side with him. And as man gradually encroaches on the wilderness and drives back the wild beasts before him, so the gods in like manner drive out the demons, and spots that were once feared, as the habitation of mysterious and presumably malignant powers, lose their terrors and either become common ground or are transformed into the seats of friendly deities. From this point of view the recognition of certain spots as haunts of the gods is the religious expression of the gradual subjugation of nature by man. In conquering the earth for himself primitive man has to contend not only with material difficulties but with superstitious terror of the unknown, paralysing his energies and forbidding him freely to put forth his strength to subdue nature to his use. Where the unknown demons reign he is afraid to set his foot and make the good things of nature his own. But where the god has his haunt he is on friendly soil, and has a protector near at hand; the mysterious powers of nature are his allies instead of his enemies, "he is in league with the stones of the field, and the wild beasts of the field are at peace with him."[1]

The triumph of the gods over the demons, like the triumph of man over wild beasts, must have been effected very gradually, and may be regarded as finally sealed and secured only in the agricultural stage, when the god of the community became also the supreme lord of the land and the author of all the good things therein. When this stage was reached the demons—or supernatural beings that have no stated relations to their human neighbours—were either driven out into waste and untrodden places, or were reduced to insignificance as merely subordinate

[1] Job v. 23. The allusion to the wild beasts is characteristic; cf. Hos. ii. 20 (18); 2 Kings xvii. 26. An Arabian parallel in Ibn Sa'd, No. 145 with Wellhausen's note, *Skizzen*, iv. 194.

beings of which private superstition might take account but with which public religion had nothing to do. Within the region frequented by a community of men the god of the community was supreme; every phenomenon that seemed supernatural was ordinarily referred to his initiative and regarded as a token of his personal presence, or of the presence of his messengers and agents; and in consequence every place that had special supernatural associations was regarded, not as a haunt of unknown demons, but as a holy place of the known god. This is the point of view which prevailed among the ancient Hebrews, and undoubtedly prevailed also among their Canaanite neighbours. Up to a certain point the process involved in all this is not difficult to follow. That the powers that haunt a district in which men live and prosper must be friendly powers is an obvious conclusion. But it is not so easy to see how the vague idea of supernatural but friendly neighbours passes into the precise conception of a definite local god, or how the local power comes to be confidently identified with the tribal god of the community. The tribal god, as we have seen, has very definite and permanent relations to his worshippers, of a kind quite different from the local relations which we have just been speaking of; he is not merely their friendly neighbour, but (at least in most cases) their kinsman and the parent of their race. How does it come about that the parent of a race of men is identified with the superhuman being that haunts a certain spot, and manifests himself there by visible apparitions, or other evidence of his presence satisfactory to the untutored mind? The importance of such an identification is enormous, for it makes a durable alliance between man and certain parts of nature which are not subject to his will and control, and so permanently raises his position in

the scale of the universe, setting him free, within a certain range, from the crushing sense of constant insecurity and vague dread of the unknown powers that close him in on every side. So great a step in the emancipation of man from bondage to his natural surroundings cannot have been easily made, and is not to be explained by any slight *à priori* method. The problem is not one to be solved off-hand, but to be carefully kept in mind as we continue our studies.

There is one thing, however, which it may be well to note at once. We have seen that through the local god, who on the one hand has fixed relations to a race of men, and on the other hand has fixed relations to a definite sphere of nature, the worshipper is brought into stated and permanent alliance with certain parts of his material environment which are not subject to his will and control. But within somewhat narrow limits exactly the same thing is effected, in the very earliest stage of savage society, and in a way that does not involve any belief in an individual stock-god, through the institution of totemism. In the totem stage of society each kinship or stock of savages believes itself to be physically akin to some natural kind of animate or inanimate things, most generally to some kind of animal. Every animal of this kind is looked upon as a brother, is treated with the same respect as a human clansman, and is believed to aid his human relations by a variety of friendly services.[1] The importance of such a permanent alliance, based on the indissoluble bond of kinship, with a whole group of natural beings lying outside the sphere of humanity, is not to be measured by our knowledge of what animals can and cannot do. For

[1] See J. G. Frazer, *Totemism* (Edinburgh: A. & C. Black, 1887), p. 20 *sqq.*, reprinted in his monumental work *Totemism and Exogamy* (London, 1910), i. 1–87, with numerous additions, iv. 173–266.

as their nature is imperfectly known, savage imagination clothes them with all sort of marvellous attributes; it is seen that their powers differ from those of man, and it is supposed that they can do many things that are beyond his scope. In fact they are invested with gifts such as we should call supernatural, and of the very same kind which heathenism ascribes to the gods—for example with the power of giving omens and oracles, of healing diseases and the like.

The origin of totemism is as much a problem as the origin of local gods. But it is highly improbable that the two problems are independent; for in both cases the thing to be explained is the emancipation of a society of men from the dread of certain natural agencies, by the establishment of the conception of a physical alliance and affinity between the two parts. It is a strong thing to suppose that a conception so remarkable as this, which is found all over the world, and which among savage races is invariably put in the totem form, had an altogether distinct and independent origin among those races which we know only in a state of society higher than savagery. *The belief in local nature-gods that are also clan-gods may not be directly evolved out of an earlier totemism, but there can be no reasonable doubt that it is evolved out of ideas or usages which also find their expression in totemism, and therefore must go back to the most primitive stage of savage society.* It is important to bear this in mind, if only that we may be constantly warned against explaining primitive religious institutions by conceptions that belong to a relatively advanced stage of human thought. But the comparison of totemism can do more than this negative service to our enquiry, for it calls our attention to certain habits of very early thought which throw light on several points in the conception of local sanctuaries.

In the system of totemism men have relations not with individual powers of nature, *i.e.* with gods, but with certain classes of natural agents. The idea is that nature, like mankind, is divided into groups or societies of things, analogous to the groups or kindreds of human society. As life analogous to human life is imagined to permeate all parts of the universe, the application of this idea may readily be extended to inanimate as well as to animate things. But the statistics of totemism show that the natural kinds with which the savage mind was most occupied were the various species of animals. It is with them especially that he has permanent relations of kinship or hostility, and round them are gathered in a peculiar degree his superstitious hopes and fears and observances. Keeping these facts before us, let us look back for a moment at the Arabian *jinn*. One difference between gods and *jinn* we have already noted; the gods have worshippers, and the *jinn* have not. But there is another difference that now forces itself on our attention; the gods have individuality, and the *jinn* have not. In the *Arabian Nights* we find *jinn* with individual names and distinctive personalities, but in the old legends the individual *jinnī* who may happen to appear to a man has no more a distinct personality than a beast.[1] He is only one of a group of beings which to man are indistinguishable from

[1] This may be illustrated by reference to a point of grammar which is of some interest and is not made clear in the ordinary books. The Arab says "the *ghūl* appeared," not "a *ghūl* appeared," just as David says "the lion came and the bear" (1 Sam. xvii. 34; Amos iii. 12, v. 19). The definite article is used because in such cases definition cannot be carried beyond the indication of the species. The individuals are numerically different, but qualitatively indistinguishable. This use of the article is sharply to be distinguished from such a case as האיש in 1 Sam. ix. 9, where the article is generic, and a general practice of men is spoken of; and also from cases like הפלים (Gen. xiv. 13), האיב, נאל הדם, etc., where the noun is really a verbal adjective implying an action, and the person is defined by the action ascribed to him.

one another, and which are regarded as making up a nation or clan of superhuman beings,[1] inhabiting a particular locality, and united together by bonds of kinship and by the practice of the blood-feud, so that the whole clan acts together in defending its haunts from intrusion or in avenging on men any injury done to one of its members.[2] This conception of the communities of the *jinn* is precisely identical with the savage conception of the animal creation. Each kind of animal is regarded as an organised kindred, held together by ties of blood and the practice of blood revenge, and so presenting a united front when it is assailed by men in the person of any of its members. Alike in the Arabian superstitions about the *jinn* and in savage superstitions about animals it is this solidarity between all the members of one species, rather than the strength of the individual *jinnī* or animal, that makes it an object of superstitious terror.

These points of similarity between the families of the *jinn* in Arabia and the families of animals among savages are sufficiently striking, but they do not nearly exhaust the case. We have already seen that the *jinn* usually appear to men in animal form, though they can also take the shape of men. This last feature, however, cannot be regarded as constituting a fundamental distinction between

[1] A curious local story about two clans of *jinn*, the B. Mālik and the B. Shaiṣabān may be read in Yācūt, iii. 476 *sqq.* It is a genuine Bedouin tale, but like most later stories of the kind is not strictly mythical, but a free invention on the lines of current superstition. The oldest case of a clan of the *jinn* which is defined by a patronymic and not merely by a local name is perhaps that of the B. Ocaish, Nābigha, xxix. 10; cf. Ibn Hish. p. 282. But Tha'lab makes the B. Ocaish a human race, and the words of Nābigha are quite consistent with this view. Jinn with personal names appear in several traditions of the prophet, but only, so far as I can see, in such as are manifestly "weak," *i.e.* spurious.

[2] For the blood-feud of the *jinn* the classical example is that in Azracī, p. 261 (see below). But see also Damīrī, *s.v. arcam* (vol. i. p. 23), where we learn that the slayer of a serpent-demon was likely to die or go mad, and this was held to be the revenge of the kin of the slain. Cf. Wellh. 149.

them and ordinary animals in the mind of the Arabs, who believed that there were whole tribes of men who had the power of assuming animal form. On the whole it appears that the supernatural powers of the *jinn* do not differ from those which savages, in the totem stage, ascribe to wild beasts. They appear and disappear mysteriously, and are connected with supernatural voices and warnings, with unexplained sickness or death, just as totem animals are; they occasionally enter into friendly relations or even into marriages with men, but animals do the same in the legends of savages; finally, a madman is possessed by the *jinn* (*majnūn*), but there are a hundred examples of the soul of a beast being held to pass into a man.[1] The accounts of the *jinn* which we possess have come to us from an age when the Arabs were no longer pure savages, and had ceased to ascribe demoniac attributes to most animals; and our narrators, when they repeat tales about animals endowed with speech or supernatural gifts, assume as a matter of course that they are not ordinary animals but a special class of beings. But the stories themselves are just such as savages tell about real animals; the blood-feud between the Banu Sahm and the *jinn* of Dhū Ṭawā is simply a war between men and all creeping things, which, as in the Old Testament, have a common name[2] and are regarded as a single species or kindred; and the "wild beast of the wild beasts of the *jinn*," which Taabbaṭa Sharran slew in a night encounter and carried home under his arm, was as concrete an animal as one can well imagine.[3] The proper form of the *jinn* seems to be

[1] The widespread belief in this form of possession ought to be cited by commentators on Dan. iv. 16.

[2] *Ḥanash* = Heb. שרץ, רמש. For the story see Azracī, p. 261 *sqq.*; Wellh. p. 154.

[3] *Agh.* xviii. 210 *sqq.* Taabbaṭa Sharran is an historical person, and the incident also is probably a fact. From the verses in which he describes his

always that of some kind of lower animal, or a monstrous composition of animal forms, as appears even in later times in the description of the four hundred and twenty species that were marshalled before Solomon.[1] But the tendency to give human shape to creatures that can reason and speak is irresistible as soon as men pass beyond pure savagery, and just as animal gods pass over into anthropomorphic gods, figured as riding on animals or otherwise associated with them, the *jinn* begin to be conceived as manlike in form, and the supernatural animals of the original conception appear as the beasts on which they ride.[2] Ultimately the only animals directly and constantly identified with the *jinn* were snakes and other noxious creeping things. The authority of certain utterances of the prophet had a share in this limitation, but it is

foe it would seem that the supposed *ghūl* was one of the feline carnivora. In Damīrī, ii. 212, last line, a *ghūl* appears in the form of a thieving cat.

[1] Cazwīnī, i. 372 *sq.* Even when they appear in the guise of men they have some animal attribute, *e.g.* a dog's hairy paw in place of a hand, Damīrī, ii. 213, l. 22.

[2] The stories in which the apparition takes this shape are obviously late. When a demon appears riding on a wolf or an ostrich to give his opinion on the merits of the Arabian poets (*Agh.* viii. 78, ix. 163, cited by Wellh. p. 152), we have to do with literary fiction rather than genuine belief; and similarly the story of a *ghūl* who rides on an ostrich in Cazwīnī, i. 373 *sq.*, is only an edifying Moslem tale. These stories stand in marked contrast with the genuine old story in Maidānī, i. 181, where the demon actually is an ostrich. The transition to the anthropomorphic view is seen in the story of Taabbaṭa Sharran, where the monster *ghūl* is called one of the wild beasts of the *jinn*, as if he were only their animal emissary. The riding beasts of the *jinn* are of many species; they include the jackal, the gazelle, the porcupine, and it is mentioned as an exceptional thing that the hare is not one of them (*Ṣiḥāḥ, s.v.*; Rasmussen, *Addit.* p. 71, l. 14), for which reason amulets are made from parts of its body (cf. *ZDMG.* xxxix. 329). Prof. De Goeje supplies me with an interesting quotation from Zamakhsharī, *Fāic*, i. 71: "Ignorant people think that wild beasts are the cattle of the *jinn*, and that a man who meets a wild beast is affected by them with mental disorder." The paralysing effect of terror is assigned to supernatural agency. Cf. Arist. *Mir. Ausc.* 145: "In Arabia there is said to be a kind of hyæna, which when it sees a beast first (*i.e.* before being seen, Plato, *Rep.* i. p. 336 D; Theocr. xiv. 22; Virgil, *Ecl.* 9. 54) or treads on a man's shadow, renders it or him incapable of voice and movement."

natural enough that these creatures, of which men everywhere have a peculiar horror and which continue to haunt and molest men's habitations after wild beasts have been driven out into the desert, should be the last to be stripped of their supernatural character.[1]

It appears then that even in modern accounts *jinn* and various kinds of animals are closely associated, while in the older legends they are practically identified, and also that nothing is told of the *jinn* which savages do not tell of animals. Under these circumstances it requires a very exaggerated scepticism to doubt that the *jinn*, with all their mysterious powers, are mainly nothing else than more or less modernised representatives of animal kinds, clothed with the supernatural attributes inseparable from the savage conception of animate nature. A species of *jinn* allied by kinship with a tribe of men would be indistinguishable from a totem kind, and instead of calling the *jinn* gods without worshippers, we may, with greater precision, speak of them as potential totems without human kinsfolk. This view of the nature of the *jinn* helps us to understand the principle on which particular spots were viewed as their haunts. In the vast solitudes of the Arabian desert every strange sound is readily taken to be the murmuring of the *jinn*, and every strange sight to be a demoniac apparition. But when certain spots were fixed on as being pre-eminently haunted places, we must necessarily suppose that the sights and sounds that were deemed supernatural really were more frequent there than elsewhere. Mere fancy might keep the supernatural reputation of a place alive, but in its origin even the uncontrolled

[1] The snake is an object of superstition in all countries. For superstitions connected with "creeping things" in general among the northern Semites, see Ezek. viii. 10. An oath by all the creeping things (*ḥanash*) between the two Ḥarras appears in Ibn Hish. 10, l. 14, Tab. i. 911. 20, in a spurious imitation of the style of the heathen soothsayers.

imagination of the savage must have some point of contact with reality. Now the nocturnal sights and sounds that affray the wayfarer in haunted regions, and the stories of huntsmen who go up into a mountain of evil name and are carried off by the *ghūl*, point distinctly to haunted spots being the places where evil beasts walk by night. Moreover, while the *jinn* frequent waste and desert places in general, their special haunts are just those where wild beasts gather most thickly—not the arid and lifeless desert, but the mountain glades and passes, the neighbourhood of trees and groves, especially the dense untrodden thickets that occupy moist places in the bottoms of the valleys.[1]

These, it is true, are the places where the spontaneous life of nature is most actively exhibited in all its phases, and where therefore it may seem self-evident that man will be most apt to recognise the presence of divine or at least of superhuman powers. But so general an explanation as this is no explanation at all. Primitive religion was not a philosophical pantheism, and the primitive deities were not vague expressions for the principle of life in nature. What we have to explain is that the places where the life of nature is most intense—or rather some of these places—appeared to the primitive Semite to be the habitations, not

[1] All this, and especially the association of the *jinn* with natural thickets, is well brought out by Wellhausen, *Heid.*[1], p. 136; [2] p. 150 *sqq.*; though he offers no explanation of the reason why "the direct impression of divine life present in nature" is associated with so bizarre a conception. In Southern Arabia natural jungles are still avoided as the haunts of wild beasts; no Arab, according to Wrede, willingly spends a night in the Wady Ma'īsha, because its jungles are the haunts of many species of dangerous carnivora (Wrede's *Reise in Hadhramaut*, ed. Maltzan, p. 131). The lions of Al-Sharā and of the jungles of the Jordan valley (Zech. xi. 3) may be compared, and it is to be remembered that in savage life, when man's struggle with wild beasts is one of life and death, the awe associated with such places is magnified tenfold. Even in the old Mohammedan literature no sharp line is drawn between danger from wild beasts and danger from *jinn*; see the scholion cited *supra*, p. 121, note.

of abstract divine powers, but of very concrete and tangible beings, with the singular attributes which we have found the *jinn* to possess, and that this belief did not rest on mere general impressions, but was supported by reference to actual demoniac apparitions. The usual vague talk about an instinctive sense of the presence of the deity in the manifestations of natural life does not carry us a whit nearer the comprehension of these beliefs, but it is helpful to note that spots of natural fertility, untouched by man's hand and seldom trodden by his foot, are the favoured haunts of wild beasts, that all savages clothe wild beasts and other animals with the very same supernatural qualities which the Arabs ascribe to the *jinn*, and that the Arabs speak of Baccār as a place famous for its demons in exactly the same matter-of-fact way in which they speak of Al-Sharā and its famous lions.

While the most marked attributes of the *jinn* are plainly derived from animals, it is to be remembered that the savage imagination, which ascribes supernatural powers to all parts of animate nature, extends the sphere of animate life in a very liberal fashion. Totems are not seldom taken from trees, which appear to do everything for their adherents that a totem animal could do. And indeed that trees are animate, and have perceptions, passions and a reasonable soul, was argued even by the early Greek philosophers on such evidence as their movements in the wind and the elasticity of their branches.[1] Thus while the supernatural associations of groves and thickets may appear to be sufficiently explained by the fact that these are the favourite lairs of wild beasts, it appears probable that the association of certain kinds of *jinn* with trees must in many cases be regarded as primary, the trees themselves being conceived as animated demoniac beings.

[1] Aristotle, *De plantis*, i. p. 815 ; Plutarch, *Plac. Philos.* v. 26.

In Ḥaḍramaut it is still dangerous to touch the sensitive Mimosa, because the spirit that resides in the plant will avenge the injury.[1] The same idea appears in the story of Ḥarb b. Omayya and Mirdās b. Abī ʿAmir, historical persons who lived a generation before Mohammed. When these two men set fire to an untrodden and tangled thicket, with the design to bring it under cultivation, the demons of the place flew away with doleful cries in the shape of white serpents, and the intruders died soon afterwards. The *jinn* it was believed slew them "because they had set fire to their dwelling-place."[2] Here the spirits of the trees take serpent form when they leave their natural seats, and similarly in Moslem superstition the *jinn* of the *ʿoshr* and the *ḥamāṭa* are serpents which frequent trees of these species. But primarily supernatural life and power reside in the trees themselves, which are conceived as animate and even as rational. Moslim b. 'Ocba heard in a dream the voice of the *gharcad* tree designing him to the command of the army of Yazīd against Medina.[3] Or again the value of the gum of the acacia (*samora*) as an amulet is connected wth the idea that it is a clot of menstruous blood (*ḥaiḍ*), *i.e.* that the tree is a woman.[4] And similarly the old Hebrew fables of trees that speak and act like human beings[5] have their original source in the savage personification of vegetable species.

[1] Wrede's *Reise*, ed. Maltzan, p. 131.

[2] *Agh.* vi. 92, xx. 135 *sq.*

[3] *Agh.* i. 14; Wellh. 205.

[4] Rasmussen, *Add.* p. 71; Zamakhsharī, *Asās*, *s.v.* حيض. New-born children's heads were rubbed with the gum to keep away the *jinn*, just as they used to be daubed with the blood of the sacrifice called *ʿacīca* (see my *Kinship*, p. 179 *sq.*). The blood of menstruation has supernatural qualities among all races, and the value of the hare's foot as an amulet was connected with the belief that this animal menstruates (Rasm. *ut sup.*). The same thing was affirmed of the hyæna, which has many magical qualities and peculiar affinities to man (*Kinship*, p. 231 *sq.*).

[5] Judg. ix. 8 *sqq.*; 2 Kings xiv. 9.

In brief it is not unjust to say that, wherever the spontaneous life of nature was manifested in an emphatic way, the ancient Semite saw something supernatural. But this is only half the truth; the other half is that the supernatural was conceived in genuinely savage fashion, and identified with the quasi-human life ascribed to the various species of animals or plants or even of inorganic things.

For indeed certain phenomena of inorganic nature directly suggest to the primitive mind the idea of living force, and the presence of a living agent. Thus, to take a trivial example, the mediæval Arabs associate a definite class of demons with sand-whirlwinds and apply the name *zawābiʿ* indifferently to these phenomena and to the *jinn* that accompany or cause them.[1] More important is the widespread belief that the stars move because they are alive, which underlies the planet and constellation worship of the Semites as of other ancient nations. Volcanic phenomena, in like manner, are taken for manifestations of supernatural life, as we see in the Greek myths of Typhoeus and in the Moslem legend of the crater of Barahūt in Ḥaḍramaut, whose rumblings are held to be the groans of lost souls;[2] probably also in the legend of the "fire of Yemen" in the valley of Ḍarawān which in heathen times is said to have served as an ordeal, devouring the guilty and sparing the innocent;[3] and again,

[1] See the lexx. and also Jāḥiẓ as cited by Vloten, *Vien. Or. J.* vii. 180. In several Arabian legends the eccentric movements of dust-whirlwinds are taken to be the visible signs of a battle between two clans of Jinn (Ibn Hish. ii. 42, Yācūt, iii. 478; cf. Ibn Hish. 131 *sq.*). Cf. Goldz. *Abh.* i. 205, ii. cviii.

[2] See Yācūt, i. 598; De Goeje, *Ḥadramaut*, p. 20 (Rev. Col. Intern. 1886). Does this belief rest on an early myth connected with the name of Ḥaḍramaut itself? See Olshausen in *Rhein. Mus.* Ser. 3, vol. viii. p. 332; *Sitzungsb. d. Berliner Ak.* 1879, p. 751 *sqq.*

[3] Ibn Hishām, p. 17, with the scholia; Bekri, p. 621; Yācūt, iii. 470. Yācūt describes the valley as accursed; no plant grew there, no man could traverse it, and no bird fly across it.

mephitic vapours rising from fissures in the earth are taken to be potent spiritual influences.[1] But remote phenomena like the movements of the stars, and exceptional phenomena like volcanoes, influence the savage imagination less than mundane and everyday things, which are not less mysterious to him and touch his common life more closely. It seems to be a mistake to suppose that distant and exceptional things are those from which primitive man forms his general views of the supernatural; on the contrary he interprets the remote by the near, and thinks of heavenly bodies, for example, as men or animals, like the animate denizens of earth.[2] Of all inanimate things that which has the best marked supernatural associations among the Semites is flowing (or, as the Hebrews say, "living") water. In one of the oldest fragments of Hebrew poetry[3] the fountain is addressed as a living being; and sacred wells are among the oldest and most ineradicable objects of reverence among all the Semites, and are credited with oracular powers and a sort of volition by which they receive or reject offerings. Of course these superstitions often take the form of a belief that the sacred spring is the dwelling-place of beings which from time to time emerge from it in human or animal form, but the fundamental

[1] It may be conjectured that the indignation of the *jinn* at the violation of their haunts, as it appears in the story of Harb and Mirdās, would not have been so firmly believed in but for the fact that places such as the *jinn* were thought to frequent are also the haunts of ague, which is particularly active when land is cultivated for the first time. According to a Mohammedan tradition, the Prophet assigned the uplands (*jals*) to the believing jinn, and the deep lowlands (*ghaur*) to the unbelieving. The latter are in Arabia the homes of fever and plague (Damīrī, i. 231).

[2] See Lang, *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, chap. v. Among the Semites the worship of sun, moon and stars does not appear to have had any great vogue in the earliest times. Among the Hebrews there is little trace of it before Assyrian influence became potent, and in Arabia it is by no means so prominent as is sometimes supposed; cf. Wellhausen, p. 209 *sqq*.

[3] Num. xxi. 17, 18: "Spring up, O well! sing ye to it!" See p. 183, n. 2.

idea is that the water itself is the living organism of a demoniac life, not a mere dead organ.[1]

If now we turn from the haunts of the demons to sanctuaries proper, the seats of known and friendly powers with whom men maintain stated relations, we find that in their physical character the homes of the gods are precisely similar to those of the *jinn*—mountains and thickets, fertile spots beside a spring or stream, or sometimes points defined by the presence of a single notable tree. As man encroaches on the wilderness, and brings these spots within the range of his daily life and walk, they lose their terror but not their supernatural associations, and the friendly deity takes the place of the dreaded demons. The conclusion to be drawn from this is obvious. The physical characters that were held to mark out a holy place are not to be explained by conjectures based on the more developed type of heathenism, but must be regarded as taken over from the primitive beliefs of savage man. The nature of the god did not determine the place of his sanctuary, but conversely the features of the sanctuary had an important share in determining the development of ideas as to the functions of the god. How this was possible we have seen in the conception of the local Baalim. The spontaneous luxuriance of marshy lands already possessed supernatural associations when there was no thought of bringing it under the service of man by cultivation, and when the rich valley bottoms were avoided with superstitious terror as the haunts of formidable natural enemies. How this terror was first broken through, and the transformation of certain groups of hostile demons into friendly and kindred powers was first effected, we cannot tell; we can only say

[1] For the details as to sacred waters among the Semites, see below in Lect. V.

that the same transformation is already effected, by means of totemism, in the most primitive societies of savages, and that there is no record of a stage in human society in which each community of men did not claim kindred and alliance with some group or species of the living powers of nature. But if we take this decisive step for granted, the subsequent development of the relation of the gods to the land follows by a kind of moral necessity, and the transformation of the vague friendly powers that haunt the seats of spontaneous natural life into the beneficent agricultural Baalim, the lords of the land and its waters, the givers of life and fertility to all that dwell on it, goes naturally hand in hand with the development of agriculture and the laws of agricultural society.

I have tried to put this argument in such a way as may not commit us prematurely to the hypothesis that the friendly powers of the Semites were originally totems, *i.e.* that the relations of certain kindred communities of men with certain groups of natural powers were established before these natural powers had ceased to be directly identified with species of plants and animals. But if my analysis of the nature of the *jinn* is correct, the conclusion that the Semites did pass through the totem stage can be avoided only by supposing them to be an exception to the universal rule, that even the most primitive savages have not only enemies but permanent allies (which at so early a stage in society necessarily means kinsfolk) among the non-human or superhuman animate kinds by which the universe is peopled. And this supposition is so extravagant that no one is likely to adopt it. On the other hand, it may be argued with more plausibility that totemism, if it ever did exist, disappeared when the Semites emerged from savagery, and that the religion of the race, in its

higher stages, may have rested on altogether independent bases. Whether this hypothesis is or is not admissible must be determined by an actual examination of the higher heathenism. If its rites usages and beliefs really are independent of savage ideas, and of the purely savage conception of nature of which totemism is only one aspect, the hypothesis is legitimate; but it is not legitimate if the higher heathenism itself is permeated in all its parts by savage ideas, and if its ritual and institutions are throughout in the closest contact with savage ritual and institutions of totem type. That the latter is the true state of the case will I believe become overwhelmingly clear as we proceed with our survey of the phenomena of Semitic religion; and a very substantial step towards the proof that it is so has already been taken, when we have found that the sanctuaries of the Semitic world are identical in physical character with the haunts of the *jinn*, so that as regards their local associations the gods must be viewed as simply replacing the plant and animal demons.[1] If this is so we can hardly avoid the conclusion that some of the Semitic gods are of totem origin, and we may expect to find the most distinct traces of this origin at the oldest sanctuaries. *But we are not to suppose that every local deity will have totem associations, for new gods as well as new sanctuaries might doubtless spring up at a later stage of human progress than that of which totemism is characteristic.* Even holy places that had an old connection with the demons may, in many instances, have come to be looked upon as the abode of friendly powers and fit seats of worship, after the demons had ceased to be directly identified with species of plants and animals, and had

[1] The complete development of this argument as it bears on the nature of the gods must be reserved for a later course of lectures; but a provisional discussion of some points on which a difficulty may arise will be found below: see *Additional Note* A, *Gods, Demons, and Plants or Animals.*

acquired quasi-human forms like the nymph and satyrs of the Greeks. *It is one thing to say that the phenomena of Semitic religion carry us back to totemism, and another thing to say that they are all to be explained from totemism.*

LECTURE IV

HOLY PLACES IN THEIR RELATION TO MAN

I HAVE spoken hitherto of the physical characters of the sanctuary, as the haunt of divine beings that prove, in the last resort, to be themselves parts of the mundane universe, and so have natural connections with sacred localities; let us now proceed to look at the places of the gods in another aspect, to wit in their relation to men, and the conduct which men are called upon to observe at and towards them. The fundamental principle by which this is regulated is that the sanctuary is holy, and must not be treated as a common place. The distinction between what is *holy* and what is *common* is one of the most important things in ancient religion, but also one which it is very difficult to grasp precisely, because its interpretation varied from age to age with the general progress of religious thought. To us holiness is an ethical idea. God, the perfect being, is the type of holiness; men are holy in proportion as their lives and character are godlike; places and things can be called holy only by a figure, on account of their associations with spiritual things. This conception of holiness goes back to the Hebrew prophets, especially to Isaiah; but it is not the ordinary conception of antique religion, nor does it correspond to the original sense of the Semitic words that we translate by "holy." While it is not easy to fix the exact idea of holiness in ancient Semitic religion, it is quite certain that it has nothing to do with morality

and purity of life. Holy persons were such, not in virtue of their character but in virtue of their race, function, or mere material consecration; and at the Canaanite shrines the name of "holy" (masc. *cĕdeshīm*, fem. *cĕdeshōth*) was specially appropriated to a class of degraded wretches, devoted to the most shameful practices of a corrupt religion, whose life, apart from its connection with the sanctuary, would have been disgraceful even from the standpoint of heathenism. But holiness in antique religion is not mainly an attribute of persons. The gods are holy,[1] and their ministers of whatever kind or grade are holy also, but holy seasons holy places and holy things, that is, seasons places and things that stand in a special relation to the godhead and are withdrawn by divine sanction from some or all ordinary uses, are equally to be considered in determining what holiness means. Indeed the holiness of the gods is an expression to which it is hardly possible to attach a definite sense apart from the holiness of their physical surroundings; it shows itself in the sanctity attached to the persons places things and times through which the gods and men come in contact with one another. The holiness of the sanctuary, which is the matter immediately before us, seems also to be on the whole the particular form of sanctity which lends itself most readily to independent investigation. Holy persons things and times, as they are conceived in antiquity, all presuppose the existence of holy places at which the persons minister, the things are preserved, and the times are celebrated. Nay the holiness of the godhead itself is manifest to men, not equally at all places, but specially at those places where the gods are immediately present and from which their activity proceeds. In fact

[1] The Phœnicians speak of the "holy gods" (האלנם הקדשם, *CIS.* No. 3, l. 9, 22), as the Hebrews predicate holiness of Jehovah.

the idea of holiness comes into prominence wherever the gods come into touch with men; it is not so much a thing that characterises the gods and divine things in themselves, as the most general notion that governs their relations with humanity; and, as these relations are concentrated at particular points of the earth's surface, it is at these points that we must expect to find the clearest indications of what holiness means.

At first sight the holiness of the sanctuary may seem to be only the expression of the idea that the sanctuary belongs to the god, that the temple and its precincts are his homestead and domain, reserved for his use and that of his ministers, as a man's house and estate are reserved for himself and his household. In Arabia, for example, where there were great tracts of sacred land, it was forbidden to cut fodder, fell trees, or hunt game;[1] all the

[1] Wellh., *Heidenthum*, p. 106, and refs. there given to the ordinances laid down by Mohammed for the *Ḥaram* of Mecca and the *Ḥimā* of Wajj at Ṭāif. In both cases the ordinance was a confirmation of old usage, and similar rules were laid down by Mohammed for his new *Ḥaram* at Medina (Belādhorī, p. 7 *sq.*). At Mecca the law against killing or chasing animals did not apply to certain noxious creatures. The usually received tradition (Bokhārī, ii. 195, of the Būlāc vocalised ed.) names the raven and the kite, the rat, the scorpion and the "biting dog," which is taken to cover the lion, panther, and wolf, and other carnivora that attack man (Mowaṭṭa, ii. 198). The serpent also was killed without scruple at Minā, which is within the Ḥaram (Bokh. ii. 196, l. 1 *sqq.*). That the protection of the god is not extended to manslaying animals and to the birds of prey that molest the sacred doves is intelligible. The permission to kill vermin is to be compared with the story of the war between the Jinn and the B. Sahm (*supra*, p. 128). From the law against cutting plants the *idhkhir* (*Andropogon schœnanthus*, or lemon-grass) was excepted by Mohammed with some hesitation, on the demand of Al-Abbās, who pointed out that it was the custom to allow it to be cut for certain purposes. Here unfortunately our texts are obscure and vary greatly, but the variations all depend on the reading of two words of which one is either "smiths" or "graves" and the other "purification" or "roofs" of houses. In the Arabic the variations turn on small graphical points often left out by scribes. I take it that originally the two uses were either both practical, "for the smiths and the (thatching of) house-roofs," or both ceremonial, "for entombment and the purification of houses." As the lemon-grass was valued in antiquity for its perfume, and the fragrant *ḥarmal* was also

natural products of the holy soil were exempt from human appropriation. But it would be rash to conclude that what cannot be the private property of men is therefore the private property of the gods, reserved for the exclusive use of them or their ministers. The positive exercise of legal rights of property on the part of the gods is only possible where they have human representatives to act for them, and no doubt in later times the priests at the greater Semitic sanctuaries did treat the holy reservations as their own domain. But in early times there was no privileged class of sacred persons to assert on their own behalf the doctrine of divine proprietorship, and in these times accordingly the prohibition of private encroachment was consistent with the existence of public or communal rights in holy places and things. In nomadic Arabia sanctuaries are older than any doctrine of property that could possibly be applied to a tract like the *ḥaram* at Mecca or the *ḥimā* of Ṭāif. To constitute private property, according to the ancient doctrine still preserved in Moslem law, a man must build on the soil or cultivate it; there is no property in natural pastures. Every tribe indeed has its own range of plains and valleys, and its own watering-places, by which it habitually encamps at certain seasons and from which it repels aliens by the strong hand. But this does not constitute property, for the boundaries of the tribal land are merely maintained by force against enemies, and not only every tribesman but every covenanted ally has equal and unrestricted right to pitch his tent and drive his cattle where he will. This is still the rule among nomadic tribes, but where there are

used in old Arabia to lay the dead in, and is still used to fumigate houses, the second reading is the better. The lemon-grass might be cut for purposes of a religious or quasi-religious character. Mohammed probably hesitated because these uses were connected with heathen superstition. Cf. *Muh. in Medina*, p. 338.

fixed villages the inhabitants claim an exclusive right to a certain circuit of pasture round the township. Claims of this description are older than Islam, and are guaranteed by Mohammed in several of his treaties with new converts, in varying terms, which evidently follow the variations of customary law in different parts of the peninsula. In such cases we may legitimately speak of *communal* property in pasture-lands, but *private* property in such has never been known to Arabian law.[1]

From this statement it is obvious that the Arabs might indeed conceive the temple to be the personal property of the god, but could not bring the rules affecting sacred pastures under the same category. On the analogies that have just come before us we can readily understand that the haunts of unfriendly demons would be shunned for fear of their enmity, but the friendly god could have no exclusive right to hold waste lands against his worshippers. At Mecca the Coraish built houses or dug wells and enjoyed the full right of property in the work of their hands, and the open Ḥaram was free to every man's cattle like an ordinary tribal or communal pasture-ground. These rules are so obviously in accordance with the whole spirit of ancient Arabian institutions that they can hardly have been peculiar to Mecca. About other sacred tracts, which lost their religious prerogative through the spread of Islam, our information is too scanty to permit a positive statement, yet it seems probable that at most sanctuaries embracing a stretch of pasture-ground, the right of grazing was free to the community of the god, but not to outsiders. It appears to me that this formula covers all the known facts if we make a reasonable allowance for local variations

[1] See Ibn Sa'd, Nos. 21, 23, 121, with Wellhausen's refs. to Doughty, ii. 245, and especially Ibn Hishām, p. 955. In two cases the reserved pasture is called a *ḥimā*, and this is the term still used. Cf. on the law of pasture, Abū Yūsuf, *Kit. al-Kharāj* (Būlāc, A.H. 1302), p. 58 *sq.* See Wellh. 108, n. 3.

in the definition of outsiders. Where the sacred tract was attached to the sanctuary of a town, it might be an open question whether the privileged religious community was limited to the townsmen or included a wider circle of the surrounding Bedouins who were accustomed to pay occasional homage at the shrine. On the other hand, a sanctuary that lay between the waters of several tribes and was equally visited by all would afford a common pasture-ground where enemies could meet and feed their flocks in security under the peace of the god. And finally, there seem to have been some Arabian sanctuaries that were neither attached to a town nor intertribal, but practically were in the hands of a single family of hereditary priests. At such sanctuaries all worshippers were in some sense outsiders, and the priests might claim the *ḥimā* as a *quasi*-private domain for themselves and the god. All these cases seem to find more or less clear exemplification in the fragmentary details that have come down to us. At the *ḥimā* of Wajj, attached to the sanctuary of al-Lāt at Ṭāif, the rules are practically identical with those at Mecca; and when we observe that Mohammed confirmed these rules, in the interest of the inhabitants,[1] at the same time that he destroyed al-Lāt and did away with the ancient sanctity of the spot, it is natural to infer that in other cases also the *ḥimā* which he allowed to subsist as a communal pasture-ground round a village or town was originally a sacred tract, protected from encroachment by the fear of the god rather than by any civil authority. It is indeed plain that with such a property-law as has been described, and in the absence of any intertribal authority, religion was the only power, other than the high

[1] According to Bekrī, p. 838, the treaty of Mohammed with the Thacīf, or people of Ṭāif, contained the clause *wathacīfun aḥaccu 'n-nāsi biwajjin*, so that the confirmation of the old taboos was clearly meant to benefit them. And so it did; for to cut down the wood is the quickest way to ruin a pasture-ground for camels. See the interesting remarks of Floyer in *Journ. R. A. Soc.*

hand, that could afford any security to a communal pasture, and we are not without evidence as to how this security was effected. The privileges of the Ḥaram at Mecca and Medina are still placed under a religious sanction; on those who violated the latter Mohammed invoked the irrevocable curse of God and the angels and all men.[1] The restrictions on the use of other *ḥimās* have under Islam only a civil sanction, but the punishments appointed by Mohammed for those who violate them are manifestly based on old religious customs exactly parallel to the *taboos* prevalent among savage nations whose notions of property are still imperfectly developed. If a wood-cutter intruded on the *ḥimā* of Wajj or Nacī', he forfeited his hatchet and his clothes; if a man unlawfully grazed his cattle on the *ḥimā* of Jorash, the cattle were forfeit.[2] To us these seem to be arbitrary penalties, attached by the will of the lawgiver to a breach of civil law; but to the Arabs, just emerged from heathenism, this was not so. We shall presently see that the ancient Semites, like other early races, deemed holiness to be propagated by physical contagion, so that common things brought into the sanctuary became holy and could not be safely withdrawn again to common use. Thus the forfeiture of clothes in Islamic law is only a continuation of the old rule, attested for the sanctuary of Mecca, that common raiment worn in the sacred place had to be cast off and left behind;[3] while the forfeiture of cattle at Jorash follows the rule recorded for the sanctuary of Al-Jalsad, that cattle straying from outside into the *ḥimā* become sacred and cannot be reclaimed. By students of primitive society these rules will at once be recognised as belonging to the sphere of *taboo* and not of

[1] Belādhorī, p. 8.
[2] Ibn Hishām, p. 918; Belādhorī, p. 9; Ibn Hishām, p. 955.
[3] For the details on this point see below, *Additional Note* B.

property-law; those who are not familiar with the subject will find it further elucidated at the end of this volume in *Additional Note* B.

Hitherto we have been speaking of a type of sanctuary older than the institution of property in land. But even where the doctrine of property is fully developed, holy places and holy things, except where they have been appropriated to the use of kings and priests, fall under the head of public rather than of private estate. According to ancient conceptions, the interests of the god and his community are too closely identified to admit of a sharp distinction between sacred purposes and public purposes, and as a rule nothing is claimed for the god in which his worshippers have not a right to share. Even the holy dues presented at the sanctuary are not reserved for the private use of the deity, but are used to furnish forth sacrificial feasts in which all who are present partake. So too the sanctuaries of ancient cities served the purpose of public parks and public halls, and the treasures of the gods, accumulated within them, were a kind of state treasure, preserved by religious sanctions against peculation and individual encroachment, but available for public objects in time of need. The Canaanites of Shechem took money from their temple to provide means for Abimelech's enterprise, when they resolved to make him their king; and the sacred treasure of Jerusalem, originally derived from the fruits of David's campaigns, was used by his successors as a reserve fund available in great emergencies. On the whole, then, it is evident that the difference between holy things and common things does not originally turn on ownership, as if common things belonged to men and holy things to the gods. Indeed there are many holy things which are also private property, images, for example, and the other appurtenances of domestic sanctuaries.

Thus far it would appear that the rights of the gods in holy places and things fall short of ownership, because they do not exclude a right of user or even of property by man in the same things. But in other directions the prerogatives of the gods, in respect of that which is holy, go beyond what is involved in ownership. The approach to ancient sanctuaries was surrounded by restrictions which cannot be regarded as designed to protect the property of the gods, but rather fall under the notion that they will not tolerate the vicinity of certain persons (*e.g.* such as are physically unclean) and certain actions (*e.g.* the shedding of blood). Nay, in many cases the assertion of a man's undoubted rights as against a fugitive at the sanctuary is regarded as an encroachment on its holiness; justice cannot strike the criminal, and a master cannot recover his runaway slave, who has found asylum on holy soil. In the Old Testament the legal right of asylum is limited to the case of involuntary homicide;[1] but the wording of the law shows that this was a narrowing of ancient custom, and many heathen sanctuaries of the Phœnicians and Syrians retained even in Roman times what seems to have ★ been an unlimited right of asylum.[2] At certain Arabian

[1] Ex. xxi. 13, 14. Here the right of asylum belongs to all altars, but it was afterwards limited, on the abolition of the local altars, to certain old sanctuaries—the cities of refuge (Deut. xix.).

[2] This follows especially from the account in Tacitus, *Ann.* iii. 60 *sqq.*, of the inquiry made by Tiberius into abuses of the right of asylum. Among the holy places to which the right was confirmed after due investigation were Paphos and Amathus, both of them Phœnician sanctuaries. The asylum at the temple of Melcarth at Tyre is mentioned by Diodorus, xvii. 41. 8. There was also a right of asylum at Daphne near Antioch (Strabo, xvi. 2. 6; 2 Macc. iv. 33), and many Phœnician and Syrian towns are designated as asylums on their coins; see Head, *Hist. Num.*, Index iv., under ΑΣΥΛΟΣ and ΙΕΡΑΣ ΑΣΥΛΟΥ. The Heracleum at the fishcuring station near the Canobic mouth of the Nile (Herod. ii. 113) may also be cited, for its name and place leave little doubt that it was a Phœnician temple. Here the fugitive slave was dedicated by being tattooed with sacred marks—a Semitic custom; cf. Lucian, *Dea Syria*, lix., and *Aghānī*,

sanctuaries the god gave shelter to all fugitives without distinction, and even stray or stolen cattle that reached the holy ground could not be reclaimed by their owners.[1] What was done with these animals is not stated; possibly they enjoyed the same liberty as the consecrated camels which the Arabs, for various reasons, were accustomed to release from service and suffer to roam at large. These camels seem to be sometimes spoken of as the property of the deity,[2] but they were not used for his service. Their consecration was simply a limitation of man's right to use them.[3]

We have here another indication that the relations of holiness to the institution of property are mainly negative. Holy places and things are not so much reserved for the use of the god as surrounded by a network of restrictions and disabilities which forbid them to be used by men except in particular ways, and in certain cases forbid them to be used at all. As a rule the restrictions are such as to prevent the appropriation of holy things by men, and

vii. 110, l. 26, where an Arab patron stamps his clients with his camel mark. I owe the last reference to Prof. de Goeje.

[1] Yācūt, *s.v. Jalsad* and *Fals*; Wellhausen, pp. 52–54.

[2] See the verse from Ibn Hishām, p. 58, explained by Wellh. p. 107. The grounds on which Wellhausen concludes that these consecrated camels formed a sacred herd grazing on the holy pasture of the god are not quite satisfactory. The story in Mofaḍḍal, *Amthāl*, p. 19, shows that sometimes at least they remained with their old herd; and this agrees best with the statement of the Arabian philologists.

[3] *E.g.* their milk might be drunk only by guests (Ibn Hishām, p. 58). Similarly, consecration sometimes meant no more than that men might eat the flesh but not women, or that only particular persons might eat of it (Sura, vi. 139 *sq.*). Above all, the consecrated camel might not be ridden, whence the name *ḥāmī*. It is recorded on the authority of Laith (*Lisān*, xix. 341) that in certain cases the back of the camel was so injured that it could not be ridden; but this certainly was not the universal rule, for in an emergency a man mounts a sacred camel to pursue robbers (Mofaḍḍal, *Amthāl*, p. 19; Freytag, *Ar. Provv.* i. 352). The *immissio hirudinum in tergum* (Rasmussen, *Add.* p. 70) is only a corruption of what Laith tells. In Rasmussen's text read اغلاق for اعلاق, and سناس for سنا من, in accordance with the *Lisān*, xix. 341, l. 20 *sq.* (see We. 114 n. 1).

sometimes they cancel existing rights of property. But they do so only by limiting the right of user, and in the case of objects like idols, which no one would propose to use except for sacred purposes, a thing may be holy and still be private property. From this point of view it would appear that common things are such as men have licence to use freely at their own good pleasure without fear of supernatural penalties, while holy things may be used only in prescribed ways and under definite restrictions, on pain of the anger of the gods. That holiness is essentially a restriction on the licence of man in the free use of natural things, seems to be confirmed by the Semitic roots used to express the idea. No stress can be laid on the root קדש, which is that commonly used by the northern Semites, for of this the original meaning is very uncertain, though there is some probability that it implies "separation" or "withdrawal." But the root חרם, which is mainly employed in Arabic but runs through the whole Semitic field, undoubtedly conveys the notion of prohibition, so that a sacred thing is one which, whether absolutely or in certain relations, is prohibited to human use.[1] The same idea of prohibition or interdiction associated with that of protection from encroachment is found in the root חמי, from which is derived the word *ḥimā*, denoting a sacred enclosure or ★ *temenos*.[2]

We have already found reason to think that in Arabia

[1] In Hebrew this root is mainly applied to such consecration as implies absolute separation from human use and association, *i.e.* the total destruction of an accursed thing, or in more modern times excommunication. Somewhat similar is the sense of *ḥarām* in the Arabic form of oath "*ana ḥarāmum in* . . .," *Agh.* xix. 27. 18.

[2] Hence perhaps the name of Hamath on the Orontes; Lagarde, *Bildung der Nomina*, p. 156. The primary sense of the root, as Nöldeke has remarked, is "to watch over," whence in Palestinian Aramaic it comes to be the usual word for "to see," while in Hebrew again the word חומה, "a wall," is derived from it.

the holiness of places is older than the institution of property in land, and the view of holiness that has just been set forth enables us to understand why it should be so. We have found that from the earliest times of savagery certain spots were dreaded and shunned as the haunts of supernatural beings. These, however, are not holy places any more than an enemy's ground is holy; they are not hedged round by definite restrictions, but altogether avoided as full of indefinite dangers. But when men establish relations with the powers that haunt a spot, it is at once necessary that there should be rules of conduct towards them and their surroundings. These rules moreover have two aspects. On the one hand, the god and his worshippers form a single community—primarily, let us suppose, a community of kinship—and so all the social laws that regulate men's conduct towards a clansman are applicable to their relations to the god. But, on the other hand, the god has natural relations to certain physical things, and these must be respected also; he has himself a natural life and natural habits in which he must not be molested. Moreover the mysterious superhuman powers of the god—the powers which we call supernatural—are manifested, according to primitive ideas, in and through his physical life, so that every place and thing which has natural associations with the god is regarded, if I may borrow a metaphor from electricity, as charged with divine energy and ready at any moment to discharge itself to the destruction of the man who presumes to approach it unduly. Hence in all their dealings with natural things men must be on their guard to respect the divine prerogative, and this they are able to do by knowing and observing the rules of holiness, which prescribe definite restrictions and limitations in their dealings with the god and all natural things that in any way pertain to the god. Thus we see

that holiness is not necessarily limited to things that are the property of the deity to the exclusion of men; it applies equally to things in which both gods and men have an interest, and in the latter case the rules of holiness are directed to regulate man's use of the holy thing in such a way that the godhead may not be offended or wronged.

Rules of holiness in the sense just explained, *i.e.* a system of restrictions on man's arbitrary use of natural things, enforced by the dread of supernatural penalties,[1] are found among all primitive peoples. It is convenient to have a distinct name for this primitive institution, to mark it off from the later developments of the idea of holiness in advanced religions, and for this purpose the Polynesian term *taboo* has been selected.[2] The field covered by taboos among savage and half-savage races is very wide, for there is no part of life in which the savage does not feel himself to be surrounded by mysterious agencies and recognise the need of walking warily. Moreover all taboos do not belong to religion proper, that is, they are not always rules of conduct for the regulation of man's contact with deities that, when taken in the right way, may be counted on as friendly, but rather appear in many cases to be precautions against the approach of malignant enemies—against contact with evil spirits and the like. Thus alongside of taboos that exactly correspond to rules of holiness, protecting the inviolability of idols and sanctuaries, priests and chiefs, and generally of all persons and things pertaining to the gods and their worship, we find another kind of taboo which in

[1] Sometimes by civil penalties also. For in virtue of its solidarity the whole community is compromised by the impiety of any one of its members, and is concerned to purge away the offence.

[2] A good account of taboo, with references to the best sources of information on the subject, is given by Mr. J. G. Frazer in the 9th ed. of the *Encycl. Britan.* vol. xxiii. p. 15 *sqq.*

the Semitic field has its parallel in rules of uncleanness. Women after child-birth, men who have touched a dead body and so forth, are temporarily taboo and separated from human society, just as the same persons are unclean in Semitic religion. In these cases the person under taboo is not regarded as holy, for he is separated from approach to the sanctuary as well as from contact with men; but his act or condition is somehow associated with supernatural dangers, arising, according to the common savage explanation, from the presence of formidable spirits which are shunned like an infectious disease. In most savage societies no sharp line seems to be drawn between the two kinds of taboo just indicated, and even in more advanced nations the notions of holiness and uncleanness often touch. Among the Syrians, for example, swine's flesh was taboo, but it was an open question whether this was because the animal was holy or because it was unclean.[1] But though not precise, the distinction between what is holy and what is unclean is real; in rules of holiness the motive is respect for the gods, in rules of uncleanness it is primarily fear of an unknown or hostile power, though ultimately, as we see in the Levitical legislation, the law of clean and unclean may be brought within the sphere of divine ordinances, on the view that uncleanness is hateful to God and must be avoided by all that have to do with Him.

The fact that all the Semites have rules of uncleanness as well as rules of holiness, that the boundary between the two is often vague, and that the former as well as the latter present the most startling agreement in point of detail with savage *taboos*,[2] leaves no reasonable doubt as to the origin and ultimate relations of the idea of holiness.

[1] Lucian, *Dea Syr.* liv.; cf. Antiphanes, *ap.* Athen. iii. p. 95 [Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.* iii. 68].

[2] See *Additional Note* B, *Holiness, Uncleanness, and Taboo.*

On the other hand, the fact that the Semites—or at least the northern Semites—distinguish between the holy and the unclean, marks a real advance above savagery. All taboos are inspired by awe of the supernatural, but there is a great moral difference between precautions against the invasion of mysterious hostile powers and precautions founded on respect for the prerogative of a friendly god. The former belong to magical superstition—the barrenest of all aberrations of the savage imagination—which, being founded only on fear, acts merely as a bar to progress and an impediment to the free use of nature by human energy and industry. But the restrictions on individual licence which are due to respect for a known and friendly power allied to man, however trivial and absurd they may appear to us in their details, contain within them germinant principles of social progress and moral order. To know that one has the mysterious powers of nature on one's side so long as one acts in conformity with certain rules, gives a man strength and courage to pursue the task of the subjugation of nature to his service. To restrain one's individual licence, not out of slavish fear, but from respect for a higher and beneficent power, is a moral discipline of which the value does not altogether depend on the reasonableness of the sacred restrictions; an English schoolboy is subject to many unreasonable taboos, which are not without value in the formation of character. But finally, and above all, the very association of the idea of holiness with a beneficent deity, whose own interests are bound up with the interests of the community, makes it inevitable that the laws of social and moral order, as well as mere external precepts of physical observance, shall be placed under the sanction of the god of the community. Breaches of social order are recognised as offences against the holiness of the deity, and the development of law and morals is made

possible, at a stage when human sanctions are still wanting, or too imperfectly administered to have much power, by the belief that the restrictions on human licence which are necessary to social well-being are conditions imposed by the god for the maintenance of a good understanding between himself and his worshippers.

As every sanctuary was protected by rigid taboos it was important that its site and limits should be clearly marked. From the account already given of the origin of holy places, it follows that in very many cases the natural features of the spot were sufficient to distinguish it. A fountain with its margin of rich vegetation, a covert of jungle haunted by lions, a shaggy glade on the mountain-side, a solitary eminence rising from the desert, where toppling blocks of weather-beaten granite concealed the dens of the hyæna and the bear, needed only the support of tradition to bear witness for themselves to their own sanctity. In such cases it was natural to draw the border of the holy ground somewhat widely, and to allow an ample verge on all sides of the sacred centre. In Arabia, as we have seen, the *ḥimā* sometimes enclosed a great tract of pasture land roughly marked off by pillars or cairns, and the *ḥaram* or sacred territory of Mecca extends for some hours' journey on almost every side of the city. The whole mountain of Horeb was sacred ground, and so probably was Mount Hermon, for its name means "holy," and the summit and slopes still bear the ruins of many temples.[1] In like manner Renan concludes from the multitude of sacred remains along the course of the Adonis, in the Lebanon, that the whole valley was a kind of sacred territory of the god from whom the river had its name.[2] In a cultivated and thickly-peopled land

[1] For the sanctity of Hermon see further Reland, *Palæstina*, p. 323. ★

[2] Renan, *Mission de Phénicie* (1864), p. 295.

it was difficult to maintain a rigid rule of sanctity over a wide area, and strict taboos were necessarily limited to the temples and their immediate enclosures, while in a looser sense the whole city or land of the god's worshippers was held to be the god's land and to participate in his holiness. Yet some remains of the old sanctity of whole regions survived even in Syria to a late date. Iamblichus, in the last days of heathenism, still speaks of Mount Carmel as "sacred above all mountains and forbidden of access to the vulgar," and here Vespasian worshipped at the solitary altar, embowered in inviolable thickets, to which ancient tradition forbade the adjuncts of temple and image.[1]

The taboos or restrictions applicable within the wide limits of these greater sacred tracts have already been touched upon. The most universal of them was that men were not allowed to interfere with the natural life of the spot. No blood might be shed and no tree cut down; an obvious rule whether these living things are regarded as the protected associates of the god, or—which perhaps was the earlier conception—as participating in the divine life. In some cases all access to the Arabian *ḥimā* was forbidden, as at the sacred tract marked off round the grave of Ibn Ṭofail.[2] For with the Arabs grave and sanctuary were

[1] Iamblichus, *Vit. Pyth.* iii. (15); Tacitus, *Hist.* ii. 78. From 1 Kings xviii. it would be clear, apart from the classical testimonies, that Carmel was a sacred mountain of the Phœnicians. It had also an altar of Jehovah, and this made it the fit place for the contest between Jehovah-worship and Baal-worship. Carmel is still clothed with thickets as it was in Old Testament times (Amos i. 2; Mic. vii. 14; Cant. vii. 5); and Amos ix. 3, Mic. vii. 14, where its woods appear as a place of refuge, do not receive their full force till we combine them with Iamblichus's notice that the mountain was an ἄβατον, where the flocks, driven up into the forest in autumn to feed on the leaves (as is still done, Thomson, *Land and Book* [1860], pp. 204 *sq.*, 485), were inviolable, and where the fugitive found a sure asylum. The sanctity of Carmel is even now not extinct, and the scene at the Festival of Elijah, described by Seetzen, ii. 96 *sq.*, is exactly like an old Canaanite feast.

[2] *Agh.* xv. 139; Wellh. p. 184. This is not the place to go into the

kindred ideas, and famous chiefs and heroes were honoured ★ by the consecration of their resting-place. But an absolute exclusion of human visitors, while not unintelligible at a tomb, could hardly be maintained at a sanctuary which contained a place of worship, and we have seen that some *ḥimās* were open pastures, while the *ḥaram* at Mecca even contained a large permanent population.[1] The tendency was evidently to a gradual relaxation of burdensome restrictions, not necessarily because religious reverence declined, but from an increasing confidence that the god was his servants' well-wisher and did not press his prerogative unduly. Yet the "jealousy" of the deity—an idea familiar to us from the Old Testament—was never lost sight of in Semitic worship. In the higher forms of religion this quality, which nearly corresponds to self-respect and the sense of personal dignity in a man, readily lent itself to an ethical interpretation, so that the jealousy of the deity was mainly conceived to be indignation against wrong-doing, as an offence against the honour of the divine sovereign;[2] but in savage times the personal

general question of the worship of ancestors. See Wellhausen, *ut supra*; Goldziher, *Culte des Ancêtres chez les Arabes* (Paris, 1885), and *Muh. Studien*, p. 229 *sqq.*; and some remarks, perhaps too sceptical, in my *Kinship*, p. 20, n. 2.

[1] Yācūt, iii. 790 (We. p. 105 *sq.*, cf. p. 43), says that marks, called "scarecrows" (*akhyila*), were set up to show that a place was a *ḥimā*, and must not be approached. But to "approach" a forbidden thing (*cariba*) is the general word for violating a taboo, so the expression ought not perhaps to be pressed too closely. The Greek ἄβατον is also used simply in the sense of inviolable (along with ἄσυλον). It is notable, however, that in the same passage Yācūt tells us that two of the marks that defined the *ḥimā* of Faid were called "the twin sacrificial stones" (*gharīyān*). He did not know the ritual meaning of *gharīy*, and may therefore include them among the *akhyila* by mere inadvertence. But if the place of sacrifice really stood on the border of the sacred ground, the inevitable inference is that the worshippers were not allowed to enter the enclosure. This would be parallel to the sacrifice in Ex. xxiv. 4, where the altar is built outside the limits of Sinai, and the people are not allowed to approach the mountain.

[2] This, it will be remembered, is the idea on which Anselm's theory of the atonement is based.

diginity of the god, like that of a great chief, asserts itself mainly in punctilious insistence on a complicated etiquette that surrounds his place and person. Naturally the strictness of the etiquette admits of gradations. When the god and his worshippers live side by side, as in the case of Mecca, or still more in cases where the idea of holiness has been extended to cover the whole land of a particular religion, the general laws of sacred observance, applicable in all parts of the holy land, are modified by practical considerations. Strict taboos are limited to the sanctuary (in the narrower sense) or to special seasons and occasions, such as religious festivals or the time of war; in ordinary life necessary actions that constitute a breach of ceremonial holiness merely involve temporary uncleanness and some ceremonial act of purification, or else are condoned altogether provided they are done in a particular way. Thus in Canaan, where the whole land was holy, the hunter was allowed to kill game if he returned the life to the god by pouring it on the ground; or again the intercourse of the sexes, which was strictly forbidden at temples and to warriors on an expedition, entailed in ordinary life only a temporary impurity, purged by ablution or fumigation.[1] But in all this care was taken not to presume on the prerogative of the gods, or trench without permission on the sanctity of their domain; and in particular, fresh encroachments on untouched parts of nature—the breaking up of waste lands, the foundation of new cities, or even the annual cutting down of corn or gathering in of the vintage—were not undertaken without special precautions to propitiate the divine powers. It was felt that such encroachments were not without grave danger, and it was often thought necessary to accompany them with expiatory

[1] See *Additional Note* C, *Taboos on the Intercourse of the Sexes.*

ceremonies of the most solemn kind.[1] Within the god's holy land all parts of life are regulated with constant regard to his sanctity, and so among the settled Semites, who live on Baal's ground, religion entered far more deeply into common life than was the case among the Arabs, where only special tracts were consecrated land and the wide desert was as yet unclaimed either by gods or by men.

Some of the restrictions enforced at ancient sanctuaries have already been touched upon; but it will repay us to look at them again more closely under the new light which falls upon the subject as soon as we recognise that all such restrictions are ultimately of the nature of taboos. The simplest and most universal of these taboos is that which protects the trees of the *temenos* or *ḥimā*, and all the natural life of the spot. In the more advanced forms of Semitic religion the natural wood of the sanctuary is sometimes represented as planted by the god,[2] which would

[1] The details, so far as they are concerned with the yearly recurring ritual of harvest and vintage, belong to the subject of Agricultural Feasts, and must be reserved for a future course of lectures. The danger connected with the breaking up of waste lands is illustrated for Arabia by the story of Ḥarb and Mirdās (*supra*, p. 133). Here the danger still comes from the *jinn* of the place, but even where the whole land already belongs to a friendly deity, precautions are necessary when man lays his hand for the first time on any of the good things of nature. Thus the Hebrews ate the fruit of new trees only in the fifth year; in the fourth year the fruit was consecrated to Jehovah, but the produce of the first three years was "uncircumcised," *i.e.* taboo, and might not be eaten at all (Lev. xix. 23 *sqq.*). A similar idea underlies the Syrian traditions of human sacrifice at the foundation of cities (Malalas, Bonn ed. pp. 37, 200, 203), which are not the less instructive that they are not historically true. In Arabia the local *jinn* or earth-demons (*ahl al-arḍ*) are still propitiated by sprinkling the blood of a sacrifice when new land is broken up, a new house built, or a new well opened (Doughty, i. 136, ii. 100, 198). Kremer, *Studien*, p. 48, cites a passage from Abū 'Obaida, *ap.* Damīrī, i. 241, which shows that such sacrifices to the *jinn* follow an ancient custom, forbidden by the prophet.

[2] The cypresses at Daphne were planted by Heracles (Malalas, p. 204); cf. Ps. civ. 16.

of course give him a right of property in it. But for the most part the phenomena of tree and grove worship, of which we shall learn more in Lect. V., point to a more ancient conception, in which the vegetation of the sanctuary is conceived as actually instinct with a particle of divine life. Equally widespread, and to all appearance equally primitive, is the rule exempting the birds, deer and other game of the sanctuary from molestation.[1] These wild creatures must have been regarded as the guests or clients rather than the property of the god, for Semitic law recognises no property in *ferœ naturœ*. But in the oldest law the client is only an artificial kinsman, whose rights are constituted by a ceremony importing that he and his patron are henceforth of one blood; and thus it is probable that, in the beginning, the beasts and birds of the sanctuary, as well as its vegetation, were conceived as holy because they partook of the pervasive divine life. We may conceive the oldest sanctuaries as charged in all their parts and pertinents with a certain supernatural energy. This is the usual savage idea about things that are *taboo*, and even in the higher religions the process of subsuming all taboos under the conception of the holiness of the personal god is always slow and often imperfectly carried out. In particular there is one main element in the doctrine of *taboo*, perfectly irrational from the standpoint of any religion that has clear views as to the

[1] The cases of Mecca and Wajj have already been cited; for the former compare the verses in Ibn Hishām, p. 74, ll. 10, 11. Birds found sanctuary at the temple of Jerusalem (Ps. lxxxiv. 3). At Curium in Cyprus, where religion is full of Semitic elements, dogs did not venture to follow game into the sacred grove, but stood outside barking (Aelian, *N. A.* xi. 7), and the same belief prevailed in the Middle Ages with regard to the mosque and tomb of Ṣiddīcā (Al-Shajara) in the mountains E. of Sidon (Mocaddasī, p. 188). In the sacred island of Icarus in the Persian Gulf the wild goats and gazelles might be taken for sacrifice only (Arrian, vii. 20); or, according to Aelian (*N. A.* xi. 9), the huntsman had to ask permission of the goddess; otherwise the hunt proved vain and a penalty was incurred.

personality of the gods, which was never eliminated from the Semitic conception of holiness, and figures even in the ritual parts of the Old Testament. Holiness, like taboo, is conceived as infectious, propagating itself by physical contact. To avoid complicating the present argument by a multitude of details, I reserve the full illustration of this matter for a note,[1] and confine myself to the observation that even in Hebrew ritual common things brought into contact with things very sacred are themselves "sanctified," so that they can be no longer used for common purposes. In some cases it is provided that this inconvenient sanctity may be washed out and purged away by a ceremonial process; in others the consecration is indelible, and the thing has to be destroyed. In the Old Testament these are mere fragmentary survivals of old rules of sanctity; and the details are to some extent peculiar. The idea that things which fall under a taboo, and so are withdrawn from common use, must be destroyed, is far more prominent among the Hebrews than among other Semites; but the general principle applies to all Semitic religions, and at once explains most of the special taboos applicable to sanctuaries, *e.g.* the right of asylum, the forfeiture of camels that stray on holy ground, and the Meccan rule that strangers who worship at the Caaba in their common dress must leave it behind them at the door of the sanctuary. All such rules are governed by the principle that common things brought into contact with the holy place become holy and inviolable, like the original pertinents of the sanctuary. Naturally this principle admits of many varieties in detail. Holiness acquired by contact is not so indelible as inborn sanctity. In many rituals it can be removed from clothes by washing them, and from the person of a worshipper by ablution. As a rule the con-

[1] See *Additional Note* B, *Holiness, Uncleanness, and Taboo.*

secration of persons by holy things is only temporary; thus the Syrian who touched a dove, the holiest of birds, was taboo for a single day, and at most ancient asylums the fugitive was no longer inviolable when he left the sacred precincts (Num. xxxv. 26 *sq.*).

The ultimate sanction of these rules lay in the intrinsic power of holy things to vindicate themselves against encroachment; or according to the higher heathenism in the jealousy of the personal god, who resents all undue violation of his environment. But when the rules were once established, they tended to maintain themselves without the constant intervention of supernatural sanctions by the action of ordinary social forces. A bold man might venture to violate a taboo and take his risk of supernatural danger; but if his comrades were not equally bold they would immediately shun him lest the danger should spread to them.[1] On this principle most ancient societies attached the penalty of outlawry or death to impious offences, such as the violation of holy things, without waiting for the god to vindicate his own cause.[2] The argument of Joash, "If he be a god, let him plead for himself, because one hath cast down his altar," does not commend itself to a firm faith. The deity is not put to such a proof till his power begins to be doubted.[3] The

[1] Cf. the case of Achan, Josh. vi. 18, vii. 1, 11 *sq.*, where Achan's breach of a taboo involves the whole host.

[2] Cf. Lev. xx. 4, 5; if the people of the land do not slay the impious person, Jehovah will destroy him and all his clan. In the Pentateuch it is sometimes difficult to decide whether the penalty invoked on impious offences is civil or supernatural, *e.g.* Lev. xvii. 4, xix. 8.

[3] Judg. vi. 31. An Arabian parallel in Ibn Hishām, p. 303 *sq.*— 'Amr's domestic idol has been repeatedly defiled by unknown Moslems. At length the owner girds the god with a sword, and bids him defend himself if he is good for anything. Of course conversion follows. Similarly in Yācūt, iii. 912 *sq.*, a daring man reclaims a stolen camel from the sanctuary of Al-Fals. A bystander exclaims, "Wait and see what will happen to him this very day!"; when several days pass and nothing happens, he renounces

principle that it is not safe to wait till the god vindicates his own holiness, has enormous historical importance as one of the chief bases of early criminal law. In the oldest type of society impious acts or breaches of taboo were the only offences treated as crimes; *e.g.* there is no such crime as theft, but a man can save his property from invasion by placing it under a taboo, when it becomes an act of impiety to touch it.[1] Among the Hebrews such taboos are created by means of a curse (Judg. xvii. 2), and by the same means a king can give validity to the most unreasonable decrees (1 Sam. xiv. 24 *sqq.*). But unreasonable taboos, as we see in the case of Saul and Jonathan, are sure to be evaded in the long run because public opinion goes against them, whereas taboos that make for the general good and check wrong-doing are supported and enforced by the community, and ultimately pass into laws with a civil sanction. But no ancient society deemed its good order to be sufficiently secured by civil sanctions alone; there was always a last recourse to the curse, the ordeal, the oath of probation at the sanctuary—all of them means to stamp an offender with the guilt of impiety and

idols and becomes a Christian. I suspect that in Judg. vi. the original text expressed a similar belief that the god's vengeance must fall on the very day of the offence. The clause אשר יריב לו יומת עד הבקר gives a very unsuitable sense. But the true Septuagint text (which in this book is better represented by A than by B) indicates a reading בו for לו. Accepting this and reading ימות (which in the old orthography is not distinguished for יומת) we get good sense: "The man who strives with the Baal dies before (the next) morning." The common belief was that supernatural judgments came swiftly on the offence, or not at all. That Jehovah does not overlook sin because He is long-suffering and gives time for repentance (Ex. xxxiv. 6, 7), is one of the distinctive points of O. T. doctrine which the prophets had special difficulty in impressing on their hearers.

[1] I believe that in early society (and not merely in the very earliest) we may safely affirm that every offence to which death or outlawry is attached was primarily viewed as a breach of holiness; *e.g.* murder within the kin, and incest, are breaches of the holiness of tribal blood, which would be supernaturally avenged if men overlooked them. ★

bring him under the direct judgment of the supernatural powers.

Very noteworthy, in this connection, is the representation in Deut. xxvii., Josh. viii. 30 *sqq.*, according to which the Israelites, on their first entry into Canaan, placed a number of the chief heads of public morality under the protection of a solemn taboo by a great act of public cursing. I use the word taboo deliberately as implying a more mechanical sequence of sin and punishment than we associate with the idea of divine judgment; ★ see the description of the operation of the curse in Zech. v. 1–4.[1]

[1] Among the Arabs the operation of a curse is purely mechanical; if a man falls on his face it may pass over him; see Wellhausen[1], p. 126. For the oath of purgation among the Arabs, see *Kinship*, p. 64 and note; among the Hebrews, Deut. xxi. 7 and Num. v. 11 *sq.*, where the connection with very primitive ideas of taboo is unmistakable (cf. p. 180, *infra*). A late Syriac survival of the use of a curse to protect (or perhaps to create) an exclusive right of property (as in Judg. xvii. 2) is found in Jacob of Edessa, *Qu.* 47, "concerning a priest who writes a curse and hangs it on a tree that no man may eat of the fruit." Various examples of the operation of a curse to vindicate rights of property, etc., in the lawless society of Arabia before Islam are collected in *Div. Hodh.* No. 245, in the form of anecdotes of the Times of Ignorance related to the Caliph 'Omar I. 'Omar observes that God granted temporal judgments, in answer to prayer, when there was no knowledge of a future state; but in Islam divine retribution is reserved for the day of judgment.

LECTURE V

SANCTUARIES, NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL. HOLY WATERS, TREES, CAVES, AND STONES

We have seen that holiness admits of degrees, and that within a sacred land or tract it is natural to mark off an inner circle of intenser holiness, where all ritual restrictions are stringently enforced, and where man feels himself to be nearer to his god than on other parts even of holy ground. Such a spot of intenser holiness becomes the sanctuary or place of sacrifice, where the worshipper approaches the god with prayers and gifts, and seeks guidance for life from the divine oracle. As holy tracts in general are the regions haunted by divine powers, so the site of the sanctuary *par excellence*, or place of worship, is a spot where the god is constantly present in some visible embodiment, or which has received a special consecration by some extraordinary manifestation of deity. For the more developed forms of cultus a mere vague *ḥimā* does not suffice; men require a special point at which they may come together and do sacrifice with the assurance that the god is present at the act. In Arabia, indeed, it seems to be not incredible that certain sacrifices were simply laid on sacred ground to be devoured by wild beasts. But even in Arabia the *ḥimā* usually, probably always, contained a fixed point where the blood of the offering was directly presented to the deity by being applied to sacred stones, or where a sacred tree was hung with gifts. In

the ordinary forms of heathenism, at any rate, it was essential that the worshipper should bring his offering into the actual presence of the god, or into contact with the symbol of that presence.[1]

The symbol or permanent visible object, at and through which the worshipper came into direct contact with the god, was not lacking in any Semitic place of worship, but had not always the same form, and was sometimes a natural object, sometimes an artificial erection. The usual natural symbols are a fountain or a tree, while the ordinary artificial symbol is a pillar or pile of stones; but very often all three are found together, and this was the rule in the more developed sanctuaries, particular sacred observances being connected with each.

The choice of the natural symbols, the fountain and the tree, is no doubt due in part to the fact that the favourite haunts of animate life, to which a superstitious reverence was attached, are mainly found beside wood and running water. But besides this we have found evidence of the direct ascription to trees and living waters of a life analogous to man's, but mysterious and therefore awful.[2] To us this may seem to be quite another point of view; in the one case the fountain or the tree merely marks the spot which the deity frequents, in the other it is the visible embodiment of the divine presence. But the primitive imagination has no difficulty in combining different ideas about the same holy place or thing. The gods are not tied to one form of embodiment or manifestation; for, as has already been observed,[3] some sort of distinction between life and the material embodiment

[1] This rule is observed even when the god is a heavenly body. The sacrifices of the Saracens to the morning star, described by Nilus, were celebrated when that star rose, and could not be made after it was lost to sight on the rising of the sun (*Nili op. quædam* [Paris, 1639], pp. 28, 117).

[2] *Supra*, p. 135 *sqq*. [3] *Supra*, pp. 86, 87.

of life is suggested to the rudest peoples by phenomena like those of dreams. Even men, it is supposed, can change their embodiment, and assume for a time the shape of wolves or birds;[1] and of course the gods with their superior powers have a still greater range, and the same deity may quite well manifest himself in the life of a tree or a spring, and yet emerge from time to time in human or animal form. All manifestations of life at or about a holy place readily assume a divine character and form a religious unity, contributing as they do to create and nourish the same religious emotion; and in all of them the godhead is felt to be present in the same direct way. The permanent manifestations of his presence, however, the sacred fountain and the sacred tree, are likely to hold the first place in acts of worship, simply because they are permanent and so attach to themselves a fixed sacred tradition. These considerations apply equally to the sanctuaries of nomadic and of settled peoples, but among the latter the religious importance of water and wood could not fail to be greatly reinforced by the growth of the ideas of Baal-worship, in which the deity as the giver of life is specially connected with quickening waters and vegetative growth.

With this it agrees that sacred wells, in connection with sanctuaries, are found in all parts of the Semitic area, but are less prominent among the nomadic Arabs than among the agricultural peoples of Syria and Palestine. There is mention of fountains or streams at a good many Arabian sanctuaries, but little direct evidence that these waters were holy, or played any definite part in the ritual. The clearest case is that of Mecca, where the holiness of the well Zamzam is certainly pre-Islamic. It would even seem that in old time gifts were cast into it, as they were

[1] *Supra*, pp. 87, 88.

cast into the sacred wells of the northern Semites.[1] Some kind of ritual holiness seems also to have attached to the pool beneath a waterfall at the Dausite sanctuary of Dusares.[2] Again, as healing springs and sacred springs are everywhere identified, it is noteworthy that the south Arabs regard medicinal waters as inhabited by *jinn*, usually of serpent form,[3] and that the water of the sanctuary at the Palmetum was thought to be health-giving, and was carried home by pilgrims[4] as Zamzam water now is. In like manner the custom of pilgrims carrying away water from the well of ʿOrwa[5] is probably a relic of ancient sanctity. Further, on the borders of the Arabian field, we have the sacred fountain of Ephca at Palmyra, with which a legend of a demon in serpent form is still connected. This is a sulphurous spring, which had a guardian

[1] So Wellhausen, p. 103, concludes with probability from the story that when the well was rediscovered and cleaned out by the grandfather of Mohammed, two golden gazelles and a number of swords were found in it. Everything told of the prophet's ancestors must be received with caution, but this does not look like invention. The two golden gazelles are parallel to the golden camels of Sabæan and Nabatæan inscriptions (*ZDMG.* xxxviii. 143 *sq.*).

[2] Ibn Hishām, p. 253; Wellhausen, p. 48 *sq.* A woman who adopts Islam breaks with the heathen god by "purifying herself" in this pool. This implies that her act was a breach of the ritual of the spot; presumably a woman who required purification (viz. from her courses) was not admitted to the sacred water; cf. Yācūt, i. 657, l. 2 *sqq.*, iv. 651, l. 4 *sqq.*; Ibn Hishām, p. 15 ult. In Ṭabarī, i. 271 *sq.*, we read that the water of Beersheba shrank when a woman in her courses drew from it. Cf. also Bērūnî, *Chron.* p. 246, l. 8 *sqq.* Under ordinary circumstances to bathe in the sacred spring would be an act of homage to the heathen god: so at least it was in Syria.

[3] Mordtmann in *ZDMG.* xxxviii. 587, cites a modern instance from Maltzan, *Reise in Südarabien*, p. 304, and others from Hamdānî's *Iklîl*, *ap.* Müller, *Burgen*, i. 34. Maltzan's spring, the hot well of Msaʿide, has every feature of an ancient sanctuary except that the serpent-god, who is invoked as Msaʿud, and sends hot or cold water at the prayer of the worshipper, has been degraded to the rank of a demon. There is an annual pilgrimage to the spot in the month Rajab, the ancient sacred month of Arabia, which is accompanied by festivities and lasts for several days.

[4] Agatharchides, *ap.* Diod. Sic. iii. 43.

[5] Yācūt, i. 434; Cazwînî, i. 200.

appointed by the god Yarhibol, and on an inscription is called the "blessed fountain."[1] Again, in the desert beyond Bostra, we find the Stygian waters, where a great cleft received a lofty cataract. The waters had the power to swallow up or cast forth the gifts flung into them, as a sign that the god was or was not propitious, and the oath by the spot and its stream was the most horrible known to the inhabitants of the region.[2] The last two cases belong to a region in which religion was not purely Arabian in character, but the Stygian waters recall the waterfall in the Dausite sanctuary of Dusares, and Ptolemy twice mentions a Stygian fountain in Arabia proper.

Among the northern Semites, the agricultural Canaanites and Syrians, sacred waters hold a much more preminent place. Where all ground watered by fountains and streams, without the aid of man's hand, was regarded as the Baal's land, a certain sanctity could hardly fail to be ascribed to every source of living water; and where the divine activity was looked upon as mainly displaying itself in the quickening of the soil, the waters which gave fertility to the land, and so life to its inhabitants, would appear to be the direct embodiment of divine energies. Accordingly we find that Hannibal, in his covenant with Philip of Macedon, when he swears before all the deities of Carthage and of Hellas, includes among the divine powers to which his oath appeals "the sun the moon and the earth, rivers, meadows (?) and waters."[3] Thus when we find that temples were so often erected near springs and

[1] Wadd., No. 2571 *c*; De Vog., No. 95. For the modern serpent myth see Mordtmann, *ut supra*; Blunt, *Pilgr. to Nejd*, ii. 67.

[2] Damascius, *Vita Isidori*, § 199.

[3] Polybius, vii. 9. The word "meadows" is uncertain, resting on a conjecture of Casaubon: λειμώνων for δαιμόνων. Reiske conjectured λιμνῶν. In Palestine to this day all springs are viewed as the seats of spirits, and the

rivers, we must consider not only that such a position was convenient, inasmuch as pure water was indispensable for ablutions and other ritual purposes, but that the presence of living water in itself gave consecration to the place.[1] The fountain or stream was not a mere adjunct to the temple, but was itself one of the principal *sacra* of the spot, to which special legends and a special ritual were often attached, and to which the temple in many instances owed its celebrity and even its name. This is particularly the case with perennial streams and their sources, which in a country like Palestine, where rain is confined to the winter months, are not very numerous, and form striking features in the topography of the region. From Hannibal's oath we may conclude that among the Phœnicians and Carthaginians all such waters were held to be divine, and what we know in detail of the waters of the Phœnician coast goes far to confirm the conclusion.[2] Of the eminent sanctity of certain rivers, such as the Belus and the Adonis, we have direct evidence, and the grove and pool of Aphaca at the source of the latter stream was the most famous of all Phœnician holy places.[3] These rivers are named from gods, and so also, on the same coast, are the Asclepius, near Sidon, the Ares (perhaps identical with the Lycus), and presumably the Kishon.[4] The river of Tripolis, which descends from the famous cedars, is still called the Cadîsha

peasant women, whether Moslem or Christian, ask their permission before drawing water (*ZDPV.* x. 180); cf. Num. xxi. 17.

[1] For the choice of a place beside a pool as the site of a chapel, see Waddington, No 2015, ἐνσεβίης τόπος οὗτος ὃν ἔκτισεν ἐγγύθι λίμνης.

[2] The authorities for the details, so far as they are not cited below, will be found in Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 161.

[3] Euseb., *Vit. Const.* iii. 55; Sozomen, ii. 5.

[4] River of קישׁ, Ar. Cais. Prof. De Goeje, referring to Hamdānī, p. 3 ★ l. 9, and perhaps p. 221, l. 14, suggests to me by letter that Cais is a title, "dominus."

or holy stream, and the grove at its source is sacred to Christians and Moslems alike.[1]

In Hellenic and Roman times the source of the Jordan at Paneas with its grotto was sacred to Pan, and in ancient days the great Israelite sanctuary of Dan occupied the same site, or that of the twin source at Tell al-Cāḍi. It is evident that Naaman's indignation when he was told to bathe in the Jordan, and his confidence that the rivers of Damascus were better than all the waters of Israel, sprang from the idea that the Jordan was the sacred healing stream of the Hebrews, as Abana and Pharpar were the sacred rivers of the Syrians, and in this he probably did no injustice to the belief of the mass of the Israelites. The sanctity of the Barada, the chief river of Damascus, was concentrated at its nominal source, the fountain of El-Fiji, that is, *πηγαί*. The river-gods Chrysorrhoa and Pegai often appear on Damascene coins, and evidently had a great part in the religion of the city. That the thermal waters of Gadara were originally sacred may be inferred from the peculiar ceremonies that were still observed by the patients in the time of Antoninus Martyr (*De locis Sanctis*, vii.). The baths were used by night; there were lights and incense, and the patient saw visions during the pernoctation. To this day a patient at the natural bath of Tiberias must not offend the spirits by pronouncing the name of God (*ZDPV.* x. 179).

The river of Cœle-Syria, the Orontes, was carved out, according to local tradition, by a great dragon, which disappeared in the earth at its source.[2] The connection

[1] Robinson, iii. 590. On Carthaginian soil, it is not impossible that the Bagradas or Majerda, Macaros or Macros in MSS. of Polybius, bears the name of the Tyrian Baal-Melcarth.

[2] Strabo, xvi. 2. 7. Other sacred traditions about the Orontes are given by Malalas, p. 38, from Pausanias of Damascus.

of *jinn* in the form of dragons or serpents with sacred or healing springs has already come before us in Arabian superstition, and the lake of Cadas near Emesa, which is regarded as the source of the river (Yācūt, iii. 588), bears a name which implies its ancient sanctity. Among Syrian waters those of the Euphrates played an important part in the ritual of Hierapolis, and from them the great goddess was thought to have been born; while the source of its chief Mesopotamian tributary, the Aborrhas or Chaboras, was reverenced as the place where Hera (Atargatis) bathed after her marriage with Zeus (Bel). It gave out a sweet odour, and was full of tame, that is sacred, fishes.[1]

The sacredness of living waters was by no means confined to such great streams and sources as have just been spoken of. But in cultivated districts fountains could not ordinarily be reserved for purposes exclusively sacred. Each town or village had as a rule its own well, and its own high place or little temple, but in Canaan the well was not generally within the precincts of the high place. Towns were built on rising ground, and the well lay outside the gate, usually below the town, while the high place stood on the higher ground overlooking the human habitations.[2] Thus any idea of sanctity that might be connected with the fountain was dissociated from the temple ritual, and would necessarily become vague and attenuated.[3] Sacred springs in the full sense of the word

[1] Ælian, *Nat. Ann.* xii. 30; Pliny, *H. N.* xxxi. 37, xxxii. 16.

[2] Gen. xxiv. 11; 1 Sam. ix. 11; 2 Sam. ii. 13, xxiii. 16; 2 Kings ii. 21; 1 Kings xxi. 13, 19, compared with chap. xxii. 38.

[3] There are, however, indications that in some cases the original sanctuary was at a well beneath the town. In 1 Kings i. 9, 38, the fountains of En-rogel, where Adonijah held his sacrificial feast, and of Gihon, where Solomon was crowned, are plainly the original sanctuaries of Jerusalem. The former was by the "serpent's stone," and may perhaps be identified with the "dragon well" of Neh. ii. 13. Here again, as in Arabia and at the Orontes, the dragon or serpent has a sacred significance.

are generally found, not at the ordinary local sanctuaries, but at remote pilgrimage shrines like Aphaca, Beersheba, Mamre, or within the enclosure of great and spacious temples like that at Ascalon, where the pool of Atargatis was shown and her sacred fishes were fed. Sometimes, as at Daphne near Antioch, the water and its surrounding groves formed a sort of public park near a city, where religion and pleasure were combined in the characteristic Syriac fashion.[1]

The myths attached to holy sources and streams, and put forth to worshippers as accounting for their sanctity, were of various types; but the practical beliefs and ritual usages connected with sacred waters were much the same everywhere. The one general principle which runs through all the varieties of the legends, and which also lies at the basis of the ritual, is that the sacred waters are instinct with divine life and energy. The legends explain this in diverse ways, and bring the divine quality of the waters into connection with various deities or supernatural powers, but they all agree in this, that their main object is to show how the fountain or stream comes to be impregnated, so to speak, with the vital energy of the deity to which it is sacred.

Among the ancients blood is generally conceived as the principle or vehicle of life, and so the account often given of sacred waters is that the blood of the deity flows in them. Thus as Milton writes—

> Smooth Adonis from his native rock
> Ran purple to the sea, supposed with blood
> Of Thammuz yearly wounded.[2]

[1] A similar example, Wadd., No. 2370. A sacred fountain of Eshmun "in the mountain" seems to appear in *CIS.* No. 3, l. 17; cf. G. Hoffmann, *Ueber einige Phœn. Inschrr.* p. 52 *sq.* See also Baudissin, *Ad.* p. 244 *sq.*

[2] *Paradise Lost*, i. 450, following Lucian, *Dea Syria*, viii.

The ruddy colour which the swollen river derived from the soil at a certain season[1] was ascribed to the blood of the god who received his death-wound in Lebanon at that time of the year, and lay buried beside the sacred source.[2] Similarily a tawny fountain near Joppa was thought to derive its colour from the blood of the sea-monster slain by Perseus,[3] and Philo Byblius says that the fountains and rivers sacred to the heaven-god (Baalshamaim) were those which received his blood when he was mutilated by his son.[4] In another class of legends, specially connected with the worship of Atargatis, the divine life of the waters resides in the sacred fish that inhabit them. Atargatis and her son, according to a legend common to Hierapolis and Ascalon, plunged into the waters—in the first case the Euphrates, in the second the sacred pool at the temple near the town—and were changed into fishes.[5] This is only another form of the idea expressed in the first class of legend, where a god dies, that is ceases to exist in human form, but his life passes into the waters where he is buried; and this again is merely a theory to bring the divine water or the divine fish into harmony with anthro-

[1] The reddening of the Adonis was observed by Maundrell on March $\frac{1}{2}\frac{7}{4}$, 169$\frac{7}{8}$, and by Renan early in February. Cf. Frazer, *GB.* v. 225.

[2] Melito in Cureton, *Spic. Syr.* p. 25, l. 7. That the grave of Adonis was also shown at the mouth of the river has been inferred from *Dea Syr.* vi. vii. The river Belus also had its Memnonion or Adonis tomb (Josephus, *B. J.* ii. 10. 2.) In modern Syria cisterns are always found beside the graves of saints, and are believed to be inhabited by a sort of fairy. A pining child is thought to be a fairy changeling, and must be lowered into the cistern. The fairy will then take it back, and the true child is drawn up in its room. This is in the region of Sidon (*ZDPV.* vol. vii. p. 84; cf. *ib.* p. 106).

[3] Pausanias, iv. 35. 9.

[4] Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* i. 10. 22 (*Fr. Hist. Gr.* iii. 568). The fountain of the Chabōras, where Hera μετὰ τοὺς γάμους . . ἀπελούσατο, belongs to the same class.

[5] Hyginus, *Astr.* ii. 30; Manilius, iv. 580 *sqq.*; Xanthus in Athenæus, viii. 37. I have discussed these legends at length in the *English Hist. Review*, April 1887, to which the reader is referred for details.

pomorphic ideas.[1] The same thing was sometimes effected in another way by saying that the anthropomorphic deity was born from the water, as Aphrodite sprang from the sea-foam, or as Atargatis, in another form of the Euphrates legend, given by the scholiast on Germanicus's Aratus, was born of an egg which the sacred fishes found in the Euphrates and pushed ashore. Here, we see, it was left to the choice of the worshippers whether they would think of the deity as arising from or disappearing in the water, and in the ritual of the Syrian goddess at Hierapolis both ideas were combined at the solemn feasts, when her image was carried down to the river and back again to the temple. Where the legend is so elastic we can hardly doubt that the sacred waters and sacred fish were worshipped for their own sake before the anthropomorphic goddess came into the religion, and in fact the sacred fish at the source of the Chaboras are connected with an altogether different myth. Fish were *taboo*, and sacred fish were found in rivers or in pools at sanctuaries, all over Syria.[2] This superstition has proved one of the

[1] The idea that the godhead consecrates waters by descending into them appears at Aphaca in a peculiar form associated with the astral character which, at least in later times, was ascribed to the goddess Astarte. It was believed that the goddess on a certain day of the year descended into the river in the form of a fiery star from the top of Lebanon. So Sozomen, *H. E.* ii. 4, 5. Zosimus, i. 58, says only that fireballs appeared at the temple and the places about it, on the occasion of solemn feasts, and does not connect the apparition with the sacred waters. There is nothing improbable in the frequent occurrence of striking electrical phenomena in a mountain sanctuary. We shall presently find fiery apparitions connected also with sacred trees (*infra*, p. 193). "Thunders, lightnings and light flashing in the heavens," appear as objects of veneration among the Syrians (Jacob of Edessa, *Qu.* 43); cf. also the fiery globe of the Heliopolitan Lion-god, whose fall from heaven is described by Damascius, *Vit. Is.* § 203, and what Pausanias of Damascus relates of the fireball that checked the flood of the Orontes (Malalas, p. 38).

[2] Xenophon, *Anab.* i. 4. 9, who found such fish in the Chalus near Aleppo, expressly says that they were regarded as gods. Lucian, *Dea Syr.* xlv., relates that at the lake of Atargatis at Hierapolis the sacred fish

most durable parts of ancient heathenism; sacred fish are still kept in pools at the mosques of Tripolis and Edessa. At the latter place it is believed that death or other ★ evil consequences would befall the man who dared to eat them.[1]

The living power that inhabits sacred waters and gives them their miraculous or healing quality is very often held to be a serpent, as in the Arabian and Hebrew cases which have been already cited,[2] or a huge dragon or water monster, such as that which in the Antiochene legend hollowed out the winding bed of the Orontes and disappeared beneath its source.[3] In such cases the serpents are of course supernatural serpents or *jinn*, and the dragon of Orontes was identified in the Greek period with Typhon, the enemy of the gods.[4] But the demon may also have other forms; thus at Rāmallāh in Palestine there are two springs, of which one is inhabited by a camel, the other by a bride; while the spring at ʿArtās is guarded by a white and a black ram.[5]

In all their various forms the point of the legends is that the sacred source is either inhabited by a demoniac being or imbued with demoniac life. The same notion appears with great distinctness in the ritual of sacred

wore gold ornaments, as did also the eels at the sanctuary of the war-god Zeus, amidst the sacred plane-trees (Herod. v. 119) at Labraunda in Caria (Pliny, *H. N.* xxxii. 16, 17; Ælian, *N. A.* xii. 30). Caria was thoroughly permeated by Phœnician influence.

[1] Sachau, *Reise*, p. 197.

[2] *Supra*, p. 168 *sqq.*

[3] The Leviathan (לִוְיָתָן) of Scripture, like the Arabian *tinnīn*, is probably a personification of the waterspout (Masʿūdī, i. 263, 266; Ps. cxlviii. 7). Thus we see how readily the Eastern imagination clothes aquatic phenomena with an animal form.

[4] Hence perhaps the modern name of the river Nahr al-ʿÂṣī, "the rebel's stream"; the explanation in Yācūt, iii. 588, does not commend itself. The burial of the Typhonic dragon at the source of the Orontes may be compared with the Moslem legend of the well at Babylon, where the rebel angels Hārūt and Mārūt were entombed (Cazwīnī, i. 197).

[5] *ZDPV.* x. 180; *PEF. Qu. St.* 1893, p. 204.

waters. Though such waters are often associated with temples, altars, and the usual apparatus of a cultus addressed to heavenly deities, the service paid to the holy well retained a form which implies that the divine power addressed was in the water. We have seen that at Mecca, and at the Stygian waters in the Syrian desert, gifts were cast into the holy source. But even at Aphaca, where, in the times to which our accounts refer, the goddess of the spot was held to be the Urania or celestial Astarte, the pilgrims cast into the pool jewels of gold and silver, webs of linen and byssus and other precious stuffs, and the obvious contradiction between the celestial character of the goddess and the earthward destination of the gifts was explained by the fiction that at the season of the feast she descended into the pool in the form of a fiery star. Similarly, at the annual fair and feast of the Terebinth, or tree and well of Abraham at Mamre, the heathen visitors, who reverenced the spot as a haunt of "angels,"[1] not only offered sacrifices beside the tree, but illuminated the well with lamps, and cast into it libations of wine, cakes, coins, myrrh, and incense.[2] On the other hand, at the sacred waters of Karwa and Sāwid in S. Arabia, described by Hamdānī in the *Iklīl* (Müller, *Burgen*, p. 69), offerings of bread, fruit or other food were deposited beside the fountain. In the former case they were believed to be eaten by the serpent denizen of the water, in the latter they were consumed by beasts and birds. At Gaza bread is still thrown into the sea by way of offering.[3]

[1] *I.e.* demons. Sozomen says "angels," and not "devils," because the sanctity of the place was acknowledged by Christians also.

[2] Sozomen, *H. E.* ii. 4.—As all "living waters" seem to have had a certain sanctity in N. Semitic religion, the custom of throwing the Ἀδώνιδος κῆποι into springs (Zenobius, *Cent.* i. 49) may probably belong to this chapter.

[3] *PEF. Qu. St.* 1893, p. 216.

In ancient religion offerings are the proper vehicle of prayer and supplication, and the worshipper when he presents his gift looks for a visible indication whether his prayer is accepted.[1] At Aphaca and at the Stygian fountain the accepted gift sank into the depths, the unacceptable offering was cast forth by the eddies. It was taken as an omen of the impending fall of Palmyra that the gifts sent from that city at an annual festival were cast up again in the following year.[2] In this example we see that the holy well, by declaring the favourable or unfavourable disposition of the divine power, becomes a place of oracle and divination. In Greece, also, holy wells are connected with oracles, but mainly in the form of a belief that the water gives prophetic inspiration to those who drink of it. At the Semitic oracle of Aphaca the method is more primitive, for the answer is given directly by the water itself, but its range is limited to what can be inferred from the acceptance or rejection of the worshipper and his petition.

The oracle of Daphne near Antioch, which was obtained by dipping a laurel leaf into the water, was presumably of the same class, for we cannot take seriously the statement that the response appeared written on the leaf.[3] The choice of the laurel leaf as the offering cast into the water must be due to Greek influence, but Daphne was a sanctuary of Heracles, *i.e.* of the Semitic Baal, before the temple of Apollo was built.[4]

[1] Cf. Gen. iv. 4, 5.

[2] Zosimus, i. 58. At Aphaca, as at the Stygian fountain, the waters fall down a cataract into a deep gorge.

[3] Sozomen, v. 19. 11. Cf. the ordeal by casting a tablet into the water at Palici in Sicily. The tablet sank if what was written on it was false (*Mir. Ausc.* § 57).

[4] Malalas, p. 204. A variant of this form of oracle occurs at Myra in Lycia, where the omen is from the sacred fish accepting or rejecting the food offered to them (Pliny, *H. N.* xxxii. 17; Ælian, *N. A.* viii. 5; Athenæus,

An oracle that speaks by receiving or rejecting the worshipper and his homage may very readily pass into an ordeal, where the person who is accused of a crime, or is suspected of having perjured himself in a suit, is presented at the sanctuary, to be accepted or rejected by the deity, in accordance with the principle that no impious person can come before God with impunity.[1] A rude form of this ordeal seems to survive even in modern times in the widespread form of trial of witches by water. In Ḥaḍramaut, according to Macrīzī,[2] when a man was injured by enchantment, he brought all the witches suspect to the sea or to a deep pool, tied stones to their backs and threw them into the water. She who did not sink was the guilty person, the meaning evidently being that the sacred element rejects the criminal.[3] That an impure person dare not approach sacred waters is a general principle—whether the impurity is moral or physical is not a distinction made by ancient religion. Thus in Arabia we have found that a woman in her uncleanness was afraid, for her children's sake, to bathe in the water of Dusares; and to this day among the Yezīdīs no one may enter the valley of Sheik Adi, with its sacred fountain, unless he has first purified his body and clothes.[4] The sacred oil-spring of the Carthaginian sanctuary, described in the book of *Wonderful Stories* that passes under the name of Aristotle,[5] would not flow except for persons ceremonially pure. An ordeal at a sacred spring based on

viii. 8, p. 333). How far Lycian worship was influenced by the Semites is not clear.

[1] Cf. Job xiii. 16; Isa. xxxiii. 14.

[2] *De Valle Ḥadhramaut*, p. 26 *sq.*

[3] The story about Mojammi' and Al-Ahwaṣ (*Agh.* iv. 48), cited by Wellhausen, *Heid.* p. 160, refers to this kind of ordeal, not to a form of magic. A very curious story of the water test for witches in India is told by Ibn Batuta, iv. 37.

[4] Layard, *Nineveh*, i. 280.

[5] *Mir. Ausc.* § 113.

this principle might be worked in several ways,[1] but the usual Semitic method seems to have been by drinking the water. Evidently, if it is dangerous for the impious person ★ to come into contact with the holy element, the danger must be intensified if he ventures to take it into his system, and it was believed that in such a case the draught produced disease and death. At the Asbamæan lake and springs near Tyana the water was sweet and kindly to those that swore truly, but the perjured man was at once smitten in his eyes, feet and hands, seized with dropsy and wasting.[2] In like manner he who swore falsely by the Stygian waters in the Syrian desert died of dropsy within a year. In the latter case it would seem that the oath by the waters sufficed; but primarily, as we see in the other case, the essential thing is the draught of water at the holy place, the oath simply taking the place of the petition which ordinarily accompanies a ritual act. Among the Hebrews this ordeal by drinking holy water is preserved even in the pentateuchal legislation in the case of a woman suspected of infidelity to her husband.[3] Here also the belief was that the holy water, which was mingled with the dust of the sanctuary, and administered with an oath, produced dropsy and wasting; and the antiquity of the

[1] See, for example, the Sicilian oracle of the Palic lake, where the oath of the accused was written on a tablet and cast into the water to sink or swim (*Mir. Ausc.* § 57).

[2] *Mir. Ausc.* § 152; Philostr., *Vit. Apollonii*, i. 6. That the sanctuary was Semitic I infer from its name; see below, p. 182.

[3] Num. v. 11 *sqq.* In *Agh.* i. 156, l. 3 *sqq.*, a suspected wife swears seventy oaths at the Caaba, to which she is conducted with circumstances of ignominy—seated on a camel between two sacks of dung. This was under Islam, but is evidently an old custom. In heathen Arabia the decision in such a case was sometimes referred to a diviner, as we see from the story of Hind bint 'Otba ('*Icd*, iii. 273; *Agh.* viii. 50). An ordeal for virgins accused of unchastity existed at the Stygian water near Ephesus. The accused swore that she was innocent; her oath was written and tied round her neck. She then entered the shallow pool, and if she was guilty the water rose till it covered the writing (Achilles Tatius, viii. 12).

ceremony is evident not only from its whole character, but because the expression "holy water" (ver. 17) is unique in the language of Hebrew ritual, and must be taken as an isolated survival of an obsolete expression. Unique though the expression be, it is not difficult to assign its original meaning; the analogies already before us indicate that we must think of water from a holy spring, and this conclusion is certainly correct. Wellhausen has shown that the oldest Hebrew tradition refers the origin of the Torah to the divine sentences taught by Moses at the sanctuary of Kadesh or Meribah,[1] beside the holy fountain which in Gen. xiv. 7 is also called "the fountain of judgment." The principle underlying the administration of justice at the sanctuary is that cases too hard for man are referred to the decision of God. Among the Hebrews in Canaan this was ordinarily done by an appeal to the sacred lot, but the survival of even one case of ordeal by holy water leaves no doubt as to the sense of the "fountain of judgment" (En-Mishpaṭ) or "waters of controversy" (Meribah).

With this evidence before us as to the early importance of holy waters among the Hebrews, we cannot but attach significance to the fact that the two chief places of pilgrimage of the northern Israelites in the time of Amos were Dan and Beersheba.[2] We have already seen that there was a sacred fountain at Dan, and the sanctuary of Beersheba properly consisted of the "Seven Wells," which gave the place its name. It is notable that among the Semites a special sanctity was attached to groups of seven wells.[3] In the canons of Jacob of Edessa (Qu. 43) we read of nominally Christian Syrians who bewail their diseases to

[1] *Prolegomena*, viii. 3 (Eng. trans. p. 343).
[2] Amos viii. 14; cf. 1 Kings xii. 30.
[3] See Nöldeke in *Litt. Centralblatt*, 22 Mar. 1879, p. 363.

the stars, or turn for help to a solitary tree or a fountain or *seven springs* or water of the sea, etc. Among the Mandæans, also, we read of mysteries performed at seven wells, and among the Arabs a place called "the seven wells" is mentioned by Strabo, xvi. 4. 24.[1] The name of the Asbamæan waters seems also to mean "seven waters" (Syr. *shabʿā mayā*); the spot is a lake where a number of sources bubble up above the surface of the water. Seven is a sacred number among the Semites, particularly affected in matters of ritual, and the Hebrew verb "to swear" means literally "to come under the influence of seven things." Thus seven ewe lambs figure in the oath between Abraham and Abimelech at Beersheba, and in the Arabian oath of covenant described by Herodotus (iii. 8), seven stones are smeared with blood. The oath of purgation at seven wells would therefore have peculiar force.[2]

It is the part of a divine power to grant to his worshippers not only oracles and judgment, but help in trouble and blessing in daily life. The kind of blessing which it is most obvious to expect from a sacred spring is the quickening and fertilisation of the soil and all that depends on it. That fruitful seasons were the chief object of petition at the sacred springs requires no special proof, for this object holds the first place in all the great religious occasions of the settled Semites, and everywhere we find that the festal cycle is regulated by the seasons of the

[1] Cf. also the seven marvellous wells at Tiberias (Cazwīnī, i. 193), and the Thorayyā or "Pleiad waters" at Ḍarīya (Yācūt, i. 924, iii. 588; Bekrī, 214, 627); also the modern Syrian custom of making a sick child that is thought to be bewitched drink from seven wells or cisterns (*ZDPV.* vii. 106).

★ [2] In Amos viii. 14 there is mention of an oath by the way (ritual?) of Beersheba. The pilgrims at Mamre would not drink of the water of the well. Sozomen supposes that the gifts cast in made it undrinkable; but at an Oriental market, where every bargain is accompanied by false oaths and protestations, the precaution is rather to be explained by fear of the divine ordeal.

agricultural year.[1] Beyond doubt the first and best gift of the sacred spring to the worshipper was its own life-giving water, and the first object of the religion addressed to it was to encourage its benignant flow.[2] But the life-giving power of the holy stream was by no means confined to the quickening of vegetation. Sacred waters are also healing waters, as we have already seen in various examples, particularly in that of the Syrians, who sought to them for help in disease. I may here add one instance which, though it lies a little outside of the proper Semitic region, is connected with a holy river of the Syrians. In the Middle Ages it was still believed that he who bathed in the spring-time in the source of the Euphrates would be free from sickness for the whole year.[3] This healing power was not confined to the water itself, but extended to the vegetation that surrounded it. By the sacred river Belus grew the colocasium plants by which Heracles was healed after his conflict with the Hydra, and the roots continued to be used as a cure for bad sores.[4] At Paneas an herb that healed all diseases grew at the base of a statue which was supposed to represent Christ, evidently a relic of the old heathenism of the place.[5] Thus when Ezekiel describes

[1] A myth of the connection of sacred waters with the origin of agriculture seems to survive in modernised form in the mediæval legend of 'Ain al-bacar, "the oxen's well," at Acre. It was visited by Christian, Jewish and Moslem pilgrims, because the oxen with which Adam ploughed issued from it (Cazwīnī, Yācūt). There was a *mashhed*, or sacred tomb, beside it, perhaps the modern representative of the ancient Memnonium.

[2] In Num. xxi. 17 we find a song addressed to the well exhorting it to ★ rise, which in its origin is hardly a mere poetic figure. We may compare what Cazwīnī, i. 189, records of the well of Ilābistān. When the water failed, a feast was held at the source, with music and dancing, to induce it to flow again. See also the modern Palestinian usage cited above, p. 169, n. 3.

[3] Cazwīnī, i. 194. I may also cite the numerous fables of amulets, to be found in the Tigris and other rivers, which protected their wearers against wild beasts, demons and other dangers (*Mir. Ausc.* § 159 *sq.*).

[4] Claudius Iolaus, *ap.* Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Ἄκη.

[5] Theophanes, quoted by Reland, *Antiq. Hebr.* ii. 922.

the sacred waters that issue from the New Jerusalem as giving life wherever they come, and the leaves of the trees on their banks as supplying medicine, his imagery is in full touch with common Semitic ideas (Ezek. xlvii. 9, 12).

The healing power of sacred water is closely connected with its purifying and consecrating power, for the primary conception of uncleanness is that of a dangerous infection. Washings and purifications play a great part in Semitic ritual, and were performed with living water, which was as such sacred in some degree. Whether specially sacred springs were used for purification, and if so under what restrictions I cannot make out; in most cases, I apprehend, they were deemed too holy to be approached by a person technically impure. It appears, however, from Ephræm Syrus that the practice of bathing in fountains was one of the heathen customs to which the Syrians of his time were much addicted, and he seems to regard this as a sort of heathen consecration.[1] Unfortunately the rhetoric of the Syrian fathers seldom condescends to precise details on such matters.

From this account of the ritual of sacred wells it will, I think, be clear that the usages and ceremonies are all intelligible on general principles, without reference to particular legends or the worship of the particular deities associated with special waters. The fountain is treated as a living thing, those properties of its waters which we call natural are regarded as manifestations of a divine life, and the source itself is honoured as a divine being, I had almost said a divine animal. When religion takes a form decidedly anthropomorphic or astral, myths are devised to reconcile the new point of view with the old usage, but the substance of the ritual remains unchanged.

[1] *Opp.* iii. 670 *sq.*; *H. et S.*, ed. Lamy, ii. 395, 411.

Let us now pass on from the worship of sacred waters to the cults connected with sacred trees.[1]

That the conception of trees as demoniac beings was familiar to the Semites has been already shown by many examples,[2] and there is also abundant evidence that in all parts of the Semitic area trees were adored as divine.

Tree worship pure and simple, where the tree is in all respects treated as a god, is attested for Arabia (but not on the best authority) in the case of the sacred date-palm at Nejrān.[3] It was adored at an annual feast, when it was all hung with fine clothes and women's ornaments. A similar tree, to which the people of Mecca resorted annually, and hung upon it weapons, garments, ostrich eggs and other gifts, is spoken of in the traditions of the prophet under the vague name of a *dhāt anwāṭ*, or "tree to hang things on." It seems to be identical with the sacred acacia at Nakhla in which the goddess Al-ʿOzzā was believed to reside.[4] The tree at Ḥodaibiya, mentioned in Sura xlviii. 18, was frequented by pilgrims who thought to derive a blessing from it, till it was cut down by the Caliph ʿOmar lest it should be worshipped like Al-Lāt and Al-ʿOzzā.[5] By the modern Arabs sacred trees are called *manāhil*, places where angels or *jinn* descend and are heard dancing and singing. It is deadly danger to pluck

[1] On sacred trees among the Semites, see Baudissin, *Studien*, ii. 184 *sqq.*; for Arabia, Wellhausen, *Heid.* p. 104. Compare Bötticher, *Baumcultus der Hellenen* (Berl. 1856), and Mannhardt, *Wald- und Feld-Culte* (Berl. 1875, 77).

[2] *Supra*, p. 133.

[3] Tabarī, i. 922 (Nöldeke's trans. p. 181); Ibn Hish. 22. The authority is Wahb b. Monabbih, who, I fear, was little better than a plausible liar.

[4] Wellhausen, pp. 36 *sq.*, 38 *sq.*

[5] Yāqūt, iii. 261. At Ḥodaibiya there was also a well whose waters were miraculously increased by the prophet (Ibn Hish. 742; *Moh. in Med.* 247). I suspect that the sanctity of tree and well are older than Mohammed, for the place is reckoned to the Ḥaram but juts out beyond the line of its border (Yāqūt, ii. 222).

so much as a bough from such a tree; they are honoured with sacrifices, and parts of the flesh are hung on them, as well as shreds of calico, beads, etc. The sick man who sleeps under them receives counsel in a dream for the restoration of his health.[1]

Among the heathen Syrians tree worship must have had a large place, for this is one of the superstitions which Christianity itself was powerless to eradicate. We have already met with nominal Christians of Syria who in their sicknesses turned for help to a solitary tree, while zealous Christians were at pains to hew down the "trees of the demons."[2] As regards the Phœnicians and Canaanites we have the testimony of Philo Byblius that the plants of the earth were in ancient times esteemed as gods and honoured with libations and sacrifices, because from them the successive generations of men drew the support of their life. To this day the traveller in Palestine frequently meets with holy trees hung like an Arabian *dhāt anwāṭ* with rags as tokens of homage.

What place the cult of trees held in the more developed forms of Semitic religion it is not easy to determine. In later times the groves at the greater sanctuaries do not seem to have been direct objects of worship, though they shared in the inviolability that belonged to all the surroundings of the deity, and were sometimes—like the ancient cypresses of Heracles at Daphne—believed to have been planted by the god himself.[3] It was not at the great sanctuaries of cities but in the open field, where the rural population had continued from age to age to practise primitive rites without modification, that the worship of "solitary

[1] Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, i. 448 *sqq.*

[2] See the citations in Kayser, *Jacob v. Edessa*, p. 141.

[3] Similarly the tamarisk at Beersheba was believed to have been planted by Abraham (Gen. xxi. 33).

trees" survived the fall of the great gods of Semitic heathenism.[1]

There is no reason to think that any of the greater Semitic cults was developed out of tree worship. In all of them the main place is given to altar service, and we shall see by and by that the beginnings of this form of worship, so far as they can be traced back to a time when the gods were not yet anthropomorphic, point to the cult of animals rather than of trees. That trees are habitually found at sanctuaries is by no means inconsistent with this view, for where the tree is merely conceived as planted by the god or as marking his favourite haunt, it receives no direct homage.

When, however, we find that no Canaanite high place was complete without its sacred tree standing beside the altar, and when we take along with this the undoubted fact that the direct cult of trees was familiar to all the Semites, it is hardly possible to avoid the conclusion that some elements of tree worship entered into the ritual even of such deities as in their origin were not tree-gods. The local sanctuaries of the Hebrews, which the prophets regard as purely heathenish, and which certainly were modelled in all points on Canaanite usage, were altar-sanctuaries. But the altars were habitually set up "under green trees," and, what is more, the altar was incomplete unless an *ashera* stood beside it. The meaning of this word, which the Authorised Version wrongly renders "grove," has given rise to a good deal of controversy. What kind of object the *ashera* was appears from Deut. xvi. 21: "Thou shalt not plant an *ashera* of any kind of

[1] The solitary tree may in certain cases be the last relic of a ruined heathen sanctuary. What Mocaddasi relates about the place called Al-Shajara ("the Tree"; *supra*, p. 160) points to something of this kind; for here there was an annual feast or fair. At the Terebinth of Mamre in like manner an altar at least can hardly have been lacking in heathen times.

wood (or, an *ashera*, any kind of tree) beside the altar of Jehovah"; it must therefore have been either a living tree or a tree-like post, and in all probability either form was originally admissible. The oldest altars, as we gather from the accounts of patriarchal sanctuaries, stood under actual trees; but this rule could not always be followed, and in the period of the kings it would seem that the place of the living tree was taken by a dead post or pole, planted in the ground like an English Maypole.[1] The *ashera* undoubtedly was an object of worship; for the prophets put it on the same line with other sacred symbols, images cippi and Baal-pillars (Isa. xvii. 8; Micah v. 12 *sqq.*), and the Phœnician inscription of Maṣ'ūb speaks of "the Astarte in the Ashera of the divinity of Hammon." The *ashera* therefore is a sacred symbol, the seat of the deity, and perhaps the name itself, as G. Hoffmann has suggested, means nothing more than the "mark" of the divine presence. But the opinion that ★ there was a Canaanite goddess called Ashera, and that the trees or poles of the same name were her particular symbols, is not tenable; every altar had its *ashera*, even such altars as in the popular, pre-prophetic forms of Hebrew religion were dedicated to Jehovah.[2] This is

[1] It is a thing made by man's hands; Isa. xvii. 8, cf. 1 Kings xvi. 33, etc. In 2 Kings xxi. 7 (cf. xxiii. 6) we read of the Ashera-image. Similarly in 1 Kings xv. 13 there is mention of a "grisly object" which Queen Maacah made for an Ashera. These expressions may imply that the sacred pole was sometimes carved into a kind of image. That the sacred tree should degenerate first into a mere Maypole, and then into a rude wooden idol, is in accordance with analogies found elsewhere, *e.g.* in Greece; but it seems quite as likely that the *ashera* is described as a kind of idol simply because it was used in idolatrous cultus. An Assyrian monument from Khorsābād, figured by Botta and Layard, and reproduced in Rawlinson, *Monarchies*, ii. 37, and Stade, *Gesch. Isr.* i. 461, shows an ornamental pole planted beside a portable altar. Priests stand before it engaged in an act of worship, and touch the pole with their hands, or perhaps anoint it with some liquid substance.

[2] The prohibition in Deut. xvi. 21 is good evidence of the previous practice of the thing prohibited. See also 2 Kings xiii. 6.

not consistent with the idea that the sacred pole was the symbol of a distinct divinity; it seems rather to show that in early times tree worship had such a vogue in Canaan that the sacred tree, or the pole its surrogate, had come to be viewed as a general symbol of deity which might fittingly stand beside the altar of any god.[1]

[1] If a god and a goddess were worshipped together at the same sanctuary, as was the case, for example, at Aphaca and Hierapolis, and if the two sacred symbols at the sanctuary were a pole and a pillar of stone, it might naturally enough come about that the pole was identified with the goddess and the pillar with the god. The worship of Tammuz or Adonis was known at Jerusalem in the time of Ezekiel (viii. 14), and with Adonis the goddess Astarte must also have been worshipped, probably as the "queen of heaven" (Jer. vii., xliv.; cf. on this worship Kuenen in the *Verslagen*, etc., of the Royal Acad. of Amsterdam, 1888). It is not therefore surprising that in one or two late passages, written at a time when all the worship of the high places was regarded as entirely foreign to the religion of Jehovah, the Asherim seem to be regarded as the female partners of the Baalim; *i.e.* that the *ashera* is taken as a symbol of Astarte (Judg. iii. 7). The prophets of the *ashera* in 1 Kings xviii. 19, who appear along with the prophets of the Tyrian Baal as ministers of the foreign religion introduced by Jezebel, must have been prophets of Astarte. They form part of the Tyrian queen's court, and eat of her table, so that they have nothing to do with Hebrew religion. And conversely the old Hebrew sacred poles can have had nothing to do with the Tyrian goddess, for Jehu left the *ashera* at Samaria standing when he abolished all trace of Tyrian worship (2 Kings xiii. 6). There is no evidence of the worship of a divine pair among the older Hebrews; in the time of Solomon Astarte worship was a foreign religion (1 Kings xi. 5), and it is plain from Jer. ii. 27 that in ordinary Hebrew idolatry the tree or stock was the symbol not of a goddess but of a god. Even among the Phœnicians the association of sacred trees with goddesses rather than with gods is not so clear as is often supposed. From all this it follows that the "prophets of the Ashera" in 1 Kings, *l.c.*, are very misty personages, and that the mention of them implies a confusion between Astarte and the Ashera, which no Israelite in Elijah's time, or indeed so long as the northern kingdom stood, could have fallen into. In fact they do not reappear either in ver. 22 or in ver. 40, and the mention of them seems to be due to a late interpolation (Wellh., *Hexateuch*, 2nd ed. (1889), p. 281).

The evidence offered by Assyriologists that Ashrat = Ashera was a goddess (see Schrader in *Zeitschr. f. Assyriologie*, iii. 363 *sq.*) cannot overrule the plain sense of the Hebrew texts. Whether it suffices to show that in some places the general symbol of deity had become a special goddess is a question on which I do not offer an opinion; but see G. Hoffmann, *Ueber einige Phœn. Inschrr.* (1889), p. 26 *sqq.*, whose whole remarks are noteworthy. In *Cit.* 51 (*ZDMG.* xxxv. 424) the goddess seems to be called the

The general adoption of tree symbols at Canaanite sanctuaries must be connected with the fact that all Canaanite Baalim, whatever their original character, were associated with naturally fertile spots (Baal's land), and were worshipped as the givers of vegetable increase. We have seen already in the case of sacred streams how the life-blood of the god was conceived as diffused through the sacred waters, which thus became themselves impregnated with divine life and energy. And it was an easy extension of this idea to suppose that the tree which overshadowed the sacred fountain, and drew perennial strength and freshness from the moisture at its roots, was itself instinct with a particle of divine life. With the ancients the conception of life, whether divine or human, was not so much individualised as it is with us; thus, for example, all the members of one kin were conceived as having a common life embodied in the common blood which flowed through their veins. Similarly one and the same divine life might be shared by a number of objects, if all of them were nourished from a common vital source, and the elasticity of this conception made it very easy to bring natural holy things of different kinds into the cult of one and the same god. Elements of water tree and animal worship could all be combined in the ritual of a single anthropomorphic deity, by the simple supposition that the life of the god flowed in the sacred waters and fed the sacred tree.

As regards the connection of holy waters and holy trees, it must be remembered that in most Semitic lands self-sown wood can flourish only where there is underground water, and where therefore springs or wells exist beside the trees. Hence the idea that the same life is

mother of the sacred pole (אם האשרת), but the editors of the *CIS.* (No. 13) read האזרת. See Cooke, No. 14.

manifested in the water and in the surrounding vegetation could hardly fail to suggest itself, and, broadly speaking, the holiness of fountains and that of trees, at least among the northern Semites, appear to be parts of the same religious conception, for it is only in exceptional cases that the one is found apart from the other.[1]

Where a tree was worshipped as the symbol of an anthropomorphic god we sometimes find a transformation legend directly connecting the life of the god with the vegetative life of the tree. This kind of myth, in which a god is transformed into a tree or a tree springs from the blood of a god, plays a large part in the sacred lore of Phrygia, where tree worship had peculiar prominence, and is also common in Greece. The Semitic examples are not numerous, and are neither so early nor so well attested as to inspire confidence that they are genuine old legends independent of Greek influence.[2] The most important of them is the myth told at Byblus in the time of Plutarch, of the sacred *erica* which was worshipped in the temple ★ of Isis, and was said to have grown round the dead body of Osiris. At Byblus, Isis and Osiris are really Astarte and Adonis, so this may possibly be an original Semitic legend of a holy tree growing from the grave of a god.[3]

[1] An interesting example of the combination may here be added to those cited above. The Syriac text of Epiphanius, *De pond. et mens.* § 62 (Lagarde, *V. T. Fragm.* p. 65 ; *Symmicta*, ii. 203), tells us that Atad of Gen. l. 11 was identified with the spring and thorn-bush of Beth-haglā near Jericho, and the explanation offered of the name Beth-haglā seems to be based on a local tradition of a ritual procession round the sacred objects. See also the *Onomastica*, *s.v.* Area Atath. In Greece also it is an exception to find a sacred tree without its fountain ; Bötticher, p. 47.

[2] Cf. Baudissin, *op. cit.* p. 214.

[3] Plut. *Is. et Os.* §§ 15, 16. One or two features in the story are noteworthy. The sacred erica was a mere dead stump, for it was cut down by Isis and presented to the Byblians wrapped in a linen cloth and anointed with myrrh like a corpse. It therefore represented the dead god. But as a mere stump it also resembles the Hebrew *ashera*. Can it be that the rite of draping and anointing a sacred stump supplies the answer to the unsolved

I apprehend, however, that the physical link between trees and anthropomorphic gods was generally sought in the sacred water from which the trees drew their life. This is probable from the use of the term *ba'l* to denote trees that need neither rain nor irrigation, and indeed from the whole circle of ideas connected with Baal's land. A tree belonged to a particular deity, not because it was of a particular species, but simply because it was the natural wood of the place where the god was worshipped and sent forth his quickening streams to fertilise the earth. The sacred trees of the Semites include every prominent species of natural wood—the pines and cedars of Lebanon, the evergreen oaks of the Palestinian hills, the tamarisks of the Syrian jungles, the acacias of the Arabian wadies, and so forth.[1] So far as these natural woods are concerned, the attempts that have been made to connect individual species of trees with the worship of a single deity break down altogether; it cannot, for example, be said that the cypress belongs to Astarte more than to Melcarth, who planted the cypress trees at Daphne.

Cultivated trees, on the other hand, such as the palm, the olive and the vine, might *à priori* be expected, among the Semites as among the Greeks, to be connected with the special worship of the deity of the spot from which their culture was diffused; for religion and agricultural

question of the nature of the ritual practices connected with the Ashera? Some sort of drapery for the *ashera* is spoken of in 2 Kings xxiii. 7, and the Assyrian representation cited on p. 188, note 1, perhaps represents the anointing of the sacred pole.

[1] In modern Palestine the carob tree is peculiarly demoniac, the reddish hue of the wood suggesting blood (*ZDPV.* x. 181). According to *PEF. Qu. St.* 1893, p. 203 *sq.*, fig, carob and sycamore trees are haunted by devils, and it is dangerous to sleep under them, whereas the lotus tree (*sidr*) and the tamarisk appear to be inhabited by a *wely* (saint). But a tree of any species may be sacred if it grows at a Macām or sacred spot.

arts spread together and the one carried the other with it Yet even of this there is little evidence; the palm was a familiar symbol of Astarte, but we also find a "Baal of the palm-tree" (Baal-tamar) in a place-name in Judg. xx. 33. The only clear Semitic case of the association of a particular deity with a fruit tree is, I believe, that of the Nabatæan Dusares, who was the god of the vine. But the vine came to the Nabatæans only in the period of Hellenic culture,[1] and Dusares as the wine-god seems simply to have borrowed the traits of Dionysus.

At Aphaca at the annual feast the goddess appeared in the form of a fiery meteor, which descended from the mountain-top and plunged into the water, while according to another account fire played about the temple, presumably, since an electrical phenomenon must have lain at the foundation of this belief, in the tree-tops of the sacred grove.[2] Similarly it was believed that fire played about the branches of the sacred olive tree between the Ambrosian rocks at Tyre, without scorching its leaves.[3] In like manner Jehovah appeared to Moses in the bush in flames of fire, so that the bush seemed to burn yet not to be consumed. The same phenomenon, according to Africanus[4] and Eustathius,[5] was seen at the terebinth of Mamre; the whole tree seemed to be aflame, but when the fire sank again remained unharmed. As lights were set by the well under the tree, and the festival was a nocturnal one, this was probably nothing more than an optical delusion exaggerated by the superstitious imagination, a mere artificial contrivance to keep up an ancient belief which must once have had wide currency in connection with

[1] Diodorus, xix. 94. 3.

[2] *Supra*, p. 175, note 1.

[3] Achilles Tatius, ii. 14; Nonnus, xl. 474; cf. the representation on a coin of Gordian III. figured in Pietschmann, *Phœnizier*, p. 295.

[4] Georg. Syncellus, Bonn ed. p. 202.

[5] Cited by Reland, p. 712.

sacred trees, and is remarkable because it shows how a tree might become holy apart from all relation to agriculture and fertility. Jehovah, "who dwells in the bush" (Deut. xxxiii. 16), in the arid desert of Sinai, was the God of the Hebrews while they were still nomads ignorant of agriculture; and indeed the original seat of a conception like the burning bush, which must have its physical basis in electrical phenomena, must probably be sought in the clear dry air of the desert or of lofty mountains. The apparition of Jehovah in the burning bush belongs to the same circle of ideas as His apparition in the thunders and lightnings of Sinai.

When the divine manifestation takes such a form as the flames in the bush, the connection between the god and the material symbol is evidently much looser than in the Baal type of religion, where the divine life is immanent in the life of the tree; and the transition is comparatively easy from the conception of Deut. xxxiii. 16, where Jehovah inhabits (not visits) the bush, as elsewhere He is said to inhabit the temple, to the view prevalent in most parts of the Old Testament, that the tree or the pillar at a sanctuary is merely a memorial of the divine name, the mark of a place where He has been found in the past and may be found again. The separation between Jehovah and physical nature, which is so sharply drawn by the prophets and constitutes one of the chief points of distinction between their faith and that of the masses, whose Jehovah worship had all the characters of Baal worship, may be justly considered as a development of the older type of Hebrew religion. It has sometimes been ★ supposed that the conception of a God immanent in nature is Aryan, and that of a transcendental God Semitic; but the former view is quite as characteristic of the Baal worship of the agricultural Semites as of the early faiths

of the agricultural Aryans. It is true that the higher developments of Semitic religion took a different line, but they did not grow out of Baal worship.

As regards the special forms of cultus addressed to sacred trees, I can add nothing certain to the very scanty indications that have already come before us. Prayers were addressed to them, particularly for help in sickness, but doubtless also for fertile seasons and the like, and they were hung with votive gifts, especially garments and ornaments, perhaps also anointed with unguents as if they had been real persons. More could be said about the use of branches, leaves or other parts of sacred trees in lustrations, as medicine, and for other ritual purposes. But these things do not directly concern us at present; they are simply to be noted as supplying additional evidence, if such be necessary, that a sacred energy, that is, a divine life, resided even in the parts of holy trees.

The only other aspect of the subject which seems to call for notice at the present stage is the connection of sacred trees with oracles and divination. Oracles and omens from trees and at tree sanctuaries are of the commonest among all races,[1] and are derived in very various ways, either from observation of phenomena connected with the trees themselves, and interpreted as manifestations of divine life, or from ordinary processes of divination performed in the presence of the sacred object. Sometimes the tree is believed to speak with an articulate voice, as the *gharcad* did in a dream to Moslim;[2] but except in a dream it is obvious that the voice of the tree can only be some rustling sound, as of wind in the branches, like that which was given to David as a token

[1] Cf. Bötticher, *op. cit.* chap. xi.

[2] *Supra*, p. 133. The same belief in trees from which a spirit speaks oracles occurs in a modern legend given by Doughty, *Ar. Des.* ii. 209.

of the right moment to attack the Philistines,[1] and requires a soothsayer to interpret it. The famous holy tree near Shechem, called the tree of soothsayers in Judg. ix. 37,[2] and the "tree of the revealer" in Gen. xii. 6, must have been the seat of a Canaanite tree oracle.[3] We have no hint as to the nature of the physical indications that guided the soothsayers, nor have I found any other case of a Semitic tree oracle where the mode of procedure is described. But the belief in trees as places of divine revelation must have been widespread in Canaan. The prophetess Deborah gave her responses under a palm near Bethel, which according to sacred tradition marked the grave of the nurse of Rebekah.[4] That the artificial sacred tree or *ashera* was used in divination would follow from 1 Kings xviii. 19, were it not that there are good grounds for holding that in this passage the prophets of the *ashera* are simply the prophets of the Tyrian Astarte. But in Hos. iv. 12 the "stock" of which the prophet's contemporaries sought counsel can hardly be anything else than the *ashera*.[5] Soothsayers who draw their inspiration

[1] 2 Sam. v. 24.

[2] A.V. "plain of Meonenim."

[3] It was perhaps only one tree of a sacred grove, for Deut. xi. 30 speaks of the "trees of the revealer" in the plural. Sam. and LXX read "oak."

[4] Gen. xxxv. 8. There indeed the tree is called an *allōn*, a word generally rendered oak. But *allōn*, like *ēlāh* and *ēlōn*, seems to be a name applicable to any sacred tree, perhaps to any great tree. Stade, *Gesch. Is.* i. 455, would even connect these words with *ēl*, god, and the Phœnician *alonīm*.

[5] As the next clause says, "and their rod declareth to them," it is commonly supposed that rhabdomancy is alluded to, *i.e.* the use of divining rods. And no doubt the divining rod, in which a spirit of life is supposed to reside, so that it moves and gives indications apart from the will of the man who holds it, is a superstition cognate to the belief in sacred trees; but when "their rod" occurs in parallelism with "their stock" or tree, it lies nearer to cite Philo Byblius, *ap.* Eus. *Pr. Ev.* i. 10. 11, who speaks of rods and pillars consecrated by the Phœnicians and worshipped by annual feasts. On this view the rod is only a smaller *ashera*. Drusius therefore seems to hit the mark in comparing Festus's note on *delubrum*, where the

from plants are found in Semitic legend even in the Middle Ages.[1]

To the two great natural marks of a place of worship, the fountain and the tree, ought perhaps to be added grottoes and caves of the earth. At the present day almost every sacred site in Palestine has its grotto, and that this is no new thing is plain from the numerous symbols of Astarte worship found on the walls of caves in Phœnicia. There can be little doubt that the oldest Phœnician temples were natural or artificial grottoes, and that the sacred as well as the profane monuments of Phœnicia, with their marked preference for monolithic forms, point to the rock-hewn cavern as the original type that dominated the architecture of the region.[2] But if this be so, the use of grottoes as temples in later times does not prove that caverns as such had any primitive religious significance. Religious practice is always conservative, and rock-hewn temples would naturally be used after men had ceased to live like troglodytes in caves and holes of the earth. Moreover, ancient temples are in most instances not so much houses where the gods live, as storehouses for the vessels and treasures of the sanctuary. The altar, the sacred tree, and the other divine symbols to which acts of worship are addressed, stand outside in front of the temple, and the whole service is carried on in the open air. Now all over the Semitic world caves and pits are the primitive storehouses, and we know that in Arabia

Romans are said to have worshipped pilled rods as gods. See more on rod worship in Bötticher, *op. cit.* xvi. 5. Was the omen derived from the rod flourishing or withering? We have such an omen in Aaron's rod (Num. xvii.); and Adonis rods, set as slips to grow or wither, seem to be referred to in Isa. xvii. 10 *sqq.*, a passage which would certainly gain force if the withering of the slips was an ill omen. Divination from the flourishing and withering of sacred trees is very common in antiquity (Bötticher, ✶ hap. xi.).

[1] Chwolsohn, *Ssabier*, ii. 914.

[2] Renan, *Phénicie*, p. 822 *sq.*

a pit called the *ghabghab*, in which the sacred treasure was stored, was a usual adjunct to sanctuaries.[1] But there are weighty reasons for doubting whether this is the whole explanation of cave sacrifices. In other parts of the world, *e.g.* in Greece, there are many examples of caves associated with the worship of chthonic deities, and also with the oracles of gods like Apollo who are not usually regarded as chthonic or subterranean; and the acts performed in these caves imply that they were regarded as the peculiar seats of divine energy. The common opinion seems to be that Semitic gods were never chthonic, in the sense that their seats and the source of their influence were sought underground. But we know that all branches of the Semites believed in chthonic demons, the Hebrew *ōb*, the Syrian *zakkūrē*, the Arabian *ahl al-arḍ* or "earth-folk,"[2] with whom wizards hold fellowship. Again, the ordinary usages of Semitic religion have many points of contact with the chthonic rites of the Greeks. The Arabian *ghabghab* is not a mere treasury, for the victim is said to be brought to it, and the sacrificial blood flows into the pit.[3] Similarly the annual human sacrifice at Dumætha (Duma) was buried under the altar-idol.[4] As regards the northern Semites the chthonic associations of the Baalim as gods of the subterranean waters are unquestionable, particularly at sanctuaries like Aphaca, where the tomb of the Baal was shown beside his sacred stream;[5] for a buried god is a god that dwells underground. The whole N. Semitic area was dotted over with sacred tombs, Memnonia, Semiramis

[1] Wellhausen, p. 103.

[2] For the *ōb* see especially Isa. xxix. 4; for the *zakkūrē*, *Julianos*, ed. Hoffmann, p. 247, and *ZDMG.* xxviii. 666. For the *ahl al-arḍ* the oldest passage I know is Ibn Hishām, p. 258, l. 19, where these demons appear in connection with witchcraft, exactly like the *ōb* and the *zakkūrē*.

[3] Yācūt, iii. 772 *sq.*; Ibn Hishām, p. 55, l. 18; cf. Wellhausen, *ut supra*.

[4] Porphyry, *De Abst.* ii. 56.

[5] *Supra*, p. 174, note.

mounds and the like, and at every such spot a god or demigod had his subterranean abode.[1] No part of old Semitic belief was more deeply graven on the popular imagination than this, which still holds its ground among the peasantry, in spite of Christianity and Islam, with the merely nominal modification that the ancient god has been transformed into a wonder-working *sheikh* or *wely*. In view of these facts it can hardly be doubted that remarkable caves or passages, leading into the bowels of the earth, were as likely to be clothed with supernatural associations among the Semites as among the Greeks. And there is at least one great Semitic temple whose legends distinctly indicate that the original sanctuary was a chasm in the ground. According to Lucian, this chasm swallowed up the waters of the Flood (Deucalion's flood, as the Hellenised ★ form of the legend has it), and the temple with its altars and special ritual of pouring water into the gulf was erected in commemoration of this deliverance.[2] According to the Christian Melito, the chasm, or "well," as he calls it, was haunted by a demon and the water-pouring was designed to prevent him from coming up to injure men.[3] Here the primitive sanctity of the chasm is the one fixed point amidst the variations and distortions of later legend; and on this analogy I am disposed to conjecture that in other cases also a cavern or cleft in the earth may have been chosen as a primæval sanctuary because it marked the spot where a chthonic god went up and down between the outer world and his subterranean home, and where he

[1] That the Semiramis mounds were really tomb-sanctuaries appears from the testimony of Ctesias cited by Syncellus, i. 119 (Bonn), and John of Antioch (*Fr. Hist. Gr.* iv. 589), compared with Langlois, *Chron. de Michel le Grand* (Venice, 1868), p. 40. See also my article on "Ctesias and the Semiramis legend" in *Eng. Hist. Rev.* April 1887, pp. 303 *sqq.*

[2] *De Dea Syria*, § 13, cf. § 48.

[3] Melito, *Spic. Syr.* p. 25.

could be best approached with prayers and offerings. What seems particularly to strengthen this conjecture is that the adytum, or dark inner chamber, found in many temples both among the Semites and in Greece, was almost certainly in its origin a cave; indeed in Greece it was often wholly or partially subterranean and is called μέγαρον—a word which in this application can hardly be true Greek, and mean "hall," but is rather to be identified with the Semitic מערה, "a cave." The adytum is not a constant feature in Greek temples, and the name ★ μέγαρον seems to indicate that it was borrowed from the Semites.[1] Where it does exist it is a place of oracle, as the Holy of Holies was at Jerusalem, and therefore cannot be looked upon in any other light than as the part of the sanctuary where the god is most immediately present.

From this obscure topic we pass at once into clearer light when we turn to consider the ordinary artificial ★ mark of a Semitic sanctuary, viz. the sacrificial pillar, cairn or rude altar. The sacred fountain and the sacred tree are common symbols at sanctuaries, but they are not invariably found, and in most cases they have but a secondary relation to the ordinary ritual. In the more advanced type of sanctuary the real meeting-place between man and his god is the altar. The altar in its developed form is a raised structure upon which sacrifices are presented to the god. Most commonly the sacrifices are fire-offerings, and the altar is the place where they are burned; but in another type of ritual, of which the Roman *lectisternium* and the Hebrew oblation of shewbread are familiar examples, the altar is simply a table on which a meal is spread before the deity. Whether fire is used or not is a

[1] The possibility of this can hardly be disputed when we think of the temple of Apollo at Delos, where the holy cave is the original sanctuary. For this was a place of worship which the Greeks took over from the Phœnicians.

detail in the mode of presentation and does not affect the essence of the sacrificial act. In either case the offering consists of food, "the bread of God" as it is called in the Hebrew ritual,[1] and there is no real difference between a table and altar. Indeed the Hebrew altar of burnt-offering is called the table of the Lord, while conversely the table of shewbread is called an altar.[2]

The table is not a very primitive article of furniture,[3] and this circumstance alone is enough to lead us to suspect that the altar was not originally a raised platform on which a sacrificial meal could be set forth. In Arabia, where sacrifice by fire is almost unknown, we find no proper altar, but in its place a rude pillar or heap of stones, beside which the victim is slain, the blood being poured out over the stone or at its base.[4] This ritual of the blood is the essence of the offering; no part of the flesh falls as a rule to the god, but the whole is distributed among the men who assist at the sacrifice. The sacred stones, which are already mentioned by Herodotus, are called *anṣāb* (sing. *noṣb*), *i.e.* stones set up, pillars. We also find the name *gharīy*, "blood-bedaubed," with reference to the ritual just described. The meaning of this ritual will occupy us later; meantime the thing to be noted is that the altar is only a modification of the *noṣb*, and that the rude Arabian usage is the primitive type out of which all the elaborate altar ceremonies of the more cultivated Semites grew. Whatever else was done in connection with a sacrifice, the primitive rite of sprinkling

[1] Lev. xxi. 8, 17, etc.; cf. Lev. iii. 11.

[2] Mal. i. 7, 12; Ezek. xli. 22; cf. Wellhausen, *Prolegomena* (Eng.), p. 71. The same word (ערך) is used of setting a table and disposing the pieces of the sacrifice on the fire-altar.

[3] The old Arabian *sofra* is merely a skin spread on the ground, not a raised table. Cf. *E. Bi.* col. 2991.

[4] Wellhausen, *Heid.* pp. 43, 101, 116; cf. *Kinship*, p. 258.

or dashing the blood against the altar, or allowing it to flow down on the ground at its base, was hardly ever omitted;[1] and this practice was not peculiar to the Semites, but was equally the rule with the Greeks and Romans, and indeed with the ancient nations generally.

As regards fire sacrifices, we shall find reason to doubt whether the hearth on which the sacred flesh was consumed was originally identical with the sacred stone or cairn over which the sacrificial blood was allowed to flow. It seems probable, for reasons that cannot be stated at this point, that the more modern form of altar, which could be used both for the ritual of the blood and as a sacred hearth, was reached by combining two operations which originally took place apart. But in any case it is certain that the original altar among the northern Semites, as well as among the Arabs, was a great stone or cairn at which the blood of the victim was shed. At Jacob's covenant with Laban no other altar appears than the cairn of stones beside which the parties to the compact ate together; in the ancient law of Ex. xx. 24, 25, it is prescribed that the altar must be of earth or of unhewn stone; and that a single stone sufficed appears from 1 Sam. xiv. 32 *sqq.*, where the first altar built by Saul is simply the great stone which he caused to be rolled unto him after the battle of Michmash, that the people might slay their booty of sheep and cattle at it, and not eat the flesh with the blood. The simple shedding of the blood by

[1] There were indeed altars at which no animal sacrifices were presented. Such are, among the Hebrews, the altar of incense and the table of shewbread, and among the Phœnicians the altar at Paphos (Tac., *Hist.* ii. 3); perhaps also the "altar of the pious" at Delos (Porph., *De Abst.* ii. 28) was of Phœnician origin. In later times certain exceptional sacrifices were burned alive or slain without effusion of blood, but this does not touch the general principle.

the stone or altar consecrated the slaughter and made it a legitimate sacrifice. Here, therefore, there is no difference between the Hebrew altar and the Arabian *nosb* or *gharīy*.

Monolithic pillars or cairns of stone are frequently mentioned in the more ancient parts of the Old Testament as standing at sanctuaries,[1] generally in connection with a sacred legend about the occasion on which they were set up by some famous patriarch or hero. In the biblical story they usually appear as mere memorial structures without any definite ritual significance; but the pentateuchal law looks on the use of sacred pillars (*maṣṣēbōth*) as idolatrous.[2] This is the best evidence that such pillars had an important place among the appurtenances of Canaanite temples, and as Hosea (iii. 4) speaks of the *maṣṣēba* as an indispensable feature in the sanctuaries of northern Israel in his time, we may be sure that by the mass of the Hebrews the pillars of Shechem, Bethel, Gilgal and other shrines were looked upon not as mere memorials of historical events, but as necessary parts of the ritual apparatus of a place of worship. That the special ritual acts connected with the Canaanite *maṣṣēba* were essentially the same as in the case of the Arabian *nosb* may be gathered from Philo Byblius, who, in his pseudo-historical manner, speaks of a certain Usous who consecrated two pillars to fire and wind, and paid worship to them, pouring out libations to them of the blood of beasts taken in hunting.[3] From these evidences, and especially from the fact that libations of the same kind

[1] At Shechem, Josh. xxiv. 26; Bethel, Gen. xxviii. 18 *sqq.*; Gilead, (Ramoth-gilead), Gen. xxxi. 45 *sqq.*; Gilgal, Josh. iv. 5; Mizpah, 1 Sam. vii. 12; Gibeon, 2 Sam. xx. 8; En-rogel, 1 Kings i. 9.

[2] Ex. xxxiv. 13; Deut. xii. 3; cf. Mic. v. 13 (12). For pillars A.V. generally gives, incorrectly, 'images."

[3] Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* i. 10. 10. Libations of blood are mentioned as a heathenish rite in Ps. xvi. 4.

are applied to both, it seems clear that the altar is a differentiated form of the primitive rude stone pillar, the *nosb* or *massēba*.[1] But the sacred stone is more than an altar, for in Hebrew and Canaanite sanctuaries the altar, in its developed form as a table or hearth, does not supersede the pillar; the two are found side by side at the same sanctuary, the altar as a piece of sacrificial apparatus, and the pillar as a visible symbol or embodiment of the presence of the deity, which in process of time comes to be fashioned and carved in various ways, till ultimately it becomes a statue or anthropomorphic idol of stone, just as the sacred tree or post was ultimately developed into an image of wood.[2]

It has been disputed whether the sacred stone at Semitic sanctuaries was from the first an object of worship, a sort of rude idol in which the divinity was somehow supposed to be present. It is urged that in the narratives of Genesis the *massēba* is a mere mark without intrinsic religious significance. But the original significance of the patriarchal symbols cannot be concluded from the sense put on them by writers who lived many centuries after those ancient sanctuaries were first founded; and at the time when the oldest of the pentateuchal narratives were written, the Canaanites and the great mass of the Hebrews certainly treated the *massēba* as a sort of idol or embodiment of the divine presence. Moreover Jacob's pillar is more than a mere landmark, for it is anointed, just as idols were in antiquity, and the pillar itself, not the spot on which it stood, is called

[1] *Nosb* and *massēba* are derived from the same root (NṢB, "set up"). Another name for the pillar or cairn is גַּלְעֵד, which occurs in place-names, both in Canaan and among the Aramæans (Nisibis, "the pillars").

[2] From this point of view the prohibition of a graven image (פֶּסֶל) in the second commandment stands on one line with the prohibition of an altar of hewn stone (Ex. xx. 25).

"the house of God,"[1] as if the deity were conceived actually to dwell in the stone, or manifest himself therein to his worshippers. And this is the conception which appears to have been associated with sacred stones everywhere. When the Arab daubed blood on the *noṣb* his object was to bring the offering into direct contact with the deity, and in like manner the practice of stroking the sacred stone with the hand is identical with the practice of touching or stroking the garments or beard of a man ★ in acts of supplication before him.[2] Here, therefore, the sacred stone is altar and idol in one; and so Porphyry (*De Abst.* ii. 56) in his account of the worship of Duma in Arabia expressly speaks of "the altar which they use as an idol."[3] The same conception must have prevailed among the Canaanites before altar and pillar were differentiated from one another, otherwise the pillar would have been simply changed into the more convenient form of an altar, and there could have been no reason for retaining both. So far as the evidence from tradition and ritual goes, we can only think of the sacred stone as consecrated by the actual presence of the godhead, so that whatever touched it was brought into immediate contact with the deity. How such a conception first obtained currency is a matter for which no direct evidence is available, and which if settled at all can be settled only by inference and conjecture. At the present stage of our inquiry it is not possible to touch on this subject except in a provisional

[1] Gen. xxviii. 22.

[2] Wellhausen, p. 109; *ibid.* p. 56. Conversely a holy person conveys a blessing by the touch of his hand (Ibn Sa'd, Nos. 90, 130), or even by touching something which others touch after him (Ibn Hishām, 338. 15).

[3] So in the well-known line of Al-A'shā the god to whom the sacred stone belongs is himself said to be *manṣūb*, "set up" (Ibn Hish. 256, 8; *Morg. Forsch.* p. 258). The Arabian gods are expressly called "gods of stone" in a verse cited by Ibn Sa'd, No. 118.

way. But some things may be said which will at least tend to make the problem more definite.

Let us note then that there are two distinct points to be considered—(1) how men came to look on an artificial structure as the symbol or abode of the god, (2) why the particular artificial structure is a stone or a cairn of stones.

(1.) In tree worship and in the worship of fountains adoration is paid to a thing which man did not make, which has an independent life, and properties such as to the savage imagination may well appear to be divine. On the same analogy one can understand how natural rocks and boulders, suited by their size and aspect to affect the savage imagination, have acquired in various parts of the world the reputation of being animated objects with power to help and hurt man, and so have come to receive religious worship. But the worship of artificial pillars and cairns of stones, chosen at random and set up by man's hand, is a very different thing from this. Of course not the rudest savage believes that in setting up a sacred stone he is making a new god; what he does believe is that the god comes into the stone, dwells in it or animates it, so ★ that for practical purposes the stone is thenceforth an embodiment of the god, and may be spoken of and dealt with as if it were the god himself. But there is an enormous difference between worshipping the god in his natural embodiment, such as a tree or some notable rock, and persuading him to come and take for his embodiment a structure set up for him by the worshipper. From the metaphysical point of view, which we are always tempted to apply to ancient religion, the worship of stocks and stones prepared by man's hand seems to be a much cruder thing than the worship of natural life as displayed in a fountain or a secular tree; but practically the idea that the godhead consents to be present in a structure set for

him by his worshippers implies a degree of intimacy and permanency in the relations between man and the being he adores which marks an advance on the worship of natural objects. It is true that the rule of Semitic worship is that the artificial symbol can only be set up in a place already consecrated by tokens of the divine presence; but the sacred stone is not merely a token that the place is frequented by a god, it is also a permanent pledge that in this place he consents to enter into stated relations with men and accept their service.

(2.) That deities like those of ancient heathenism, which were not supposed to be omnipresent, and which were commonly thought of as having some sort of corporeal nature, could enter into a stone for the convenience of their worshippers, seems to us a fundamental difficulty, but was hardly a difficulty that would be felt by primitive man, who has most elastic conceptions of what is possible. When we speak of an idol we generally think of an image presenting a likeness of the god, because our knowledge of heathenism is mainly drawn from races which had made some advance in the plastic arts, and used idols shaped in such a way as to suggest the appearance and attributes which legend ascribed to each particular deity. But there is no reason in the nature of things why the physical embodiment which the deity assumes for the convenience of his worshipper should be a copy of his proper form, and in the earliest times to which the worship of sacred stones goes back there was evidently no attempt to make the idol a simulacrum. A cairn or rude stone pillar is not a portrait of anything, and I take it that we shall go on altogether false lines if we try to explain its selection as a divine symbol by any consideration of what it looks like. Even when the arts had made considerable progress the Semites felt no need to fashion their sacred symbols into

likenesses of the gods. Melcarth was worshipped at Tyre in the form of two pillars,[1] and at the great temple of Paphos, down to Roman times, the idol was not an anthropomorphic image of Astarte, but a conical stone.[2] These antique forms were not retained from want of plastic skill, or because there were not well-known types on which images of the various gods could be and often were constructed; for we see from the second commandment that likenesses of things celestial terrestrial and aquatic were objects of worship in Canaan from a very early date. It was simply not thought necessary that the symbol in which the divinity was present should be like the god.

Phœnician votive cippi were often adorned with rude figures of men, animals and the like, as may be seen in the series of such monuments dedicated to Tanith and Baal Hammān which are depicted in the *Corpus Inscr. Sem.* These figures, which are often little better than hieroglyphics, served, like the accompanying inscriptions, to indicate the meaning of the cippus and the deity to which it was devoted. An image in like manner declares its own meaning better than a mere pillar, but the chief idol of a great sanctuary did not require to be explained in this way; its position showed what it was without either figure or inscription. It is probable that among the Phœnicians and Hebrews, as among the Arabs at the time of Mohammed, portrait images, such as are spoken of in the second com-

[1] Herod. ii. 44. Twin pillars stood also before the temples of Paphos and Hierapolis, and Solomon set up two brazen pillars before his temple at Jerusalem (1 Kings vii. 15, 21). As he named them "The stablisher" and "In him is strength," they were doubtless symbols of Jehovah.

[2] Tac., *Hist.* ii. 2. Other examples are the cone of Elagabalus at Emesa (Herodian, v. 3. 5) and that of Zeus Casius. More in Zoega, *De obeliscis*, p. 203. The cone at Emesa was believed to have fallen from heaven, like the idol of Artemis at Ephesus and other ancient and very sacred idols.

mandment, were mainly small gods for private use.[1] For public sanctuaries the second pillar or *ashera* sufficed.

The worship of sacred stones is often spoken of as if it belonged to a distinctly lower type of religion than the worship of images. It is called fetichism—a merely popular term, which conveys no precise idea, but is vaguely supposed to mean something very savage and contemptible. And no doubt the worship of unshapen blocks is from the artistic point of view a very poor thing, but from a purely religious point of view its inferiority to image worship is not so evident. The host in the mass is artistically as much inferior to the Venus of Milo as a Semitic *maṣṣēba* was, but no one will say that mediæval Christianity is a lower form of religion than Aphrodite worship. What seems to be implied when sacred stones are spoken of as fetiches is that they date from a time when stones were regarded as the natural embodiment and proper form of the gods, not merely as the embodiment which they took up in order to receive the homage of their worshippers. Such a view, I venture to think, is entirely without foundation. Sacred stones are found in all parts of the world and in the worship of gods of the most various kinds, so that their use must rest on some cause which was operative in all primitive religions. But that all or most ancient gods were originally gods of stones, inhabiting natural rocks or boulders, and that artificial cairns or pillars are imitations of these natural objects, is against evidence and quite incredible. Among the Semites the sacred pillar is universal, but the instances of the worship of rocks and stones *in situ* are neither numerous

[1] Of the common use of such gods every museum supplies evidence, in the shape of portable idols and amulets with pictured carving. Compare 2 Macc. xii. 40, where we read that many of the army of Judas Maccabæus—Jews fighting against heathenism—wore under their shirts ἱερώματα τῶν ἀπὸ Ἰαμνείας εἰδώλων.

nor prominent, and the idea of founding a theory of the origin of sacred stones in general upon them could hardly occur to any one, except on the perfectly gratuitous supposition that the idol or symbol must necessarily be like the god.[1]

The notion that the sacred stone is a simulacrum of the god seems also to be excluded by the observation that several pillars may stand together as representatives of a single deity. Here, indeed, the evidence must be sifted with some care, for a god and a goddess were often worshipped together, and then each would have a pillar.[2] But this kind of explanation does not cover all the cases. In the Arabian rite described in Herod. iii. 8, two deities are invoked, but seven sacred stones are anointed with

[1] The stone of al-Lāt at Ṭāïf, in which the goddess was supposed to dwell, is identified by local tradition with a mass which seems to be a natural block *in situ*, though not one of unusual size or form. See my *Kinship*, p. 299, and Doughty, ii. 515. At 'Okāz the sacred circle was performed round rocks (*ṣokhūr*, Yācūt, iii. 705), presumably the remarkable group which I ☆ described in 1880 in a letter to the *Scotsman* newspaper. "In the S.E. corner of the small plain, which is barely two miles across, rises a hill of loose granite blocks, crowned by an enormous pillar standing quite erect and flanked by lower masses. I do not think that this pillar can be less than 50 or 60 feet in height, and its extraordinary aspect, standing between two lesser guards on either side, is the first thing that strikes the eye on nearing the plain." The rock of Dusares, referred to by Steph. Byz., is perhaps the cliff with a waterfall which has been already mentioned (*supra*, p. 168), and so may be compared with the rock at Kadesh from which the fountain gushed. The sanctity of rocks from which water flows, or of rocks that form a sacred grotto, plainly cannot be used to explain the origin of sacred cairns and pillars which have neither water nor cavern.

That the phrase "Rock of Israel," applied to Jehovah, has anything to do with stone worship may legitimately be doubted. The use of baetylia, or small portable stones to which magical life was ascribed, hardly belongs to the present argument. The idol Abnīl at Nisibis is simply "the cippus of El" (Assem. i. 27).

[2] Cf. *Kinship*, pp. 60 n., 299 *sqq*. Whether the two gharī at Ḥira and Faid (Wellh. p. 43) belong to a pair of gods, or are a double image of one deity, like the twin pillars of Heracles-Melcarth at Tyre, cannot be decided. Wellhausen inclines to the latter view, citing *Ḥamāsa*, 190. 15. But in Arabic idiom the two 'Ozzās may mean al-'Ozzā and her companion goddess al-Lāt. Mr. C. Lyall suggests the reading *gharīyaini*.

blood, and a plurality of sacred stones round which the worshippers circled in a single act of worship are frequently spoken of in Arabian poetry.[1] Similarly in Canaan the place-name Anathoth means images of 'Anath in the plural; and at Gilgal there were twelve sacred pillars according to the number of the twelve tribes,[2] as at Sinai twelve pillars were erected at the covenant sacrifice.[3] Twin pillars of Melcarth have already been noticed at Tyre, and are familiar to us as the "pillars of Hercules" in connection with the Straits of Gibraltar.

Another view taken of sacred pillars and cippi is that they are images, not of the deity, but of bodily organs taken as emblems of particular powers or attributes of deity, especially of life-giving and reproductive power. I will say something of this theory in a note; but as an explanation of the origin of sacred stones it has not even a show of plausibility. Men did not begin by worshipping emblems of divine powers, they brought their homage and offerings to the god himself. If the god was already conceived as present in the stone, it was a natural exercise of the artistic faculty to put something on the stone to indicate the fact; and this something, if the god was anthropomorphically conceived, might either be a human figure, or merely an indication of important parts of the human figure. At Tabāla in Arabia, for

[1] Wellh., *Heid.* p. 102. The poets often seem to identify the god with one of the stones, as al-'Ozzā was identified with one of the three trees at Nakhla. The *anṣāb* stand beside the god (*Tāj*, iii. 560, l. 1) or round him, which probably means that the idol proper stood in the midst. In the verse of al-Farazdac, *Agh.* xix. 3, l. 30, to which Wellhausen calls attention, the Oxford MS. of the Nacāiḍ and that of the late Spitta-Bey read, *'alā ḥīni lā tuḥyā 'l-banātu wa-idh humū 'ukūfun 'alā 'l-anṣābi ḥawla 'l-mudawwari*, and the scholia explain *al-mudawwar* as *ṣanam yadūrūna ḥawlahu*. It is impossible to believe that this distinction between one stone and the rest is primitive. ★

[2] Josh. iv. 20. These stones are probably identical with the stone-idols (A.V. "quarries") of Judg. iii. 19, 26.

[3] Ex. xxiv. 4.

instance, a sort of crown was sculptured on the stone of al-Lāt to mark her head. In like manner other parts of the body may be rudely designated, particularly such as distinguish sex. But that the sacred cippus, as such, is not a sexual emblem, is plain from the fact that exactly the same kind of pillar or cone is used to represent gods and goddesses indifferently.[1]

On a review of all these theories it seems most probable that the choice of a pillar or cairn as the primitive idol was not dictated by any other consideration than convenience for ritual purposes. The stone or stone-heap was a convenient mark of the proper place of sacrifice, and at the same time, if the deity consented to be present at it, provided the means for carrying out the ritual of the sacrificial blood. Further than this it does not seem possible to go, till we know why it was thought so essential to bring the blood into immediate contact with the god adored. This question belongs to the subject of sacrifice, which I propose to commence in the next lecture.[2]

[1] See *Additional Note* D, *Phallic Symbols*.

[2] One or two isolated statements about sacred stones, not sufficiently important or well attested to be mentioned in the text, may deserve citation in a note. Pliny, *H. N.* xxxvii. 161, speaks of an ordeal at the temple of Melcarth at Tyre by sitting on a stone seat, *ex qua pii facile surgebant.*— Yācūt, iii. 760, has a very curious account of a stone like a landmark near Aleppo. When it was thrown down the women of the adjoining villages were seized by a shameful frenzy, which ceased when it was set up again. Yācūt had this by very formal written attestation from persons he names; but failed to obtain confirmation of the story on making personal inquiry at Aleppo.

LECTURE VI

SACRIFICE—PRELIMINARY SURVEY

We have seen in the course of the last lecture that the practices of ancient religion required a fixed meeting-place between the worshippers and their god. The choice of such a place is determined in the first instance by the consideration that certain spots are the natural haunts of a deity, and therefore holy ground. But for most rituals it is not sufficient that the worshipper should present his service on holy ground: it is necessary that he should come into contact with the god himself, and this he believes himself to do when he directs his homage to a natural object, like a tree or a sacred fountain, which is believed to be the actual seat of the god and embodiment of a divine life, or when he draws near to an artificial mark of the immediate presence of the deity. In the oldest forms of Semitic religion this mark is a sacred stone, which is at once idol and altar; in later times the idol and the altar stand side by side, and the original functions of the sacred stone are divided between them; the idol represents the presence of the god, and the altar serves to receive the gifts of the worshipper. Both are necessary to constitute a complete sanctuary, because a complete act of worship implies not merely that the worshipper comes into the presence of his god with gestures of homage and words of prayer, but also that he lays before the deity some material oblation. In antiquity an act of

worship was a formal operation in which certain prescribed rites and ceremonies must be duly observed. And among these the oblation at the altar had so central a place that among the Greeks and Romans the words *ἱερουργία* and *sacrificium*, which in their primary application denote any action within the sphere of things sacred to the gods, and so cover the whole field of ritual, were habitually used, like our English word sacrifice, of those oblations at the altar round which all other parts of ritual turned. In English idiom there is a further tendency to narrow the word sacrifice to such oblations as involve the slaughter of a victim. In the Authorised Version of the Bible "sacrifice and offering" is the usual translation of the Hebrew *zébaḥ uminḥa*, that is, "bloody and bloodless oblations." For the purposes of the present discussion, however, it seems best to include both kinds of oblation under the term "sacrifice"; for a comprehensive term is necessary, and the word "offering," which naturally suggests itself as an alternative, is somewhat too wide, as it may properly include not only sacrifices but votive offerings, of treasure images and the like, which form a distinct class from offerings at the altar.

Why sacrifice is the typical form of all complete acts of worship in the antique religions, and what the sacrificial act means, is an involved and difficult problem. The problem does not belong to any one religion, for sacrifice is equally important among all early peoples in all parts of the world where religious ritual has reached any considerable development. Here, therefore, we have to deal with an institution that must have been shaped by the action of general causes, operating very widely and under conditions that were common in primitive times to all races of mankind. To construct a theory of sacrifice exclusively on the Semitic evidence would be unscientific

and misleading, but for the present purpose it is right to put the facts attested for the Semitic peoples in the foreground, and to call in the sacrifices of other nations to confirm or modify the conclusions to which we are led. For some of the main aspects of the subject the Semitic evidence is very full and clear, for others it is fragmentary and unintelligible without help from what is known about other rituals.

Unfortunately the only system of Semitic sacrifice of which we possess a full account is that of the second temple at Jerusalem;[1] and though the ritual of Jerusalem as described in the Book of Leviticus is undoubtedly based on very ancient tradition, going back to a time when there was no substantial difference, in point of form, between Hebrew sacrifices and those of the surrounding nations, the system as we have it dates from a time when sacrifice was no longer the sum and substance of worship. In the long years of Babylonian exile the Israelites who remained true to the faith of Jehovah had learned to draw nigh to their God without the aid of sacrifice and offering, and, when they returned to Canaan, they did not return to the old

[1] The detailed ritual laws of the Pentateuch belong to the post-exilic document commonly called the Priestly Code, which was adopted as the law of Israel's religion at Ezra's reformation (444 B.C.). To the Priestly Code belong the Book of Leviticus, together with the cognate parts of the adjacent Books, Ex. xxv.–xxxi., xxxv.–xl., and Num. i.–x., xv.–xix., xxv.–xxxvi. (with some inconsiderable exceptions). With the Code is associated an account of the sacred history from Adam to Joshua, and some ritual matter is found in the historical sections of the work, especially in Ex. xii., where the law of the Passover is mainly priestly, and represents post-exilic usage. The law of Deuteronomy (seventh cent. B.C.) and the older codes of Ex. xx.–xxiii., xxxiv., have little to say about the rules of ritual, which in old times were matters of priestly tradition and not incorporated in a law-book. A just view of the sequence and dates of the several parts of the Pentateuch is essential to the historical study of Hebrew religion. Readers to whom this subject is new may refer to Wellhausen's *Prolegomena* (Eng. trans., Edin. 1883), to the article "Pentateuch," *Encycl. Brit.*, 9th ★ ed., to my *Old Test. in the Jewish Church* (2nd ed. 1892), or to Professor Driver's *Introduction*.

type of religion. They built an altar, indeed, and restored its ritual on the lines of old tradition, so far as these could be reconciled with the teaching of the prophets and the Deuteronomic law—especially with the principle that there was but one sanctuary at which sacrifice could be acceptably offered. But this principle itself was entirely destructive of the old importance of sacrifice, as the stated means of converse between God and man. In the old time every town had its altar, and a visit to the local sanctuary was the easy and obvious way of consecrating every important act of life. No such interweaving of sacrificial service with everyday religion was possible under the new law, nor was anything of the kind attempted. The worship of the second temple was an antiquarian resuscitation of forms which had lost their intimate connection with the national life, and therefore had lost the greater part of their original significance. The Book of Leviticus, with all its fulness of ritual detail, does not furnish any clear idea of the place which each kind of altar service held in the old religion, when all worship took the form of sacrifice. And in some particulars there is reason to believe that the desire to avoid all heathenism, the necessity for giving expression to new religious ideas, and the growing tendency to keep the people as far as possible from the altar and make sacrifice the business of a priestly caste, had introduced into the ritual features unknown to more ancient practice.

The three main types of sacrifice recognised by the Levitical law are the whole burnt-offering (*ʿōla*), the sacrifice followed by a meal of which the flesh of the victim formed the staple (*shélem*, *zébaḥ*), and the sin-offering (*ḥaṭṭāth*), with an obscure variety of the last named called *asham* (A.V. "trespass-offering"). Of these *ʿōla* and *zébaḥ* are frequently mentioned in the older literature, and they

are often spoken of together, as if all animal sacrifices fell under one or the other head. The use of sacrifice as an atonement for sin is also recognised in the old literature, especially in the case of the burnt-offering, but there is little or no trace of a special kind of offering appropriated for this purpose before the time of Ezekiel.[1] The formal distinctions with regard to Hebrew sacrifices that can be clearly made out from the pre-exilic literature are—

(1) The distinction between animal and vegetable oblations, *zébaḥ* and *minḥa*).

(2) The distinction between offerings that were consumed by fire and such as were merely set forth on the sacred table (the shewbread).

(3) The distinction between sacrifices in which the consecrated gift is wholly made over to the god, to be consumed on the altar or otherwise disposed of in his service, and those at which the god and his worshippers partake together in the consecrated thing. To the latter class belong the *zebaḥīm*, or ordinary animal sacrifices, in which a victim is slain, its blood poured out at the altar, and the fat of the intestines with certain other pieces burned, while the greater part of the flesh is left to the offerer to form the material of a sacrificial banquet.

These three distinctions, which are undoubtedly ancient, and applicable to the sacrifices of other Semitic nations, suggest three heads under which a preliminary survey of the subject may be conveniently arranged. But not till we reach the third head shall we find ourselves brought face to face with the deeper aspects of the problem of the origin and significance of sacrificial worship.

[1] See Wellhausen, *Prolegomena*, chap. ii. The Hebrew designations of the species of sacrifices are to be compared with those on the Carthaginian tables of fees paid to priests for the various kinds of offerings, *CIS.* Nos. 165, 164 *sqq.*, but the information given in these is so fragmentary that it is difficult to make much of it. See below, p. 237 n.

1. *The material of sacrifice.* The division of sacrifices into animal and vegetable offerings involves the principle that sacrifices—as distinct from votive offerings of garments, weapons, treasure and the like—are drawn from edible substances, and indeed from such substances as form the ordinary staple of human food. The last statement is strictly true of the Levitical ritual; but, so far as the flesh of animals is concerned, it was subject, even in the later heathen rituals, to certain rare but important exceptions, unclean or sacred animals, whose flesh was ordinarily forbidden to men, being offered and eaten sacramentally on very solemn occasions. We shall see by and by that in the earliest times these extraordinary sacrifices had a very great importance in ritual, and that on them depends the theory of the oldest sacrificial meals; but, as regards later times, the Hebrew sacrifices are sufficiently typical of the ordinary usage of the Semites generally. The four-footed animals from which the Levitical law allows victims to be selected are the ox the sheep and the goat, that is, the "clean" domestic quadrupeds which men were allowed to eat. The same quadrupeds are named upon the Carthaginian inscriptions that give the tariff of sacrificial fees to be paid at the temple,[1] and in Lucian's account of the Syrian ritual at Hierapolis.[2] The Israelites neither ate nor sacrificed camels, but among the Arabs the camel was ★ common food and a common offering. The swine, on the other hand, which was commonly sacrificed and eaten in Greece, was forbidden food to all the Semites,[3] and occurs as a sacrifice only in certain exceptional rites of the kind already alluded to. Deer, gazelles and other kinds of game were eaten by the Hebrews, but not sacrificed, and from Deut. xii. 16 we may conclude that this was an

[1] *CIS.* Nos. 165, 167. [2] *Dea Syria*, liv.
[3] Lucian, *ut sup.* (Syrians); Sozomen, vi. 38 (all Saracens).

ancient rule. Among the Arabs, in like manner, a gazelle was regarded as an imperfect oblation, a shabby substitute for a sheep.[1] As regards birds, the Levitical law admits pigeons and turtle-doves, but only as holocausts and in certain purificatory ceremonies.[2] Birds seem also to be mentioned in the Carthaginian sacrificial lists; what is said of them is very obscure, but it would appear that they might be used either for ordinary sacrifices (*shelem kalīl*) or for special purposes piacular and oracular. That the quail was sacrificed to the Tyrian Baal appears from Athenæus, ix. 47, p. 392*d*. See p. 469.

Fish were eaten by the Israelites, but not sacrificed; among their heathen neighbours, on the contrary, fish—or certain kinds of fish—were forbidden food, and were sacrificed only in exceptional cases.[3]

Among the Hebrew offerings from the vegetable kingdom, meal wine and oil take the chief place,[4] and these were also the chief vegetable constituents of man's daily food.[5]

[1] Wellh. p. 115; Hārith, *Mo'all.* 69; especially *Lisān*, vi. 211. The reason of this rule, and certain exceptions, will appear in the sequel.

[2] Lev. i. 14, xii. 6, 8, xiv. 22, xv. 14, 29; Num. vi. 10. Two birds, of which one is slain and its blood used for lustration, appear also in the ritual for cleansing a leper, or a house that has been affected with leprosy (Lev. xiv. 4 *sq.*, 49 *sq.*). Further, the turtle-dove and nestling (pigeon) appear in an ancient covenant ceremony (Gen. xv. 9 *sqq.*). The fact that the dove was not used by the Hebrews for any ordinary sacrifice, involving a sacrificial meal, can hardly be, in its origin, independent of the sacrosanct character ascribed to this bird in the religion of the heathen Semites. The Syrians would not eat doves, and their very touch made a man unclean for a day (*Dea Syria*, liv.). In Palestine also the dove was sacred with the Phœnicians and Philistines, and on this superstition is based the common Jewish accusation against the Samaritans, that they were worshippers of the dove (see for all this Bochart, *Hierozoicon*, II. i. 1). Nay, sacred doves that may not be harmed are found even at Mecca. In legal times the dove was of course a "clean" bird to the Hebrews, but it is somewhat remarkable that we never read of it in the Old Testament as an article of diet—not even in 1 Kings v. 2 *sqq.* (A.V. iv. 22 *sqq.*)—though it is now one of the commonest table-birds all over the East.

[3] See below, p. 292 *sq.* [4] Cf. Mic. vi. 7 with Lev. ii. 1 *sqq.*

[5] Ps. civ. 14 *sq.*

In the lands of the olive, oil takes the place that butter and other animal fats hold among northern nations, and accordingly among the Hebrews, and seemingly also among the Phœnicians,[1] it was customary to mingle oil with the cereal oblation before it was placed upon the altar, in conformity with the usage at ordinary meals. In like manner no cereal offering was complete without salt,[2] which, for physiological reasons, is a necessary of life to all who use a cereal diet, though among nations that live exclusively on flesh and milk it is not indispensable and is often dispensed with. Wine, which as Jotham's parable has it, "cheereth gods and men,"[3] was added to whole burnt-offerings and to the oblation of victims of whose flesh the worshippers partook.[4] The sacrificial use of wine, without which no feast was complete, seems to have ★ been well-nigh universal wherever the grape was known,[5] and even penetrated to Arabia, where wine was a scarce and costly luxury imported from abroad. Milk, on the other hand, though one of the commonest articles of food among the Israelites, has no place in Hebrew sacrifice, but libations of milk were offered by the Arabs, and also at Carthage.[6] Their absence among the Hebrews may perhaps be explained by the rule of Ex. xxiii. 18, Lev. ii. 11, which excludes all ferments from presentation at the altar; for in hot climates milk ferments rapidly and is generally eaten sour.[7] The same principle covers the

[1] In *CIS.* No. 165, l. 14, the בלל is to be interpreted by the aid of Lev. vii. 10, and understood of bread or meal moistened with oil.

[2] Lev. ii. 13. [3] Judg. ix. 13. [4] Num. xv. 5.

[5] For some exceptions see Aesch., *Eum.* 107; Soph., *Oed. Col.* 100, with Schol.; Paus. ii. 11. 4; v. 15. 10 (Greek libations to the Eumenides and to the Nymphs); and Athen. xv. 48 (libations to the sun at Emesa).

[6] Wellh. p. 114 *sq.*; *CIS.* No. 165, l. 14; No. 167, l. 10.

[7] The rule against offering fermented things on the altar was not observed in northern Israel in all forms of sacrifice (Amos iv. 5), and traces of greater freedom in this respect appear also in Lev. vii. 13, xxiii. 17. It seems strange that wine should be admitted in sacrifice and leaven excluded, for

prohibition of "honey,"[1] which term, like the modern Arabic *dibs*, appears to include fruit juice inspissated by boiling—a very important article of food in modern and presumably in ancient Palestine. Fruit in its natural state, however, was offered at Carthage,[2] and was probably admitted by the Hebrews in ancient times.[3] Among the

leaven is a product of vinous fermentation, and leavened bread equally with wine is to the nomad a foreign luxury (*al-khamr wal-khamīr*, *Agh.* xix. 25), so that both alike must have been wanting in the oldest type of Hebrew sacrifices. Thus the continued prohibition of leaven in sacrifice, after wine was admitted, can hardly be regarded as a mere piece of religious conservatism, but must have some further significance. It is possible that in its oldest form the legal prohibition of leaven applied only to the Passover, to which Ex. xxiii. 18, xxxiv. 25, specially refer. In this connection the prohibition of leaven is closely associated with the rule that the fat and flesh must not remain over till the morning. For we shall find by and by that a similar rule applied to certain Saracen sacrifices nearly akin to the Passover, which were even eaten raw, and had to be entirely consumed before the sun rose. In this case the idea was that the efficacy of the sacrifice lay in the living flesh and blood of the victim. Everything of the nature of putrefaction was therefore to be avoided, and the connection between leaven and putrefaction is obvious.

The only positive law against the sacrificial use of milk is that in Ex. xxiii. 19, xxxiv. 26: "Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk." ★ Mother's milk is simply goat's milk, which was that generally used (Prov. xxvii. 27), and flesh seethed in milk is still a common Arabian dish; sour milk is specified as the kind employed in *PEF. Qu. St.* 1888, p. 188. The context of the passages in Exodus shows that some ancient form of sacrifice is referred to; cf. Judg. vi. 19, where we have a holocaust of sodden flesh. A sacrificial gift sodden in sour milk would evidently be of the nature of fermented food; but I do not feel sure that this goes to the root of the matter. Many primitive peoples regard milk as a kind of equivalent for blood, and thus to eat a kid seethed in its mother's milk might be taken as equivalent to eating "with the blood," and be forbidden to the Hebrews along with the bloody sacraments of the heathen, of which more hereafter.

[1] Lev. ii. 11. [2] *CIS.* No. 166.

[3] The term *hillūlīm*, applied in Lev. xix. 24 to the consecrated fruit ★ borne by a new tree in its fourth year, is applied in Judg. ix. 27 to the Canaanite vintage feast at the sanctuary. The Carthaginian fruit-offering consisted of a branch bearing fruit, like the "ethrog" of the modern Jewish feast of Tabernacles. The use of "goodly fruits" at this festival is ordained in Lev. xxiii. 40, but their destination is not specified. In Carthage, though the inscription that speaks of the rite is fragmentary, it seems to be clear that the fruit was offered at the altar, for incense is mentioned with it; and this, no doubt, is the original sense of the Hebrew rite also.

Hebrews vegetable or cereal oblations were sometimes presented by themselves, especially in the form of first-fruits, but the commonest use of them was as an accompaniment to an animal sacrifice. When the Hebrew ate flesh, he ate bread with it and drank wine, and when he offered flesh on the table of his God, it was natural that he should add to it the same concomitants which were necessary to make up a comfortable and generous meal.

Of these various oblations animal sacrifices are by far the most important in all the Semitic countries. They are in fact the typical sacrifice, so that among the Phœnicians the word *zébaḥ*, which properly means a slaughtered victim, is applied even to offerings of bread and oil.[1] That cereal offerings have but a secondary place in ritual is not unintelligible in connection with the history of the Semitic race. For all the Semites were originally nomadic, and the ritual of the nomad Arabs and the settled Canaanites has so many points in common that there can be no question that the main lines of sacrificial worship were fixed before any part of the Semitic stock had learned agriculture and adopted cereal food as its ordinary diet. It must be observed, however, that animal food—or at least the flesh of domestic animals, which are the only class of victims admitted among the Semites as ordinary and regular sacrifices—was not a common article of diet even among the nomad Arabs. The everyday food of the nomad consisted of milk, of game, when he could get it, and to a limited extent of dates and meal—the latter for the most part being attainable only by purchase or robbery. Flesh

Cf. the raisin-cakes (A.V. "flagons of wine"), Hos. iii. 1, which from the context appear to be connected with the worship of the Baalim.

[1] *CIS.* No. 165, l. 12; 167, l. 9. In the context צד can hardly mean game, but must be taken, as in Josh. ix. 11 *sqq.*, of cereal food, the ordinary "provision" of agricultural peoples.

of domestic animals was eaten only as a luxury or in times of famine.[1] If therefore the sole principle that governed the choice of the material of sacrifices had been that they must consist of human food, milk and not flesh would have had the leading place in nomad ritual, whereas its real place is exceedingly subordinate. To remove this difficulty it may be urged that, as sacrifice is food offered to the gods, it ought naturally to be of the best and most luxurious kind that can be attained; but on this principle it is not easy to see why game should be excluded, for a gazelle is not worse food than an old camel.[2] The true solution of the matter lies in another direction. Among the Hebrews no sacrificial meal was provided for the worshippers unless a victim was sacrificed; if the oblation was purely cereal it was wholly consumed either on the altar or by the priests, in the holy place, *i.e.* by the representatives of the deity.[3] In like manner the only Arabian meal-offering about which we have particulars, that of the god Ocaisir,[4] was laid before the idol in handfuls. The poor, however, were allowed to partake of it, being viewed no doubt as the guests of the deity.

[1] See the old narratives, *passim*, and compare Doughty, i. 325 *sq.* The statement of Fränkel, *Fremdwörter*, p. 31, that the Arabs lived mainly on flesh, overlooks the importance of milk as an article of diet among all the pastoral tribes, and must also be taken with the qualification that the flesh used as ordinary food was that of wild beasts taken in hunting. On this point the evidence is clear; Pliny, *H. N.* vi. 161, "nomadas lacte et ferina carne uesci"; Agatharchides, *ap.* Diod. Sic. iii. 44. 2; Ammianus, xiv. 4, 6, "uictus uniuersis caro ferina est lactisque abundans copia qua sustentantur"; Nilus, p. 27. By these express statements we must interpret the vaguer utterances of Diodorus (xix. 94. 9) and Agatharchides (*ap.* Diod. iii. 43. 5) about the ancient diet of the Nabatæans: the "nourishment supplied by their herds" was mainly milk. Certain Arab tribes, like the modern Sleyb, had no herds and lived wholly by hunting, and these perhaps are referred to in what Agatharchides says of the Banizomenes, and in the Syriac life of Simeon Stylites (Assemani, *Mart.* ii. 345), where, at any rate, *besrā d'ḥaiwāthā* means game.

[2] Cf. Gen. xxvii. 7.

[3] Lev. ii. 3, v. 11, vi. 16 (E.V. 22).

[4] Yācūt, *s.v.*; Wellh. p. 62 *sqq.*

The cereal offering therefore has strictly the character of a tribute paid by the worshipper to his god, as indeed is expressed by the name *minḥa*, whereas when an animal is sacrificed, the sacrificer and the deity feast together, part of the victim going to each. The predominance assigned in ancient ritual to animal sacrifice corresponds to the predominance of the type of sacrifice which is not a mere payment of tribute but an act of social fellowship between the deity and his worshippers. Why this social meal always includes the flesh of a victim will be considered in a subsequent lecture.

All sacrifices laid upon the altar were taken by the ancients as being literally the food of the gods. The Homeric deities "feast on hecatombs,"[1] nay, particular Greek gods have special epithets designating them as the goat-eater, the ram-eater, the bull-eater, even "the cannibal," with allusion to human sacrifices.[2] Among the Hebrews the conception that Jehovah eats the flesh of bulls and drinks the blood of goats, against which the author of Ps. l. protests so strongly, was never eliminated from the ancient technical language of the priestly ritual, in which the sacrifices are called לחם אלהים, "the food of the deity." In its origin this phrase must belong to the same circle of ideas as Jotham's "wine which cheereth gods and men." But in the higher forms of heathenism the crass materialism of this conception was modified, in the case of fire-offerings, by the doctrine that man's food must be etherealised or sublimated into fragrant smoke before the gods partake of it. This observation brings us to the second of the points which we have noted in connection with Hebrew sacrifice, viz. the distinction between sacrifices that are merely set forth on the sacred table before the deity, and such as are consumed by fire upon the altar.

[1] *Iliad*, ix. 531. [2] αἰγοφάγος, κριοφάγος, ταυροφάγος, Διόνυσος ὠμηστής.

2. The table of shewbread has its closest parallel in the *lectisternia* of ancient heathenism, when a table laden with meats was spread beside the idol. Such tables were set in the great temple of Bel at Babylon,[1] and, if any weight is to be given to the apocryphal story of Bel and the Dragon in the Greek Book of Daniel, it was popularly believed that the god actually consumed the meal provided for him,[2] a superstition that might easily hold its ground by priestly connivance where the table was spread inside a temple. A more primitive form of the same kind of offering appears in Arabia, where the meal-offering to Ocaiṣir is cast by handfuls at the foot of the idol mingled with the hair of the worshipper,[3] and milk is poured over the sacred stones. A narrative of somewhat apocryphal colour, given without reference to his authority by Sprenger,[4] has it that in the worship of ʿAmm-anas in Southern Arabia, whole hecatombs were slaughtered and left to be devoured by wild beasts. Apart from the exaggeration, there may be something in this; for the idea that sacred animals are the guests or clients of the god is not alien to Arabian thought,[5] and to feed them is an act of religion

[1] Herod. i. 181, 183; Diod. Sic. ii. 9. 7.

[2] The story, so far as it has a basis in actual superstition, is probably drawn from Egyptian beliefs; but in such matters Egypt and Babylon were much alike; Herod. i. 182.

[3] The same thing probably applies to other Arabian meal-offerings, *e.g.* the wheat and barley offered to Al-Kholaṣa (Azrāqī, p. 78). As the dove was the sacred bird at Mecca, the epithet *Moṭʿim al-ṭair*, "he who feeds the ★ birds," applied to the idol that stood upon Marwa (*ibid.*), seems to point to similar meal-offerings rather than to animal victims left lying before the god. The "idol" made of *ḥais*, *i.e.* a mass of dates kneaded up with butter and sour milk, which the B. Ḥanīfa ate up in time of famine (see the *Lexx. s.v.* تباعة; Ibn Coteiba, ed. Wüst. p. 299; Bīrūnī, *Chron.* p. 210), probably belonged to the widespread class of cereal offerings, shaped as rude idols and eaten sacramentally (Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, p. 436; *ZDMG.* xxx. 539).

[4] *Leb. Moh.* iii. 457.

[5] See above, p. 142 *sqq.*, and the god-name Motʿim al-ṭair in the last

in many heathen systems, especially where, as in Egypt,[1] ★ the gods themselves are totem-deities, *i.e.* personifications or individual representations of the sacred character and attributes which, in the purely totem stage of religion, were ascribed without distinction to all animals of the holy kind. Thus at Cynopolis in Egypt, where dogs were honoured and fed with sacred food, the local deity was the divine dog Anubis, and similarly in Greece, at the sanctuary of the Wolf Apollo (Apollo Lycius) of Sicyon, an old tradition preserved—though in a distorted form—the memory of a time when flesh used to be set forth for the wolves.[2] It is by no means impossible that something of the same sort took place at certain Arabian shrines, for we have already learned how closely the gods were related to the *jinn* and the *jinn* to wild animals, and the list of Arabian deities includes a Lion-god (Yaghūth) and a Vulture-god (Nasr),[3] to whose worship rites like those described by Sprenger would be altogether appropriate.

But while it cannot be thought impossible that sacrificial victims were presented on holy ground and left to be devoured by wild beasts as the guests or congeners of the gods, I confess that there seems to me to be no sufficient evidence that such a practice had any considerable place in Arabian ritual. The leading idea in the animal sacrifices of the Semites, as we shall see by and by, was not that of a gift made over to the god, but of an act of communion,

note but one; also Hamdānī's account of the offerings at Sāwid, *supra*, p. 177.

[1] Strabo, xvii. 1. 39 *sq.* (p. 812).

[2] Pausanias, ii. 9. 7. The later rationalism which changed the Wolf-god into a Wolf-slayer gave the story a corresponding twist by relating that the flesh was poisoned, under the god's directions, with the leaves of a tree whose trunk was preserved in the temple, like the sacred erica at Byblus.

[3] See *Kinship*, pp. 223, 242; Nöldeke, *ZDMG.* 1886, p. 186. See also, ★ for the Himyarite Vulture-god, *ZDMG.* xxix. 600, and compare the eagle standard of Morra, Nābigha, iv. 7, Ahlw. = xxi. 7, Der.

in which the god and his worshippers unite by partaking together of the flesh and blood of a sacred victim. It is true that in the case of certain very solemn sacrifices, especially of *piacula*, to which class the sacrifices cited by Sprenger appear to belong, the victim sometimes came to be regarded as so sacred that the worshippers did not venture to eat of it at all, but that the flesh was burned or buried or otherwise disposed of in a way that secured it from profanation; and among the Arabs, who did not use burning except in the case of human sacrifices, we can quite well understand that one way of disposing of holy flesh might be to leave it to be eaten by the sacred animals of the god. Or again, when a sacrifice is expressly offered as a ransom, as in the case of the hundred camels with which ʿAbd-al-Moṭṭalib redeemed his vow to sacrifice his son, it is intelligible that the offerer reserves no part of the flesh, but leaves it to anyone who chooses to help himself; or even (according to another reading) leaves it free to man and beast.[1] On the whole, however, all the well-authenticated accounts of Arabian sacrifice seem to indicate that the original principle, that the worshippers must actually eat of the sacred flesh, was very rigorously held to.[2] Wellhausen indeed is disposed to think that the practice of slaughtering animals and leaving them beside the altar to be devoured by wild beasts was not confined to certain exceptional cults, but prevailed generally in the case of the *ʿatāïr* (sing. *ʿatīra*) or annual sacrifices presented by the Arabs in the month Rajab, which originally corresponded to the Hebrew Passover-month (Abib, Nisan).[3]

[1] Ibn Hish. p. 100, l. 7; Ṭabarī, i. 1078, l. 4. (Wellh. 116.)

[2] The evidence of Nilus is very important in this connection; for the interval between his time and that of the oldest native traditions is scarcely sufficient to allow for the development of an extensive system of sacrifice without a sacrificial meal; *infra*, p. 338.

[3] Cf. Wellh.[1] p. 94 *sq.*, [2] 98 *sq.* To complete the parallelism of the Passover

"It is remarkable," says Wellhausen, "how often we hear of the *'atāïr* lying round the altar-idol, and sometimes in poetical comparisons the slain are said to be left lying on the battlefield like *'atāïr*."[1] But on the Arabian method of sacrifice the carcases of the victims naturally lie on the ground, beside the sacred stone, till the blood, which is the god's portion, has drained into the *ghabghab*, or pit, at its foot, and till all the other ritual prescriptions have been fulfilled. Thus at a great feast when many victims were offered together, the scene would resemble a battle-field; indeed, it is impossible to imagine a more disgusting scene of carnage than is still presented every year at Minā on the great day of sacrifice, when the ground is literally covered with innumerable carcases. It is not therefore necessary to suppose that the *'atāïr* at Rajab were left to the hyæna and the vulture; and, as the name *atīra* seems to be also used in a more general sense of any victim whose blood is applied to the sacred stones at the sanctuary, it is hardly to be thought that there was anything very exceptional in the form of the Rajab ceremony.

In the higher forms of Semitic heathenism offerings of the shewbread type are not very conspicuous; in truth the idea that the gods actually consume the solid food deposited

with the Rajab offerings, Wellhausen desiderates evidence connecting the *'atāïr* of Rajab with the sacrifice of firstlings. The traditionists, *e.g.* Bokhārī, vi. 207 (at the close of the *Kit. al-'acīca*), distinguish between firstlings (*fara'*) and *'atīra*, but the line of distinction is not sharp. The lexicons apply the name *fara'*, not only to firstlings sacrificed while their flesh was still like glue (*Lisān*, x. 120), but also to the sacrifice of one beast ★ in a hundred, which is what the scholiast on Ḥarith's *Moall.* 69 understands by the *'atīra*. Conversely the *Lisān*, vi. 210, defines the *'atīra* as a first-ling (*awwal mā yuntaj*) which was sacrificed to the gods. If we could accept this statement without reserve, in the general confusion of the later Arabs on the subject, it would supply what Wellhausen desiderates.

[1] Wellh.[1] p. 115, cf. [2] 121; cf. the verses cited *ibid.* pp. 18, 61; and, for the poetical comparisons, Ibn Hishām, 534. 4; Alcama, vi. 3, Soc.

at their shrines is too crude to subsist without modification beyond the savage state of society; the ritual may survive, but the sacrificial gifts, which the god is evidently unable to dispose of himself, will come to be the perquisite of the priests, as in the case of the shewbread, or of the poor, as in the meal sacrifice to Ocaiṣir. In such cases the actual eating is done by the guests of the deity, but the god himself may still be supposed to partake of food in a subtle and supersensuous way. It is interesting to note the gradations of ritual that correspond to this modification of the original idea.

In the more primitive forms of Semitic religion the difficulty of conceiving that the gods actually partake of food is partly got over by a predominant use of liquid oblations; for fluid substances, which sink in and disappear, are more easily believed to be consumed by the deity than obstinate masses of solid matter.

The libation, which holds quite a secondary place in the more advanced Semitic rituals, and is generally a mere accessory to a fire offering, has great prominence among the Arabs, to whom sacrifices by fire were practically unknown except, as we shall see by and by, in the case of human sacrifice. Its typical form is the libation of blood, the subtle vehicle of the life of the sacrifice; but milk, which was used in ritual both by the Arabs and by the Phœnicians, is also no doubt a very ancient Semitic libation. In ordinary Arabian sacrifices the blood which was poured over the sacred stone was all that fell to the god's part, the whole flesh being consumed by the worshippers and their guests; and the early prevalence of this kind of oblation appears from the fact that the word נסך, "to pour," which in Hebrew means to pour out a drink-offering, is in Arabic the general term for an act of worship.

In the North Semitic ritual the most notable feature in

the libation, which ordinarily consisted of wine, is that it was not consumed by fire, even when it went with a fire-offering. The Greeks and Romans poured the sacrificial wine over the flesh, but the Hebrews treated it like the blood, pouring it out at the base of the altar.[1] In Ecclesiasticus the wine so treated is even called "the blood of the grape,"[2] from which one is tempted to conclude that here also blood is the typical form of libation, and that wine is a surrogate for it, as fruit-juice seems to have been in certain Arabian rites.[3] It is true that the blood of the sacrifice is not called a libation in Hebrew ritual, and in Ps. xvi. 4 "drink-offerings of blood" are spoken of as something heathenish. But this proves that such libations were known; and that the Hebrew altar ritual of the blood is essentially a drink-offering appears from Ps. l. 13, where Jehovah asks, "Will I eat the flesh of bulls or drink the blood of goats?" and also from 2 Sam. xxiii. 17, where David pours out as a drink-offering the water from the well of Bethlehem, refusing to drink "the blood of the men that fetched it in jeopardy of their lives." Putting all this together, and noting also that libations were retained as a chief part of ritual in the domestic heathenism of the Hebrew women in the time of Jeremiah,[4] and that private service is often more conservative than

[1] Ecclus. l. 15; Jos. *Antt.* iii. 9. 4. Num. xv. 7 is sometimes cited as proving that in older times the wine was poured over the sacrificial flesh, but see against this interpretation Num. xxviii. 7.

★ [2] The term αἷμα βοτρύων occurs in the Tyrian legend of the invention of wine, Ach. Tatius, ii. 2, and may possibly be the translation of an old Phœnician phrase.

[3] *Kinship*, p. 59 n.; Wellh. p. 125.

[4] Jer. xix. 13, xxxii. 29, xliv. 17, 18. With this worship on the house-tops, cf. what Strabo, xvi. 4. 26, tells of the daily offerings of libations and incense presented to the sun by the Nabatæans at an altar erected on the house-tops. The sacrificial act must be done in the presence of the deity ★ (cf. Nilus, pp. 30, 117), and if the sun or the queen of heaven is worshipped, a place open to the sky must be chosen. See Wellh. 41.

public worship, we are led to conclude (1) that the libation of blood is a common Semitic practice, older than fire-sacrifices, and (2) that the libation of wine is in some sense an imitation of, and a surrogate for, the primitive blood-offering.

Whether libations of water can properly be reckoned among the drink-offerings of the Semites is very doubtful. David's libation is plainly exceptional, and in the Levitical ritual offerings of water have no place. In the actual practice of later Judaism, however, water drawn from the fountain of Siloam, and carried into the Temple amidst the blare of trumpets, was solemnly poured out upon the altar on seven days of the Feast of Tabernacles.[1] According to the Rabbins, the object of this ceremony was to secure fertilising rains in the following year. The explanation is doubtless correct, for it is a common belief all over the world that pouring out water is a potent rain-charm.[2] ★ This being so, we can well understand that the rite derives no countenance from the law; in truth it does not belong to the sphere of religion at all, but falls under the category of sympathetic magic in which natural phenomena are thought to be produced by imitating them on a small scale. In some forms of this charm thunder is imitated as well as rain;[3] and perhaps the trumpet-blowing at the Temple is to be explained in this way.

The closest parallel to the water-pouring of the Feast

[1] See *Succa*, iv. 9; Lightfoot on John vii. 37; Reland, *Ant. Heb.* p. 448 *sq.*, with the refs. there given. The water was poured into a special channel in the altar.

[2] Numerous examples are given by Frazer, *Golden Bough*, i. 248 *sqq.*, to which I may add the annual "water-pouring" at Ispahan (Bīrūnī, *Chron.* p. 228 *sqq.*; Cazwīnī, i. 84).

[3] Frazer, i. 303: a very curious Arabian rain-charm, where cattle (or perhaps antelopes) are driven into the mountains with firebrands attached to their tails, seems to be an imitation of lightning. See Wellhausen, p. 167; *Lisān*, v. 140; Rāghib, i. 94.

of Tabernacles is found in the rite of Hierapolis, described by Lucian.[1] Twice a year a great concourse of worshippers assembled at the Temple bearing water from "the sea" (*i.e.* the Euphrates[2]), which was poured out in the Temple and flowed away into a cleft which, according to tradition, absorbed the waters of Deucalion's flood, and so gave occasion to the erection of a sanctuary, with commemorative services on the spot.[3]

★ In Hebrew ritual oil is not a libation, but when used in sacrifice serves to moisten and enrich a cereal offering. The ancient custom of pouring oil on sacred stones[4] was presumably maintained at Bethel according to the precedent set by Jacob; and even in the fourth Christian century the Bordeaux pilgrim speaks of the "lapis pertusus" at Jerusalem "ad quem ueniunt Iudæi singulis annis et ungunt eum"; but, as oil by itself was not an article of food, the natural analogy to this act of ritual is to be sought in the application of unguents to the hair and skin. The use of unguents was a luxury proper to feasts and gala days, when men wore their best clothes and made merry; and from Ps. xlv. 8 (E.V. 7) compared with Isa. lxi. 3, we may con-

[1] *Dea Syria*, § 13, cf. § 48. The same rite is alluded to by Melito in Cureton, *Spic. Syr.* p. 25.

[2] To the dwellers in Mesopotamia the Euphrates was "the sea"; Philostratus, *Vita Apollonii*, i. 20.

[3] The ritual of pouring water into the cleft has its parallel in the modern practice at the fountain of water before the gates of Tyre, when in September the water becomes red and troubled, and the natives gather for a great feast and restore its limpidity by pouring a pitcher of sea-water into the source (Volney, *État pol. de la Syrie*, chap. viii.; Mariti, ii. 269). Here the ceremony takes place at the end of the dry season when the water is low, and may therefore be compared with the legend that Mohammed made the empty well of Hodaibiya to overflow by causing it to be stirred with one of his arrows after a pitcher of water had been poured into it (*Moh. in Med.* p. 247). As a rule the pouring out of water in early superstition is, as we have already seen, a rain-charm, and possibly the rite of Hierapolis was really designed to procure rain, but only in due measure.

[4] Gen. xxviii. 18, xxxv. 14.

clude that the anointing of kings at their coronation is part of the ceremony of investing them in the festal dress and ornaments appropriate to their dignity on that joyous day (cf. Cant. iii. 11). To anoint the head of a guest was a hospitable act and a sign of honour; it was the completion of the toilet appropriate to a feast. Thus the sacred stone or rude idol described by Pausanias (x. 24. 6) had oil poured on it daily, and was crowned with wool at every feast. We have seen that the Semites on festal occasions dressed up their sacred poles, and they did the same with their idols.[1] With all this the ritual of anointing goes quite naturally; thus at Medīna in the last days of heathenism we find a man washing his domestic idol, which had been defiled by Moslems, and then anointing it.[2] But apart from this, the very act of applying ointment to the sacred symbol had a religious significance. The Hebrew word meaning to anoint (*mashaḥ*) means properly to wipe or stroke with the hand, which was used to spread the unguent over the skin. Thus the anointing of the sacred symbol is associated with the simpler form of homage common in Arabia, in which the hand was passed over the idol (*tamassoḥ*). In the oath described by Ibn Hishām, p. 85, the parties dip their hands in unguent and then wipe them on the Caaba. The ultimate source of the use of unguents in religion will be discussed by and by in connection with animal sacrifice.

The sacrificial use of blood, as we shall see hereafter, is connected with a series of very important ritual ideas, turning on the conception that the blood is a special seat of the life. But primarily, when the blood is offered at the altar, it is conceived to be drunk by the deity. Apart from Ps. l. 13 the direct evidence for this is somewhat scanty, so far as the Semites are concerned; the authority usually

[1] Ezek. xvi. 18. [2] Ibn Hishām, p. 303.

appealed to is Maimonides, who states that the Ṣabians looked on blood as the nourishment of the gods. So late a witness would have little value if he stood alone, but the expression in the Psalm cannot be mere rhetoric, and the same belief appears among early nations in all parts of the globe.[1] Nor does this oblation form an exception to the rule that the offerings of the gods consist of human food, for many savages drink fresh blood by way of nourishment, and esteem it a special delicacy.[2]

Among the Arabs, down to the age of Mohammed, blood drawn from the veins of a living camel was eaten—in a kind of blood pudding—in seasons of hunger, and perhaps also at other times.[3] We shall find, however, as we proceed, that sacrificial blood, which contained the life, gradually came to be considered as something too sacred to be eaten, and that in most sacrifices it was entirely made over to the god at the altar. As all slaughter of domestic animals for food was originally sacrificial among the Arabs as well as among the Hebrews, this carried with it the disuse of blood as an article of ordinary food; and

[1] See Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[4], ii. 381 *sq.* The story told by Yācūt, ii. 882, of the demon at the temple of Riām to whom bowls of sacrificial blood were presented, of which he partook, seems to have a Jewish origin. According to one version this demon had the form of a black dog (cf. Ibn Hish. p. 18, l. 3).

[2] See, for America, Bancroft, *Native Races*, i. 55, 492, ii. 344. In Africa fresh blood is held as a dainty by all the negroes of the White Nile (Marno, *Reise*, p. 79); it is largely drunk by Masai warriors (Thomson, p. 430); and also by the Gallas, as various travellers attest. Among the Hottentots the pure blood of beasts is forbidden to women but not to men; Kolben, *State of the Cape*, i. 205, cf. 203. In the last case we see that the blood is sacred food. For blood-drinking among the Tartars, see Yule's *Marco Polo*, i. 254, and the editor's note. Where mineral salt is not used for food, the drinking of blood supplies, as Thomson remarks, an important constituent to the system.

[3] Maidānī, ii. 119; *Ḥamāsa*, p. 645, last verse. From *Agh.* xvi. 107. 20, one is led to doubt whether the practice was confined to seasons of famine, or whether this kind of food was used more regularly, as was done, on the other side of the Red Sea, by the Troglodytes (Agatharchides in *Fr. Geog. Gr.* i. 153). See further the *Lexx. s.vv. faṣada, 'ilhiz, bajja, musawwad.*

even when slaughter ceased to involve a formal sacrifice, it was still thought necessary to slay the victim in the name of a god and pour the blood on the ground.[1] Among the Hebrews this practice soon gave rise to an absolute prohibition of blood-eating; among the Arabs the rule was made absolute only by Mohammed's legislation.[2]

The idea that the gods partake only of the liquid parts of the sacrifice appears, as has been already said, to indicate a modification of the most crassly materialistic conception of the divine nature. The direction which this modification took may, I think, be judged of by comparing the sacrifices of the gods with the oblations offered to the dead. In the famous *νέκυια* of the *Odyssey*[3] the ghosts drink greedily of the sacrificial blood, and libations of gore form a special feature in Greek offerings to heroes. Among the Arabs, too, the dead are thirsty rather than hungry; water and wine are poured upon their graves.[4] Thirst is a subtler appetite than hunger, and therefore more appropriate to the disembodied shades, just as it is from thirst rather than from hunger that the Hebrews and many other nations borrow metaphors for spiritual longings and intellectual desires. Thus the idea that the gods drink, but do not eat, seems to mark the feeling that they must be thought of as having a less solid material nature than men.

[1] Wellh.[1] 113 *sq.*, [2] 117. In an Arab encampment slaves sleep beside "the blood and the dung" (*Agh.* viii. 74. 29); cf. 1 Sam. ii. 8.

[2] Whether the blood of game was prohibited to the Hebrews before the law of Lev. xvii. 13 is not quite clear; Deut. xii. 16 is ambiguous. In Islām as in Judaism the prohibition of blood-eating and the rule that carrion must not be eaten go together (Lev. xvii. 15; Ibn Hish. p. 206, l. 7).

[3] Bk. xi.; cf. Pindar, *Ol.* i. 90, where the word *αἱμακουρίαι* is explained by Hesychius as *τὰ ἐναγίσματα τῶν κατοιχομένων*; Pausan. v. 13, § 2; Plut., *Aristides*, 21.

[4] Wellhausen, p. 182.

A farther step in the same direction is associated with the introduction of fire sacrifices; for, though there are valid reasons for thinking that the practice of burning the flesh or fat of victims originated in a different line of thought (as we shall by and by see), the fire ritual readily lent itself to the idea that the burnt flesh is simply a food-offering etherealised into fragrant smoke, and that the gods regale themselves on the odour instead of the substance of the sacrifice. Here again the ānalogy of gifts to the dead helps us to comprehend the point of view; among the Greeks of the seventh century B.C. it was, as we learn from the story of Periander and Melissa, a new idea that the dead could make no use of the gifts buried with them, unless they were etherealised by fire.[1] A similar notion seems to have attached itself to the custom of sacrifice by fire, combined probably at an early date with the idea that the gods, as ethereal beings, lived in the upper air, towards which the sacrificial smoke ascended in savoury clouds. Thus the prevalence among the settled Semites of fire sacrifices, which were interpreted as offerings of fragrant smoke, marks the firm establishment of a conception of the divine nature which, though not purely spiritual, is at least stripped of the crassest aspects of materialism.

3. The distinction between sacrifices which are wholly made over to the god and sacrifices of which the god and the worshipper partake together requires careful handling. In the later form of Hebrew ritual laid down in the Levitical law, the distinction is clearly marked. To the former class belong all cereal oblations (Heb. *minḥa*; A.V. "offering" or "meat-offering"), which so far as they are not burned on the altar are assigned to the priests, and among

[1] Herodotus, v. 92; cf. Joannes Lydus, *Mens.* iii. 27, where the object of burning the dead is said to be to etherealise the body along with the soul.

animal sacrifices the sin-offering and the burnt-offering or holocaust. Most sin-offerings were not holocausts, but the part of the flesh that was not burned fell to the priests. To the latter class, again, belong the *zebaḥīm* or *shelamīm* (sing. *zébaḥ*, *shélem*, Amos v. 22), that is, all the ordinary festal sacrifices, vows and freewill offerings, of which the share of the deity was the blood and the fat of the intestines, the rest of the carcase (subject to the payment of certain dues to the officiating priest) being left to the worshipper to form a social feast.[1] In judging of the original scope and meaning of these two classes of sacrifice, it will be convenient, in the first instance, to confine our attention to the simplest and most common forms of offering. In the last days of the kingdom of Judah, and still more after the Exile, piacular sacrifices and holocausts acquired a prominence which they did not possess in ancient times. The old history knows nothing of the Levitical sin-offering; the atoning function of sacrifice is not confined to a particular class of oblation, but belongs to

[1] In the English Bible *zebaḥīm* is rendered "sacrifices," and *shelamīm* "peace-offerings." The latter rendering is not plausible, and the term *shelamīm* can hardly be separated from the verb *shillem*, to pay or discharge, *e.g.* a vow. *Zébaḥ* is the more general word, including (like the Arabic *dhibḥ*) all animals slain for food, agreeably with the fact that in old times all slaughter was sacrificial. In later times, when slaughter and sacrifice were no longer identical, *zébaḥ* was not precise enough to be used as a technical term of ritual, and so the term *shelamīm* came to be more largely used than in the earlier literature.

On the sacrificial lists of the Carthaginians the terms corresponding to עלה and זבח seem to be כלל and צועת. The former is the old Hebrew כליל (Deut. xxxiii. 10; 1 Sam. vii. 9), the latter is etymologically quite obscure. In the Carthaginian burnt-sacrifice a certain weight of the flesh was apparently not consumed on the altar, but given to the priests (*CIS.* 165), as in the case of the Hebrew sin-offering, which was probably a modification of the holocaust. The שלם כלל, which appears along with כלל and צועת in *CIS.* 165 (but not in *CIS.* 167), is hardly a third co-ordinate species of sacrifice. The editors of the *Corpus* regard it as a variety of the holocaust (*hol. eucharisticum*), which is not easily reconciled with their own restitution of l. 11 or with the Hebrew sense of שלם. Perhaps it is an ordinary sacrifice accompanying a holocaust.

all sacrifices.[1] The holocaust, again, although ancient, is not in ancient times a common form of sacrifice, and unless on very exceptional occasions occurs only in great public feasts and in association with *zebaḥīm*. The distressful times that preceded the end of Hebrew independence drove men to seek exceptional religious means to conciliate the favour of a deity who seemed to have turned his back on his people. Piacular rites and costly holocausts became, therefore, more usual, and after the abolition of the local high places this new importance was still further accentuated by contrast with the decline of the more common forms of sacrifice. When each local community had its own high place, it was the rule that every animal slain for food should be presented at the altar, and every meal at which flesh was served had the character of a sacrificial feast.[2] As men ordinarily lived on bread fruit and milk, and ate flesh only on feast days and holidays, this rule was easily observed as long as the local sanctuaries stood. But when there was no altar left except at Jerusalem, the identity of slaughter and sacrifice could no longer be maintained, and accordingly the law of Deuteronomy allows men to slay and eat domestic animals everywhere, provided only that the blood—the ancient share of the god—is poured out upon the ground.[3] When this new rule came into force men ceased to feel that the eating of flesh was essentially a sacred act, and though strictly religious meals were still maintained at Jerusalem on the great feast days, the sacrificial meal necessarily lost much of its old signifi-

[1] To *zébaḥ* and *minḥa*, 1 Sam. iii. 14, xxvi. 19, and still more to the holocaust, Mic. vi. 6, 7.

[2] Hos. ix. 4.

[3] Deut. xii. 15, 16; cf. Lev. xvii. 10 *sq*. The fat of the intestines was also from ancient times reserved for the deity (1 Sam. ii. 16), and therefore it also was forbidden food (Lev. iii. 17). The prohibition did not extend to the fat distributed through other parts of the body.

cance, and the holocaust seemed to have a more purely sacred character than the *zébaḥ*, in which men ate and drank just as they might do at home.

But in ancient times the preponderance was all the other way, and the *zébaḥ* was not only much more frequent than the holocaust, but much more intimately bound up with the prevailing religious ideas and feelings of the Hebrews. On this point the evidence of the older literature is decisive; *zébaḥ* and *minḥa*, sacrifices slain to provide a religious feast, and vegetable oblations presented at the altar, make up the sum of the ordinary religious practices of the older Hebrews, and we must try to understand these ordinary rites before we attack the harder problem of exceptional forms of sacrifice.

Now, if we put aside the *piacula* and whole burnt-offerings, it appears that, according to the Levitical ritual, the distinction between oblations in which the worshipper shared, and oblations which were wholly given over to the deity to be consumed on the altar or by the priests, corresponds to the distinction between animal and vegetable offerings. The animal victim was presented at the altar and devoted by the imposition of hands, but the greater part of the flesh was returned to the worshipper, to be eaten by him under special rules. It could be eaten only by persons ceremonially clean, *i.e.* fit to approach the deity; and if the food was not consumed on the same day, or in certain cases within two days, the remainder had to be burned.[1] The plain meaning of these rules is that the flesh is not common but holy,[2] and that the act of eating it is a part of the service, which is to be completed before men break up from the sanctuary.[3] The *zébaḥ*, therefore, is

[1] Lev. vii. 15 *sqq.*, xix. 6, xxii. 30.

[2] Hag. ii. 12; cf. Jer. xi. 15, LXX.

[3] The old sacrificial feasts occupy but a single day (1 Sam. ix.), or at most two days (1 Sam. xx. 27).

not a mere attenuated offering, in which man grudges to give up the whole victim to his God. On the contrary, the central significance of the rite lies in the act of communion between God and man, when the worshipper is admitted to eat of the same holy flesh of which a part is laid upon the altar as "the food of the deity." But with the *minḥa* nothing of this kind occurs; the whole consecrated offering is retained by the deity, and the worshipper's part in the service is completed as soon as he has made over his gift. In short, while the *zébaḥ* turns on an act of communion between the deity and his worshippers, the *minḥa* (as its name denotes) is simply a tribute.

I will not undertake to say that the distinction so clearly laid down in the Levitical law was observed before the Exile in all cases of cereal sacrifices. Probably it was not, for in most ancient religions we find that cereal offerings come to be accepted in certain cases as substitutes for animal sacrifices, and that in this way the difference between the two kinds of offering gradually gets to be obliterated.[1] But in such matters great weight is to be attached to priestly tradition, such as underlies the Levitical ritual. The priests were not likely to invent a distinction of the kind which has been described, and in point of fact there is good evidence that they did not invent it. For there is no doubt that in ancient times the ordinary source of the *minḥa* was the offering of first-fruits—this is, of a small but choice portion of the annual produce of the ground, which in fact is the only cereal oblation prescribed in the oldest laws.[2] So far as can be seen, the first-fruits were always a tribute wholly made

[1] So at Rome models in wax or dough often took the place of animals. The same thing took place at Athens: Hesychius, *s.vv.* βοῦς and ἑβδόμοις βοῦς; cf. Thucyd. i. 126 and *schol.* At Carthage we have found the name *zébaḥ* applied to vegetable offerings (p. 222 n.).

[2] Ex. xxii. 29, xxiii. 19, xxxiv. 26.

over to the deity at the sanctuary. They were brought by the peasant in a basket and deposited at the altar,[1] and so far as they were not actually burned on the altar, they were assigned to the priests[2]—not to the ministrant as a reward for his service, but to the priests as a body, as the household of the sanctuary.[3]

Among the Hebrews, as among many other agricultural peoples, the offering of first-fruits was connected with the idea that it is not lawful or safe to eat of the new fruit until the god has received his due.[4] The offering makes the whole crop lawful food, but it does not make it holy food; nothing is consecrated except the small portion offered at the altar, and of the remaining store clean persons and unclean eat alike throughout the year. This, therefore, is quite a different thing from the consecration of animal sacrifices, for in the latter case the whole flesh is holy, and only those who are clean can eat of it.[5]

In old Israel all slaughter was sacrifice,[6] and a man could never eat beef or mutton except as a religious act, but cereal food had no such sacred associations; as soon as God had received His due of first-fruits, the whole domestic store was common. The difference between cereal and animal food was therefore deeply marked, and though bread was of course brought to the sanctuary to be

[1] Deut. xxvi. 1 *sqq.*

[2] Lev. xxiii. 17; Deut. xviii. 4. For the purpose of this argument it is not necessary to advert to the distinction recognised by post-Biblical tradition between *rēshīth* and *bikkūrīm*, on which see Wellh., *Prolegomena*, 3rd ed., p. 161 *sq.* (Eng. trans., p. 157 *sq.*).

[3] This follows from 2 Kings xxiii. 9. The tribute was sometimes paid to a man of God (2 Kings iv. 42), which is another way of making it over to the deity. In the Levitical law also the *minḥa* belongs to the priests as a whole (Lev. vii. 10). This is an important point. What the ministrant receives as a fee comes from the worshipper, what the priests as a whole receive is given them by the deity.

[4] Lev. xxiii. 14; cf. Pliny, *H. N.* xviii. 8.

[5] Hos. ix. 4 refers only to animal food.

[6] The same thing is true of Old Arabia; Wellh. p. 117.

eaten with the *zebaḥīm*, it had not and could not have the same religious meaning as the holy flesh. It appears from Amos iv. 4 that it was the custom in northern Israel to lay a portion of the worshipper's provision of ordinary leavened bread on the altar with the sacrificial flesh, and this custom was natural enough; for why should not the deity's share of the sacrificial meal have the same cereal accompaniments as man's share? But there is no indication that this oblation consecrated the part of the bread retained by the worshipper and made it holy bread. The only holy bread of which we read is such as belonged to the priests, not to the offerer.[1] In Lev. vii. 14, Num. vi. 15, the cake of common bread is given to the priest instead of being laid on the altar, but it is carefully distinguished from the *minḥa*. In old times the priests had no altar dues of this kind. They had only the first-fruits and a claim to a piece of the sacrificial flesh,[2] from which it may be presumed that the custom of offering bread with the *zébaḥ* was not primitive. Indeed Amos seems to mention it with some surprise as a thing not familiar to Judæan practice. At all events no sacrificial meal could consist of bread alone. All through the old history it is taken for granted that a religious feast necessarily implies a victim slain.[3]

[1] 1 Sam. xxi. 4. [2] Deut. xviii. 3, 4; 1 Sam. ii. 13 *sqq.*

[3] What has been said above of the contrast between cereal sacrificial gifts and the sacrificial feast seems to me to hold good also for Greece and Rome, with some modification in the case of domestic meals, which among the Semites had no religious character, but at Rome were consecrated by a portion being offered to the household gods. This, however, has nothing to do with public religion, in which the law holds good that there is no sacred feast without a victim, and that consecrated *aparchæ* are wholly given over to the sanctuary. The same thing holds good for many other peoples, and seems, so far as my reading goes, to be the general rule. But there are exceptions. My friend Mr. J. G. Frazer, to whose wide reading I never appeal without profit, refers me to Wilken's *Alfoeren van het eiland Beroe*, p. 26, where a true sacrificial feast is made of the first-fruits of rice. This

The distinction which we are thus led to draw between the cereal oblation, in which the dominant idea is that of a tribute paid to the god, and animal sacrifices, which are essentially acts of communion between the god and his worshippers, deserves to be followed out in more detail. But this task must be reserved for another lecture.

is called "eating the soul of the rice," so that the rice is viewed as a living creature. In such a case it is not unreasonable to say that the rice may be regarded as really an animate victim. Agricultural religions seem often to have borrowed ideas from the older cults of pastoral times.

LECTURE VII

FIRST-FRUITS, TITHES, AND SACRIFICIAL MEALS

It became apparent to us towards the close of the last lecture that the Levitical distinction between *minḥa* and *zébaḥ*, or cereal oblation and animal sacrifice, rests upon an ancient principle; that the idea of communion with the deity in a sacrificial meal of holy food was primarily confined to the *zébaḥ* or animal victim, and that the proper significance of the cereal offering is that of a tribute paid by the worshipper from the produce of the soil. Now we have already seen that the conception of the national deity as the Baal, or lord of the land, was developed in connection with the growth of agriculture and agricultural law. Spots of natural fertility were the Baal's land, because they were productive without the labour of man's hands, which, according to Eastern ideas, is the only basis of private property in the soil; and land which required irrigation was also liable to the payment of a sacred tribute, because it was fertilised by streams which belonged to the god or even were conceived as instinct with divine energy. This whole circle of ideas belongs to a condition of society in which agriculture and the laws that regulate it have made considerable progress, and is foreign to the sphere of thought in which the purely nomadic Semites moved. That the *minḥa* is not so ancient a form of sacrifice as the *zébaḥ* will not be doubted, fo nomadic life is older than agriculture. But if the foregoin argument

is correct, we can say more than this; we can affirm that the idea of the sacrificial meal as an act of communion is older than sacrifice in the sense of tribute, and that the latter notion grew up with the development of agricultural life and the conception of the deity as Baal of the land. Among the nomadic Arabs the idea of sacrificial tribute has little or no place; all sacrifices are free-will offerings, and except in some rare forms of piacular oblation—particularly human sacrifice—and perhaps in some very simple offerings such as the libation of milk, the object of the sacrifice is to provide the material for an act of sacrificial communion with the god.[1]

In most ancient nations the idea of sacrificial tribute is most clearly marked in the institution of the sacred tithe, which was paid to the gods from the produce of the soil, and sometimes also from other sources of revenue.[2] In antiquity tithe and tribute are practically identical, nor is the name of tithe strictly limited to tributes of one-tenth, the term being used to cover any impost paid in kind upon a fixed scale. Such taxes play a great part in the revenues of Eastern sovereigns, and have done so from a very early date. The Babylonian kings drew a tithe from imports,[3] and the tithe of the fruits of the soil had the first place among the revenues of the Persian satraps.[4] The Hebrew kings in like manner took tithes of their subjects, and the tribute in kind which Solomon drew from the provinces for the support of his household may

[1] Some points connected with this statement which invite attention, but cannot be fully discussed at the present stage of the argument, will be considered in *Additional Note* E, *Sacred Tribute in Arabia*.

[2] See the instances collected by Spencer, Lib. iii. cap. 10, § 1; Hermann, *Gottesdienstliche Alterth. d. Gricchen*, 2nd ed., § 20, note 4; Wyttenbach in the index to his edition of Plutarch's *Moralia*, *s.v.* Ἡρακλῆς.

[3] Aristotle, *Œcon.* p. 1352*b* of the Berlin edition. A tithe on imports is found also at Mecca (Azracī, p. 107; Ibn Hish. p. 72).

[4] Aristotle, *Œcon.* p. 1345*b*.

be regarded as an impost of this sort.[1] Thus the institution of a sacred tithe corresponds to the conception of the national god as a king, and so at Tyre tithes were paid to Melcarth, "the king of the city." The Carthaginians, as Diodorus[2] tells us, sent the tithe of produce to Tyre annually from the time of the foundation of their city. This is the earliest example of a Semitic sacred tithe of which we have any exact account, and it is to be noted that it is as much a political as a religious tribute; for the temple of Melcarth was the state treasury of Tyre, and it is impossible to draw a distinction between the sacred tithe paid by the Carthaginians and the political tribute paid by other colonies, such as Utica.[3]

The oldest Hebrew laws require the payment of first-fruits, but know nothing of a tithe due at the sanctuary. And indeed the Hebrew sanctuaries in old time had not such a splendid establishment as called for the imposition of sacred tributes on a large scale. When Solomon erected his temple, in emulation of Hiram's great buildings at Tyre, a more lavish ritual expenditure became necessary; but, as the temple at Jerusalem was attached to the palace, this was part of the household expenditure of the sovereign, and doubtless was met out of the imposts *in natura* levied for the maintenance of the court.[4] In other words, the maintenance of the royal sanctuary was a charge on the king's tithes; and so we find that a tenth directly paid to the sanctuary forms no part of the temple revenues

[1] 1 Sam. viii. 15, 17; 1 Kings iv. 7 *sqq.* The "king's mowings" (Amos vii. 1) belong to the same class of imposts, being a tribute in kind levied on the spring herbage to feed the horses of the king (cf. 1 Kings xviii. 5). Similarly the Romans in Syria levied a tax on pasture-land in the month Nisan for the food of their horses: see Bruns and Sachau, *Syrisch-Röm. Rechtsbuch*, Text L, § 121; and Wright, *Notulæ Syriacæ* (1887), p. 6.

[2] Lib. xx. cap. 14.

[3] Jos., *Antt.* viii. 5. 3, as read by Niese after Gutschmid.

[4] Cf. 2 Kings xvi. 15; Ezek. xlv. 9 *sqq.*

referred to in 2 Kings xii. 4. In northern Israel the royal sanctuaries, of which Bethel was the chief,[1] were originally maintained, in the same way, by the king himself; but as Bethel was not the ordinary seat of the court, so that the usual stated sacrifices there could not be combined with the maintenance of the king's table, some special provision must have been made for them. As the new and elaborate type of sanctuary was due to Phœnician influence, it was Phœnicia, where the religious tithe was an ancient institution, which would naturally suggest the source from which a more splendid worship should be defrayed; the service of the god of the land ought to be a burden on the land. And the general analogy of fiscal arrangements in the East makes it probable that this would be done by assigning to the sanctuary the taxes in kind levied on the surrounding district;[2] it is therefore noteworthy that the only pre-Deuteronomic references to a tithe paid at the sanctuary refer to the "royal chapel" of Bethel.[3]

The tithes paid to ancient sanctuaries were spent in various ways, and were by no means, what the Hebrew tithes ultimately became under the hierocracy, a revenue appropriated to the maintenance of the priests; thus in South Arabia we find tithes devoted to the erection of sacred monuments.[4] One of the chief objects, however, for which they were expended was the maintenance of feasts and sacrifices of a public character, at which the worshippers were entertained free of charge.[5] This element

[1] Amos vii. 13.

[2] Cf. the grant of the village of Bætocæce for the maintenance of the sanctuary of the place, Waddington, No. 2720*a*.

[3] Gen. xxviii. 22; Amos iv. 4.

[4] Mordtm. und Müller, *Sab. Denkm.* No. 11 (*CIS.* iv. 19, l. 7).

[5] Xen., *Anab.* v. 3. 9; Waddington, *ut supra.* Similarly the tithes of incense paid to the priests at Sabota in South Arabia were spent on the feast which the god spread for his guests for a certain number of days (Pliny,

cannot have been lacking at the royal sanctuaries of the Hebrews, for a splendid hospitality to all and sundry who assembled at the great religious feasts was recognised as the duty of the king even in the time of David.[1] And so we find that Amos enumerates the tithe at Bethel as one of the chief elements that contributed to the jovial luxurious worship maintained at that holy place.

If this account of the matter is correct, the tithes collected at Bethel were strictly of the nature of a tribute gathered from certain lands, and payment of them was doubtless enforced by royal authority. They were not used by each man to make a private religious feast for himself and his family, but were devoted to the maintenance of the public or royal sacrifices. This, it ought to be said, is not the view commonly taken by modern critics. The old festivities at Hebrew sanctuaries before the regal period were maintained, not out of any public revenue, but by each man bringing up to the sanctuary his own victim and all else that was necessary to make up a hearty feast, with the sacrificial flesh as its *pièce de resistance*.[2] It is generally assumed that this description was still applicable to the feasts at Bethel in Amos's time, and that the tithes were the provision that each farmer brought with him to feast his domestic circle and friends. At first sight this view looks plausible enough, especially when we find that the Book of Deuteronomy, written a century after Amos prophesied, actually prescribes that the annual tithes should be used by each householder to furnish forth a family feast before Jehovah. But it is not safe to argue back from the reforming ordinances of Deuteronomy to the practices of the northern sanctuaries, without checking the

H. N. xii. 63). M. R. Duval (*Rev. d'Assyriologie*, etc., 1888, p. 1 *sq.*) ★ argues that at Taimā, in N. Arabia, there was a tithe on palm trees from which grants were made to the priest. But this is very doubtful.

[1] 2 Sam. vi. 19. [2] 1 Sam. i. 21, 24, x. 3.

inference at every point. The connection between tithe and tribute is too close and too ancient to allow us to admit without hesitation that the Deuteronomic annual tithe, which retains nothing of the character of a tribute, is the primitive type of the institution. And this difficulty is not diminished when we observe that the Book of Deuteronomy recognises also another tithe, payable once in three years, which really is of the nature of a sacred tribute, although it is devoted not to the altar but to charity. It is arbitrary to say that the first tithe of Deuteronomy corresponds to ancient usage, and that the second is an innovation of the author; indeed, some indications of the Book of Deuteronomy itself point all the other way. In Deut. xxvi. 12, the third year, in which the charity tithe is to be paid, is called *par excellence* "the year of tithing," and in the following verse the charity tithe is reckoned in the list of "holy things," while the annual tithe, to be spent on family festivities at the sanctuary, is not so reckoned. In the face of these difficulties it is not safe to assume that either of the Deuteronomic tithes exactly corresponds to old usage. And if we look at Amos's account of the worship at Bethel as a whole, a feature which cannot fail to strike us is that the luxurious feasts beside the altars which he describes are entirely different in kind from the old rustic festivities at Shiloh described in 1 Samuel. They are not simple agricultural merry-makings of a popular character, but mainly feasts of the rich, enjoying themselves at the expense of the poor. The keynote struck in chap. ii. 7, 8, where the sanctuary itself is designated as the seat of oppression and extortion, is re-echoed all through the book; Amos's charge against the nobles is not merely that they are professedly religious and yet oppressors, but that their luxurious religion is founded on oppression, on the gains of

corruption at the sacred tribunal and other forms of extortion. This is not the association in which we can look for the idyllic simplicity of the Deuteronomic family feast of tithes. But it is the very association in which one expects to find the tithe as I have supposed it to be; the revenues of the state religion, originally designed to maintain a public hospitality at the altar, and enable rich and poor alike to rejoice before their God, were monopolised by a privileged class.

This being understood, the innovations in the law of tithes proposed in the Book of Deuteronomy become sufficiently intelligible. In the kingdom of Judah there was no royal sanctuary except that at Jerusalem, the maintenance of which was part of the king's household charges, and it is hardly probable that any part of the royal tithes was assigned to the maintenance of the local sanctuaries. But as early as the time of Samuel we find religious feasts of clans or of towns, which are not a mere agglomeration of private sacrifices, and so must have been defrayed out of communal funds; from this germ, as religion became more luxurious, a fixed impost on land for the maintenance of the public services, such as was collected among the Phœnicians, would naturally grow. Such an impost would be in the hands, not of the priests, but of the heads of clans and communes, *i.e.* of the rich, and would necessarily be liable to the same abuses as prevailed in the northern kingdom. The remedy which Deuteronomy proposes for these abuses is to leave each farmer to spend his own tithes as he pleases at the central sanctuary. But this provision, if it had stood alone, would have amounted to the total abolition of a communal fund, which, however much abused in practice, was theoretically designed for the maintenance of a public table, where every one had a right to claim a portion, and which was

doubtless of some service to the landless proletariate, however hardly its collection might press on the poorer farmer.[1] This difficulty was met by the triennial tithe devoted to charity, to the landless poor and to the landless Levite. Strictly speaking, this triennial due was the only real tithe left—the only impost for a religious purpose which a man was actually bound to pay away—and to it the whole subsequent history of Hebrew tithes attaches itself. The other tithe, which was not a due but of a mere voluntary character, disappears altogether in the Levitical legislation.

If this account of the Hebrew tithe is correct, that institution is of relatively modern origin—as indeed is indicated by the silence of the most ancient laws—and throws very little light on the original principles of Semitic sacrifice. The principle that the god of the land claims a tribute on the increase of the soil was originally expressed in the offering of first-fruits, at a time when sanctuaries and their service were too simple to need any elaborate provision for their support. The tithe originated when worship became more complex and ritual more splendid, so that a fixed tribute was necessary for its maintenance. The tribute took the shape of an impost on the produce of land, partly because this was an ordinary source of revenue for all public purposes, partly because such an impost could be justified from the religious point of view, as agreeing in principle with the oblation of first-fruits, and constituting a tribute to the god from the agricultural blessings he bestowed. But here the similarity between tithes and first-fruits ends. The first-fruits constituted a private sacrifice of the worshipper, who brought

[1] The same principle was acknowledged in Greece, ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν γὰρ οἱ πτωχοὶ ζῶσιν (*Schol.* on Aristoph. *Plutus*, 596, in Hermann *op. cit.* § 15, note 16). So too in the Arabian meal-offering to Ocaiṣir (*supra*, p. 223).

them himself to the altar and was answerable for the payment only to God and his own conscience. The tithe, on the contrary, was a public burden enforced by the community for the maintenance of public religion. In principle there was no reason why it should not be employed for any purpose, connected with the public exercises of religion, for which money or money's worth was required; the way in which it should be spent depended not on the individual tithe-payer but on the sovereign or the commune. In later times, after the exile, it was entirely appropriated to the support of the clergy. But in old Israel it seems to have been mainly, if not exclusively, used to furnish forth public feasts at the sanctuary. In this respect it entirely differed from the first-fruits, which might be, and generally were, offered at a public festival, but did not supply any part of the material of the feast. The sacred feast, at which men and their god ate together, was originally quite unconnected with the cereal oblations paid in tribute to the deity, and its staple was the *zébaḥ*—the sacrificial victim. We shall see by and by that in its origin the *zébaḥ* was not the private offering of an individual householder but the sacrifice of a clan, and so the sacrificial meal had pre-eminently the character of a public feast. Now when public feasts are organised on a considerable scale, and furnished not merely with store of sacrificial flesh, but—as was the wont in Israel under the kings—with all manner of luxurious accessories, they come to be costly affairs, which can only be defrayed out of public moneys. The Israel of the time of the kings was not a simple society of peasants, all living in the same way, who could simply club together to maintain a rustic feast by what each man brought to the sanctuary from his own farm. Splendid festivals like those of Bethel were evidently not furnished in this way, but were mainly banquets

of the upper classes in which the poor had a very subordinate share. The source of these festivals was the tithe, but it was not the poor tithe-payer who figured as host at the banquet. The organisation of the feast was in the hands of the ruling classes, who received the tithes and spent them on the service in a way that gave the lion's share of the good things to themselves; though no doubt, as in other ancient countries, the principle of a public feast was not wholly ignored, and every one present had something to eat and drink, so that the whole populace was kept in good humour.[1] Of course it is not to be supposed that the whole service was of this public character. Private persons still brought up their own vows and free-will offerings, and arranged their own family parties. But these, I conceive, were quite independent of the tithes, which were a public tax devoted to what was regarded as the public part of religion. On the whole, therefore, the tithe system has nothing to do with primitive Hebrew religion; the only point about it which casts a light backwards on the earlier stages of worship is that it could hardly have sprung up except in connection with the idea that the maintenance of sacrifice was a public duty, and that the sacrificial feast had essentially a public character. This point, however, is of the highest importance, and must be kept clearly before us as we proceed.

Long before any public revenue was set apart for the maintenance of sacrificial ritual, the ordinary type of Hebrew worship was essentially social, for in antiquity all religion was the affair of the community rather than of the

[1] The only way of escape from this conclusion is to suppose that the rich nobles paid out of their own pockets for the more expensive parts of the public sacrifices; and no one who knows the East and reads the Book of Amos will believe that. Nathan's parable about the poor man's one lamb, which his rich neighbour took to make a feast (necessarily at that date sacrificial), is an apposite illustration.

individual. A sacrifice was a public ceremony of a township or of a clan,[1] and private householders were accustomed to reserve their offerings for the annual feasts, satisfying their religious feelings in the interval by vows to be discharged when the festal season came round.[2] Then the crowds streamed into the sanctuary from all sides, dressed in their gayest attire,[3] marching joyfully to the sound of music,[4] and bearing with them not only the victims appointed for sacrifice, but store of bread and wine to set forth the feast.[5] The law of the feast was open-handed hospitality; no sacrifice was complete without guests, and portions were freely distributed to rich and poor within the circle of a man's acquaintance.[6] Universal hilarity prevailed, men ate drank and were merry together, rejoicing before their God.

The picture which I have drawn of the dominant type of Hebrew worship contains nothing peculiar to the religion of Jehovah. It is clear from the Old Testament that the ritual observances at a Hebrew and at a Canaanite sanctuary were so similar that to the mass of the people Jehovah worship and Baal worship were not separated by any well-marked line, and that in both cases the prevailing

[1] 1 Sam. ix. 12, xx. 6. In the latter passage "family" means "clan," not "domestic circle." See below, p. 276, note.

[2] 1 Sam. i. 3, 21.

[3] Hos. ii. 15 (E.V. 13).

[4] Isa. xxx. 29.

[5] 1 Sam. x. 3.

[6] 1 Sam. ix. 13; 2 Sam. vi. 19, xv. 11; Neh. viii. 10. The guests of the sacrifice supply a figure to the prophets (Ezek. xxxix. 17 *sqq.*; Zeph. i. 7). Nabal's refusal to allow David to share in his sheep-shearing feast was not only churlish but a breach of religious custom; from Amos iv. 5 it would appear that with a free-will offering there was a free invitation to all to come and partake. For the Arabian usuage in like cases, see Wellhausen, p. 117 *sq.* A banqueting hall for the communal sacrifice is mentioned as early as 1 Sam. ix. 22, and the name given to it (*lishka*) seems to be identical with the Greek λέσχη, from which it may be gathered that the Phœnicians had similar halls from an early date; cf. Judg. ix. 27, xvi. 23 *sqq.* For the communal feasts of the Syrians in later times, see Posidon. Apam *ap.* Athen. xii. 527 (*Fr. Hist. Gr.* iii. 258).

tone and temper of the worshippers were determined by the festive character of the service. Nor is the prevalence of the sacrificial feast, as the established type of ordinary religion, confined to the Semitic peoples; the same kind of worship ruled in ancient Greece and Italy, and seems to be the universal type of the local cults of the small agricultural communities out of which all the nations of ancient civilisation grew. Everywhere we find that a sacrifice ordinarily involves a feast, and that a feast cannot be provided without a sacrifice. For a feast is not complete without flesh, and in early times the rule that all slaughter is sacrifice was not confined to the Semites.[1] The identity of religious occasions and festal seasons may indeed be taken as the determining characteristic of the type of ancient religion generally; when men meet their god they feast and are glad together, and whenever they feast and are glad they desire that the god should be of the party. This view is proper to religions in which the habitual temper of the worshippers is one of joyous confidence in their god, untroubled by any habitual sense of human guilt, and resting on the firm conviction that they and the deity they adore are good friends, who understand each other perfectly and are united by bonds not easily broken. The basis of this confidence lies of course in the view that the gods are part and parcel of the same natural community with their worshippers. The divine father or king claims the same kind of respect and service as a human father or king, and practical religion is simply a branch of social duty, an understood part of the conduct

[1] It is Indian (Manu, v. 31 *sqq.*) and Persian (Sprenger, *Eranische Alterth.* iii. 578; cf. Herod. i. 132; Strabo, xv. 3. 13, p. 732). Among the Romans and the older Greeks there was something sacrificial about every feast, or even about every social meal; in the latter case the Romans paid tribute to the household gods. On the identity of feast and sacrifice in Greece, see Athenæus, v. 19; Buchholz, *Hom. Realien*, II. ii. 202, 213 *sqq.*

of daily life, governed by fixed rules to which every one has been trained from his infancy. No man who is a good citizen, living up to the ordinary standard of civil morality in his dealings with his neighbours, and accurately following the ritual tradition in his worship of the gods, is oppressed with the fear that the deity may set a higher standard of conduct and find him wanting. Civil and religious morality have one and the same measure, and the conduct which suffices to secure the esteem of men suffices also to make a man perfectly easy as to his standing with the gods. It must be remembered that all antique morality is an affair of social custom and customary law, and that in the more primitive forms of ancient life the force of custom is so strong that there is hardly any middle course between living well up to the standard of social duty which it prescribes, and falling altogether outside the pale of the civil and religious community. A man who deliberately sets himself against the rules of the society in which he lives must expect to be outlawed; but minor offences are readily condoned as mere mistakes, which may expose the offender to a fine but do not permanently lower his social status or his self-respect. So too a man may offend his god, and be called upon to make reparation to him. But in such a case he knows, or can learn from a competent priestly authority, exactly what he ought to do to set matters right, and then everything goes on as before. In a religion of this kind there is no room for an abiding sense of sin and unworthiness, or for acts of worship that express the struggle after an unattained righteousness, the longing for uncertain forgiveness. It is only when the old religions begin to break down that these feelings come in. The older national and tribal religions work with the smoothness of a machine. Men are satisfied with their gods, and they feel that the gods are satisfied with them.

Or if at any time famine, pestilence or disaster in war appears to shew that the gods are angry, this casts no doubt on the adequacy of the religious system as such, but is merely held to prove that a grave fault has been committed by some one for whom the community is responsible, and that they are bound to put it right by an appropriate reparation. That they can put it right, and stand as well with the god as they ever did, is not doubted; and when rain falls, or the pestilence is checked, or the defeat is retrieved, they at once recover their old easy confidence, and go on eating and drinking and rejoicing before their god with the assurance that he and they are on the best of jovial good terms.

The kind of religion which finds its proper æsthetic expression in the merry sacrificial feast implies a habit of mind, a way of taking the world as well as a way of regarding the gods, which we have some difficulty in realising. Human life is never perfectly happy and satisfactory, yet ancient religion assumes that through the help of the gods it is so happy and satisfactory that ordinary acts of worship are all brightness and hilarity, expressing no other idea than that the worshippers are well content with themselves and with their divine sovereign. This implies a measure of *insouciance*, a power of casting off the past and living in the impression of the moment, which belongs to the childhood of humanity, and can exist only along with a childish unconsciousness of the inexorable laws that connect the present and the future with the past. Accordingly the more developed nations of antiquity, in proportion as they emerged from national childhood, began to find the old religious forms inadequate, and either became less concerned to associate all their happiness with the worship of the gods, and, in a word, less religious, or else were unable to think of the divine

powers as habitually well pleased and favourable, and so were driven to look on the anger of the gods as much more frequent and permanent than their fathers had supposed, and to give to atoning rites a stated and important place in ritual, which went far to change the whole attitude characteristic of early worship, and substitute for the old joyous confidence a painful and scrupulous anxiety in all approach to the gods. Among the Semites the Arabs furnish an example of the general decay of religion, while the nations of Palestine in the seventh century B.C. afford an excellent illustration of
* the development of a gloomier type of worship under the pressure of accumulated political disasters. On the whole, however, what strikes the modern thinker as surprising is not that the old joyous type of worship ultimately broke down, but that it lasted so long as it did, or even that it ever attained a paramount place among nations so advanced as the Greeks and the Syrians. This is a matter which well deserves attentive consideration.

First of all, then, it is to be observed that the frame of mind in which men are well pleased with themselves, with their gods, and with the world, could not have dominated antique religion as it did, unless religion had been essentially the affair of the community rather than of individuals. It was not the business of the gods of heathenism to watch, by a series of special providences, over the welfare of every individual. It is true that individuals laid their private affairs before the gods, and asked with prayers and vows for strictly personal blessings. But they did this just as they might crave a personal boon from a king, or as a son craves a boon from a father, without expecting to get all that was asked. What the gods might do in this way was done as a matter of personal favour, and was no part of their proper function

as heads of the community. The benefits which were expected from the gods were of a public character, affecting the whole community, especially fruitful seasons, increase of flocks and herds, and success in war. So long as the community flourished the fact that an individual was miserable reflected no discredit on divine providence, but was rather taken to prove that the sufferer was an evil-doer, justly hateful to the gods. Such a man was out of place among the happy and prosperous crowd that assembled on feast days before the altar; even in Israel, Hannah, with her sad face and silent petition, was a strange figure at the sanctuary of Shiloh, and the unhappy leper, in his lifelong affliction, was shut out from the exercises of religion as well as from the privileges of social life. So too the mourner was unclean, and his food was not brought into the house of God; the very occasions of life in which spiritual things are nearest to the Christian, and the comfort of religion is most fervently sought, were in the ancient world the times when a man was forbidden to approach the seat of God's presence. To us, whose habit it is to look at religion in its influence on the life and happiness of individuals, this seems a cruel law; nay, our sense of justice is offended by a system in which misfortunes set up a barrier between a man and his God. But whether in civil or in profane matters, the habit of the old world was to think much of the community and little of the individual life, and no one felt this to be unjust even though it bore hardly on himself. The god was the god of the nation or of the tribe, and he knew and cared for the individual only as a member of the community. Why, then, should private misfortune be allowed to mar by its ill-omened presence the public gladness of the sanctuary?

Accordingly the air of habitual satisfaction with them-

selves, their gods and the world, which characterises the worship of ancient communities, must be explained without reference to the vicissitudes of individual life. And so far as the thing requires any other explanation than the general *insouciance* and absorption in the feelings of the moment characteristic of the childhood of society, I apprehend that the key to the joyful character of the antique religions known to us lies in the fact that they took their shape in communities that were progressive and on the whole prosperous. If we realise to ourselves the conditions of early society, whether in Europe or in Asia, at the first daybreak of history, we cannot fail to see that a tribe or nation that could not hold its own and make headway must soon have been crushed out of existence in the incessant feuds it had to wage with all its neighbours. The communities of ancient civilisation were formed by the survival of the fittest, and they had all the self-confidence and elasticity that are engendered by success in the struggle for life. These characters, therefore, are reflected in the religious system that grew up with the growth of the state, and the type of worship that corresponded to them was not felt to be inadequate till the political system was undermined from within or shattered by blows from without.

These considerations sufficiently account for the development of the habitually joyous temper of ancient sacrificial worship. But it is also to be observed that when the type was once formed it would not at once disappear, even when a change in social conditions made it no longer an adequate expression of the habitual tone of national life. The most important functions of ancient worship were reserved for public occasions, when the whole community was stirred by a common emotion, and among agricultural nations the stated occasions of

sacrifice were the natural seasons of festivity, at harvest and vintage. At such times every one was ready to cast off his cares and rejoice before his god, and so the coincidence of religious and agricultural gladness helped to keep the old form of worship alive, long after it had ceased to be in full harmony with men's permanent view of the world. Moreover it must be remembered that the spirit of boisterous mirth which characterised the oldest religious festivals was nourished by the act of worship itself. The sacrificial feast was not only an expression of gladness but a means of driving away care, for it was set forth with every circumstance of gaiety, with garlands, perfumes and music, as well as with store of meat and wine. The sensuous Oriental nature responds to such physical stimulus with a readiness foreign to our more sluggish temperament; to the Arab it is an excitement and a delight of the highest order merely to have flesh to eat.[1] From the earliest times, therefore, the religious gladness of the Semites tended to assume an orgiastic character and become a sort of intoxication of the senses, in which anxiety and sorrow were drowned for the moment. This is apparent in the old Canaanite festivals, such as the vintage feast at Shechem described in Judg. ix. 27, and not less in the service of the Hebrew high places, as it is characterised by the prophets. Even at Jerusalem the worship must have been boisterous indeed, when Lam. ii. 7 compares the shouts of the storming party of the Chaldæans in the courts of the temple with the noise of a solemn feast. Among the Nabatæans and elsewhere the orgiastic character of the worship often led in later times to the identification of Semitic gods, especially of Dusares, with

[1] A current Arabic saying, which I have somewhere seen ascribed to Ta'abbaṭa Sharran, reckons the eating of flesh as one of the three great delights of life. In Maidānī, ii. 22, flesh and wine are classed together as seductive luxuries.

the Greek Dionysus. It is plain that a religion of this sort would not necessarily cease to be powerful when it ceased to express a habitually joyous view of the world and the divine governance; in evil times, when men's thoughts were habitually sombre, they betook themselves to the physical excitement of religion, as men now take refuge in wine. That this is not a fancy picture is clear from Isaiah's description of the conduct of his contemporaries during the approach of the Assyrians to Jerusalem,[1] when the multiplied sacrifices that were offered to avert the disaster degenerated into a drunken carnival—"Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." And so in general when an act of Semitic worship began with sorrow and lamentation—as in the mourning for Adonis, or in the great atoning ceremonies which became common in later times—a swift revulsion of feeling followed, and the gloomy part of the service was presently succeeded by a burst of hilarious revelry, which, in later times at least, was not a purely spontaneous expression of the conviction that man is reconciled with the powers that govern his life and rule the universe, but in great measure a mere orgiastic excitement. The nerves were strung to the utmost tension in the sombre part of the ceremony, and the natural reaction was fed by the physical stimulus of the revelry that followed.

This, however, is not a picture of what Semitic religion was from the first, and in its ordinary exercises, but of the shape it tended to assume in extraordinary times of national calamity, and still more under the habitual pressure of grinding despotism, when the general tone of social life was no longer bright and hopeful, but stood in painful contrast to the joyous temper proper to the traditional forms of worship. Ancient heathenism was not made for such times, but for seasons of national prosperity, when its

[1] Isa. xxii. 12, 13, compared with i. 11 *sqq.*

joyous rites were the appropriate expression for the happy fellowship that united the god and his worshippers to the satisfaction of both parties. Then the enthusiasm of the worshipping throng was genuine. Men came to the sanctuary to give free vent to habitual feelings of thankful confidence in their god, and warmed themselves into excitement in a perfectly natural way by feasting together, as people still do when they rejoice together.

In acts of worship we expect to find the religious ideal expressed in its purest form, and we cannot easily think well of a type of religion whose ritual culminates in a jovial feast. It seems that such a faith sought nothing higher than a condition of physical *bien être*, and in one sense this judgment is just. The good things desired of the gods were the blessings of earthly life, not spiritual but carnal things. But Semitic heathenism was redeemed from mere materialism by the fact that religion was not the affair of the individual but of the community. The ★ ideal was earthly, but it was not selfish. In rejoicing before his god a man rejoiced with and for the welfare of his kindred, his neighbours and his country, and, in renewing by a solemn act of worship the bond that united him to his god, he also renewed the bonds of family social and national obligation. We have seen that the compact between the god and the community of his worshippers was not held to pledge the deity to make the private cares of each member of the community his own. The gods had their favourites no doubt, for whom they were prepared to do many things that they were not bound to do; but no man could approach his god in a purely personal matter with that spirit of absolute confidence which I have described as characteristic of antique religions; it was the community, and not the individual, that was sure of the permanent and unfailing help of its deity. It was a

national not a personal providence that was taught by ancient religion. So much was this the case that in purely personal concerns the ancients were very apt to turn, not to the recognised religion of the family or of the state, but to magical superstitions. The gods watched over a man's civic life, they gave him his share in public benefits, the annual largess of the harvest and the vintage, national peace or victory over enemies, and so forth, but they were not sure helpers in every private need, and above all they would not help him in matters that were against the interests of the community as a whole. There was therefore a whole region of possible needs and desires for which religion could and would do nothing; and if supernatural help was sought in such things it had to be sought through magical ceremonies, designed to purchase or constrain the favour of demoniac powers with which the public religion had nothing to do. Not only did these magical superstitions lie outside religion, but in all well-ordered states they were regarded as illicit. A man had no right to enter into private relations with supernatural powers that might help him at the expense of the community to which he belonged. In his relations to the unseen he was bound always to think and act with and for the community, and not for himself alone.

With this it accords that every complete act of worship —for a mere vow was not a complete act till it was fulfilled by presenting a sacrifice—had a public or quasi-public character. Most sacrifices were offered on fixed occasions, at the great communal or national feasts, but even a private offering was not complete without guests, and the surplus of sacrificial flesh was not sold but distributed with an open hand.[1] Thus every act of

[1] See above, p. 254. In Greece, in later times, sacrificial flesh was exposed for sale (1 Cor. x. 25).

worship expressed the idea that man does not live for himself only but for his fellows, and that this partnership of social interests is the sphere over which the gods preside and on which they bestow their assured blessing.

The ethical significance which thus appertains to the sacrificial meal, viewed as a social act, received particular emphasis from certain ancient customs and ideas connected with eating and drinking. According to antique ideas, those who eat and drink together are by this very act tied to one another by a bond of friendship and mutual obligation. Hence when we find that in ancient religions all the ordinary functions of worship are summed up in the sacrificial meal, and that the ordinary intercourse between gods and men has no other form, we are to remember that the act of eating and drinking together is the solemn and stated expression of the fact that all who share the meal are brethren, and that the duties of friendship and brotherhood are implicitly acknowledged in their common act. By admitting man to his table the god admits him to his friendship; but this favour is extended to no man in his mere private capacity; he is received as one of a community, to eat and drink along with his fellows, and in the same measure as the act of worship cements the bond between him and his god, it cements also the bond between him and his brethren in the common faith.

We have now reached a point in our discussion at which it is possible to form some general estimate of the ethical value of the type of religion which has been described. The power of religion over life is twofold, lying partly in its association with particular precepts of conduct, to which it supplies a supernatural sanction, but mainly in its influence on the general tone and temper

of men's minds, which it elevates to higher courage and purpose, and raises above a brutal servitude to the physical wants of the moment, by teaching men that their lives and happiness are not the mere sport of the blind forces of nature, but are watched over and cared for by a higher power. As a spring of action this influence is more potent than the fear of supernatural sanctions, for it is stimulative, while the other is only regulative. But to produce a moral effect on life the two must go together; a man's actions must be not only supported by the feeling that the divine help is with him, but regulated by the conviction that that help will not accompany him except on the right path. In ancient religion, as it appears among the Semites, the confident assurance of divine help belongs, not to each man in his private concerns, but to the community in its public functions and public aims; and it is this assurance that is expressed in public acts of worship, where all the members of the community meet together to eat and drink at the table of their god, and so renew the sense that he and they are altogether at one. Now, if we look at the whole community of worshippers as absolutely one, personify them and think of them as a single individual, it is plain that the effect of this type of religion must be regarded as merely stimulative and not regulative. When the community is at one with itself and at one with its god, it may, for anything that religion has to say, do exactly what it pleases towards all who are outside it. Its friends are the god's friends, its enemies the god's enemies; it takes its god with it in whatever it chooses to do. As the ancient communities of religion are tribes or nations, this is as much as to say that, properly speaking, ancient religion has no influence on intertribal or international morality—in such matters the god simply goes with his own nation or his own tribe.

So long as we consider the tribe or nation of common religion as a single subject, the influence of religion is limited to an increase of the national self-confidence—a quality very useful in the continual struggle for life that was waged between ancient communities, but which beyond this has no moral value

But the case is very different when we look at the religious community as made up of a multitude of individuals, each of whom has private as well as public purposes and desires. In this aspect it is the regulative influence of ancient religion that is predominant, for the good things which religion holds forth are promised to the individual only in so far as he lives in and for the community. The conception of man's chief good set forth in the social act of sacrificial worship is the happiness of the individual in the happiness of the community, and thus the whole force of ancient religion is directed, so far as the individual is concerned, to maintain the civil virtues of loyalty and devotion to a man's fellows at a pitch of confident enthusiasm, to teach him to set his highest good in the prosperity of the society of which he is a member, not doubting that in so doing he has the divine power on his side and has given his life to a cause that cannot fail. This devotion to the common weal was, as every one knows, the mainspring of ancient morality and the source of all the heroic virtues of which ancient history presents so many illustrious examples. In ancient society, therefore, the religious ideal expressed in the act of social worship and the ethical ideal which governed the conduct of daily life were wholly at one, and all morality—as morality was then understood—was consecrated and enforced by religious motives and sanctions.

These observations are fully applicable only to the typical form of ancient religion, when it was still strictly

tribal or national. When nationality and religion began to fall apart, certain worships assumed a character more or less cosmopolitan. Even in heathenism, therefore, in its more advanced forms, the gods, or at least certain gods, are in some measure the guardians of universal morality, and not merely of communal loyalty. But what was thus gained in comprehensiveness was lost in intensity and strength of religious feeling, and the advance towards ethical universalism, which was made with feeble and uncertain steps, was never sufficient to make up for the decline of the old heroic virtues that were fostered by the narrower type of national faith.

LECTURE VIII

THE ORIGINAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ANIMAL SACRIFICE

ENOUGH has been said as to the significance of the sacrificial feast as we find it among ancient nations no longer barbarous. But to understand the matter fully we must trace it back to its origin in a state of society much more primitive than that of the agricultural Semites or Greeks.

The sacrificial meal was an appropriate expression of the antique ideal of religious life, not merely because it was a social act and an act in which the god and his worshippers were conceived as partaking together, but because, as has already been said, the very act of eating and drinking with a man was a symbol and a confirmation of fellowship and mutual social obligations. The one thing directly expressed in the sacrificial meal is that the god and his worshippers are *commensals*, but every other point in their mutual relations is included in what this involves. Those who sit at meat together are united for all social effects; those who do not eat together are aliens to one another, without fellowship in religion and without reciprocal social duties. The extent to which this view prevailed among the ancient Semites, and still prevails among the Arabs, may be brought out most clearly by reference to the law of hospitality. Among the Arabs every stranger whom one meets in the desert is a natural enemy, and has no protection against violence except his own strong hand or the fear

that his tribe will avenge him if his blood be spilt.[1] But if I have eaten the smallest morsel of food with a man, I have nothing further to fear from him; "there is salt ★ between us," and he is bound not only to do me no harm, but to help and defend me as if I were his brother.[2] So far was this principle carried by the old Arabs, that Zaid al-Khail, a famous warrior in the days of Mohammed, refused to slay a vagabond who carried off his camels, because the thief had surreptitiously drunk from his father's milk bowl before committing the theft.[3] It does not indeed follow as a matter of course that because I have eaten once with a man I am permanently his friend, for the bond of union is conceived in a very realistic way, and strictly speaking lasts no longer than the food may be supposed to remain in my system.[4] But the temporary bond is confirmed by repetition,[5] and readily passes into a permanent tie confirmed by an oath. "There was a sworn alliance between the Liḥyān and the Moṣṭalic, they were

[1] This is the meaning of Gen. iv. 14 *sq.* Cain is "driven out from the face of the cultivated land" into the desert, where his only protection is the law of blood revenge.

[2] The *milḥa*, or bond of salt, is not dependent on the actual use of mineral salt with the food by which the bond is constituted. Milk, for example, will serve the purpose. Cf. Burckhardt, *Bedouins and Wahabys*, i. 329, and *Kāmil*, p. 284, especially the verse of Abu 'l-Ṭamaḥān there cited, where salt is interpreted to mean "milk."

[3] *Agh.* xvi. 51; cf. *Kinship*, p. 176 *sq.*

[4] Burton, *Pilgrimage*, iii. 84 (1st ed.), says that some tribes "require to renew the bond every twenty-four hours," as otherwise, to use their own phrase, "the salt is not in their stomachs" (almost the same phrase is used in the verse of Abu 'l-Ṭamaḥān referred to above). But usually the protection extended to a guest lasts three days and a third after his departure (Burckhardt, *op. cit.* i. 136); or, according to Doughty, i. 228, two nights and the day between. A curious example of the degree to which these notions might be pushed is given in the *Amthāl* of Mofaḍḍal al-Ḍabbī, Const. A. H. 1300, p. 46, where a man claims and obtains the help of Al-Ḥārith in recovering his stolen camels, because the water that was still in their stomachs when they were taken from him had been drawn with the help of a rope borrowed from Al-Ḥārith's herdsmen.

[5] "O enemy of God, wilt thou slay this Jew? Much of the fat on thy paunch is of his substance" (Ibn Hishām, p. 553 *sq.*).

wont to eat and drink together."[1] This phrase of an Arab narrator supplies exactly what is wanted to define the significance of the sacrificial meal. The god and his worshippers are wont to eat and drink together, and by this token their fellowship is declared and sealed.

The ethical significance of the common meal can be most adequately illustrated from Arabian usage, but it was not confined to the Arabs. The Old Testament records many cases where a covenant was sealed by the parties eating and drinking together. In most of these indeed the meal is sacrificial, so that it is not at once clear that two men are bound to each other merely by partaking of the same dish, unless the deity is taken in as a third party to the covenant. The value of the Arabian evidence is that it supplies proof that the bond of food is valid of itself, that religion may be called in to confirm and strengthen it, but that the essence of the thing lies in the physical act of eating together. That this was also the case among the Hebrews and Canaanites may be safely concluded from analogy, and appears to receive direct confirmation from Josh. ix. 14, where the Israelites enter into alliance with the Gibeonites by taking of their victuals, without consulting Jehovah. A formal league confirmed by an oath follows, but by accepting the proffered food the Israelites are already committed to the alliance.

But we have not yet got to the root of the matter. What is the ultimate nature of the fellowship which is constituted or declared when men eat and drink together? In our complicated society fellowship has many types and many degrees; men may be united by bonds of duty and honour for certain purposes, and stand quite apart in all

[1] *Diw. Hodh.* No. 87 (Kosegarten's ed. p. 170). In Sukkarī's account of the battle of Coshāwa (William Wright, *Nacā'id*, p. 20) a captive refuses to eat the food of his captor who has slain his son, and thus apparently keeps his right of blood revenge alive.

other things. Even in ancient times—for example, in the Old Testament—we find the sacrament of a common meal introduced to seal engagements of various kinds. But in every case the engagement is absolute and inviolable; it constitutes what in the language of ethics is called a duty of perfect obligation. Now in the most primitive society there is only one kind of fellowship which is absolute and inviolable. To the primitive man all other men fall under two classes, those to whom his life is sacred and those to whom it is not sacred. The former are his fellows; the latter are strangers and potential foemen, with whom it is absurd to think of forming any inviolable tie unless they are first brought into the circle within which each man's life is sacred to all his comrades.

But that circle again corresponds to the circle of kinship, for the practical test of kinship is that the whole kin is answerable for the life of each of its members. By the rules of early society, if I slay my kinsman, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, the act is murder, and is punished by expulsion from the kin;[1] if my kinsman is slain by an outsider I and every other member of my kin are bound to avenge his death by killing the manslayer or some member of his kin. It is obvious that under such a system there can be no inviolable fellowship except between men of the same blood. For the duty of blood revenge is paramount, and every other obligation is dissolved as soon as it comes into conflict with the claims of blood. I cannot bind myself absolutely to a man, even for a temporary purpose, unless during the time of our engagement he is put into a kinsman's place. And this is as much as to say that a

[1] Even in Homeric society no bloodwit can be accepted for slaughter within the kin; a point which is commonly overlooked, *e.g.* by Buchholz, *Hom. Real.* II. i. 76.

stranger cannot become bound to me, unless at the same time he becomes bound to all my kinsmen in exactly the same way. Such is, in fact, the law of the desert; when any member of a clan receives an outsider through the bond of salt, the whole clan is bound by his act, and must, while the engagement lasts, receive the stranger as one of themselves.[1]

The idea that kinship is not purely an affair of birth, but may be acquired, has quite fallen out of our circle of ideas; but so, for that matter, has the primitive conception of kindred itself. To us kinship has no absolute value, but is measured by degrees, and means much or little, or nothing at all, according to its degree and other circumstances. In ancient times, on the contrary, the fundamental obligations of kinship had nothing to do with degrees of relationship, but rested with absolute and identical force on every member of the clan. To know that a man's life was sacred to me, and that every blood-feud that touched him involved me also, it was not necessary for me to count cousinship with him by reckoning up to our common ancestor; it was enough that we belonged to the same clan and bore the same clan-name. What was my clan was determined by customary law, which was not the same in all stages of society; in the earliest Semitic communities a man was of his mother's clan, in later times he belonged to the clan of his father. But the essential idea of kinship was independent of the particular form of the law. A kin was a group of persons whose lives were so bound up together, in what must be called a physical unity, that they could be treated as parts

[1] This of course is to be understood only of the fundamental rights and duties which turn on the sanctity of kindred blood. The secondary privileges of kinship, in matters of inheritance and the like, lie outside of the present argument, and with regard to them the covenanted ally had not the full rights of a kinsman (*Kinship*, p. 55 *sq.*).

of one common life. The members of one kindred looked on themselves as one living whole, a single animated mass of blood, flesh and bones, of which no member could be touched without all the members suffering. This point of view is expressed in the Semitic tongues in many familiar forms of speech. In a case of homicide Arabian tribesmen do not say, "The blood of M. or N. has been spilt," naming the man; they say, "Our blood has been spilt." In Hebrew the phrase by which one claims kinship is "I am your bone and your flesh."[1] Both in Hebrew and in Arabic "flesh" is synonymous with "clan" or kindred group.[2] To us all this seems mere metaphor, from which no practical consequences can follow. But in early thought there is no sharp line between the metaphorical and the literal, between the way of expressing a thing and the way of conceiving it; phrases and symbols are treated as realities. Now, if kinship means participation in a common mass of flesh blood and bones, it is natural that it should be regarded as dependent, not merely on the fact that a man was born of his mother's body, and so was from his birth a part of her flesh, but also on the not less significant fact that he was nourished by her milk. And so we find that among the Arabs there is a tie of milk, as well as of blood, which unites the
★ foster-child to his foster-mother and her kin. Again, after the child is weaned, his flesh and blood continue to be nourished and renewed by the food which he shares with his commensals, so that commensality can be thought of (1) as confirming or even (2) as constituting kinship in a very real sense.[3]

Judg. ix. 2; 2 Sam. v. 1. Conversely in acknowledging kinship the
★ phrase is "Thou art my bone and my flesh" (Gen. xxix. 14; 2 Sam. xix. 12); cf. Gen. xxxvii. 27, "our brother and our flesh."

[2] Lev. xxv. 49; *Kinship*, p. 175.

[3] Cf. *Kinship*, p. 176 *sq.*

As regards their bearing on the doctrine of sacrifice it will conduce to clearness if we keep these two points distinct. Primarily the circle of common religion and of common social duties was identical with that of natural kinship,[1] and the god himself was conceived as a being of the same stock with his worshippers. It was natural, therefore, that the kinsmen and their kindred god should seal and strengthen their fellowship by meeting together from time to time to nourish their common life by a common meal, to which those outside the kin were not admitted. A good example of this kind of clan sacrifice, in which a whole kinship periodically joins, is afforded by the Roman *sacra gentilicia*. As in primitive society no man can belong to more than one kindred, so among the Romans no one could share in the *sacra* of two gentes—to do so was to confound the ritual and contaminate the purity of the gens. The *sacra* consisted in common anniversary sacrifices, in which the clansmen honoured the gods of the clan and after them the "demons" of their ancestors, so that the whole kin living and dead were brought together in the service.[2] That the earliest sacrificial feasts among the Semites were of the nature of *sacra gentilicia* is matter of inference rather than of direct evidence, but is not on that account less certain. For that the Semites form no exception to the general rule that the circle of religion and of kinship were originally identical, has been shown in Lecture II. The only thing, therefore, for which additional proof is needed is that the sacrificial ritual of the Semites already existed in this primitive form of society. That this was so is morally certain on general grounds; for an institution like the

[1] *Supra*, p. 50.

[2] For proofs and further details see the evidence collected by Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsverwaltung*, 2nd ed., iii. 130 *sq.*

sacrificial meal, which occurs with the same general features all over the world, and is found among the most primitive peoples, must, in the nature of things, date from the earliest stage of social organisation. And the general argument is confirmed by the fact that after several clans had begun to frequent the same sanctuary and worship the same god, the worshippers still grouped themselves for sacrificial purposes on the principle of kinship. In the days of Saul and David all the tribes of Israel had long been united in the worship of Jehovah, yet the clans still maintained their annual gentile sacrifice, at which every member of the group was bound to be present.[1] But evidence more decisive comes to us from Arabia, where, as we have seen, men would not eat together at all unless they were united by kinship or by a covenant that had the same effect as natural kinship. Under such a rule the sacrificial feast must have been confined to kinsmen, and the clan was the largest circle that could unite in a sacrificial act. And so, though the great sanctuaries of heathen Arabia were frequented at the pilgrimage feasts by men of different tribes, who met peaceably for a season under the protection of the truce of God, we find that their participation in the worship of the same holy place did not bind alien clans together in any religious unity; they worshipped side by side, but not together. It is only under Islam that the pilgrimage

[1] 1 Sam. xx. 6, 29. The word *mishpaḥa*, which the English Bible here and elsewhere renders "family," denotes not a household but a clan. In verse 29 the true reading is indicated by the Septuagint, and has been restored by Wellhausen (הוּא צִוָּה לִי אַחַי). It was not David's brother, but his brethren, that is his clansmen, that enjoined his presence. The annual festivity, the duty of all clansmen to attend, the expectation that this sacred duty would be accepted as a valid excuse for absence from court even at the king's new-moon sacrifice, are so many points of correspondence with the Roman gentile worship; cf. Gellius, xvi. 4. 3, and the other passages cited by Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsverwaltung*, 2nd ed., iii. 132, note 4.

becomes a bond of religious fellowship, whereas in the times of heathenism it was the correct usage that the different tribes, before they broke up from the feast, should engage in a rivalry of self-exaltation and mutual abuse, which sent them home with all their old jealousies freshly inflamed.[1]

That the sacrificial meal was originally a feast of kinsmen, is apt to suggest to modern minds the idea that its primitive type is to be sought in the household circle, and that public sacrifices, in which the whole clan united, are merely an extension of such an act of domestic worship as in ancient Rome accompanied every family meal. The Roman family never rose from supper till a portion of food had been laid on the burning hearth as an offering to the Lares, and the current opinion, which regards the gens as nothing more than an enlarged household, naturally looks on the gentile sacrifice as an enlargement of this domestic rite. But the notion that the clan is only a larger household is not consistent with the results of modern research. Kinship is an older thing than family life, and in the most primitive societies known to us the family or household group was not a subdivision of the clan, but contained members of more than one kindred. As a rule the savage

[1] See Goldziher, *Muh. Stud.* i. 56. The prayer and exhortation of the leader of the procession of tribes from 'Arafa (*Agh.* iii. 4; Wellh.[1] p. 191) seems to me to be meant for his own tribe alone. The prayer for "peace among our women, a continuous range of pasture occupied by our herdsmen, wealth placed in the hands of our most generous men," asks only blessings for the tribe, and indeed occurs elsewhere as a form of blessing addressed to a tribe (*Agh.* xix. 132. 6). And the admonition to observe treaties, honour clients, and be hospitable to guests, contains nothing that was not a point of tribal morality. The *ijāza*, or right to give the signal for dissolving the worshipping assembly, belonged to a particular tribe; it was the right to start first. The man who gave the sign to this tribe closed the service for them by a prayer and admonition. This is all that I can gather from the passage, and it does not prove that the tribes had any other religious communion than was involved in their being in one place at one time.

man may not marry a clanswoman, and the children are of the mother's kin, and therefore have no communion of blood religion with their father. In such a society there is hardly any family life, and there can be no sacred household meal. Before the family meal can acquire the religious significance that it possessed in Rome, one of two things must take place: either the primitive association of religion with kinship must be dissolved, or means must have been found to make the whole household of one blood, as was done in Rome by the rule that the wife upon her marriage was adopted into her husband's gens.[1] The rudest nations have religious rules about food, based on the principle of kinship, viz. that a man may not eat the totem animal of his clan; and they generally have some rites of the nature of the sacrificial feast of kinsmen; but it is not the custom of savages to take their ordinary daily food in a social way, in regular domestic meals. Their habit is to eat irregularly and apart, and this habit is strengthened by the religious rules, which often forbid to one member of a household the food which is permitted to another.

We have no direct evidence as to the rules and habits of the Semites in the state of primitive savagery, though there is ample proof of an indirect kind that they originally reckoned kinship through the mother, and that men often, if not always, took their wives from strange kins. It is to be presumed that at this stage of society the Semite did not eat with his wife and children, and it is certain that if he did so the meal could not have had a religious character, as an acknowledgment and seal of kinship and adherence

[1] In Greece, according to the testimony of Theophrastus, *ap.* Porph., *De Abst.* ii. 20 (Bernays, p. 68), it was customary to pay to the gods an *aparche* of every meal. The term ἀπάρχεσθαι seems to place this offering under the head of gifts rather than of sacrificial communion, and the gods to whom the offering was made were not, as at Rome, family gods.

to a kindred god. But in fact the family meal never became a fixed institution among the Semites generally. In Egypt, down to the present day, many persons hardly ever eat with their wives and children,[1] and, among the Arabs, boys who are not of full age do not presume to eat in the presence of their parents, but take their meals separately or with the women of the house.[2] No doubt the seclusion of women has retarded the development of family life in Mohammedan countries; but for most purposes this seclusion has never taken much hold on the desert, and yet in northern Arabia no woman will eat ★ before men.[3] I apprehend that these customs were originally formed at a time when a man and his wife and family were not usually of one kin, and when only kinsmen would eat together.[4] But be this as it may, the fact remains that in Arabia the daily family meal has never been an established institution with such a religious significance as attaches to the Roman supper.[5]

The sacrificial feast, therefore, cannot be traced back to the domestic meal, but must be considered as having been

[1] Lane, *Mod. Egyptians*, 5th ed., i. 179; cf. *Arabian Nights*, chap. ii. note 17.

[2] Burckhardt, *Bed. and Wah.* i. 355; Doughty, ii. 142.

[3] Burckhardt, *op. cit.* i. 349. Conversely Ibn Mojāwir, *ap.* Sprenger, *Postrouten*, p. 151, tells of southern Arabs who would rather die than accept food at the hand of a woman.

[4] In Arabia, even in historical times, the wife was not adopted into her husband's kin. The children in historical times were generally reckoned to the father's stock; but there is much reason to think that this new rule of kinship, when it first came in, did not mean that the infant was born into his father's clan, but that he was adopted into it by a formal act, which did not always take place in infancy. We find that young children follow their mother (*Kinship*, p. 137 *sq.*), and that the law of blood revenge did not prevent fathers from killing their young daughters (*ibid.* p. 153 *sq.*). Of this more hereafter.

[5] The naming of God, by which every meal is consecrated according to Mohammed's precept, seems in ancient times to have been practised only when a victim was slaughtered; cf. Wellh. p. 117. Here the *tahlīl* corresponds to the blessing of the sacrifice, 1 Sam. ix. 13.

from the first a public feast of clansmen. That this is true not only for Arabia but for the Semites as a whole might be inferred on general grounds, inasmuch as all Semitic worship manifestly springs from a common origin, and the inference is confirmed by the observation that even among the agricultural Semites there is no trace of a sacrificial character being attached to ordinary household meals. The domestic hearth among the Semites was not an altar as it was at Rome.[1]

Almost all varieties of human food were offered to the gods, and any kind of food suffices, according to the laws of Arabian hospitality, to establish that bond between two men which in the last resort rests on the principle that only kinsmen eat together. It may seem, therefore, that in the abstract any sort of meal publicly partaken of by a company of kinsmen may constitute a sacrificial feast. The distinction between the feast and an ordinary meal lies, it may seem, not in the material or the copiousness of the repast, but in its public character. When men eat alone they do not invite the god to share their food, but when the clan eats together as a kindred unity the kindred god must also be of the party.

Practically, however, there is no sacrificial feast according to Semitic usage except where a victim is slaughtered. The rule of the Levitical law, that a cereal oblation, when offered alone, belongs wholly to the god and gives no occasion for a feast of the worshippers, agrees with the older history, in which we never find a sacrificial meal of which flesh does not form part. Among the Arabs the usage is the same; a religious banquet implies a victim. It appears, therefore, to look at the matter from its merely human side, that the slaughter of a victim must have been

[1] The passover became a sort of household sacrifice after the exile, but was not so originally. See Wellhausen, *Prolegomena*, chap. iii.

in early times the only thing that brought the clan together for a stated meal. Conversely, every slaughter was a clan sacrifice, that is, a domestic animal was not slain except to procure the material for a public meal of kinsmen. This last proposition seems startling, but it is confirmed by the direct evidence of Nilus as to the habits of the Arabs of the Sinaitic desert towards the close of the fourth Christian century. The ordinary sustenance of these Saracens was derived from pillage or from hunting, to which, no doubt, must be added, as a main element, the milk of their herds. When these supplies failed they fell back on the flesh of their camels, one of which was slain for each clan (*συγγένεια*) or for each group which habitually pitched their tents together (*συσκηνία*)—which according to known Arab usage would always be a fraction of a clan—and the flesh was hastily devoured by the kinsmen in dog-like fashion, half raw and merely softened over the fire.[1]

To grasp the force of this evidence we must remember that, beyond question, there was at this time among the Saracens private property in camels, and that therefore, so far as the law of property went, there could be no reason why a man should not kill a beast for the use of his own family. And though a whole camel might be too much for a single household to eat fresh, the Arabs knew and practised the art of preserving flesh by cutting it into strips and drying them in the sun. Under these circumstances private slaughter could not have failed to be customary, unless it was absolutely forbidden by tribal usage. In short, it appears that while milk, game, the fruits of pillage were private food which might be eaten in any way, the

[1] *Nili opera quædam nondum edita* (Paris, 1639), p. 27.—The *συγγένεια* answers to the Arabic *baṭn*, the *συσκηνία* to the Arabic *ḥayy*, in the sense of encampment. See *Kinship*, p. 41 *sq.*

camel was not allowed to be killed and eaten except in a public rite, at which all the kinsmen assisted.

This evidence is all the more remarkable because, among the Saracens of whom Nilus speaks, the slaughter of a camel in times of hunger does not seem to have been considered as a sacrifice to the gods. For a couple of pages later he speaks expressly of the sacrifices which these Arabs offered to the morning star, the sole deity that they acknowledged. These could be performed only when the star was visible, and the whole victim—flesh, skin and bones—had to be devoured before the sun rose upon it, and the day-star disappeared. As this form of sacrifice was necessarily confined to seasons when the planet Venus was a morning star, while the necessity for slaughtering a camel as food might arise at any season, it is to be inferred that in the latter case the victim was not recognised as having a sacrificial character. The Saracens, in fact, had outlived the stage in which no necessity can justify slaughter that is not sacrificial. The principle that the god claims his share in every slaughter has its origin in the religion of kinship, and dates from a time when the tribal god was himself a member of the tribal stock, so that his participation in the sacrificial feast was only one aspect of the rule that no kinsman must be excluded from a share in the victim. But the Saracens of Nilus, like the Arabs generally in the last ages of heathenism, had ceased to do sacrifice to the tribal or clan gods with whose worship the feast of kinsmen was originally connected. The planet Venus, or Lucifer, was not a tribal deity, but, as we know from a variety of sources, was worshipped by all the northern Arabs, to whatever kin they belonged. It is not therefore surprising that in case of necessity we should meet with a slaughter in which the non-tribal deity had no part; but it is noteworthy that, after the

victim had lost its sacrificial character, it was still deemed necessary that the slaughter should be the affair of the whole kindred. That this was so, while among the Hebrews, on the other hand, the rule that all legitimate slaughter is sacrifice survived long after householders were permitted to make private sacrifices on their own account, is characteristic of the peculiar development of Arabia, where, as Wellhausen has justly remarked, religious feeling was quite put in the shade by the feeling for the sanctity of kindred blood. Elsewhere among the Semites we see the old religion surviving the tribal system on which it was based, and accommodating itself to the new forms of national life; but in Arabia the rules and customs of the kin retained the sanctity which they originally derived from their connection with the religion of the kin, long after the kindred god had been forgotten or had sunk into quite a subordinate place. I take it, however, that the eating of camels' flesh continued to be regarded by the Arabs as in some sense a religious act, even when it was no longer associated with a formal act of sacrifice; for abstinence from the flesh of camels and wild asses was prescribed by Simeon Stylites to his Saracen converts,[1] and traces of an idolatrous significance in feasts of camels' flesh appear in Mohammedan tradition.[2]

The persistence among the Arabs of the scruple against private slaughter for a man's own personal use may, I think, be traced in a modified form in other parts of Arabia and long after the time of Nilus. Even in modern times,

[1] Theodoret, ed. Nösselt, iii. 1274 *sq.*

[2] Wellh. p. 117; *Kinship*, p. 60. These traces are the more worthy of notice because we also find indications that, down to the time of the prophet, or even later, the idea prevailed that camels, or at all events certain breeds of camels, were of demoniac origin; see Cazwīnī, ii. 42, and other authorities cited by Vloten in the *Vienna Oriental Journal*, vii. 239.

when a sheep or camel is slain in honour of a guest, the good old custom is that the host keeps open house for his neighbours, or at least distributes portions of the flesh as far as it will go. To do otherwise is still deemed churlish, though not illegal, and the old Arabic literature leaves the impression that in ancient times this feeling was still stronger than it is now, and that the whole encampment was considered when a beast was slain for food.[1] But be this as it may, it is highly significant to find that, even in one branch of the Arabian race, the doctrine that hunger itself does not justify slaughter, except as the act of the clan, was so deeply rooted as to survive the doctrine that all slaughter is sacrifice. This fact is sufficient to remove the last doubt as to the proposition that all sacrifice was originally clan sacrifice, and at the same time it puts the slaughter of a victim in a new light, by classing it among the acts which, in primitive society, are illegal to an individual, and can only be justified when the whole clan shares the responsibility of the deed. So far as I know, there is only one class of actions recognised by early nations to which this description applies, viz. actions which involve an invasion of the sanctity of the tribal blood. In fact, a life which no single tribesman is allowed to invade, and which can be sacrificed only by the consent and common action of the kin, stands on the same footing with the life of the fellow-tribesman. Neither may be taken away by private violence, but only by the consent of the kindred

[1] Compare especially the story of Māwīya's courtship (*Agh.* xvi. 103 *sq.*; Caussin de Perceval, ii. 613). The beggar's claim to a share in the feast is doubtless ultimately based on religious and tribal usage rather than on personal generosity. Cf. Deut. xxvi. 13. Similarly among the Zulus, "when a man kills a cow—which, however, is seldom and reluctantly done, unless it happens to be stolen property—the whole population of the hamlet assemble to eat it without invitation; and people living at a distance of ten miles will also come to partake of the feast" (Shaw, *Memorials of South Africa*, p. 59).

and the kindred god. And the parallelism between the two cases is curiously marked in detail by what I may call a similarity between the ritual of sacrifice and of the execution of a tribesman. In both cases it is required that, as far as possible, every member of the kindred should be not only a consenting party but a partaker in the act, so that whatever responsibility it involves may be equally distributed over the whole clan. This is the meaning of the ancient Hebrew form of execution, where the culprit is stoned by the whole congregation.

The idea that the life of a brute animal may be protected by the same kind of religious scruple as the life of a fellow-man is one which we have a difficulty in grasping, or which at any rate we are apt to regard as more proper to a late and sentimental age than to the rude life of primitive times. But this difficulty mainly comes from our taking up a false point of view. Early man had certainly no conception of the sacredness of animal life as such, but neither had he any conception of the sacredness of human life as such. The life of his clansman was sacred to him, not because he was a man, but because he was a kinsman; and, in like manner, the life of an animal of his totem kind is sacred to the savage, not because it is animate, but because he and it are sprung from the same stock and are cousins to one another.

It is clear that the scruple of Nilus's Saracens about killing the camel was of this restricted kind; for they had no objection to kill and eat game. But the camel they would not kill except under the same circumstances as make it lawful for many savages to kill their totem, *i.e.* under the pressure of hunger or in connection with exceptional religious rites.[1] The parallelism between the Arabian custom and totemism is therefore complete except

[1] Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, iv. pp. 19 *sq.*, 45.

in one point. There is no direct evidence that the scruple against the private slaughter of a camel had its origin in feelings of kinship. But, as we have seen, there is this indirect evidence, that the consent and participation of the clan, which was required to make the slaughter of a camel legitimate, is the very thing that is needed to make the death of a kinsman legitimate. And direct evidence we cannot expect to find, for it is most improbable that the Arabs of Nilus's time retained any clear ideas about the original significance of rules inherited by tradition from a more primitive state of society.

The presumption thus created that the regard paid by the Saracens for the life of the camel sprang from the same principle of kinship between men and certain kinds of animals which is the prime factor in totemism, would not be worth much if it rested only on an isolated statement about a particular branch of the Arab race. But it is to be observed that the same kind of restriction on the private slaughter of animals must have existed in ancient times among all the Semites. We have found reason to believe that among the early Semites generally no slaughter was legitimate except for sacrifice, and we have also found reason, apart from Nilus's evidence, for believing that all Semitic sacrifice was originally the act of the community. If these two propositions are true, it follows that all the Semites at one time protected the lives of animals proper for sacrifice, and forbade them to be slain except by the act of the clan, that is, except under such circumstances as would justify or excuse the death of a kinsman. Now, if it thus appears that the scruple against private slaughter of an animal proper for sacrifice was no mere individual peculiarity of Nilus's Saracens, but must at an early period have extended to all the Semites, it is obvious that the conjecture which connects the scruple with a feeling of

kinship between the worshippers and the victim gains greatly in plausibility. For the origin of the scruple must now be sought in some widespread and very primitive habit of thought, and it is therefore apposite to point out that among primitive peoples there are no binding precepts of conduct except those that rest on the principle of kinship.[1] This is the general rule which is found in operation wherever we have an opportunity of observing rude societies, and that it prevailed among the early Semites is not to be doubted. Indeed among the Arabs the rule held good without substantial modification down to the time of Mohammed. No life and no obligation was sacred unless it was brought within the charmed circle of the kindred blood.

Thus the *prima facie* presumption, that the scruple in question had to do with the notion that certain animals were akin to men, becomes very strong indeed, and can hardly be set aside unless those who reject it are prepared to show that the idea of kinship between men and beasts, as it is found in most primitive nations, was altogether foreign to Semitic thought, or at least had no substantial place in the ancient religious ideas of that race. But I do not propose to throw the burden of proof on the antagonist.

I have already had occasion in another connection to shew by a variety of evidences that the earliest Semites, like primitive men of other races, drew no sharp line of distinction between the nature of gods, of men, and of beasts, and had no difficulty in admitting a real kinship between (*a*) gods and men, (*b*) gods and sacred animals, (*c*) families of men and families of beasts.[2] As regards

[1] In religions based on kinship, where the god and his worshippers are of one stock, precepts of sanctity are, of course, covered by the principle of kinship.

[2] *Supra*, pp. 41 *sqq.* 85 *sqq.*

the third of these points, the direct evidence is fragmentary and sporadic; it is sufficient to prove that the idea of kinship between races of men and races of beasts was not foreign to the Semites, but it is not sufficient to prove that such a belief was widely prevalent, or to justify us in taking it as one of the fundamental principles on which Semitic ritual was founded. But it must be remembered that the three points are so connected that if any two of them are established, the third necessarily follows. Now, as regards (*a*), it is not disputed that the kinship of gods with their worshippers is a fundamental doctrine of Semitic religion; it appears so widely and in so many forms and applications, that we cannot look upon it otherwise than as one of the first and most universal principles of ancient faith. Again, as regards (*b*), a belief in sacred animals, which are treated with the reverence due to divine beings, is an essential element in the most widespread and important Semitic cults. All the great deities of the northern Semites had their sacred animals, and were themselves worshipped in animal form, or in association with animal symbols, down to a late date; and that this association implied a veritable unity of kind between animals and gods is placed beyond doubt, on the one hand, by the fact that the sacred animals, *e.g.* the doves and fish of Atargatis, were reverenced with divine honours; and, on the other hand, by theogonic myths, such as that which makes the dove-goddess be born from an egg, and transformation myths, such as that of Bambyce, where it was believed that the fish-goddess and her son had actually been transformed into fish.[1]

[1] Examples of the evidence on this head have been given above; a fuller account of it will fall to be given in a future course of lectures. Meantime the reader may refer to *Kinship*, chap. vii. I may here, however, add a general argument which seems to deserve attention. We have seen (*supra*, p. 142 *sqq.*) that holiness is not based on the idea of property. Holy

Now if kinship between the gods and their worshippers, on the one hand, and kinship between the gods and certain kinds of animals, on the other, are deep-seated principles of Semitic religion, manifesting themselves in all parts of the sacred institutions of the race, we must necessarily conclude that kinship between families of men and animal kinds was an idea equally deep-seated, and we shall expect to find that sacred animals, wherever they occur, will be treated with the regard which men pay to their kinsfolk.

Indeed in a religion based on kinship, where the god and his worshippers are of one stock, the principle of sanctity and that of kinship are identical. The sanctity of a kinsman's life and the sanctity of the godhead are not two things, but one; for ultimately the only thing that is sacred is the common tribal life, or the common blood which is identified with the life. Whatever being partakes in this life is holy, and its holiness may be described indifferently, as participation in the divine life and nature, or as participation in the kindred blood.

Thus the conjecture that sacrificial animals were originally treated as kinsmen, is simply equivalent to the conjecture that sacrifices were drawn from animals of a holy kind, whose lives were ordinarily protected by religious scruples and sanctions; and in support of this position a great mass of evidence can be adduced, not merely for Semitic sacrifice, but for ancient sacrifice generally.

In the later days of heathenism, when animal food

animals, and holy things generally, are primarily conceived, not as belonging to the deity, but as being themselves instinct with divine power or life. Thus a holy animal is one which has a divine life; and if it be holy to a particular god, the meaning must be that its life and his are somehow bound up together. From what is known of primitive ways of thought we may infer that this means that the sacred animal is akin to the god, for all valid and permanent relation between individuals is conceived as kinship.

was commonly eaten, and the rule that all legitimate slaughter must be sacrificial was no longer insisted on, sacrifices were divided into two classes; ordinary sacrifices, where the victims were sheep, oxen or other beasts habitually used for food, and extraordinary sacrifices, where the victims were animals whose flesh was regarded as forbidden meat. The Emperor Julian[1] tells us that in the cities of the Roman Empire such extraordinary sacrifices were celebrated once or twice a year in mystical ceremonies, and he gives as an example the sacrifice of the dog to Hecate. In this case the victim was the sacred animal of the goddess to which it was offered; Hecate is represented in mythology as accompanied by demoniac dogs, and in her worship she loved to be addressed by the name of Dog.[2] Here, therefore, the victim is not only a sacred animal, but an animal kindred to the deity to which it is sacrificed. The same principle seems to lie at the root of all exceptional sacrifices of unclean animals, *i.e.* animals that were not ordinarily eaten, for we have already seen that the idea of uncleanness and holiness meet in the primitive conception of taboo. I leave it to classical scholars to follow this out in its application to Greek and Roman sacrifice; but as regards the Semites it is worth while to establish the point by going in detail through the sacrifices of unclean beasts that are known to us.

1. *The swine.* According to Al-Nadīm the heathen Harranians sacrificed the swine and ate swine's flesh once a year.[3] This ceremony is ancient, for it appears in Cyprus in connection with the worship of the Semitic Aphrodite and Adonis. In the ordinary worship of

[1] *Orat.* v. p. 176.

[2] Porph., *De Abst.* iii. 17, iv. 16. Mr. Bury has suggested that etymologically Ἑκάτη = Hund, hound, as ἑκατον = hundert, hundred.

[3] *Fihrist*, p. 326, l. 3 *sq.*

Aphrodite swine were not admitted, but in Cyprus wild boars were sacrificed once a year on April 2.[1] The same sacrifice is alluded to in the Book of Isaiah as a heathen abomination,[2] with which the prophet associates the sacrifice of two other unclean animals, the dog and the mouse. We know from Lucian that the swine was esteemed sacrosanct by the Syrians,[3] and that it was specially sacred to Aphrodite or Astarte is affirmed by Antiphanes, *ap.* Athen. iii. 49.[4]

2. *The dog.* This sacrifice, as we have seen, is mentioned in the Book of Isaiah, and it seems also to be alluded to as a Punic rite in Justin, xviii. 1. 10, where we read that Darius sent a message to the Carthaginians forbidding them to sacrifice human victims and to eat the flesh of dogs: in the connection a religious meal must be understood. In this case the accounts do not connect the rite with any particular deity to whom the dog was sacred,[5] but we know from Al-Nadīm that the dog was sacred among the Harranians. They offered sacrificial gifts to it, and in certain mysteries dogs were solemnly declared to be the brothers of the mystæ.[6] A hint as to the identity of the god to whom the dog was sacred may perhaps be got from Jacob of Sarug, who mentions "the Lord with the dogs" as one of the deities of Carrhæ.[7] This god again may be compared with the huntsman

[1] Lydus, *De Mensibus*, Bonn ed., p. 80. Exceptional sacrifices of swine to Aphrodite also took place at Argos (Athen. iii. 49) and in Pamphylia (Strabo, ix. 5. 17), but the Semitic origin of these rites is not so certain as in the case of the Cyprian goddess. The sacrifice of a sow is represented on the rock sculptures of J'rapta (Renan, *Phén.* pl. 31; cf. Pietschmann, p. 219, also Baudissin, *Adonis*, p. 145).

[2] Isa. lxv. 4, lxvi. 3, 17.

[3] *Dea Syria*, liv.

[4] In a modern Syrian superstition we find that a demoniac swine haunts houses where there is a marriageable maiden, *ZDPV.* vii. 107.

[5] Movers, *Phoenizier*, i. 104, is quite unsatisfactory.

[6] *Fihrist*, p. 326, l. 27; cf. p. 323, l. 28; p. 324, l. 2.

[7] *ZDMG.* xxix. 110; cf. vol. xlii. p. 473.

Heracles of the Assyrians mentioned by Tacitus.[1] The Tyrian Heracles or Melcarth also appears accompanied by a dog in the legend of the invention of the purple dye preserved by Pollux (i. 46) and Malalas (p. 32).[2] In Mohammedan tradition a demoniac character is ascribed to black dogs, which probably implies that in heathenism they had a certain sanctity.[3]

3. *Fish*, or at least certain species of fish, were sacred to Atargatis and forbidden food to all the Syrians, her worshippers, who believed—as totem peoples do—that if they ate the sacred flesh they would be visited by ulcers.[4]

[1] Tacitus, *Ann.* xii. 13. A huntsman god accompanied by a dog is figured ★ on cylinders (*Gazette Archéol.* 1879, p. 178 *sqq.*), but Assyriologists seem not to be agreed as to his identity. There were probably more divine huntsmen than one.

[2] Whether the Sicilian god Adranus, whose sacred dogs are mentioned by Ælian, *Nat. An.* xi. 20 (confirmed by monumental evidence; Ganneau, *Rec. d'Arch. Or.* i. 236), is of Semitic origin is very uncertain. He is generally identified with Adar (the Adrammelech of the Bible); see Holm, *Gesch. Sic.* i. 95, 377. But the very existence of an Assyrian god Adar is problematical, and the Hadran of Melito (*Spic. Syr.* p. 25), who is taken by others as the Semitic equivalent of Adranus, is a figure equally obscure.

If the conjecture that the Heracles worshipped by the νέλει in the Cynosarges at Athens was really the Phœnician Heracles can be made out, the connection of this deity with the dog will receive further confirmation. For Cynosarges means "the dog's yard" (Wachsmuth, *Athen.* i. 461). Steph. Byz. *s.v.* explains the name by a legend that while Diomos was sacrificing to Heracles, a white dog snatched the sacrificial pieces and laid them down on the spot where the sanctuary afterwards stood. The dog is here the sacred messenger who declares the will of the god, like the eagle of Zeus in Malalas, p. 199; cf. Steph. Byz. *s.v.* γαλεῶται. The sanctity of the dog among the Phœnicians seems also to be confirmed by the proper names ★ כלבא, כלבאלים, and by the existence of a class of sacred ministers called "dogs" (*CIS.* No. 86, cf. Deut. xxiii. 18 [19]). Reinach and G. Hoffmann, *op. cit.* p. 17, are hardly right in thinking of literal dogs; but in any case that would only strengthen the argument.

[3] Damīrī, ii. 223; Vloten in *Vienna Or. Journ.* vii. 240. See also the legend of the dog-demon of Riām, B. Hish. p. 18. In Moslem countries dogs are still regarded with a curious mixture of respect and contempt. They are unclean, but it is an act of piety to feed them, and especially to give them drink (Moslim, ii. 196, ed. of A. H. 1290); and to kill a dog, as I have observed at Jeddah, is an act that excites a good deal of feeling. See also *ZDPV.* vii. 93.

[4] See the evidence collected by Selden, *de Diis Syris, Synt.* ii. cap. 3.

Yet Mnaseas (*ap.* Athen. viii. 37) tells us that fish were daily cooked and presented on the table of the goddess, being afterwards consumed by the priests; and Assyrian cylinders display the fish laid on the altar or presented before it, while, in one example, a figure which stands by in an attitude of adoration is clothed, or rather disguised, in a gigantic fish skin.[1] The meaning of such a disguise is well known from many savage rituals; it implies that the worshipper presents himself as a fish, *i.e.* as a being kindred to his sacrifice, and doubtless also to the deity to which it is consecrated.

4. *The mouse* appears as an abominable sacrifice in Isa. lxvi. 17, along with the swine and the "abomination" (שקץ). The last word is applied in the Levitical law[2] to creeping vermin generally (שרץ = Arab. *ḥanash*), a term which included the mouse and other such small quadrupeds as we also call vermin. All such creatures were unclean in an intense degree, and had the power to communicate uncleanness to whatever they touched. So strict a taboo is hardly to be explained except by supposing that, like the Arabian *ḥanash*,[3] they had supernatural and demoniac qualities. And in fact, in Ezek. viii. 10, we find them as objects of superstitious adoration. On what authority Maimonides says that the Harranians sacrificed field-mice I do not know,[4] but the biblical evidence is sufficient for our purpose.

5. *The horse* was sacred to the Sun-god, for 2 Kings xxiii. 11 speaks of the horses which the kings of Judah had consecrated to this deity—a superstition to which Josiah put an end. At Rhodes, where religion is throughout of a Semitic type, four horses were cast into the sea as a sacrifice at the annual feast of the sun.[5] The

[1] Menant, *Glyptique*, ii. 53. [2] Lev. xi. 41. [3] *Supra*, p. 128.

[4] Ed. Munk, vol. iii. p. 64, or Chwolsohn, *Ssabier*, ii. 456.

[5] Festus, *s.v.* "October equus"; cf. Pausanias, iii. 20. 4 (sacrifice of horses to the Sun at Taygetus); *Kinship*, p. 242 *sq.*

winged horse (Pegasus) is a sacred symbol of the Carthaginians.

6. *The dove*, which the Semites would neither eat nor touch, was sacrificed by the Romans to Venus;[1] and as the Roman Venus-worship of later times was largely derived from the Phœnician sanctuary of Eryx, where the dove had peculiar honour as the companion of Astarte,[2] it is very possible that this was a Semitic rite, though I have not found any conclusive evidence that it was so. It must certainly have been a very rare sacrifice; for the dove among the Semites had a quite peculiar sanctity, and Al-Nadīm says expressly that it was not sacrificed by the Harranians.[3] It was, however, offered by the Hebrews, in sacrifices which we shall by and by see reason to regard as closely analogous to mystical rites; and in Juvenal, vi. 459 *sqq.*, the superstitious matrons of Rome are represented as calling in an Armenian or Syrian (Commagenian) haruspex to perform the sacrifice of a dove, a chicken, a dog, or even a child. In this association an exceptional and mystic sacrifice is necessarily implied.[4]

The evidence of these examples is unambiguous. When an unclean animal is sacrificed it is also a sacred animal. If the deity to which it is devoted is named, it is the deity which ordinarily protects the sanctity of the victim, and, in some cases, the worshippers either in words or by symbolic disguise claim kinship with the victim and the god. Further, the sacrifice is generally limited to certain solemn occasions, usually annual, and so has the character of a public celebration. In several cases the worshippers partake of the sacred flesh, which at other times it would

[1] Propertius, iv. 5. 62.

[2] Ælian, *Nat. An.* iv. 2.

[3] *Fihrist*, p. 319, l. 21.

[4] Cf. the חזות, *CIS.* No. 165, l. 11. Some other sacrifices of wild animals, which present analogies to these mystic rites, will be considered in *Additional Note* F, *Sacrifices of Sacred Animals.*

be impious to touch. All this is exactly what we find among totem peoples. Here also the sacred animal is forbidden food, it is akin to the men who acknowledge its sanctity, and if there is a god it is akin to the god. And, finally, the totem is sometimes sacrificed at an annual feast, with special and solemn ritual. In such cases the flesh may be buried or cast into a river, as the horses of the sun were cast into the sea,[1] but at other times it is eaten as a mystic sacrament.[2] These points of contact with the most primitive superstition cannot be accidental; they show that the mystical sacrifices, as Julian calls them, the sacrifices of animals not ordinarily eaten, are not the invention of later times, but have preserved with great accuracy the features of a sacrificial ritual of extreme antiquity.

To a superficial view the ordinary sacrifices of domestic animals, such as were commonly used for food, seem to stand on quite another footing; yet we have been led, by an independent line of reasoning, based on the evidence that all sacrifice was originally the act of the

[1] Bancroft, iii. 168; Frazer, *Totem. and Exog.*, i. 44 *sq.*, iv. 230 *sq.*

[2] The proof of this has to be put together out of the fragmentary evidence which is generally all that we possess on such matters. As regards America the most conclusive evidence comes from Mexico, where the gods, though certainly of totem origin, had become anthropomorphic, and the victim, who was regarded as the representative of the god, was human. At other times paste idols of the god were eaten sacramentally. But that the ruder Americans attached a sacramental virtue to the eating of the totem appears from what is related of the Bear clan of the Ouataouaks (*Lettres édif. et cur.* vi. 171), who when they kill a bear make him a feast of his own flesh, and tell him not to resent being killed; "tu as de l'esprit, tu vois que nos enfants souffrent la faim, ils t'aiment, ils veulent te faire entrer dans leur corps, n'est il pas glorieux d'être mangé par des enfans de Captaine?" The bear feast of the Ainos of Japan (fully described by Scheube in *Mitth. Deutsch. Gesellsch. S. und S. O. Asiens*, No. 22, p. 44 *sq.*) is a sacrificial feast on the flesh of the bear, which is honoured as divine, and slain with many apologies to the gods, on the pretext of necessity. The eating of the totem as medicine (Frazer, i. 22) belongs to the same circle of ideas. See also *infra*, p. 314.

clan, to surmise that they also in their origin were rare and solemn offerings of victims whose lives were ordinarily deemed sacred, because, like the unclean sacred animals, they were of the kin of the worshippers and of their god.[1]

And in point of fact precisely this kind of respect and
★ reverence is paid to domestic animals among many pastoral peoples in various parts of the globe. They are regarded on the one hand as the friends and kinsmen of men, and on the other hand as sacred beings of a nature akin to the gods; their slaughter is permitted only under exceptional circumstances, and in such cases is never used to provide a private meal, but necessarily forms the occasion of a public feast, if not of a public sacrifice. The clearest case is that of Africa. Agatharchides,[2] describing the Troglodyte nomads of East Africa, a primitive pastoral people in the polyandrous stage of society, tells us that their whole sustenance was derived from their flocks and herds. When pasture abounded, after the rainy season, they lived on milk mingled with blood (drawn apparently, as in Arabia, from the living animal), and in the dry season they had recourse to the flesh of aged or weakly beasts. But the butchers were regarded as unclean. Further, "they gave the name of parent to no human being, but only to the ox and cow, the ram and ewe, from whom they had their nourishment."[3] Here we have all the features which our theory requires: the beasts are sacred and kindred beings,

[1] Strictly speaking the thing is much more than a surmise, even on the evidence already before us. But I prefer to understate rather than overstate the case in a matter of such complexity.

[2] The extracts of Photius and Diodorus are printed together in *Fr. Hist. Gr.* i. 153. The former has some points which the latter omits. See also Artemidorus, *ap.* Strabo, xvi. 4. 17.

[3] This reminds us of the peculiar form of covenant among the Gallas, in which a sheep is introduced as the mother of the parties (Lobo in Pinkerton's *Collection*; *Africa*, i. 8).

for they are the source of human life and subsistence. They are killed only in time of need, and the butchers are unclean, which implies that the slaughter was an impious act.

Similar institutions are found among all the purely pastoral African peoples, and have persisted with more or less modification or attenuation down to our own time.[1] The common food of these races is milk or game;[2] cattle are seldom killed for food, and only on exceptional occasions, such as the proclamation of a war, the circumcision of a youth, or a wedding,[3] or in order to obtain a skin for clothing, or because the creature is maimed or old.[4]

In such cases the feast is public, as among Nilus's Saracens,[5] all blood relations and even all neighbours having a right to partake. Further, the herd and its members are objects of affectionate and personal regard,[6] and are surrounded by sacred scruples and taboos. Among the Caffres the cattle kraal is sacred; women may not enter

[1] For the evidence of the sanctity of cattle among modern rude peoples, I am largely indebted to Mr. Frazer.

[2] Sallust, *Jugurtha*, 89 (Numidians); Alberti, *De Kaffers* (Amst. 1810), p. 37; Lichtenstein, *Reisen*, i. 144. Out of a multitude of proofs I cite these, as being drawn from the parts of the continent most remote from one another.

[3] So among the Caffres (Fleming, *Southern Africa*, p. 260; Lichtenstein, *Reisen*, i. 442). The Dinkas hardly kill cattle except for a funeral feast (Stanley, *Darkest Africa*, i. 424).

[4] Alberti, p. 163 (Caffres); cf. Gen. iii. 21, and Herod. iv. 189. The religious significance of the dress of skin, which appears in the last cited passage, will occupy us later.

[5] So among the Zulus (*supra*, p. 284, note) and among the Caffres (Alberti, *ut supra*).

[6] See in particular the general remarks of Munzinger on the pastoral peoples of East Africa, *Ostafr. Studien* (2nd ed., 1883), p. 547: "The nomad values his cow above all things, and weeps for its death as for that of a child." Again: "They have an incredible attachment to the old breed of cattle, which they have inherited from father and grandfather, and keep a record of their descent"—a trace of the feeling of kinship between the herd and the tribe, as in Agatharchides. See also Schweinfurth, *Heart of Africa*, i. 59 (3rd ed., 1878), and compare 2 Sam. xii. 3.

it,[1] and to defile it is a capital offence.[2] Finally, the notion that cattle are the parents of men, which we find in Agatharchides, survives in the Zulu myth that men, especially great chiefs, "were belched up by a cow."[3]

These instances may suffice to show how universally the attitude towards domestic animals, described by Agatharchides, is diffused among the pastoral peoples of Africa. But I must still notice one peculiar variation of the view that the life of cattle is sacred, which occurs both in Africa and among the Semites. Herodotus[4] tells us that the Libyans, though they ate oxen, would not touch the flesh of the cow. In the circle of ideas which we have found to prevail throughout Africa, this distinction must be connected, on the one hand, with the prevalence of kinship through women, which necessarily made the cow more sacred than the ox, and, on the other, with the fact that it is the cow that fosters man with her milk. The same rule prevailed in Egypt, where the cow was sacred to Hathor-Isis, and also among the Phœnicians, who both ate and sacrificed bulls, but would as soon have eaten human flesh as that of the cow.[5]

The importance of this evidence for our enquiry is all the greater because there is a growing disposition among scholars to recognise an ethnological connection of a somewhat close kind between the Semitic and African races. But the ideas which I have attempted to unfold are not

[1] Fleming, p. 214.

[2] Lichtenstein, i. 479, who adds that the punishment will not seem severe if we consider how holy their cattle are to them.

[3] Lang, *Myth, Ritual*, etc. i. 179.

[4] Bk. iv. chap. 186.

[5] See Porphyry, *De Abst.* ii. 11, for both nations; and, for the Egyptians, Herod. ii. 41. The Phœnician usage can hardly be ascribed to Egyptian influence, for at least a preference for male victims is found among the Semites generally, even where the deity is a goddess. See what Chwolsohn, *Ssabier*, ii. 77 *sqq.*, adduces in illustration of the statement of the *Fihrist*, that the Harranians sacrificed only male victims.

the property of a single race. How far the ancient holiness of cattle, and especially of the cow, among the Iranians, presents details analogous to those which have come before us, is a question which I must leave to the professed students of a very obscure literature; it seems at least to be admitted that the thing is not an innovation of Zoroastrianism, but common to the Iranians with their Indian cousins, so that the origin of the sacred regard paid to the cow must be sought in the primitive nomadic life of the Indo-European race. But to show that exactly such notions as we have found in Africa appear among pastoral peoples of quite different race, I will cite the case of the Todas of South India. Here the domestic animal, the milk-giver and the main source of subsistence, is the buffalo. "The buffalo is treated with great kindness, even with a degree of adoration,"[1] and certain cows, the descendants from mother to daughter of some remote sacred ancestor, are hung with ancient cattle bells and invoked as divinities.[2] Further, "there is good reason for believing the Todas' assertion that they have never at any time eaten the flesh of the female buffalo," and the male they eat only once a year, when all the adult males in the village join in the ceremony of killing and eating a young bull calf, which is killed with special ceremonies and roasted by a sacred fire. Venison, on the other hand, they eat with pleasure.[3] At a funeral one or two buffaloes are killed:[4] "as each animal falls, men,

[1] Marshall, *Travels among the Todas* (1873), p. 130.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 131.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 81. The sacrifice is eaten only by males. So among the Caffres certain holy parts of an ox must not be eaten by women; and in Hebrew law the duty of festal worship was confined to males, though women were not excluded. Among the Todas men and women habitually eat apart, as the Spartans did; and the Spartan blood-broth may be compared with the Toda animal sacrifice.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 176.

women and children group themselves round its head, and fondle, caress, and kiss its face, then sitting in groups of pairs . . . give way to wailing and lamentation." These victims are not eaten, but left on the ground.

These examples may suffice to show the wide diffusion among rude pastoral peoples of a way of regarding sacred animals with which the Semitic facts and the inferences I have drawn from them exactly correspond; let us now enquire how far similar ideas can be shown to have prevailed among the higher races of antiquity. In this connection I would first of all direct your attention to the wide prevalence among all these nations of a belief that the habit of slaughtering animals and eating flesh is a departure from the laws of primitive piety. Except in certain ascetic circles, priestly or philosophical, this opinion bore no practical fruit; men ate flesh freely when they could obtain it, but in their legends of the ★ Golden Age it was told how in the earliest and happiest days of the race, when man was at peace with the gods and with nature, and the hard struggle of daily toil had not begun, animal food was unknown, and all man's wants were supplied by the spontaneous produce of the bounteous earth. This, of course, is not true, for even on anatomical grounds it is certain that our remote ancestors were carnivorous, and it is matter of observation that primitive nations do not eschew the use of animal food in general, though certain kinds of flesh are forbidden on grounds of piety. But, on the other hand, the idea of the Golden Age cannot be a mere abstract speculation without any basis in tradition. The legend in which it is embodied is part of the ancient folk-lore of the Greeks,[1] and the practical application of the idea in the form of a

[1] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 109 *sqq.* Cf. Preller-Robert, I. i. p. 87 *sqq.*, for the other literature of the subject.

precept of abstinence from flesh, as a rule of perfection or of ceremonial holiness, is first found, not among innovating and speculative philosophers, but in priestly circles, *e.g.* in Egypt and India—whose lore is entirely based on tradition, or in such philosophic schools as that of Pythagoras, all whose ideas are characterised by an extraordinary regard for ancient usage and superstition.

In the case of the Egyptian priests the facts set forth by Porphyry in his book *De Abstinentia*, iv. 6 *sqq.*, on the authority of Chæremon,[1] enable us to make out distinctly the connection between the abstinence imposed on the priests and the primitive beliefs and practice of the mass of the people.

From ancient times every Egyptian had, according to the nome he lived in, his own particular kind of forbidden flesh, venerating a particular species of sacred animal, exactly as totemistic savages still do. The priests extended this precept, being in fact the ministers of a national religion, which gathered into one system the worships of the various nomes; but only some of them went so far as to eat no flesh at all, while others, who were attached to particular cults, ordinarily observed abstinence only from certain kinds of flesh, though they were obliged to confine themselves to a strictly vegetable diet at certain religious seasons, when they were specially engaged in holy functions. It is, however, obvious that the multitude of local prohibitions could not have resulted in a general doctrine of the superior piety of vegetarianism, unless the list of animals which were sacred in one or other part of the country had included those domestic animals which in a highly cultivated country like Egypt must always form the chief source of animal food.

[1] The authority is good; see Bernays, *Theophrastos' Schrift Ueber Frömmigkeit* (Breslau, 1866), p. 21.

In Egypt this was the case, and indeed the greatest and most widely recognised deities were those that had associations with domesticated animals. In this respect Egyptian civilisation declares its affinity to the primitive usages and superstitions of the pastoral populations of Africa generally; the Calf-god Apis, who was supposed to be incarnate in an actual calf at Memphis, and the Cow-goddess Isis-Hathor, who is either represented in the form of a cow, or at least wears a cow's horns, directly connect the dominant cults of Egypt with the sanctity ascribed to the bovine species by the ruder races of Eastern Africa, with whom the ox is the most important domestic animal; and it is not therefore surprising to learn that even in later times the eating of cow's flesh seemed to the Egyptians a practice as horrible as cannibalism. Cows were never sacrificed; and though bulls were offered on the altar, and part of the flesh eaten in a sacrificial feast, the sacrifice was only permitted as a *piaculum*, was preceded by a solemn fast, and was accompanied by public lamentation as at the death of a kinsman.[1] In like manner, at the annual sacrifice at Thebes to the Ram-god Amen, the worshippers bewailed the victim, thus declaring its kinship with themselves; while, on the other hand, its kinship or identity with the god was expressed in a twofold way, for the image of Amen was draped in the skin of the sacrifice, while the body was buried in a sacred coffin.[2]

In Egypt, the doctrine that the highest degree of holiness can only be attained by abstinence from all animal food, was the result of the political fusion of a number of local cults in one national religion, with a national priesthood that represented imperial ideas. Nothing of this sort took place in Greece or in most of the Semitic lands,[3] and

[1] Herod. ii. 39 *sq.*
[2] Herod. ii. 42.
[3] Babylonia is perhaps an exception.

in these accordingly we find no developed doctrine of priestly asceticism in the matter of food.[1]

Among the Greeks and Semites, therefore, the idea of a Golden Age, and the trait that in that age man was vegetarian in his diet, must be of popular not of priestly origin. Now in itself the notion that ancient times were better than modern, that the earth was more productive, men more pious and their lives less vexed with toil and sickness, needs no special explanation; it is the natural result of psychological laws which apply equally to the memory of individuals and the memory of nations. But the particular trait of primitive vegetarianism, as a characteristic feature of the good old times, does not fall under this general explanation, and can only have arisen at a time when there was still some active feeling of pious scruple about killing and eating flesh. This scruple cannot have applied to all kinds of flesh, *e.g.* to game, but it must have covered the very kinds of flesh that were ordinarily eaten in the agricultural stage of society, to which the origin of the legend of the Golden Age undoubtedly belongs. Flesh, therefore, in the legend means the flesh of domestic animals, and the legend expresses a feeling of respect for the lives of these animals, and an idea that their slaughter for food was an innovation not consistent with pristine piety.

When we look into the details of the traditions which later writers cite in support of the doctrine of primæval vegetarianism, we see that in effect this, and no more than

[1] On the supposed case of the Essenes see Lucius's books on the Essenes and Therapeutæ, and Schürer, *Gesch. des Jüd. Volkes*, ii.[4] 679. The Therapeutæ, whether Jews or Christian monks, appear in Egypt, and most probably they were Egyptian Christians. Later developments of Semitic asceticism almost certainly stood under foreign influences, among which Buddhism seems to have had a larger and earlier share than it has been usual to admit. In old Semitic practice, as among the modern Jews and Moslems, religious fasting meant abstinence from all food, not merely from flesh.

this, is contained in them. The general statement that early man respected all animal life is mere inference, but popular tradition and ancient ritual alike bore testimony that the life of the swine and the sheep,[1] but above all of the ox,[2] was of old regarded as sacred, and might not be taken away except for religious purposes, and even then only with special precautions to clear the worshippers from the guilt of murder.

To make this quite plain, it may be well to go in some detail into the most important case of all, that of the ox. That it was once a capital offence to kill an ox, both in Attica and in the Peloponnesus, is attested by Varro.[3] So far as Athens is concerned, this statement seems to be drawn from the legend that was told in connection with the annual sacrifice of the Diipolia, where the victim was a bull, and its death was followed by a solemn enquiry as to who was responsible for the act.[4] In this trial every one who had anything to do with the slaughter was called as a party: the maidens who drew water to sharpen the axe and knife threw the blame on the sharpeners, they put it on the man who handed the axe, he on the man who struck down the victim, and he again on the one who cut its throat, who finally fixed the responsibility on the knife, which was accordingly found guilty of murder and cast into the sea. According to the legend, this act was a mere dramatic imitation of a piacular sacrifice devised to expiate the offence of one Sopatros, who killed an ox that he saw eating the cereal gifts from the table of the gods. This impious offence was followed by famine, but the oracle

[1] Porph., *De Abst.* ii. 9.

[2] *Ibid.* ii. 10, 29 *sq.*; Plato, *Leges*, vi. p. 782; Pausanias, viii. 2. 1 *sqq.* compared with i. 28. 10 (bloodless sacrifices under Cecrops, sacrifice of an ox in the time of Erechtheus).

[3] *R. R.* ii. 5.

[4] Pausanias, i. 24. 4; Theophrastus, *ap.* Porph., *De Abst.* ii. 30.

declared that the guilt might be expiated if the slayer were punished and the victim raised up again in connection with the same sacrifice in which it died, and that it would then go well with them if they tasted of the flesh and did not hold back. Sopatros himself, who had fled to Crete, undertook to return and devise a means of carrying out these injunctions, provided that the whole city would share the responsibility of the murder that weighed on his conscience; and so the ceremonial was devised, which continued to be observed down to a late date.[1] Of course the legend as such has no value; it is derived from the ritual, and not *vice versâ*; but the ritual itself shows clearly that the slaughter was viewed as a murder, and that it was felt to be necessary, not only to go through the form of throwing the guilt on the knife, but to distribute the responsibility as widely as possible, by employing a number of sacrificial ministers—who, it may be observed, were chosen from different kindreds—and making it a public duty to taste of the flesh. Here, therefore, we have a well-marked case of the principle that sacrifice is not to be excused except by the participation of the whole community.[2] This rite does not stand alone. At Tenedos the priest who offered a bull-calf to Dionysus ἀνθρωπορραίστης was attacked with stones and had to flee for his life;[3] and at Corinth, in the annual sacrifice of a goat to Hera Acræa, care was taken to shift the responsibility of the death off the shoulders of the community by employing hirelings as

[1] Aristophanes alludes to it as a very old-world rite (*Nubes*, 985), but the observance was still kept up in the days of Theophrastus in all its old quaintness. In Pausanias's time it had undergone some simplification, unless his account is inaccurate.

[2] The further feature that the ox chooses itself as victim, by approaching the altar and eating the gifts laid on it, is noticeable, both because a similar rite recurs at Eryx, as will be mentioned presently, and because in this way the victim eats of the table of the gods, *i.e.* is acknowledged as divine.

[3] Ælian, *Nat. An.* xii. 34.

ministers. Even they did no more than hide the knife in such a way that the goat, scraping with its feet, procured its own death.[1] But indeed the idea that the slaughter of a bull was properly a murder, and only to be justified on exceptional sacrificial occasions, must once have been general in Greece; for *βουφόνια* (*βουφονεῖν*, *βουφόνος*) or "ox-murder," which in Athens was the name of the peculiar sacrifice of the Diipolia, is in older Greek a general term for the slaughter of oxen for a sacrificial feast.[2] And that the "ox-murder" must be taken quite literally appears in the sacrifice at Tenedos, where the bull-calf wears the cothurnus and its dam is treated like a woman in childbed. Here the kinship of the victim with man is clearly expressed, but so also is his kinship with the "man-slaying" god to whom the sacrifice is offered, for the cothurnus is proper to Bacchus, and that god was often represented and invoked as a bull.[3]

The same combination of ideas appears in the Hebrew and Phœnician traditions of primitive abstinence from flesh and of the origin of sacrifice. The evidence in this case requires to be handled with some caution, for the Phœnician traditions come to us from late authors, who are gravely suspected of tampering with the legends they record, and the Hebrew records in the Book of Genesis, though they are undoubtedly based on ancient popular lore, have been recast under the influence of a higher faith, and purged of such elements as were manifestly inconsistent

[1] Hesychius, *s.v.* *αἴξ αἴγα*; Zenobius on the same proverb; *Schol.* on Eurip., *Medea*.

[2] See *Iliad*, vii. 466; the Homeric hymn to Mercury, 436, in a story which seems to be one of the many legends about the origin of sacrifice; Æsch., *Prom.* 530.

[3] See especially Plutarch, *Qu. Gr.* 36. Another example to the same effect is that of the goat dressed up as a maiden, which was offered to Artemis Munychia (*Paræmiogr. Gr.* i. 402, and Eustathius as there cited by the editors).

with Old Testament monotheism. As regards the Hebrew accounts, a distinction must be drawn between the earlier Jahvistic story and the post-exile narrative of the priestly historian. In the older account, just as in the Greek fable of the Golden Age, man, in his pristine state of innocence, lived at peace with all animals,[1] eating the spontaneous fruits of the earth; but after the Fall he was sentenced to earn his bread by agricultural toil. At the same time his war with hurtful creatures (the serpent) began, and domestic animals began to be slain sacrificially, and their skins used for clothing.[2] In the priestly history, on the other hand, man's dominion over animals, and seemingly also the agricultural life, in which animals serve man in the work of tillage, are instituted at the creation.[3] In this narrative there is no Garden of Eden, and no Fall, except the growing corruption that precedes the Flood. After the Flood man receives the right to kill and eat animals, if their blood is poured upon the ground,[4] but sacrifice begins only with the Mosaic dispensation. Now, as sacrifice and slaughter were never separated, in the case of domestic animals, till the time of Deuteronomy, this form of the story cannot be ancient; it rests on the post-Deuteronomic law of sacrifice, and especially on Lev. xvii. 10 *sq.* The original Hebrew tradition is that of the Jahvistic story, which agrees with Greek legend in connecting the sacrifice of domestic animals with a fall from the state of pristine innocence.[5] This, of course, is not the main feature in the

[1] Cf. Isa. xi. 6 *sq.*

[2] Gen. ii. 16 *sqq.*, iii. 15, 21, iv. 4. I am disposed to agree with Budde (*Bibl. Urgeschichte*, p. 83), that the words of ii. 15, "to dress it and to keep it," are by a later hand. They agree with Gen. i. 26 *sqq.* (priestly), but not with iii. 17 (Jahvistic).

[3] Gen. i. 28, 29, where the use of corn as well as of the fruit of trees is implied.

[4] Gen. ix. 1 *sq.*

[5] The Greek legend in the *Works and Days* agrees with the Jahvistic

biblical story of the Fall, nor is it one on which the narrator lays stress, or to which he seems to attach any special significance. But for that very reason it is to be presumed that this feature in the story is primitive, and that it must be explained, like the corresponding Greek legend, not by the aid of principles peculiar to the Old Testament revelation, but by considerations of a more general kind. There are other features in the story of the Garden of Eden—especially the tree of life—which prove that the original basis of the narrative is derived from the common stock of North Semitic folk-lore; and that this common stock included the idea of primitive vegetarianism is confirmed by Philo Byblius,[1] whose legend of the primitive men, who lived only on the fruits of the soil and paid divine honour to these, has too peculiar a form to be regarded as a mere transcript either from the Bible or from Greek literature.

It is highly improbable that among the ancient Semites the story of a Golden Age of primitive fruit-eating can have had its rise in any other class of ideas than those which led to the formation of a precisely similar legend in Greece. The Greeks concluded that primitive man did not eat the flesh of domestic animals, because their sacrificial ritual regarded the death of a victim as a kind of murder, only to be justified under special circumstances, and when it was accompanied by special precautions, for which a definite historical origin was assigned. And just in the same way the Cypro-Phœnician legend which Porphyry[2] quotes from Asclepiades, to prove that the early Phœnicians did not eat

story also in ascribing the Fall to the fault of a woman. But this trait does not seem to appear in all forms of the Greek story (see Preller-Robert, i. 94 *sq.*), and the estrangement between gods and men is sometimes ascribed to Prometheus, who is also regarded as the inventor of fire and of animal sacrifice.

[1] *Ap.* Eus., *Pr. Ev.* i. 106 (*Fr. Hist. Gr.* iii. 565).

[2] *De Abst.* iv. 15.

flesh, turns on the idea that the death of a victim was originally a surrogate for human sacrifice, and that the first man who dared to taste flesh was punished with death. The details of this story, which exactly agree with Lamb's humorous account of the discovery of the merits of roast sucking pig, are puerile and cannot be regarded as part of an ancient tradition, but the main idea does not seem to be mere invention. We have already seen that the Phœnicians would no more eat cow-beef than human flesh; it can hardly, therefore, be questioned that in ancient times the whole bovine race had such a measure of sanctity as would give even to the sacrifice of a bull the very character that our theory requires. And when Asclepiades states that every victim was originally regarded as a surrogate for a human sacrifice, he is confirmed in a remarkable way by the Elohistic account of the origin of burnt-sacrifice in Gen. xxii., where a ram is accepted in lieu of Isaac. This narrative presents another remarkable point of contact with Phœnician belief. Abraham says that God Himself will provide the sacrifice (ver. 8), and at ver. 13 the ram presents itself unsought as an offering. Exactly this principle was observed down to late times at the great Astarte temple at Eryx, where the victims were drawn from the sacred herds nourished at the sanctuary, and were believed to offer themselves spontaneously at the altar.[1] This is quite analogous to the usage at the Diipolia, where a number of cattle were driven round the sacred table, and the bull was selected for slaughter that approached it and ate of the sacred *popana*, and must be regarded as one of the many forms and fictions adopted to free the worshippers

[1] Ælian, *Nat. An.* x. 50; cf. Isa. liii. 7; Jer. xi. 19 (R.V.); but especially 1 Sam. vi. 14, where the kine halt at the sacrificial stone (Diog. Laert. i. 10. 3); also Ibn Hishām, p. 293, l. 14. That the victim presents itself spontaneously or comes to the altar willingly is a feature in many worships (*Mir. Ausc.* 137; Porph., *De Abst.* i. 25).

of responsibility for the death of the victim. All this goes to show that the animal sacrifices of the Phœnicians were regarded as quasi-human. But that the sacrificial kinds were also viewed as kindred to the gods may be concluded from the way in which the gods were represented. The idolatrous Israelites worshipped Jehovah under the form of a steer, and the second commandment implies that idols were made in the shape of many animals. So too the bull of Europa, Zeus Asterius, is, as his epithet implies, the male counterpart of Astarte, with whom Europa was
★ identified at Sidon.[1] Astarte herself was figured crowned with a bull's head,[2] and the place name Ashteroth Karnaim [3] is probably derived from the sanctuary of a horned Astarte. It may indeed be questioned whether this last is identical with the cow-Astarte of Sidon, or is rather a sheep-goddess; for in Deut. vii. 13 the produce of the flock is called the "Ashtaroth of the sheep"—an antique expression that must have a religious origin. This sheep-Aphrodite was specially worshipped in Cyprus, where her annual mystic or piacular sacrifice was a sheep, and was presented by worshippers clad in sheepskins, thus declaring their kinship at once with the victim and with the deity.[4]

It is well to observe that in the most ancient nomadic

[1] *De Dea Syria*, iv.; *Kinship*, p. 308.

[2] Philo Byb., *fr.* 24 (*Fr. Hist. Gr.* iii. 569).

[3] Gen. xiv. 5. Kuenen, in his paper on *De Melecheth des Hemels*, p. 37, thinks it possible that the true reading is "Ashteroth and Karnaim." But the identity of the later Carnain or Carnion with Ashtaroth or בעשתרה, "the temple of Astarte" (Josh. xxi. 27), is confirmed by the fact that there was a τέμενος or sacred enclosure there (1 Macc. v. 43). See further *ZDMG.* xxix. 431, note 1. The ancient sanctity of the Astarte-shrine has been transferred to the sepulchre of Job; cf. *S. Silviæ Peregrinatio* (Rome, 1887), 56 *sqq.* A Punic Baal-Carnaim has lately been discovered in the sanctuary of Saturnus Balcaranensis on Jebel Bū Curnein near Tunis. This, however, may probably be a local designation derived from the ancient name of the double-topped mountain (*Mélanges d'Archéol. etc.*, Rome, 1892, p. 1 *sq.*).

[4] See *Additional Note* G, *The Sacrifice of a Sheep to the Cyprian Aphrodite.*

times, to which the sanctity of domestic animals must be referred, the same clan or community will not generally be found to breed more than one kind of domestic animal. Thus in Arabia, though the lines of separation are not so sharp as we must suppose them to have formerly been, there is still a broad distinction between the camel-breeding tribes of the upland plains and the shepherd tribes of the mountains; and in like manner sheep and goats are the flocks appropriate to the steppes of Eastern Palestine, while kine and oxen are more suitable for the well-watered Phœnician mountains. Thus in the one place we may expect to find a sheep-Astarte, and in another a cow-goddess, and the Hebrew idiom in Deut. vii. 13 agrees with the fact that before the conquest of agricultural Palestine, the Hebrews, like their kinsmen of Moab, must have been mainly shepherds, not cowherds.[1]

I have now, I think, said enough about the sanctity of domestic animals; the application to the doctrine of sacrifice must be left for another lecture.

[1] The great ancestress of the house of Joseph is Rachel, "the ewe." For the Moabites see 2 Kings iii. 4. ★

LECTURE IX

THE SACRAMENTAL EFFICACY OF ANIMAL SACRIFICE, AND COGNATE ACTS OF RITUAL — THE BLOOD COVENANT —BLOOD AND HAIR OFFERINGS

In the course of the last lecture we were led to look with some exactness into the distinction drawn in the later ages of ancient paganism between ordinary sacrifices, where the victim is one of the animals commonly used for human food, and extraordinary or mystical sacrifices, where the significance of the rite lies in an exceptional act of communion with the godhead, by participation in holy flesh which is ordinarily forbidden to man. Analysing this distinction, and carrying back our examination of the evidence to the primitive stage of society in which sacrificial ritual first took shape, we were led to conclude that in the most ancient times all sacrificial animals had a sacrosanct character, and that no kind of beast was offered to the gods which was not too holy to be slain and eaten without a religious purpose, and without the consent and active participation of the whole clan.

For the most primitive times, therefore, the distinction drawn by later paganism between ordinary and extraordinary sacrifices disappears. In both cases the sacred function is the act of the whole community, which is conceived as a circle of brethren, united with one another and with their god by participation in one life or life-blood. The same blood is supposed to flow also in the veins of the

victim, so that its death is at once a shedding of the tribal blood and a violation of the sanctity of the divine life that is transfused through every member, human or irrational, of the sacred circle. Nevertheless the slaughter of such a victim is permitted or required on solemn occasions, and all the tribesmen partake of its flesh, that they may thereby cement and seal their mystic unity with one another and with their god. In later times we find the conception current that any food which two men partake of together, so that the same substance enters into their flesh and blood, is enough to establish some sacred unity of life between them; but in ancient times this significance seems to be always attached to participation in the flesh of a sacrosanct victim, and the solemn mystery of its death is justified by the consideration that only in this way can the sacred cement be procured which creates or keeps alive a living bond of union between the worshippers and their god. This cement is nothing else than the actual life of the sacred and kindred animal, which is conceived as residing in its flesh, but especially in its blood, and so, in the sacred meal, is actually distributed among all the participants, each of whom incorporates a particle of it with his own individual life.

The notion that, by eating the flesh, or particularly by drinking the blood, of another living being, a man absorbs its nature or life into his own, is one which appears among primitive peoples in many forms. It lies at the root of the widespread practice of drinking the fresh blood of enemies—a practice which was familiar to certain tribes of the Arabs before Mohammed, and which tradition still ascribes to the wild race of Caḥṭān[1]—and also of the

[1] See the evidence in *Kinship*, p. 296; and cf. Doughty, ii. 41, where the better accounts seem to limit the drinking of human blood by the Caḥṭān to the blood covenant. See Wellh. 125, n. 6.

habit observed by many savage huntsmen of eating some part (*e.g.* the liver) of dangerous carnivora, in order that the courage of the animal may pass into them. And in some parts of the world, where men have the privilege of choosing a special kind of sacred animal either in lieu of, or in addition to, the clan totem, we find that the compact between the man and the species that he is thenceforth to regard as sacred is sealed by killing and eating an animal of the species, which from that time forth becomes forbidden food to him.[1]

But the most notable application of the idea is in the rite of blood brotherhood, examples of which are found all over the world.[2] In the simplest form of this rite, two men become brothers by opening their veins and sucking one another's blood. Thenceforth their lives are not two but one. This form of covenant is still known in the Lebanon[3] and in some parts of Arabia.[4] In ancient Arabic literature there are many references to the blood covenant, but instead of human blood that of a victim slain at the sanctuary is employed. The ritual in this case is that all who share in the compact must dip their hands into the gore, which at the same time is applied to the sacred stone that symbolises the deity, or is poured forth at its base. The dipping of the hands into the dish

[1] Frazer (*Totemism and Exogamy*, i. 44 *sq.*) has collected some evidence of the killing, but not of the eating. For the latter he refers me to Cruickshank, *Gold Coast* (1853), p. 133 *sq.*

[2] See the collection of evidence in Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant* (New York, 1885); and compare, for the Arabs, *Kinship*, pp. 57 *sqq.*, 59 n.; Wellhausen, p. 125 *sqq.*; Goldziher, *Literaturbl. f. or. Phil.* 1886, p. 24, *Muh. Stud.* p. 67. In what follows I do not quote examples in detail for things sufficiently exemplified in the books just cited.

[3] Trumbull, p. 5 *sq.*

[4] Doughty, ii. 41. The value of the evidence is quite independent of the accuracy of the statement that the Caḥṭān still practise the rite; at least the tradition of such a rite subsists. See also Trumbull, p. 9.

implies communion in an act of eating,[1] and so the ★ members of the bond are called "blood-lickers." There seems to be no example in the old histories and poems of a covenant in which the parties lick one another's blood. But we have seen that even in modern times the use of human blood in covenants is not unknown to the Semites, and the same thing appears for very early times from Herodotus's account of the form of covenant used by the Arabs on the borders of Egypt.[2] Blood was drawn with a sharp stone from the thumbs of each party, and smeared on seven sacred stones with invocations of the gods. The smearing makes the gods parties to the covenant, but evidently the symbolical act is not complete unless at the same time the human parties taste each other's blood. It is probable that this was actually done, though Herodotus does not say so. But it is also possible that in course of time the ritual had been so far modified that it was deemed sufficient that the two bloods should meet on the sacred stone.[3] The rite described by Herodotus has for its object the admission of an individual stranger[4] to fellowship with an Arab clansman and his kin; the compact is primarily between two individuals, but the obligation contracted by the single clansman is binding on all his "friends," *i.e.* on the other members of the kin. The reason why it is so binding is that he who has drunk a clansman's blood is no longer a stranger but a brother, and included in the mystic circle of those who have a share in the life-blood that is common to all the clan. Primarily the covenant is not a

[1] Matt. xxvi. 23.

[2] Herod. iii. 8.

[3] Some further remarks on the various modifications of covenant ceremonies among the Semites will be found in *Additional Note* H.

[4] The ceremony might also take place between an Arab and his "townsman" (ἀστός), which, I apprehend, must mean another Arab, but one of a different clan. For if a special contract between two clansmen were meant, there would be no meaning in the introduction to the "friends" who agree to share the covenant obligation.

special engagement to this or that particular effect, but a bond of troth and life-fellowship to all the effects for which kinsmen are permanently bound together. And this being so, it is a matter of course that the engagement has a religious side as well as a social, for there can be no brotherhood without community of *sacra*, and the sanction of brotherhood is the jealousy of the tribal deity, who sedulously protects the holiness of kindred blood. This thought is expressed symbolically by the smearing of the two bloods, which have now become one, upon the sacred stones, which is as much as to say that the god himself is a third blood-licker, and a member of the bond of brotherhood.[1] It is transparent that in ancient times the deity so brought into the compact must have been the kindred god of the clan to which the stranger was admitted; but even in the days of Herodotus the old clan religion had already been in great measure broken down; all the Arabs of the Egyptian frontier, whatever their clan, worshipped
★ the same pair of deities, Orotal and Alilat (Al-Lāt), and these were the gods invoked in the covenant ceremony. If, therefore, both the contracting parties were Arabs, of different clans but of the same religion, neither could feel that the covenant introduced him to the *sacra* of a new god, and the meaning of the ceremony would simply be that the gods whom both adored took the compact under their protection. This is the ordinary sense of covenant with sacrifice in later times, *e.g.* among the Hebrews, but also among the Arabs, where the deity invoked is ordinarily Allah at the Caaba or some other great deity of more than tribal consideration. But that the appeal to a god already acknowledged by both parties is a departure from

[1] Compare the blood covenant which a Mosquito Indian used to form with the animal kind he chose as his protectors; Bancroft, i. 740 *sq.* (Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, i. 50).

the original sense of the rite, is apparent from the application of the blood, not only to the human contractors, but to the altar or sacred stone, which continued to be an invariable feature in covenant sacrifice; for this part of the rite has its full and natural meaning only in a ceremony of initiation, where the new tribesman has to be introduced to the god for the first time and brought into life-fellowship with him, or else in a periodical clan sacrifice held for the purpose of refreshing and renewing a bond between the tribesmen and their god, which by lapse of time may seem to have been worn out.

In Herodotus the blood of the covenant is that of the human parties; in the cases known from Arabic literature it is the blood of an animal sacrifice. At first sight this seems to imply a progress in refinement and an aversion to taste human blood. But it may well be doubted whether such an assumption is justified by the social history of the Arabs,[1] and we have already seen that the primitive form of the blood covenant has survived into modern times. Rather, I think, we ought to consider that the ceremony described by Herodotus is a covenant between individuals, without that direct participation of the whole kin, which, even in the time of Nilus, many centuries later, was essential in those parts of Arabia to an act of sacrifice involving the death of a victim. The covenants made by sacrifice are generally if not always compacts between whole kins, so that here sacrifice was appropriate, while at the same time a larger supply of blood was necessary than could well be obtained without slaughter. That the blood of an animal was accepted in lieu of the tribesmen's own blood, is generally passed over by modern writers without explanation. But an explanation is certainly required,

[1] See the examples of cannibalism and the drinking of human blood cited in *Kinship*, p. 296 *sq.*

and is fully supplied only by the consideration that, the victim being itself included in the sacred circle of the kin, whose life was to be communicated to the new-comers, its blood served quite the same purpose as man's blood. On this view the rationale of covenant sacrifice is perfectly clear.

I do not, however, believe that the origin of sacrifice can possibly be sought in the covenant between whole kins—a kind of compact which in the nature of things cannot have become common till the tribal system was weak, and which in primitive times was probably unknown. Even the adoption of individuals into a new clan, so that they renounced their old kin and *sacra*, is held by the most exact students of early legal custom to be, comparatively speaking, a modern innovation on the rigid rules of the ancient blood-fellowship; much more, then, must this be true of the adoption or fusion of whole clans. I apprehend, therefore, that the use of blood drawn from a living man for the initiation of an individual into new *sacra*, and the use of the blood of a victim for the similar initiation of a whole clan, must both rest in the last resort on practices that were originally observed within the bosom of a single kin.

To such sacrifice the idea of a covenant, whether between the worshippers mutually or between the worshippers and their god, is not applicable, for a covenant means artificial brotherhood, and has no place where the natural brotherhood of which it is an imitation already subsists. The Hebrews, indeed, who had risen above the conception that the relation between Jehovah and Israel was that of natural kinship, thought of the national religion as constituted by a formal covenant-sacrifice at Mount Sinai, where the blood of the victims was applied to the altar on the one hand, and to the people on the other,[1] or even

[1] Ex. xxiv. 4 *sqq.*

by a still earlier covenant rite in which the parties were Jehovah and Abraham.[1] And by a further development of the same idea, every sacrifice is regarded in Ps. l. 5 as a covenant between God and the worshipper.[2] But in purely natural religions, where the god and his community are looked upon as forming a physical unity, the idea that religion rests on a compact is out of place, and acts of religious communion can only be directed to quicken and confirm the life-bond that already subsists between the parties. Some provision of this sort may well seem to be necessary where kinship is conceived in the very realistic way of which we have had so many illustrations. Physical unity of life, regarded as an actual participation in one common mass of flesh and blood, is obviously subject to modification by every accident that affects the physical system, and especially by anything that concerns the nourishment of the body and the blood. On this ground alone it might well seem reasonable to reinforce the sacred life from time to time by a physical process. And this merely material line of thought naturally combines itself with considerations of another kind, which contain the germ of an ethical idea. If the physical oneness of the

[1] Gen. xv. 8 *sqq.*

[2] That Jehovah's relation to Israel is not natural but ethical, is the doctrine of the prophets, and is emphasised, in dependence on their teaching, in the Book of Deuteronomy. But the passages cited show that the idea has its foundation in pre-prophetic times; and indeed the prophets, though they give it fresh and powerful application, plainly do not regard the conception as an innovation. In fact, a nation like Israel is not a natural unity like a clan, and Jehovah as the national God was, from the time of Moses downward, no mere natural clan god, but the god of a confederation, so that here the idea of a covenant religion is entirely justified. The worship of Jehovah throughout all the tribes of Israel and Judah is probably older than the genealogical system that derives all the Hebrews from one natural parent; cf. *Kinship*, p. 34 n. Mohammed's conception of heathen religion as resting on alliance (Wellh. p. 127) is also to be explained by the fact that the great gods of Arabia in his time were not the gods of single clans.

deity and his community is impaired or attenuated, the help of the god can no longer be confidently looked for. And conversely, when famine, plague or other disaster shows that the god is no longer active on behalf of his own, it is natural to infer that the bond of kinship with him has been broken or relaxed, and that it is necessary to retie it by a solemn ceremony, in which the sacred life is again distributed to every member of the community. From this point of view the sacramental rite is also an atoning rite, which brings the community again into harmony with its alienated god, and the idea of sacrificial communion includes within it the rudimentary conception of a piacular ceremony. In all the older forms of Semitic ritual the notions of communion and atonement are bound up together, atonement being simply an act of communion designed to wipe out all memory of previous estrangement.

The actual working of these ideas may be seen in two different groups of ritual observance. Where the whole community is involved, the act of communion and atonement takes the shape of sacrifice. But, besides this communal act, we find what may be called private acts of worship, in which an individual seeks to establish a physical link of union between himself and the deity, apart from the sacrifice of a victim, either by the use of his own blood in a rite analogous to the blood covenant between private individuals, or by other acts involving an identical principle. Observances of this kind are peculiarly instructive, because they exhibit in a simple form the same ideas that lie at the root of the complex system of ancient sacrifice; and it will be profitable to devote some attention to them before we proceed further with the subject of sacrifice proper. By so doing we shall indeed be carried into a considerable digression, but I hope

that we shall return to our main subject with a firmer grasp ★ of the fundamental principles involved.[1] (See p. 336.)

In the ritual of the Semites and other nations, both ancient and modern, we find many cases in which the worshipper sheds his own blood at the altar, as a means of recommending himself and his prayers to the deity.[2] A classical instance is that of the priests of Baal at the contest between the god of Tyre and the God of Israel (1 Kings xviii. 28). Similarly at the feast of the Syrian goddess at Mabbog, the Galli and devotees made gashes in their arms, or offered their backs to one another to beat,[3] exactly as is now done by Persian devotees at the annual commemoration of the martyrdom of Hasan and Hosain.[4] ★ I have elsewhere argued that the general diffusion of this usage among the Aramæans is attested by the Syriac word *ethkashshaph*, "make supplication," literally "cut ★ oneself." [5]

The current view about such rites in modern as in ancient times has been that the effusion of blood without taking away life is a substitute for human sacrifice,[6] an explanation which recommends itself by its simplicity, and probably hits the truth with regard to certain cases. But,

[1] For the subject discussed in the following paragraphs, compare especially the copious collection of materials by Dr. G. A. Wilken, *Ueber das Haaropfer, etc.*, Amsterdam, 1886–7.

[2] Cf. Spencer, *Leg. Rit. Heb.* ii. 13. 2. [3] *Dea Syria*, l.

[4] This seems to be a modern survival of the old rites of Anaitis-worship, for the similar observances in the worship of Bellona at Rome under the empire were borrowed from Cappadocia, and apparently from a form of the cult of Anaitis (see the refs. in Roscher, *s.v.*). The latter, again, was closely akin to the worship of the Syrian goddess, and appears to have been developed to a great extent under Semitic influence. See my paper on "Ctesias and the Semiramis Legend," *English Hist. Rev.*, April 1887.

[5] *Journ. Phil.* xiv. 125; cf. Nöldeke in *ZDMG.* xl. 723.

[6] See Pausanias, iii. 16. 10, where this is the account given of the bloody flagellation of the Spartan ephebi at the altar of Artemis Orthia. Similarly Euripides, *Iph. Taur.* 1458 *sqq.*; cf. also Bourke, *Snake Dance of the Moquis of Arizona*, p. 196; and especially Wilken, *op. cit.* p. 68 *sqq.*

as a general explanation of the offering of his own blood by a suppliant, it is not quite satisfactory. Human sacrifice is offered, not on behoof of the victim, but at the expense of the victim on behoof of the sacrificing community, while the shedding of one's own blood is in many cases a means of recommending oneself to the godhead. Further, there is an extensive class of rites prevalent among savage and barbarous peoples in which blood-shedding forms part of an initiatory ceremony, by which youths, at or after the age of puberty, are admitted to the status of a man, and to a full share in the social privileges and *sacra* of the community. In both cases the object of the ceremony must be to tie, or to confirm, a blood-bond between the worshipper and the god by a means more potent than the ordinary forms of stroking, embracing or kissing the sacred stone. To this effect the blood of the man is shed at the altar, or applied to the image of the god, and has exactly the same efficacy as in the forms of blood covenant that have been already discussed.[1] And that this is so receives strong confirmation from the identical practices observed among so many nations in mourning for deceased kinsmen. The Hebrew law forbade mourners to gash or puncture themselves in honour of the dead,[2] evidently associating this practice, which nevertheless was common down to the close of the old kingdom,[3] with heathenish rites. Among the Arabs

[1] That the blood must fall on the altar, or at its foot, is expressly attested in certain cases, *e.g.* in the Spartan worship of Artemis Orthia, and in various Mexican rites of the same kind; see Sahagun, *Nouvelle Espagne* (French Tr., 1880), p. 185. In Tibullus's account of Bellona worship (Lib. i. El. 6, vv. 45 *sqq.*) the blood is sprinkled on the idol; the church-fathers add that those who shared in the rite drank one another's blood.

[2] Lev. xix. 28, xxi. 5; Deut. xiv. 1.

[3] Jer. xvi. 6. The funeral feast which Jeremiah mentions in the following verse (see the Revised Version, and compare Hos. ix. 4), and which has for its object to comfort the mourners, is, I apprehend, in its origin a feast of communion with the dead; cf. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[4], ii. 30 *sqq.* This

in like manner, as among the Greeks and other ancient nations, it was customary in mourning to scratch the face to the effusion of blood.[1] The original meaning of this practice appears in the form which it has retained among certain rude nations. In New South Wales, "several men stand by the open grave and cut each other's heads with a boomerang, and hold their heads over the grave so that the blood from the wound falls on the corpse."[2] Similarly in Otaheite the blood as well as the tears shed in mourning were received on pieces of linen, which were thrown on the bier.[3] Here the application of blood and tears to the dead is a pledge of enduring affection; and in Australia the ceremony is completed by cutting a piece of flesh from the corpse, which is dried, cut up and distributed among the relatives and friends of the deceased; some suck their portion "to get strength and courage." The twosided nature of the rite in this case puts it beyond question that the object is to make an enduring covenant with the dead. ★

Among the Hebrews and Arabs, and indeed among many other peoples both ancient and modern, the laceration of the flesh in mourning is associated with the practice of shaving the head or cutting off part of the hair and

act of communion consoles the survivors; but in the oldest times the consolation has a physical basis; thus the Arabian *solwān*, or draught that makes the mourner forget his grief, consists of water with which is mingled dust from the grave (Wellh. p. 163), a form of communion precisely similar in principle to the Australian usage of eating a small piece of the corpse. There is a tendency at present, in one school of anthropologists, to explain all death customs as due to fear of ghosts. But among the Semites, at any rate, almost all death customs, from the kissing of the corpse (Gen. l. 1) onwards, are dictated by an affection that endures beyond the grave.

[1] Wellh. p. 181, gives the necessary citations. Cf. on the rites of mourning in general, Bokhārī, ii. 75 *sq.*, and Freytag in his Latin version of the *Ḥamāsa*, i. 430 *sq.*

[2] F. Bonney in *Journ. Anthrop. Inst.* xiii. (1884) p. 134. For this and the following reference I am indebted to Mr. Frazer.

[3] *Cook's First Voyage*, Bk. i. chap. 19.

depositing it in the tomb or on the funeral pyre.[1] Here also a comparison of the usage of more primitive races shows that the rite was originally two-sided, and had exactly the same sense as the offering of the mourner's blood. For among the Australians it is permitted to pull some hair from the corpse in lieu of a part of its flesh. The hair, in fact, is regarded by primitive peoples as a living and important part of the body, and as such is the object of many taboos and superstitions.[2]

[1] See for the Arabs (among whom the practice was confined to women) the authorities referred to above; also Krehl, *Rel. der Araber*, p. 33, and Goldziher, *Muh. Stud.* i. 248; note also the epithet *ḥalāc* = *ḥālica*, "death." For the Hebrews—whose custom was not to shave the whole head but only the front of it—see Jer. xvi. 6; Amos viii. 10; Ezek. vii. 18; and the legal prohibitions, Lev. xix. 27; Deut. xiv. 1; cf. also Lev. xxi. 5; Ezek. xliv. 20. In the Hebrew case it is not expressly said that the hair was laid on the tomb, but in Arabia this was done in the times of heathenism, and is still done by some Bedouin tribes, according to the testimony of modern travellers. A notable feature in the Arabian custom is that after shaving her head the mourner wrapped it in the *sicāb*, a cloth stained with her own blood. See the verse ascribed to the poetess Al-Khansā in *Tāj*, *s.v.*

[2] See Frazer, *Golden Bough*, iii. 258 *sqq.* Wilken (*op. cit.* p. 78 *sqq.*, and "De Simsonsage," *Gids*, 1888. No. 5) has collected many instances to show that the hair is often regarded as the special seat of life and strength. It may be conjectured that this idea is connected with the fact that the hair continues to grow, and so to manifest life, even in mature age, and this conjecture is supported by the fact that the nails are among many peoples the object of similar superstitious regard. The practice of cutting off the hair of the head, or a part of it, is pretty widely diffused; see Wilken, *Haaropfer*, p. 74, and for the Arabs an isolated statement of a Mahūby Arab in Doughty, i. 450, to which Mr. Doughty does not appear to attach much weight. Yet it seems to me that a custom of cutting off the hair of the dead is implied when we read that the Bekrites before the desperate battle of Ciḍḍa shaved their heads as devoting themselves to death (Ham. 253, l. 17), and perhaps also in Ibn Hishām, p. 254, l. 16 *sq.*, where a man dreams that his head is shaven and accepts this as an omen of death. Wilken supposes that the hair was originally cut away from the corpse, or from the dying man, to facilitate the escape of the soul from the body. This notion might very well recommend itself to the savage mind, inasmuch as the hair continues to grow for some time after death. But when we find the hair of the dead used as a means of divination, or as a charm, as is done among many peoples (Wilken, *Haaropfer*, Anh. ii.), we are led to think that the main object in cutting it off must be to preserve it as a means of continued connection with the dead. The possession of hair from a man's head or of a shaving from his nails is, in

Thus, when the hair of the living is deposited with the dead, and the hair of the dead remains with the living, a permanent bond of connection unites the two.

Now among the Semites and other ancient peoples the hair-offering is common, not only in mourning but in the worship of the gods, and the details of the ritual in the two cases are so exactly similar that we cannot doubt that a single principle is involved in both. The hair of Achilles was dedicated to the river-god Spercheus, in whose honour it was to be shorn on his safe return from Troy; but, knowing that he should never return, the hero transferred the offering to the dead Patroclus, and laid his yellow locks in the hand of the corpse. Arab women laid their hair on the tomb of the dead; young men and maidens in Syria cut off their flowing tresses and deposited them in caskets of gold and silver in the temples.[1] The Hebrews shaved the fore part of the head in mourning; the Arabs of Herodotus habitually adopted a like tonsure in honour of their god Orotal, who was supposed to wear his hair in the same way.[2] To argue from these parallels

primitive magic, a potent means of getting and retaining a hold over him. This, I suppose, is the reason why an Arab before releasing a captive cut off his hair and put it in his quiver; see the authorities cited by Wilken, p. 111, and add Rasmussen, *Addit.* p. 70 *sq.*, *Agh.* xii. 128. 1. On the same principle Mohammed's hair was preserved by his followers and worn on their persons (*Muh. in Med.* 429, *Agh.* xv. 12. 13). One such hair is the famous relic in the mosque of the Companion at Cairawān.

[1] *Dea Syria*, lx., where modern editors, by a totally inadmissible conjecture, make it appear that maidens offered their locks, and youths only their beard. Cf. Ephraem Syrus, *Op. Syr.* i. 246; the Syriac version of Lev. xix. 27 renders "ye shall not let your hair grow long," and Ephraem explains that it was the custom of the heathen to let their hair grow for a certain time, and then on a fixed day to shave the head in a temple or beside a sacred fountain.

[2] The peculiar Arab tonsure is already referred to in Jer. xxv. 23, R.V. It is found elsewhere in antiquity, *e.g.* in Eubœa and in some parts of Asia Minor (*Iliad*, ii. 542; Plut. *Thes.* 5; Strabo, x. 3. 6; Chœrilus, *ap.* Jos., *c. Ap.* i. 22; Pollux, ii. 28). At Delphi, where Greek ephebi were wont to offer the long hair of their childhood, this peculiar cut was called *θησσίς*, for

between customs of mourning and of religion that the worship of the gods is based on the cult of the dead, would be to go beyond the evidence; what does appear is that the same means which were deemed efficacious to maintain an enduring covenant between the living and the dead were used to serve the religious purpose of binding together in close union the worshipper and his god.

Starting from this general principle, we can explain without difficulty the two main varieties of the hair-offering as it occurs in religion. In its nature the offering is a personal one, made on behalf of an individual, not of a community. It does not therefore naturally find a place in the stated and periodical exercises of local or tribal religion, where a group of men is gathered together in an ordinary act of communal worship. Its proper object is to create or to emphasise the relation between an individual and a god, and so it is in place either in ceremonies of initiation, by which a new member is incorporated into the circle of a particular religion, or in connection with special vows and special acts of devotion, by which a worshipper seeks to knit more closely the bond between himself and his god. Thus in Greek religion the hair-offering occurs either at the moment when a youth enters on manhood, and so takes up a full share in the religious as well as the political responsibilities of a citizen, or else in fulfilment of a vow made at some moment when a man is in special need of divine succour. The same thing is true of Semitic religion, but to make this clear requires some explanation.

Theseus was said to have shorn only his front locks at the temple. Among the Curetes this was the way in which warriors wore their hair; presumably, therefore, children let the front locks grow long, and sacrificed them on entering manhood, just as among the Arabs the two side locks are the distinguishing mark of an immature lad.

In early societies a man is destined by his birth to become a member of a particular political and social circle, which is at the same time a distinct religious community. But in many cases this destination has to be confirmed by a formal act of admission to the community. The child or immature stripling has not yet full civil privileges and responsibilities, and in general, on the principle that civil and religious status are inseparable, he has no full part either in the rights or in the duties of the communal religion. He is excluded from many religious ceremonies, and conversely he can do without offence things which on religious grounds are strictly forbidden to the full tribesman. Among rude nations the transition from ★ civil and religious immaturity to maturity is frequently preceded by certain probationary tests of courage and endurance; for the full tribesman must above all things be a warrior. In any case the step from childhood to manhood is too important to take place without a formal ceremony and public rites of initiation, importing the full and final incorporation of the neophyte into the civil and religious fellowship of his tribe or community.[1] It is clear from what has already been said, that the application of the blood of the youth to the sacred symbol, or the depositing of his hair at the shrine of his people's god, might form a significant feature in such a ritual; and among very many rude peoples one or other of these ceremonies is actually observed in connection with the rites which every young man must pass through before he attains the position of a warrior, and is allowed to marry and exercise the other prerogatives of perfect manhood. Among wholly barbarous races these initiation ceremonies have great importance,

[1] In some cases the rite seems to be connected with the transference of the lad from the mother's to the father's kin. But for the present argument it is not necessary to discuss this aspect of the matter.

and are often extremely repulsive in character. The blood-offering in particular frequently takes a form which makes it a severe test of the neophyte's courage—as in the cruel flagellation of Spartan ephebi at the altar of Artemis Orthia, or in the frightful ordeal which takes the place of simple circumcision in some of the wilder mountain tribes of Arabia.[1] As manners become less fierce, and society ceases to be organised mainly for war, the ferocity of primitive ritual is naturally softened, and the initiation ceremony gradually loses importance, till at last it becomes a mere domestic celebration, which in its social aspect may be compared to the private festivities of a modern family when a son comes of age, and in its religious aspect to the first communion of a youthful Catholic. When the rite loses political significance, and becomes purely religious, it is not necessary that it should be deferred to the age of full manhood; indeed, the natural tendency of pious parents will be to dedicate their child as early as possible to the god who is to be his protector through life. Thus circum-
★ cision, which was originally a preliminary to marriage, and so a ceremony of introduction to the full prerogative of manhood, is now generally undergone by Mohammedan boys before they reach maturity, while, among the Hebrews, infants were circumcised on the eighth day from birth. Similar variations of usage apply to the Semitic hair-offering. Among the Arabs in the time of Mohammed it was common to sacrifice a sheep on the birth of a child, and then to shave the head of the infant and daub the scalp with the blood of the victim. This ceremony—callek *ʿacīca*, or "the cutting off of the hair"—was designed to "avert evil from the child," and was evidently an act of dedication by which the infant was brought under the

[1] The connection between circumcision and the initiatory blood-offering will be considered more fully in another place.

protection of the god of the community.[1] Among Lucian's ★ Syrians, on the other hand, the hair of boys and girls was allowed to grow unshorn as a consecrated thing from birth to adolescence, and was cut off and dedicated at the sanctuary as a necessary preliminary to marriage. In other words, the hair-offering of youths and maidens was a ceremony of religious initiation, through which they had to pass before they were admitted to the status of social maturity. The same thing appears to have occurred, at least in the case of maidens, at Phœnician sanctuaries; for the female worshippers at the Adonis feast of Byblus, who, according to the author just cited, were required to sacrifice either their hair or their chastity,[2] appear from other accounts to have been ★ generally maidens, of whom this act of devotion was exacted as a preliminary to marriage.[3] I apprehend that

[1] That the hair was regarded as an offering appears from the Moslem practice, referred by tradition to the example of Fāṭima, of bestowing in alms its weight of silver. Alms are a religious oblation, and in the similar custom which Herod. ii. 65, Diod. i. 83, attest for ancient Egypt, the silver was paid to the sanctuary. See for further details *Kinship*, p. 179 *sqq.*, where I have dwelt on the way in which such a ceremony would facilitate the change of the child's kin, when the rule that the son followed the father and not the mother began to be established. I still think that this point is worthy of notice, and that the desire to fix the child's religion, and with it his tribal connection, at the earliest possible moment, may have been one cause for performing the ceremony in infancy. But Nöldeke's remarks in *ZDMG.* xl. 184, and a fuller consideration of the whole subject of the hair-offering, have convinced me that the name *'acica* is not connected with the idea of change of kin, but is derived from the cutting away of the first hair. In this, however, I see a confirmation of the view that among the Arabs, as among the Syrians, the old usage was to defer the cutting of the first hair till adolescence, for *'acca* is a very strong term to apply to the shaving of the scanty hair of a new-born infant, while it is quite appropriate to the sacrifice of the long locks characteristic of boyhood. Cf. also the use of the same verb in the phrases *'occat tamīmatuhu* (*Kāmil*, 405, l. 19), *'acca 'l-shabābu tamīmatī* (*Tāj*, *s.v.*), used of the cutting away, when manhood was reached, of the amulet worn during childhood. In modern Syria (Sidon district) a child's hair must not be cut till it is a year old (*ZDPV.* vii. 85).

[2] *Dea Syria*, vi.

[3] Sozomen, v. 10. 7. Cf. Socrates, i. 18, and the similar usage in

among the Arabs, in like manner, the *ʿacīca* was originally a ceremony of initiation into manhood, and that the transference of the ceremony to infancy was a later innovation, for among the Arabs, as among the Syrians, young lads let their hair grow long, and the sign of immaturity was the retention of the side locks, which adult warriors did not wear.[1] The cutting of the side locks was therefore a formal mark of admission into manhood, and in the time of Herodotus it must also have been a formal initiation into the worship of Orotal, for otherwise the religious significance which the Greek historian attaches to the shorn forehead of the Arabs is unintelligible. At that time, therefore, we must conclude that a hair-offering, precisely equivalent to the *ʿacīca*, took place upon entry into manhood, and thereafter the front hair was habitually worn short as a permanent memorial of this dedicatory sacrifice. It is by no means clear that even in later times the initiatory ceremony was invariably performed in infancy, for the name *ʿacīca*, which in Arabic denotes the first hair as well as the religious ceremony of cutting it off, is sometimes applied to the ruddy locks of a lad approaching manhood,[2] and figuratively to the plumage of a swift young ostrich or the tufts of an ass's hair, neither of which has much resemblance to the scanty down on the head of a new-born babe.[3]

It would seem, therefore, that the oldest Semitic usage, both in Arabia and in Syria, was to sacrifice the hair of

Babylon, Herod. i. 199. We are not to suppose that participation in these rites was confined to maidens before marriage (Euseb. *Vit. Const.* iii. 58. 1), but it appears that it was obligatory on them.

[1] See Wellh., *Heid.* p. 198.

[2] Imraulcais, 3. 1; see also *Lisān*, xii. 129, l. 18, and Dozy, *s.v.*

[3] Zohair, 1. 17; *Diw. Hodh.* 232. 9. The sense of "down," which Nöldeke, *ut supra*, gives to the word in these passages, is hardly appropriate.

childhood upon admission to the religious and social status of manhood.

The bond between the worshipper and his god which was established by means of the hair-offering had an enduring character, but it was natural to renew it from time to time, when there was any reason to fear that the interest of the deity in his votary might have been relaxed. Thus it was customary for the inhabitants of Ṭāïf in Arabia to shave their heads at the sanctuary of the town whenever they returned from a journey.[1] Here the idea seems to be that absence from the holy place might have loosened the religious tie, and that it was proper to bind it fast again. In like manner the hair-offering formed part of the ritual in every Arabian pilgrimage,[2] and also at the great feasts of Byblus and Bambyce,[3] which were not mere local celebrations, but drew worshippers from distant parts. The worshipper in these cases desired to attach himself as firmly as possible to a deity and a shrine with which he could not hope to keep up frequent and regular connection, and thus it was fitting that, when he went forth from the holy place, he should leave part of himself behind, as a permanent link of union with the temple and the god that inhabited it.

The Arabian and Syrian pilgrimages with which the hair-offering was associated were exceptional services; in many cases their object was to place the worshipper under the protection of a foreign god, whose cult had no place in the pilgrim's local and natural religion, and in any case

[1] *Muh. in Med.* p. 381.

[2] Wellh. p. 123 *sq.*; Goldziher, *op. cit.* p. 249. That the hair was shaved as an offering appears most clearly in the worship of Ocaiṣir, where it was mixed with an oblation of meal.

[3] *Dea Syria*, vi., lv. In the latter case the eyebrows also were shaved, and the sacrifice of hair from the eyebrow reappears in Peru, in the laws of the Incas. On the painted inscription of Citium (*CIS.* No. 86) barbers (גלבם) are enumerated among the stated ministers of the temple

the service was not part of a man's ordinary religious duties, but was spontaneously undertaken as a work of special piety, or under the pressure of circumstances that made the pilgrim feel the need of coming into closer touch with the divine powers. Among the Hebrews, at least in later times, when stated pilgrimages to Jerusalem were among the ordinary and imperative exercises of every man's religion, the pilgrimage did not involve a hair-offering, nor is it probable that in any part of antiquity this form of service was required in connection with ordinary visits to one's own local temple. The Pentateuchal law recognises the hair-offering only in the case of the peculiar vow of the Nazarite, the ritual of which is described in Num. vi. The details there given do not help us to understand what part the Nazirate held in the actual religious life of the Jews under the law, but from Josephus[1] we gather that the vow was generally taken in times of sickness or other trouble, and that it was therefore exactly parallel to the ordinary Greek vow to offer the hair on deliverance from urgent danger. From the antique point of view, the fact that a man is in straits or peril is a proof that the divine powers on which his life is dependent are estranged or indifferent, and a warning to bring himself into closer relation with the god from whom he is estranged. The hair-offering affords the natural means towards this end, and, if the offering cannot be accomplished at the moment, it ought to be made the subject of a vow, for a vow is the recognised way of antedating a future act of service and making its efficacy begin at once. A vow of this kind, aiming at the redintegration of normal relations with the deity, is naturally more than a bare promise; it is a promise for the performance of which one at once begins to make active

[1] *B. J.* ii. 15. 1.

preparation, so that the life of the votary from the time when he assumes the engagement is taken out of the ordinary sphere of secular existence, and becomes one continuous act of religion.[1] As soon as a man takes the vow to poll his locks at the sanctuary, the hair is a consecrated thing, and as such, inviolable till the moment for discharging the vow arrives; and so the flowing locks of the Hebrew Nazarite or of a Greek votary like Achilles are the visible marks of his consecration. In like manner the Arabian pilgrim, whose resolution to visit a distant shrine was practically a vow,[2] was not allowed to poll or even to comb and wash his locks till the pilgrimage was accomplished; and on the same principle the whole course of his journey, from the day when he first set his face towards the temple with the resolution to do homage there, was a period of consecration (*iḥrām*),[3] during which he was subject to a number of other ceremonial restrictions or taboos, of the same kind with those imposed by actual presence in the sanctuary.

The taboos connected with pilgrimages and other vows require some further elucidation, but to go into the matter now would carry us too far from the point immediately before us. I will therefore reserve what I have still to say on this subject for an additional note.[4] What has been said already covers all the main examples of the hair-offering among the Semites.[5] They present considerable variety

[1] Of course, if the vow is conditional on something to happen in the future, the engagement does not necessarily come into force till the condition is fulfilled.

[2] In Mohammedan law it is expressly reckoned as a vow.

[3] Under Islam the consecration of the pilgrim need not begin till he reaches the boundaries of the sacred territory. But it is permitted, and according to many authorities preferable, to assume the *iḥrām* on leaving one's home; and this was the ancient practice.

[4] See *Additional Note* I, *The Taboos incident to Pilgrimages and Vows.*

[5] Quite distinct from the hair-offering are the cases in which the hair is shaved off (but not consecrated) as a means of purification after pollution;

of aspect, but the result of our discussion is that they can be referred to a single principle. In their origin the hair-offering and the offering of one's own blood are precisely similar in meaning. But the blood-offering, while it presents the idea of life-union with the god in the strongest possible form, is too barbarous to be long retained as an ordinary act of religion. It continued to be practised among the civilised Semites, by certain priesthoods and societies of devotees; but in the habitual worship of laymen it either fell out of use or was retained in a very attenuated form, in the custom of tatooing the flesh with ★ punctures in honour of the deity.[1] The hair-offering, on the other hand, which involved nothing offensive to civilised

e.g. Lev. xiv. 9 (purification of leper); *Dea Syria*, liii. (after defilement by the dead); Deut. xxi. 12. In such cases the hair is cut off because defilement is specially likely to cling to it.

[1] For the στίγματα on the wrists and necks of the heathen Syrians the classical passage is *Dea Syria*, lix.; compare for further evidence the discussion in Spencer, *Leg. Rit. Heb.* ii. 14; and see also *Kinship*, p. 249 *sqq.* The tattooed marks were the sign that the worshipper belonged to the god; thus at the temple of Heracles at the Canobic mouth of the Nile, the fugitive slave who had been marked with the sacred stigmata could not be reclaimed by his master (Herod. ii. 113). The practice therefore stands on one line with the branding or tattooing of cattle, slaves and prisoners of war. But in Lev. xix. 28, where tattooing is condemned as a heathenish practice, it is immediately associated with incisions in the flesh made in mourning or in honour of the dead, and this suggests that in their ultimate origin the *stigmata* are nothing more than the permanent scars of punctures made to draw blood for a ceremony of self-dedication to the deity. Among the Arabs I find no direct evidence of a religious significance attached to tattooing, and the practice appears to have been confined to women, as was also the habitual use of amulets in mature life. The presumption is that this coincidence is not accidental, but that the tattooed marks were originally sacred stigmata like those of the Syrians, and so were conceived to have the force of a charm. Pietro della Valle (ed. 1843), i. 395, describes the Arabian tattooing, and says that it is practised all over the East by men as well as by women. But so far as I have observed, it is only Christian men that tattoo in Syria, and with them the pattern chosen is a sacred symbol, which has been shown to me as a proof that a man was exempt from the military service to which Moslems are liable. In Farazdac, ed. Boucher, p. 232, l. 9, a tattooed hand is the mark of a foreigner. In Egypt men of the peasant class are sometimes tattooed.

feelings, continued to play an important part in religion to the close of paganism, and even entered into Christian ritual in the tonsure of priests and nuns.[1]

Closely allied to the practice of leaving part of oneself —whether blood or hair—in contact with the god at the sanctuary, are offerings of part of one's clothes or other things that one has worn, such as ornaments or weapons. In the *Iliad*, Glaucus and Diomede exchange armour in token of their ancestral friendship; and when Jonathan makes a covenant of love and brotherhood with David, he invests him with his garments, even to his sword, his bow, and his girdle.[2] Among the Arabs, he who seeks protection lays hold of the garments of the man to whom he appeals, or more formally ties a knot in the head-shawl of his protector.[3] In the old literature, "pluck away my garments from thine" means "put an end to our attachment."[4] The clothes are so far part of a man that they can serve as a vehicle of personal connection. Hence the religious significance of suspending on an idol or *Dhāt Anwāt*, not only weapons, ornaments and complete garments, but mere shreds from one's raiment. These rag-offerings are still to be seen hanging on the sacred

[1] The latter was practised in Jerome's time in the monasteries of Egypt and Syria (*Ep.* 147 ad Sabinianum).

[2] 1 Sam. xviii. 3 *sq.* I presume that by ancient law Saul was bound to acknowledge the formal covenant thus made between David and his son, and that this ought to be taken into account in judging of the subsequent relations between the three.

[3] Wellhausen, *Heidenthum*, p. 109, note 3; Burckhardt, *Bed. and Wah.* i. 130 *sq.*; Blunt, *Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates*, i. 42. The knot, says Burckhardt, is tied that the protector may look out for witnesses to prove the act, and "the same custom is observed when any transaction is to be witnessed." But primarily, I apprehend, the knot is the symbolic sign of the engagement that the witnesses are called to prove, and I was told in the Ḥijāz that the suppliant gets a fragment of the fringe of the shawl to keep as his token of the transaction. In the covenant sacrifice, Herod. iii. 8, the blood is applied to the sacred stones with threads from the garments of the two contracting parties.

[4] Imraulc., *Moall.* l. 21

trees of Syria and on the tombs of Mohammedan saints; they are not gifts in the ordinary sense, but pledges of attachment.[1] It is possible that the rending of garments in mourning was originally designed to procure such an offering for the dead, just as the tearing of the hair on the like occasion is not a natural sign of mourning, but a relic of the hair-offering. Natural signs of mourning must not be postulated lightly; in all such matters habit is a second nature.[2]

Finally, I may note in a single word that the counterpart of the custom of leaving part of oneself or of one's clothes with the deity at the sanctuary, is the custom of wearing sacred relics as charms, so that something belonging to the god remains always in contact with one's person.[3]

The peculiar instructiveness of the series of usages which we have been considering, and the justification for the long digression from the subject of sacrifice into which they have led us, is that the ceremonies designed to establish a life-bond between the worshipper and his god are here dissociated from the death of a victim and from every idea of penal satisfaction to the deity. They have

[1] A masterful man, in the early days of Islam, reserves a water for his own use by hanging pieces of fringe of his red blanket on a tree beside it, or by throwing them into the pool; Farazdac, p. 195, *Agh.* viii. 159. 10 *sqq.*

[2] It is to be noted that most of the standing methods of expressing sorrow and distress are derived from the formal usages employed in primitive times in mourning for the dead. These usages, however, are not all to be derived from one principle. While the rudest nations seek to keep up their connection with the beloved dead, they also believe that very dangerous influences hover round death-beds, corpses, and graves, and many funeral ceremonies are observed as safeguards against these, as has been well shown by Mr. Frazer, *Journ. Anthr. Inst.* xv. 64 *sqq.*; though I think he has not sufficiently allowed for another principle that underlies many such customs, namely, the affectionate desire of even the rudest peoples to keep up a friendly intercourse with their dead friends and relations. Compare below, p. 370.

[3] Thus in Palestine, at the present time, the man who hangs a rag on a sacred tree takes with him in return, as a preservative against evil, one of the rags that have been sanctified by hanging there for some time before (*PEF. Qu. St.* 1893, p. 204).

indeed an atoning force, whenever they are used to renew relations with a god who is temporarily estranged, but this is merely a consequence of the conception that the physical link which they establish between the divine and human parties in the rite binds the god to the man as well as the man to the god. Even in the case of the blood-offering there is no reason to hold that the pain of the self-inflicted wounds had originally any significant place in the ceremony. But no doubt, as time went on, the barbarous and painful sacrifice of one's own blood came to be regarded as more efficacious than the simpler and commoner hair-offering; for in religion what is unusual always appears to be more potent, and more fitted to reconcile an offended deity.

The use of the Syriac word *ethkashshaph* seems to show that the sacrifice of one's own blood was mainly associated among the Aramæans with deprecation or supplication to an angry god, and though I cannot point among the Semites to any formal atoning ceremony devised on this principle, the idea involved can be well illustrated by a rite still sometimes practised in Arabia, as a means of making atonement to a man for offences short of murder. With bare and shaven head the offender appears at the door of the injured person, holding a knife in each hand, and, reciting a formula provided for the purpose, strikes his head several times with the sharp blades. Then, drawing his hands over his bloody scalp, he wipes them on the doorpost. The other must then come out and cover the suppliant's head with a shawl, after which he kills a sheep, and they sit down together at a feast of reconciliation. The characteristic point in this rite is the application of the blood to the doorpost, which, as in the passover service, is equivalent to applying it to the person of the inmates. Here, therefore, we still see the old idea at work, that the reconciling

value of the rite lies, not in the self-inflicted wounds, but in the application of the blood to make a life-bond between the two parties.

On the same analogy, when we turn to those blood-rites in which a whole community takes part, and in which therefore a victim has to be slaughtered to provide the material for the ceremony, we may expect to find that, at least in old times, the significant part of the ceremony does not lie in the death of the victim, but in the application of its life or life-blood; and in this expectation we shall not be disappointed.

Of all Semitic sacrifices those of the Arabs have the rudest and most visibly primitive character; and among the Arabs, where there was no complicated fire-ceremony at the altar, the sacramental meal stands out in full relief as the very essence of the ritual. Now, in the oldest known form of Arabian sacrifice, as described by Nilus, the camel chosen as the victim is bound upon a rude altar of stones piled together, and when the leader of the band has thrice led the worshippers round the altar in a solemn procession accompanied with chants, he inflicts the first wound, while the last words of the hymn are still upon the lips of the congregation, and in all haste drinks of the blood that gushes forth. Forthwith the whole company fall on the victim with their swords, hacking off pieces of the quivering flesh and devouring them raw with such wild haste, that in the short interval between the rise of the day star which marked the hour for the service to begin, and the disappearance of its rays before the rising sun, the entire camel, body and bones, skin, blood and entrails, is wholly devoured.[1] The plain meaning of this is that the victim was

[1] This must not be regarded as incredible. According to Artemidorus, *ap.* Strabo, xvi. 4. 17, the Troglodytes ate the bones and skin as well as the flesh of cattle.

devoured before its life had left the still warm blood and flesh,—raw flesh is called "living" flesh in Hebrew and Syriac,—and that thus in the most literal way all those who shared in the ceremony absorbed part of the victim's life into themselves. One sees how much more forcibly than any ordinary meal such a rite expresses the establishment or confirmation of a bond of common life between the worshippers, and also, since the blood is shed upon the altar itself, between the worshippers and their god.

In this sacrifice, then, the significant factors are two: the conveyance of the living blood to the godhead, and the absorption of the living flesh and blood into the flesh and blood of the worshippers. Each of these is effected in the simplest and most direct manner, so that the meaning of the ritual is perfectly transparent. In later Arabian sacrifices, and still more in the sacrifices of the more civilised Semitic nations, the primitive crudity of the ceremonial was modified, and the meaning of the act is therefore more or less disguised, but the essential type of the ritual remains the same.

In all Arabian sacrifices except the holocaust—which occurs only in the case of human victims—the godward side of the ritual is summed up in the shedding of the victim's blood, so that it flows over the sacred symbol, or gathers in a pit (*ghabghab*) at the foot of the altar idol. An application of the blood to the summit of the sacred stone may be added, but that is all.[1] What enters the *ghabghab* is held to be conveyed to the deity; thus at certain Arabian shrines the pit under the altar was the place where votive treasures were deposited. A pit to receive the blood existed also at Jerusalem under the altar of burnt-offering, and similarly in certain Syrian sacrifices the blood was collected in a hollow, which

[1] Zohair, x. 24.

apparently bore the name of *mashkan*, and thus was designated as the habitation of the godhead.[1]

In Arabia, accordingly, the most solemn act in the ritual is the shedding of the blood, which in Nilus's narrative takes place at the moment when the sacred chant comes to an end. This, therefore, is the crisis of the service, to which the choral procession round the altar leads up.[2] In later Arabia, the *ṭawāf*, or act of circling the sacred stone, was still a principal part of religion; but even before Mohammed's time it had begun to be dissociated from sacrifice, and become a meaningless ceremony. Again, the original significance of the *wocūf*, or "standing," which in the ritual of the post-Mohammedan pilgrimage has in like manner become an unmeaning ceremony, is doubtless correctly explained by Wellhausen, who compares it with the scene described by more than one old poet, where the worshippers stand round the altar idol, at a respectful distance, gazing with rapt attention, while the slaughtered victims lie stretched on the ground. The moment of this act of adoration must be that when the slaughter of the victims is just over, or still in progress, and their blood is draining into the *ghabghab*, or being applied by the priest to the head of the *noṣb*.[3]

In the developed forms of North Semitic worship, where fire-sacrifices prevail, the slaughter of the victim loses its importance as the critical point in the ritual.

[1] See the text published by Dozy and De Goeje in the *Actes* of the Leyden Congress of Orientalists, 1883, vol. iii. pp. 337, 363. For the *ghabghab*, see p. 198 *supra*, and Wellhausen, p. 103. Compare also the Persian ritual, Strabo, xv. 3. 14, and that of certain Greek sacrifices, Plutarch, *Aristides*, xxi.: τὸν ταῦρον εἰς τὴν πυρὰν σφάξας.

[2] The festal song of praise (הִלֵּל, *tahlīl*) properly goes with the dance round the altar (cf. Ps. xxvi. 6 *sq.*), for in primitive times song and dance are inseparable. (Cf. Wellh. 110 *sq.*)

[3] Wellh. p. 61 *sq.*; Yācūt, iii. 94, l. 13 *sq.* (cf. Nöldeke in *ZDMG.* 1887, p. 721); *ibid.* p. 182, l. 2 *sq.* (*supra*, p. 228).

The altar is above all things a hearth, and the burning of the sacrificial fat is the most solemn part of the service.

This, however, is certainly not primitive; for even in the period of fire-sacrifice the Hebrew altar is called מזבח, that is, "the place of slaughter,"[1] and in ancient times the victim was slain on or beside the altar, just as among the Arabs, as appears from the account of the sacrifice of Isaac, and from 1 Sam. xiv. 34.[2] The latter passage proves that in the time of Saul the Hebrews still knew a form of sacrifice in which the offering was completed in the oblation of the blood. And even in the case of fire-sacrifice the blood was not cast upon the flames, but dashed against the sides of the altar or poured out at its foot; the new ritual was not able wholly to displace the old. Nay, the sprinkling of the blood continued to be regarded as the principal point of the ritual down to the last days of Jewish ritual; for on it the atoning efficacy of the sacrifice depended.[3]

As regards the manward part of the ritual, the revolting details given by Nilus have naturally no complete parallel in the worship of the more civilised Semites, or even of the later Arabs. In lieu of the scramble described by Nilus—the wild rush to cut gobbets of flesh from the still quivering victim—we find among the later Arabs a partition of the sacrificial flesh among all who are present at the ceremony. Yet it seems possible that the *ijāza*, or "permission," that is, the word of command that terminates the *wocūf*, was originally the permission to fall upon the

[1] Aram. *madbaḥ*, Arab. *madhbaḥ*; the latter means also a trench in the ground, which is intelligible from what has been said about the *ghabghab*.

[2] *Supra*, p. 202. In Ps. cxviii. 27 the festal victim is bound with cords to the horns of the altar, a relic of ancient usage which was no longer intelligible to the Septuagint translators or to the Jewish traditional expositors. Cf. the sacrificial stake to which the victim is bound in Vedic sacrifices.

[3] Heb. ix. 22; Reland, *Ant. Heb.* p. 300 (Gem. on *Zeb.* xlii. 1).

slaughtered victim. In the Meccan pilgrimage the *ijāza* which terminates the *wocūf* at ʿArafa was the signal for a hot race to the neighbouring sanctuary of Mozdalifa, where the sacred fire of the god Cozaḥ burned; it was, in fact, not so much the permission to leave ʿArafa as to draw near to Cozaḥ. The race itself is called *ifāḍa*, which may mean either "dispersion" or "distribution." It cannot
★ well mean the former, for ʿArafa is not holy ground, but merely the point of assemblage, just outside the Ḥaram, at which the ceremonies began, and the station at ʿArafa is only the preparation for the vigil at Mozdalifa. On the other hand, if the meaning is "distribution," the *ifāḍa* answers to the rush of Nilus's Saracens to partake of the sacrifice. The only difference is that at Mozdalifa the crowd is not allowed to assemble close to the altar, but has to watch the performance of the solemn rites from afar; compare Ex. xix. 10–13.[1]

The substitution of an orderly division of the victim for the scramble described by Nilus does not touch the meaning of the ceremonial. Much more important, from its effect in disguising an essential feature in the ritual, is the modification by which, in most Semitic sacrifices, the flesh is not eaten "alive" or raw, but sodden or roasted. It is obvious that this change could not fail to establish itself with the progress of civilisation; but it was still possible to express the idea of communion in the actual life of the victim by eating its flesh "with the blood."

[1] It may be noted that the ceremonies at Mozdalifa lay wholly between sunset and sunrise, and that there was apparently one sacrifice just at or after sunset and another before sunrise,—another point of contact with the ritual described by Nilus. The *wocūf* corresponding to the morning sacrifice was of course held at Mozdalifa within the Ḥaram, for the pilgrims were already consecrated by the previous service. Nābigha in two places speaks of a race of pilgrims to a place called Ilāl. If the reference is to the Meccan *ḥajj*, Ilāl must be Mozdalifa not, as the geographers suppose, a place at ʿArafa.

That bloody morsels were consumed by the heathen in Palestine, and also by the less orthodox Israelites, is apparent from Zech. ix. 7; Ezek. xxxiii. 25;[1] Lev. xix. 26; and the context of these passages, with the penalty of excommunication attached to the eating of blood in Lev. vii. 27, justify us in assuming that this practice had a directly religious significance, and occurred in connection with sacrifice. That it was in fact an act of communion with heathen deities, is affirmed by Maimonides, not as a mere inference from the biblical texts, but on the basis of Arabic accounts of the religion of the Harranians.[2] It would seem, however, that in the northern Semitic lands the ritual of blood-eating must already have been rare in the times to which our oldest documents belong; presumably, indeed, it was confined to certain mystic initiations, and did not extend to ordinary sacrifices.[3]

[1] I cannot comprehend why Cornill corrects Ezek. xxxiii. 25 by Ezek. xviii. 6, xxii. 9, and not conversely; cf. LXX. on Lev. xix. 26, where the same mistake occurs.

[2] *Dalālat al-Ḥāirīn*, iii. 46, vol. iii. p. 104 of Munk's ed. (Paris, 1866) and p. 371 of his translation. That Maimonides had actual accounts of the Harranians to go on appears by comparing the passage with that quoted above from an Arabic source in the *Actes* of the Leyden Congress; but there may be a doubt whether his authorities attested blood-eating among the Harranians, or only supplied hints by which he interpreted the biblical evidence.

[3] For the mystic sacrifices of the heathen Semites, see above, p. 290 *sqq*. That these sacrifices were eaten with the blood appears from a comparison of Isa. lxv. 4, lxvi. 3, 17. All these passages refer to the same circle of rites, in which the victims chosen were such animals as were strictly taboo in ordinary life—the swine, the dog, the mouse and vermin (שֶׁקֶץ) generally. To such sacrifices, as we learn from lxvi. 17, a peculiar consecrating and purifying efficacy was attached, which must be ascribed to the sacramental participation in the sacrosanct flesh. The flesh was eaten in the form of broth, which in lxv. 4 is called broth of *piggūlīm*, *i.e.* of carrion, or flesh so killed as to retain the blood in it (Ezek. iv. 14; cf. Zech. ix. 7). We are to think, therefore, of a broth made with the blood, like the black broth of the Spartans, which seems also to have been originally a sacred food, reserved for warriors. The dog-sacrifice in lxvi. 3 is killed by breaking its neck, which agrees with this conclusion. Similarly in the mysteries of the Ainos, the sacred bear, which forms the sacrifice, is killed

In the legal sacrifices of the Hebrews blood was never eaten, but in the covenant sacrifice of Ex. xxiv. it is sprinkled on the worshippers, which, as we have already learned by a comparison of the various forms of the blood covenant between men, has the same meaning. In later forms of sacrifice this feature disappears, and the communion between god and man, which is still the main thing in ordinary sacrifices, is expressed by burning part of the flesh on the altar, while the rest is cooked and eaten by the worshippers. But the application of the living blood to the worshipper is retained in certain special cases—at the consecration of priests and the purification of the leper [1]—where it is proper to express in the strongest way the establishment of a special bond between the god and his servant,[2] or the restitution of one who has been cut off from religious fellowship with the deity and the community of his worshippers. In like manner, in the forms of sin-offering described in Lev. iv., it is at least required that the priest should dip his finger in the blood of the victim; and in this kind of ritual, as is expressly stated in Lev. x. 17, the priest acts as the representative of the sinner or bears his sin. Again, the blood of the Paschal lamb is applied to the doorposts, and so extends its efficacy to all within the dwelling—the "house" in all the Semitic languages standing for the household or family.[3]

without effusion of blood; cf. the Indian rite, Strabo, xv. 1. 54 (Satapatha Brahmana, tr. Eggeling, ii. 190), and the Cappadocian, *ibid.* xv. 3. 15; also the Finnish sacrifice, Mannhardt, *Ant. Wald- u. Feldkulte*, p. 160, and other cases of the same kind, *Journ. R. Geog. Soc.* vol. iii. p. 283, vol. xl. p. 171. Spencer compares the πνικτά of Acts xv. 20.

[1] Lev. viii. 23, xiv. 6, 14.

[2] The relation between God and His priests rests on a covenant (Deut. xxxiii. 9; Mal. ii. 4 *sqq.*).

[3] In modern Arabia "it is the custom to slaughter at the tent door and sprinkle the camels with the blood" (Blunt, *Nejd*, i. 203; also Doughty, i. 499). This protects the camels from sickness. Also the live booty from a foray is sprinkled with sacrificial blood—presumably to incorporate it with the tribal

The express provision that the flesh of the lamb must not be eaten raw seems to be directed against a practice similar to what Nilus describes; and so also the precept that the passover must be eaten in haste, in ordinary outdoor attire, and that no part of it must remain till the morning, becomes intelligible if we regard it as having come down from a time when the living flesh was hastily devoured beside the altar before the sun rose.[1] From all this it is apparent that the ritual described by Nilus is by no means an isolated invention of the religious fancy, in one of the most barbarous corners of the Semitic world, but a very typical embodiment of the main ideas that underlie the sacrifices of the Semites generally. Even in its details it probably comes nearer to the primitive form of Semitic worship than any other sacrifice of which we have a description.

We may now take it as made out that, throughout the Semitic field, the fundamental idea of sacrifice is not that of a sacred tribute, but of communion between the god and his worshippers by joint participation in the living flesh and blood of a sacred victim. We see, however, that in the more advanced forms of ritual this idea becomes attenuated and tends to disappear, at least in the commoner kinds of sacrifice. When men cease to eat raw or living flesh, the blood, to the exclusion of the solid parts of the body, comes to be regarded as the vehicle of life and the true *res sacramenti*. And the nature of the sacrifice as a sacramental act is still further disguised when—for reasons

cattle (*tilād*); Doughty, i. 452. An obscure reference to the smearing of a camel with blood is found in Azraḳī, p. 53, l. 13, *Agh.* xiii. 110, l. 6, but the variations between the two texts make it hazardous to attempt an explanation. Cp. on the whole subject of blood-sprinkling, Kremer, *Studien*, p. 45 *sqq.*

[1] There is so much that is antique about the Paschal ritual, that one is tempted to think that the law of Ex. xii. 46, "neither shall ye break a bone thereof," may be a prohibition of some usage descended from the rule given by Nilus, that the bones as well as the flesh must be consumed.

that will by and by appear more clearly—the sacramental blood is no longer drunk by the worshippers but only sprinkled on their persons, or finally finds no manward application at all, but is wholly poured out at the altar, so that it becomes the proper share of the deity, while the flesh is left to be eaten by man. This is the common form of Arabian sacrifice, and among the Hebrews the same form is attested by 1 Sam. xiv. 34. At this stage, at least among the Hebrews, the original sanctity of the life of domestic animals is still recognised in a modified form, inasmuch as it is held unlawful to use their flesh for food except in a sacrificial meal. But this rule is not strict enough to prevent flesh from becoming a familiar luxury. Sacrifices are multiplied on trivial occasions of religious gladness or social festivity, and the rite of eating at the sanctuary loses the character of an exceptional sacrament, and means no more than that men are invited to feast and be merry at the table of their god, or that no feast is complete in which the god has not his share.

This stage in the evolution of ritual is represented by the worship of the Hebrew high places, or, beyond the Semitic field, by the religion of the agricultural communities of Greece. Historically, therefore, it coincides with the stage of religious development in which the deity is conceived as the king of his people and the lord of the land, and as such is habitually approached with gifts and tribute. It was the rule of antiquity, and still is the rule in the East, that the inferior must not present himself before his superior without a gift "to smooth his face" and make him gracious.[1] The same phrase is habitually applied in the Old Testament to acts of sacrificial worship, and in Ex.

[1] חלה פני, Prov. xix. 6; Ps. xlv. 13 (12), E.V., "intreat his favour." In the Old Testament the phrase is much oftener used of acts of worship addressed to the deity, *e.g.* 1 Sam. xiii. 12, of the burnt-offering.

xxiii. 15 the rule is formulated that no one shall appear before Jehovah empty-handed. *Δῶρα θεοὺς πείθει, δῶρ' αἰδοίους βασιλῆας.*

As the commonest gifts in a simple agricultural state of society necessarily consisted of grain, fruits and cattle, which served to maintain the open hospitality that prevailed at the courts of kings and great chiefs, it was natural that animal sacrifices, as soon as their sacramental significance fell into the background, should be mainly regarded as gifts of homage presented at the court of the divine king, out of which he maintained a public table for his worshippers. In part they were summed up along with the cereal oblations of first-fruits as stated tributes, which everyone who desired to retain the favour of the god was expected to present at fixed seasons; in part they were special offerings with which the worshipper associated special petitions, or with which he approached the deity to present his excuses for a fault and request forgiveness.[1] In the case where it is the business of the worshipper to make satisfaction for an offence, the gift may assume rather the character of a fine payable at the sanctuary; for in the oldest free communities personal chastisement is reserved for slaves, and the offences of freemen are habitually wiped out by the payment of an amercement.[2] But in the older Hebrew custom the fines paid to the sanctuary do not appear to have taken the form of victims for sacrifice, but rather of payments in money to the priest,[3] and the atoning effect ascribed to gifts

[1] 1 Sam. xxvi. 19: "If Jehovah hath stirred thee up against me, let Him be gratified by an oblation."

[2] The reason of this is that not even a chief can strike or mutilate a freeman without exposing himself to retaliation. This is still the case among the Bedouins, and so it was also in ancient Israel; see *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, 2nd ed., p. 368.

[3] 2 Kings xii. 16; cf. Amos ii. 8; Hos. iv. 8.

and sacrifices of all kinds seems simply to rest on the general principle that a gift smooths the face and pacifies anger.

It has sometimes been supposed that this is the oldest form of the idea of atoning sacrifice, and that the elaborate piacula, which begin to take the chief place in the altar ritual of the Semites from the seventh century onwards, are all developed out of it. The chief argument that appears to support this view is that the whole burnt-offering, which is entirely made over to the deity, the worshipper retaining no part for his own use, is prominent among piacular sacrifices, and may even be regarded as the piacular sacrifice *par excellence*. In the later forms of Syrian heathenism the sacrificial meal practically disappears, and almost the whole altar service consists of piacular holocausts,[1] and among the Jews the highest sin-offerings, whose blood was brought into the inner sanctuary, were wholly consumed, but not upon the altar,[2] while the flesh of other sin-offerings was at least withdrawn from the offerer and eaten by the priests.

We have seen, however, that a different and profounder conception of atonement, as the creation of a life-bond between the worshipper and his god, appears in the most primitive type of Semitic sacrifices, and that traces of it can still be found in many parts of the later ritual. Forms of consecration and atonement in which the blood of the victim is applied to the worshipper, or the blood of the worshipper conveyed to the symbol of godhead, occur in all stages of heathen religion, not only among the Semites but among the Greeks and other races; and even on *à priori* grounds it seems probable that when the Northern Semites,

[1] That the Harranians never ate sacrificial flesh seems to be an exaggeration, but one based on the prevalent character of their ritual; see Chwolsohn ii. 89 *sq.*

[2] Lev. vi. 23 (30), xvi. 27, iv. 11, 20.

in the distress and terror produced by the political convulsions of the seventh century, began to cast about for rites of extraordinary potency to conjure the anger of the gods, they were guided by the principle that ancient and half obsolete forms of ritual are more efficacious than the everyday practices of religion.

Further, it is to be observed that in the Hebrew ritual both of the holocaust and of the sin-offering, the victim is slain at the altar "before Jehovah," a phrase which is wanting in the rule about ordinary sacrifices, and implies that the act of slaughter and the effusion of the blood beside the altar have a special significance, as in the ancient Arabian ritual. Moreover, in the sin-offering there is still—although in a very attenuated form—a trace of the manward application of the blood, when the priest dips his finger in it, and so applies it to the horns of the altar, instead of merely dashing it against the sides of the altar from a bowl;[1] and also, as regards the destination of the flesh, which is eaten by the priests in the holy place, it is clear from Lev. x. 17 that the flesh is given to the priests because they minister as the representatives of the sinful people, and that the act of eating it is an essential part of the ceremony, exactly as in the old ritual of communion. In fact the law expressly recognises that the flesh and blood of the sin-offering is a sanctifying medium of extraordinary potency; whosoever touches the flesh becomes holy, the garment on which the blood falls must be washed in a holy place, and even the vessel in which the flesh is sodden must be broken or scoured to remove the infection of its sanctity.[2] That this is the reason why none but the priests are allowed

[1] Lev. iv. 6, 17, 34, compared with chap. iii. 2. זרק is to sprinkle or dash from the bowl, מזרק.

[2] Lev. vi. 20 (27).

to eat of it has been rightly discerned by Ewald;[1] the flesh, like the sacramental cup in the Roman Catholic Church, was too sacred to be touched by the laity. Thus the Levitical sin-offering is essentially identical with the ancient sacrament of communion in a sacred life; only the communion is restricted to the priests, in accordance with the general principle of the priestly legislation, which surrounds the holy things of Israel by fence within fence, and makes all access to God pass through the mediation of the priesthood.

I am not aware that anything quite parallel to the ordinary Hebrew sin-offering occurs among the other Semites; and indeed no other Semitic religion appears to have developed to the same extent the doctrine of the consuming holiness of God, and the consequent need for priestly intervention between the laity and the most holy things. But among the Romans the flesh of certain piacula was eaten by the priests, and in the piacular sacrifice of the Arval Brothers the ministrants also partook of the blood.[2] Among the Greeks, again, piacular victims —like the highest forms of the Hebrew sin-offering— were not eaten at all, but either burned, or buried, or cast into the sea, or carried up into some desert mountain far from the foot of man.[3] It is commonly supposed that this was done because they were unclean, being laden with the sins of the guilty worshippers; but this explanation is excluded, not only by the analogy of the Hebrew sin-offering, which is a *códesh codashīm*, or holy thing of the first class, but by various indications in Greek myth and ritual. For to the Greeks earth and sea are not impure but holy, and at Trœzen a sacred laurel was

[1] *Alterthümer*, 3rd ed., p. 87 *sq.*; cf. the Syrian fish-sacrifices of which only the priests partook, *supra*, p. 293.

[2] Marquardt, *Sacralwesen*, p. 185; Servius on Æn. iii. 231.

[3] Hippocrates, ed. Littré, vi. 362.

believed to have grown from the buried carcase of the victim used in the atonement for Orestes.[1] Further, the favourite piacular victims were sacred animals, *e.g.* the swine of Demeter and the dog of Hecate, and the essential part of the lustration consisted in the application of the blood of the offering to the guilty person, which is only intelligible if the victim was a holy sacrament. The blood was indeed too holy to be left in permanent contact with a man who was presently to return to common life, and therefore it was washed off again with water.[2] According to Porphyry, the man who touched a sacrifice designed to avert the anger of the gods was required to bathe and wash his clothes in running water before entering the city or his house,[3] an ordinance which recurs in the case of such Hebrew sin-offerings as were not eaten, and of the red heifer whose ashes were used in lustrations. These were burnt "without the camp," and both the ministrant priest and the man who disposed of the body had to bathe and wash their clothes exactly as in the Greek ritual.[4]

From all this it would appear that the sin-offering and other forms of piacula, including the holocaust, in which there is no sacrificial meal of which the sacrificer himself partakes, are yet lineally descended from the ancient ritual of sacrificial communion between the worshippers and their god, and at bottom rest on the same principle with those ordinary sacrifices in which the sacrificial meal played a chief part. But the development of this part of our

[1] Pausanias, ii. 31. 8.

[2] Apoll. Rhod., *Argon.* iv. 702 *sqq.* Cf. Schoemann, *Gr. Alterth.* II. v. 13.

[3] *De Abst.* ii. 44.

[4] Lev. xvi. 24, 28; Num. xix. 7–10. In the *Fihrist*, p. 319, l. 12, after it has been explained that the sacrifices of the Harranians were not eaten but burned, it is added, "and the temple is not entered on that day."

subject must be reserved for another lecture, in which I will try to explain how the original form of sacrifice came to be differentiated into two distinct types of worship, and gave rise on the one hand to the "honorific" or ordinary, and on the other to the "piacular" or exceptional sacrifices of later times.

LECTURE X

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SACRIFICIAL RITUAL—FIRE-SACRIFICES AND PIACULA

We have come to see that the sin-offering as well as the ordinary sacrificial meal is lineally descended from the primitive sacrifice of communion, in which the victim is a sacred animal that may not ordinarily be killed or used for food. But while in the one case the notion of the special holiness and inviolable character of the victim has gradually faded away, in the other this aspect of the sacrifice has been intensified, till even a religious participation in the flesh is regarded as an impiety. Each of these opposite processes can to a certain extent be traced from stage to stage. As regards the sacrificial meal, we find, both in the case of Nilus's Saracens and in that of African peoples, with whom the ox has a sanctity similar to that which the Arabs ascribed to the camel, that the sacramental flesh begins to be eaten as food under the pressure of necessity; and when this is done, it also begins to be cooked like other food. Then we have the stage, represented by the early Hebrew religion, in which domestic animals are freely eaten, but only on condition that they are presented as sacrifices at the altar and consumed in a sacred feast. And, finally, a stage is reached in which, as in Greece in the time of the Apostle Paul, sacrificial meat is freely sold in the shambles, or, as in Arabia before Mohammed, nothing more is required than that the beast

designed for food shall be slain in the name of a god. In piacular sacrifices, on the other hand, we find, in a variety of expressions, a struggle between the feeling that the victim is too holy to be eaten or even touched, and the principle that its atoning efficacy depends on the participation of the worshippers in its life, flesh and blood. In one rite the flesh may be eaten, or the blood drunk, but only by consecrated priests; in another, the flesh is burned, but the blood is poured on the hands or body of the sinner; in another, the lustration is effected with the ashes of the victim (the red heifer of the Jewish law); or, finally, it is enough that the worshipper should lay his hands on the head of the victim before its slaughter, and that then its life-blood should be presented at the altar.

The reasons for the gradual degradation of ordinary sacrifice are not far to seek; they are to be found, on the one hand, in the general causes which make it impossible for men above the state of savagery to retain a literal faith in the consanguinity of animal kinds with gods and men, and, on the other hand, in the pressure of hunger, and afterwards in the taste for animal food, which in a settled country could not generally be gratified except by eating domestic animals. But it is not so easy to understand, *first*, why in spite of these influences certain sacrifices retained their old sacrosanct character, and in many cases became so holy that men were forbidden to touch or eat of them at all; and, *second*, why it is to this particular class of sacrifices that a special piacular efficacy is assigned.

In looking further into this matter, we must distinguish between the sacred domestic animals of pastoral tribes—the milk-givers, whose kinship with men rests on the principle of fosterage—and those other sacred animals of wild or half-domesticated kinds, such as the dove and the swine, which even in the later days of Semitic heathenism

were surrounded by strict taboos, and looked upon as in some sense partakers of a divine nature. The latter are undoubtedly the older class of sacred beings; for observation of savage life in all parts of the world shows that the belief in sacred animals, akin to families of men, attains its highest development in tribes which have not yet learned to breed cattle and live on their milk. Totemism pure and simple has its home among races like the Australians and the North American Indians, and seems always to lose ground after the introduction of pastoral life. It would appear that the notion of kinship with milk-giving animals through fosterage has been one of the most powerful agencies in breaking up the old totem-religions, just as a systematic practice of adoption between men was a potent agency in breaking up the old exclusive system of clans. As the various totem clans began to breed cattle and live on their milk, they transferred to their herds the notions of sanctity and kinship which formerly belonged to species of wild animals, and thus the way was at once opened for the formation of religious and political communities larger than the old totem kins. In almost all ancient nations in the pastoral and agricultural stage, the chief associations of the great deities are with the milk-giving animals; and it is these animals, the ox, the sheep, the goat, or in Arabia the camel, that appear as victims in the public and national worship. But experience shows that primitive religious beliefs are practically indestructible, except by the destruction of the race in which they are ingrained, and thus we find that the new ideas of what I may call pastoral religion overlaid the old notions, but did not extinguish them. For example, the Astarte of the Northern Semites is essentially a goddess of flocks and herds, whose symbol and sacred animal is the cow, or (among the sheep-rearing tribes of the Syro-

Arabian desert) the ewe.[1] But this pastoral worship appears to have come on the top of certain older faiths, in which the goddess of one kindred of men was associated with fish, and that of another kindred with the dove. These creatures, accordingly, though no longer prominent in ritual, were still held sacred and surrounded by taboos, implying that they were of divine nature and akin to the goddess herself. The very fact that they were not regularly sacrificed, and therefore not regularly eaten even in religious feasts, tended to preserve their antique sanctity long after the sacrificial flesh of beeves and sheep had sunk almost to the rank of ordinary food; and thus, as we have seen in considering the case of the mystic sacrifices of the Roman Empire, the rare and exceptional rites, in which the victim was chosen from a class of animals ordinarily tabooed as human food, retained even in later paganism a sacramental significance, almost absolutely identical with that which belonged to the oldest sacrifices. It was still felt that the victim was of a divine kind, and that, in partaking of its flesh and blood, the worshippers enjoyed a veritable communion with the divine life. That to such sacrifices there was ascribed a special cathartic and consecrating virtue requires no explanation, for how can the impurity of sin be better expelled than by a draught of sacred life? and how can man be brought nearer to his god than by physically absorbing a particle of the divine nature?

It is, however, to be noted that piacula of this kind, in which atonement is effected by the use of an exceptional victim of sacred kind, do not rise into prominence till the national religions of the Semites fall into decay. The public piacular sacrifices of the independent Semitic states appear, so far as our scanty information goes, to

[1] *Supra*, p. 310.

have been mainly drawn from the same kinds of domestic animals as supplied the ordinary sacrifices, except where an exceptional emergency demanded a human victim. Among the Hebrews, in particular, there is no trace of anything answering to the later mystic sacrifices up to the time of the captivity. At this epoch, when the national religion appeared to have utterly broken down, and the judgment of those who were not upheld by the faith of the prophets was that "Jehovah had forsaken His land,"[1] all manner of strange sacrifices of unclean creatures—the swine, the dog, the mouse and other vermin—began to become popular, and were deemed to have a peculiar purifying and consecrating power.[2] The creatures chosen ★ for these sacrifices are such as were unclean in the first degree, and surrounded by strong taboos of the kind which in heathenism imply that the animal is regarded as divine; and in fact the sacrifices of vermin described in the Book of Isaiah have their counterpart in the contemporary worship of all kinds of vermin described by Ezekiel.[3] ★ Both rites are evidently part of a single superstition, the sacrifice being a mystical communion in the body and blood of a divine animal. Here, therefore, we have a clear case of the re-emergence into the light of day of a cult of the most primitive totem type, which had been banished for centuries from public religion, but must have been kept alive in obscure circles of private or local superstition, and sprang up again on the ruins of the national faith, like some noxious weed in the courts of a deserted temple. But while the ritual and its interpretation are still quite primitive, the resuscitated totem mysteries have this great difference from their ancient

[1] Ezek. viii. 12.
[2] Isa. lxv. 3 *sqq.*, lxvi. 3, 17; see above, p. 291 *sq.*, p. 343, note 3.
[3] Ezek. viii. 10.

models, that they are no longer the exclusive possession of particular kins, but are practised, by men who desert the religion of their birth, as means of initiation into a new religious brotherhood, no longer based on natural kinship, but on mystical participation in the divine life held forth in the sacramental sacrifice. From this point of view the obscure rites described by the prophets have a vastly greater importance than has been commonly recognised; they mark the first appearance in Semitic history of the tendency to found religious societies on voluntary association and mystic initiation, instead of natural kinship and nationality. This tendency was not confined to the Hebrews, nor did it reach its chief development among them. The causes which produced a resuscitation of obsolete mysteries among the Jews were at work at the same period among all the Northern Semites; for everywhere the old national deities had shown themselves powerless to resist the gods of Assyria and Babylon. And among these nations the tendency to fall back for help on primitive superstitions was not held in check, as it was among the Hebrews, by the counter-influence of the Prophets and the Law. From this period, therefore, we may date with great probability the first rise of the mystical cults which ★ played so large a part in the later developments of ancient paganism, and spread their influence over the whole Græco-Roman world. Most of these cults appear to have begun among the Northern Semites, or in the parts of Asia Minor that fell under the empire of the Assyrians and Babylonians. The leading feature that distinguishes them from the old public cults, with which they entered into competition, is that they were not based on the principle of nationality, but sought recruits from men of every race who were willing to accept initiation through the mystic sacraments; and in pursuance of this

object they carried on a missionary propaganda in all parts of the Roman Empire, in a way quite alien to the spirit of national religion. The nature of their sacramental sacrifices, so far as it is known to us, indicates that they were of a like origin with the Hebrew superstitions described by Isaiah; they used strange victims, invoked the gods by animal names, and taught the initiated to acknowledge kinship with the same animals.[1] To pursue this subject further would carry us beyond the limits of our present task; for a full discussion of mystical sacrifices cannot be confined to the Semitic field. These sacrifices, as we have seen, lie aside from the main development of the national religions of the Semites, and they acquire public importance only after the collapse of the national systems. In later times they were much sought after, and were held to have a peculiar efficacy in purging away sin, and bringing man into living union with the gods. But their atoning efficacy proceeds on quite different lines from that of the recognised piacular rites of national religion. In the latter the sinner seeks reconciliation with the national god whom he has offended, but in mystic religion he takes refuge from the divine wrath by incorporating himself in a new religious community. Something of the same kind takes place in more primitive society, when an outlaw, who has been banished from the social and religious fellowship of his clan for shedding kindred blood, is received by the covenant of adoption into another clan. Here also the act of adoption, which is a religious as well as a civil rite, is in so far an act of atonement, that the outlaw has again a god to receive his worship and his prayers; but he is not reconciled to the god of his former worship, for it is only in a somewhat advanced stage of polytheism that acceptance by one

[1] Porph., *De Abst.* iv. 16, compared with *Fihrist*, p. 326, l. 25 *sq.*

god puts a man right with the gods as a whole. Among the Greeks, where the gods formed a sort of family circle, and were accessible to one another's influence, the outlaw, like Orestes, wanders about in exile, till he can find a god willing to receive him and act as his sponsor with the other deities; and here, therefore, as in the mystical rites of the Semites, the ceremony of purification from bloodshed is essentially a ceremony of initiation into the cult of some god who, like the Apollo of Trœzen, makes it his business to receive suppliants. But among the older Semites there was no kinship or friendship between the gods of adjacent tribes or nations, and there was no way of reconciliation with the national god through the mediation of a third party, so that all atoning sacrifices were necessarily offered to the national god himself, and drawn, like ordinary sacrifices, from the class of domestic animals appropriated to his worship.

In the oldest stage of pastoral religion, when the tribal herd possessed inviolate sanctity, and every sheep or camel —according as the tribe consisted of shepherds or camel-herds—was regarded as a kinsman, there was no occasion and no place for a special class of atoning sacrifices. The relations between the god and his worshippers were naturally as good and intimate as possible, for they were based on the strongest of all ties, the tie of kinship. To secure that this natural good understanding should continue unimpaired, it was only necessary that the congenital bond of kinship should not wear out, but continue strong and fresh. And this was provided for by periodical sacrifices, of the type described by Nilus, in which a particle of the sacred life of the tribe was distributed, between the god and his worshippers, in the sacramental flesh and blood of an animal of the holy stock of the clan. To make the sacrifice effective, it

was only necessary that the victim should be perfect and without fault—a point which is strongly insisted upon in all ancient sacrifice—*i.e.*, that the sacred life should be completely and normally embodied in it. In the later ages of antiquity there was a very general belief—the origin of which will be explained as we proceed—that in strictness the oldest rituals demanded a human victim, and that animal sacrifices were substitutes for the life of a man. But in the oldest times there could be no reason for thinking a man's life better than that of a camel or a sheep as a vehicle of sacramental communion; indeed, if we may judge from modern examples of that primitive habit of thought which lies at the root of Semitic sacrifice, the animal ★ life would probably be deemed purer and more perfect than that of man.

On the other hand, there is every reason to think that even at this early stage certain impious crimes, notably murder within the kin, were expiated by the death of the offender. But the death of such a criminal cannot with any justice be called a sacrifice. Its object was simply to eliminate the impious person from the society whose sanctity he had violated, and outlawry was accepted as an alternative to execution.

As time went on, the idea of the full kinship of men with their cattle began to break down. The Saracens of Nilus killed and ate their camels in time of hunger, but we may be sure that they would not in similar circumstances have eaten one another. Thus even in a society where the flesh of the tribal camel was not ordinary food, and where private slaughter was forbidden, a camel's life was no longer as sacred as that of a man; it had begun to be recognised that human life, or rather the life of a tribesman, was a thing of unique sanctity. At the same time

the old forms of sacrifice were retained, and the tradition of their old meaning cannot have been lost, for the ritual forms were too plainly significant to be misinterpreted. In short, the life of a camel, which no longer had the full value of a tribesman's life for ordinary purposes, was treated as a tribesman's life when it was presented at the altar; so that here we have already a beginning of the idea that the victim *quâ* victim possesses a sacrosanct character which does not belong to it merely in virtue of its natural kind. But now also, let it be noted, it is expressly attested that the sacrificial camel is regarded as the substitute for a human victim. The favourite victims of the Saracens were young and beautiful captives,[1] but if these were not to be had they contented themselves with a white and faultless camel. As to the veracity of this account there is no question: Nilus's own son, Theodulus, when a captive in the hands of these barbarians, escaped being sacrificed only by the accident that, on the appointed morning, his captors did not awake till the sun rose, and the lawful hour for the rite was past; and there are well-authenticated instances of the sacrifice of captives to Al-ʿOzzā by the Lakhmite king of Al-Ḥīra at least a century later.[2]

It is true that in these cases the victims are aliens and not tribesmen, as in strictness the sense of the ritual requires; but the older Semites, when they had recourse to human sacrifice, were more strictly logical, and held with rigour to the fundamental principle that the life of the victim must be a kindred life.[3] The modification accepted

[1] The sacrifice of choice captives occurs also among the Carthaginians (Diod. xx. 65), and perhaps a trace of the same thing appears among the Hebrews in the slaying of Agag "before the LORD, at the sanctuary of Gilgal" (1 Sam. xv. 33).

[2] Nöldeke's *Tabari*, p. 171 (Procop., *Pers.* ii. 28; Land, *Anecd.* iii. 247); Isaac of Antioch, i. 220.

[3] See, for the Hebrews, Gen. xxii.; 2 Kings xxi. 6; Micah vi. 7: for the Moabites, 2 Kings iii. 27: for the Phœnicians, Philo Byblius in *Fr. Hist.*

by the Saracens was one for which there was the strongest motive, and accordingly all over the world we find cases of human sacrifice in which an alien is substituted for a tribesman. This was not done in accordance with any change in the meaning of the ritual, for originally the substitution was felt to be a fraud on the deity; thus Diodorus tells us that the Carthaginians, in a time of trouble, felt that their god was angry because slave boys had been privily substituted for the children of their best families; and elsewhere we find that it is considered necessary to make believe that the victim is a tribesman, or even, as in the human sacrifices of the Mexicans, to dress and treat him as the representative of the deity to whom he is to be offered. Perhaps something of this kind was in the mind of Nilus's Saracens when they drank with prisoners destined to death, and so admitted them to boon fellowship.[1]

Gr. iii. 570 (Eus., *Pr. Ev.* 156 D); Porph., *De Abst.* ii. 56: for the Carthaginians, Porph., *ibid.* ii. 27; Diodorus, xx. 14; Plutarch, *De Superst.* 13: for the Syrians, *Dea Syr.* lviii.; Lampridius, *Vita Heliog.* 8, "pueri nobiles et decori . . . patrimi et matrimi": for the Babylonians, 2 Kings xvii. 31. For the Arabs the well-known story of 'Abd al-Moṭṭalib's vow (B. Hish. p. 97), though of doubtful authenticity, may probably be accepted as based on actual custom. Another example of a vow to sacrifice a son is given in Mālik's Mowaṭṭa, Tunis ed., p. 176 (Kremer, *Stud. z. vergl. Culturg.* p. 44).

[1] Nilus, p. 66, where, however, the slaughter is not formally a sacrifice. The narrative represents the offer of drink as mere mockery, but it is difficult to reconcile this with known Arabian custom; see above, p. 270. A more serious attempt to adopt Theodulus into the Saracen community seems to have been made after his providential escape from death; he was invited to eat unclean things and sport with the women (p. 117). The combination is significant, and as μιαροφαγεῖν must refer to the eating of idolatrous meats, presumably camel's flesh,—which Symeon Stylites forbade to his Arab converts,—the question arises whether γυναιξὶ προσπαίζειν has not also a reference to some religious practice, and whether Wellhausen[1], p. 40, has not been too hasty in supposing that the orgies of the Arabian Venus renounced by the converts just mentioned are mere rhetorical orgies; cf. *Kinship*, p. 301.

It has been suggested to me by an eminent scholar that the sacrifice of choice captives after a victory may be a form of *naciʾa* and properly a thank-offering from the spoil; cf. the slaying of Agag. This is not impossible, for

From a purely abstract point of view it seems plausible enough that the Saracens, who accepted an alien as a substitute for a tribesman, might also accept a camel as a substitute for a man. The plan of substituting an offering which can be more readily procured or better spared, for the more costly victim which traditional ritual demands, was largely applied throughout antiquity, and belongs to the general system of make-believe by which early nations, while entirely governed by regard for precedents, habitually get over difficulties in the strict carrying out of traditional rules. If a Roman rite called for a stag as victim, and a stag could not be had, a sheep was substituted and feigned to be a stag (*cervaria ovis*), and so forth. The thing was really a fraud, but one to which the gods were polite enough to shut their eyes rather than see the whole ceremony fail. But in the particular case before us it is difficult to believe that the camel was substituted for a man, and ultimately for a tribesman. In that case the ritual of the camel-sacrifice would have been copied from human sacrifice, but in reality this was not so. The camel was eaten, but the human victim was burned, after the blood had been poured out as a libation,[1] and there can be no

different ideas often find their embodiment in identical ceremonies; but the case of Jephthah's daughter and the express testimony of Diodorus appear to me to weigh strongly against such a view.

[1] This appears from what we read of the preparations for the sacrifice of Theodulus, among which are mentioned frankincense (the accompaniment of fire-offerings) and a bowl for the libation, p. 110; and, at p. 113, Theodulus prays: "Let not my blood be made a libation to demons, nor let unclean spirits be made glad with the sweet smoke of my flesh." See Wellhausen[1], p. 113, who conjectures that in Arabia human sacrifices were generally burned, citing Yāqūt, iv. 425, who tells that every clan of Rabī'a gave a son to the god Moḥarric, "the burner," at Salmān (in 'Irāq, on the pilgrim road from Cufa). Nöldeke, in *ZDMG.* xli. 712, doubts whether the reference is to human sacrifice; for Yāqūt (*i.e.* Ibn al-Kalbī) presently cites examples of men of different clans called "sons of Moḥarric," which may imply that the sons were not sacrificed, but consecrated as children of the god. This,

question that the former is the more primitive rite. I apprehend, therefore, that human sacrifice is not more ancient than the sacrifice of sacred animals, and that the prevalent belief of ancient heathenism, that animal victims are an imperfect substitute for a human life, arose by a false inference from traditional forms of ritual that had ceased to be understood. In the oldest rituals the victim's life is manifestly treated as sacred, and in some rites, as we have seen in our examination of the Attic *Buphonia*, the idea that the slaughter is really a murder, *i.e.* a shedding of kindred blood, was expressed down to quite a late date. When the full kinship of animals with men was no longer recognised in ordinary life, all this became unintelligible, and was explained by the doctrine that at the altar the victim took the place of a man.

This doctrine appears all over the ancient world in connection with atoning sacrifices, and indeed the false inference on which it rests was one that could not fail to be drawn wherever the old forms of sacrifice had been shaped at a time when cattle were revered as kindred

however, is so peculiar an institution for Arabia that it still remains probable that the consecration was a substitute for sacrifice. At Salmān, in the neighbourhood of Al-Ḥīra, we are in the region of the human sacrifices of the Lakhmite kings. And these were probably burnt-offerings; cf. the legend of the holocaust of one hundred prisoners by 'Amr b. Hind, *Kāmil*, p. 97; *Agh.* xix. 129. Hence this king is said to have been called Moḥarric, or, according to another tradition, because he burned Yemāma (Mofaḍḍal al-Ḍabbī, *Amthāl*, p. 68); but, as Nöldeke observes (*Ghassan. Fürsten* [1887], p. 7), Moḥarric without the article is hardly a mere epithet (*lacab*), and I apprehend that the Lakhmite family was called "the family of Moḥarric" after their god, presumably Lucifer, the morning star, who afterwards became feminine as al-'Ozzā (*supra*, p. 56, note 3). The Ghassanid princes of the house of Jafna were also called "the family of Moḥarric," Ibn Cot. p. 314; Ibn Dor. p. 259, and here the tradition is that their ancestor was the first Arab who burned his enemies in their encampment. This, however, is obviously a form of *ḥérem*, and must, I take it, be a religious act. For the "family" (*āl*) of a god, as meaning his worshippers, see *Kinship*, p. 44.

beings. And this appears to have been the case in the beginnings of every pastoral society. Accordingly, to cite but a few instances, the notion that animal sacrifice is accepted in lieu of an older sacrifice of the life of a man appears among the Hebrews, in the story of Isaac's sacrifice,[1] among the Phœnicians,[2] among the Egyptians, where the victim was marked with a seal bearing the image of a man bound, and with a sword at his throat,[3] and also among the Greeks, the Romans, and many other nations.[4] As soon, however, as it came to be held that cattle were merely substitutes, and that the full sense of the sacrifice was not brought out without an actual human victim, it was naturally inferred that the original form of offering was more potent, and was indicated on all occasions of special gravity. Wherever we find the doctrine of substitution of animal life for that of man, we find also examples of actual human sacrifice, sometimes confined to seasons of extreme peril, and sometimes practised periodically at solemn annual rites.[5]

[1] Gen. xxii. 13; cf. Lev. xvii. 11. [2] Porph., *De Abst.* iv. 15.

[3] Plut., *Is. et Os.* xxxi. According to Wiedemann, *Herodots Zweites* ★ *Buch*, p. 182, these symbols are simply the hieroglyphic determinant of the word *sema*, "slay."

[4] See the examples in Porph., *De Abst.* ii. 54 *sqq.*, and for the Romans, Ovid, *Fasti*, vi. 162. We have had before us Greek rites where the victim is disguised as a man; but conversely human sacrifices are often dressed up as animals, or said to represent animals: an example, from the worship at Hierapolis-Bambyce, is found in *Dea Syria*, lviii., where fathers sacrificing their children say that they are not children but beeves.

[5] Examples of human sacrifices, many of which subsisted within the Roman Empire down to the time of Hadrian, are collected by Porphyry, *ut supra*, on whom Eusebius, *Præp. Ev.* iv. 16, *Laus Const.* xiii. 7, depends. See also Clem. Alex., *Coh. ad Gentes*, p. 27 (p. 36, Potter); cf. Hermann, *Gr. Alth.* ii. § 27. In what follows I confine myself to the Semites; it may therefore be noted that, in antiquity generally, human victims were buried, burned, or cast into the sea or into a river (cf. Mannhardt's essay on the Lityerses legend). Yet indications survive that they were originally sacrifices of communion, and as such were tasted by the worshippers: notably in the most famous case of all, the human sacrifice offered in ★ Arcadia to Zeus Lycæus—the wolf-god—where a fragment of the *exta* was

I apprehend that this is the point from which the special development of piacular sacrifices, and the distinction between them and ordinary sacrifices, takes its start. It was impossible that the sacrificial customs should continue unmodified where the victim was held to represent a man and a tribesman, for even savages commonly refuse to eat their own kinsfolk, and to growing civilisation the idea that the gods had ordained meals of human flesh, or of flesh that was as sacred as that of a man, was too repulsive to be long retained. But when I say "repulsive," I put the matter rather in the light in which it appears to us, than in that wherein it presented itself to the first men who had scruples about cannibalism. Primarily the horror of eating human flesh was no doubt superstitious; it was felt to be dangerous to eat so sacrosanct a thing, even with all the precautions of religious ceremonial. Accordingly, in human sacrifices, and also in such other offerings as continued to be performed with a ritual simulating human sacrifice, the sacrificial meal tended to fall out of use; while, on the other hand, where the sacrificial meal was retained, the tendency was to drop such features in the ritual as suggested the disgusting idea of cannibalism.[1] ★ And so the apparent paradox is explained, that precisely in those sacrifices in which the victim most fully retained its original theanthropic character, and was therefore most efficacious as a vehicle of atonement, the primitive idea of

placed among the portions of sacrificial flesh derived from other victims that were offered along with the human sacrifice, and the man who tasted it was believed to become a were-wolf (Plato, *Rep.* viii. 15, p. 565 D; Pausanias, viii. 2).

Of the human sacrifices of rude peoples those of the Mexicans are perhaps the most instructive, for in them the theanthropic character of the victim comes out most clearly.

[1] Of course neither tendency was consistently carried out in every detail of ritual; there remains enough that is common to honorific and piacular sacrifice to enable us to trace them back to a common source.

atonement by communion in the sacred flesh and blood was most completely disguised. The modifications in the form of ritual that ensued when sacrifices of a certain class were no longer eaten, can be best observed by taking the case of actual human sacrifice and noting how other sacrifices of equivalent significance follow its model.

Whether the custom of actually eating the flesh survived in historical times in any case of human sacrifice is more than doubtful,[1] and even in the case of animal piacula—apart from those of mystic type, in which the idea of initiation into a new religion was involved—the sacrificial meal is generally wanting or confined to the priests. The custom of drinking the blood, or at least of sprinkling it on the worshippers, may have been kept up longer; there is some probability that it was observed in the human sacrifices of Nilus's Saracens;[2] and the common Arabian

[1] According to Mohammedan accounts, the Harranians in the Middle Ages annually sacrificed an infant, and, boiling down its flesh, baked it into cakes, of which only freeborn men were allowed to partake (*Fihrist*, p. 323, l. 6 *sqq.*; cf. Chwolsohn's *Excursus on Human Sacrifice*, vol. ii. p. 142). But in regard to the secret mysteries of a forbidden religion, such as Syrian heathenism was in Arabian times, it is always doubtful how far we can trust a hostile narrator, who, even if he did not merely reproduce popular fictions, might easily take for a real human sacrifice what was only the mystic offering of a theanthropic animal. The new-born infant corresponds to the Arabian *fara'*, offered while its flesh was still like glue, and to the Hebrew piaculum of a sucking lamb in 1 Sam. vii. 9.

[2] The reason for thinking this is that on the Arabian mode of sacrifice a bowl was not required to convey the blood to the deity, while it would be necessary if the blood was drunk by the worshippers or sprinkled upon them. It is true that the narrative speaks also of the preparation of a libation,—whether of water or of wine does not appear,—but this in the Arabian ritual can hardly be more than a vehicle for the more potent blood, just as the blood was mixed with water in Greek sacrifices to heroes. Water as a vehicle for sacrificial ashes appears in the Hebrew ritual of the red heifer (Num. xix. 9), and is prescribed as a vehicle for the blood of lustration in Lev. xiv. 5 *sq.* In the legends cited in the next note we find the notion that if the blood of a human victim touches the ground, vengeance will be taken for it. That the drinking of human blood, *e.g.* from an enemy slain in battle, was a Saracen practice, is attested by Ammianus and Procopius

belief that the blood of kings, and perhaps also of other men of noble descent, is a cure for hydrophobia and demoniacal possession, seems to be a reminiscence of blood-drinking in connection with human sacrifice, for the Greeks in like manner, who ascribed epilepsy to demoniacal possession, sought to cure it by piacular offerings and purifications with blood.[1]

When the sacrosanct victim ceased to be eaten, it was necessary to find some other way of disposing of its flesh. It will be remembered that, in the sacrificial meals of Nilus's Saracens, it was a point of religion that the whole carcase should be consumed before the sun rose; the victim was so holy that no part of it could be treated as mere waste. The problem of disposing of the sacred carcase was in fact analogous to that which occurs whenever a kinsman dies. Here, too, the point is to find a way of dealing with the body consistent with the respect due to the dead—a respect which does not rest on sentimental grounds, but on the belief that the corpse is taboo, a source

(see *Kinship*, p. 296 *sqq.*); and the anecdote given by Wellh. p. 126, from *Agh.* xii. 144, where a husband, unable to save his wife from the enemy, kills her, anoints himself with her blood, and fights till he is slain, illustrates the significance which the Arabs attached to human blood as a vehicle of communion.

[1] Hippocrates, ed. Littré, vi. 362. The evidence for this Arabian superstition is collected by Freytag in his notes to the *Ḥamāsa*, ii. 583, and by We.[1] 142, [2] 162. It consists in poetical and proverbial allusions, to which may be added a verse in Mas'ūdī, iii. 193, and in a legend from the mythical story of Queen Zabbā (*Agh.* xiv. 74; Ṭabari, i. 760; Maidānī, i. 205 *sqq.*), where a king is slain by opening the veins of his arms, and the blood, to be used as a magical medicine, is gathered in a bowl. Not a drop must fall on the ground, otherwise there will be blood-revenge for it. I cannot but suspect that the legend is based on an old form of sacrifice applied to captive chiefs (cf. the case of Agag); it is described as the habitual way of killing kings; cf. *Agh.* xv. 75. 4, where 'Abd Yaghūth is killed by opening his veins. The rule that not a drop of the blood must fall on the ground appears also in Caffre sacrifice; Maclean, *Caffre Laws*, p. 81. According to later authorities, cited in the *Tāj al-'Arūs* (i. 3. 181 of the old edition), it was enough for this cure to draw a drop of blood from the finger of a noble, and drink it mixed with water.

of very dangerous supernatural influences of an infectious kind. In later times this infectiousness is expressed as uncleanness; but in the primitive taboo, as we know, sanctity and uncleanness meet and are indistinguishable. Now, as regards the kindred dead generally, we find a great range of funeral customs, all directed to make sure that the corpse is properly disposed of, and can no longer be a source of danger to the living, but rather of blessing.[1] In certain cases it is the duty of the survivors to eat up their dead, just as in Nilus's sacrifice. This was the use of the Issedones, according to Herodotus (iv. 26). At other times the dead are thrown outside the kraal, to be eaten by wild beasts (Masai land), or are deposited in a desert place which men must not approach; but more commonly the body is buried or burned. All these practices reappear in the case of such sacrifices as may not be eaten. Mere exposure on the soil of the sanctuary was perhaps the use in certain Arabian cults;[2] but this, it is plain, could not suffice unless the sacred enclosure was an adyton forbidden to the foot of man. Hence at Duma the annual human victim is buried at the foot of the altar idol,[3] and elsewhere, perhaps, the corpse is hung up between earth and heaven before the deity.[4] Or else the sacrosanct flesh is carried

[1] This subject has been fully handled by Mr. J. G. Frazer in *Journ. Anthrop. Inst.* xv. 64 *sqq.*, to which I refer for details. I think Mr. Frazer goes too far in supposing that mere fear of ghosts rules in all these observances. Not seldom we find also a desire for continued fellowship with the dead, under such conditions as make the fellowship free from danger. In the language of physics, sanctity is a *polar* force, it both attracts and repels.

[2] *Supra*, p. 225 *sqq.*

[3] Porph., *De Abst.* ii. 56. In old Arabia little girls were often buried alive by their fathers, apparently as sacrifices to the goddesses; see *Kinship*, p. 291. A similar form of human sacrifice probably lies at the root of the legend about the tombs of the lovers whom Semiramis buried alive (Syncellus, i. 119, from John of Antioch), for though these lovers are gods, all myths of the death of gods seem to be derived from sacrifices of theanthropic victims.

[4] Deut. xxi. 21; cf. 1 Sam. xxxi. 10. The execution of criminals con-

away into a desert place in the mountains, as was done in the Greek piacula of which Hippocrates speaks, or is simply flung down (a precipice) from the vestibule of the temple, as was the use of Hierapolis.[1] Among the Hebrews, on the same principle, the heifer offered in atonement for an untraced murder was sacrificed by breaking (or, perhaps, severing) its neck in a barren ravine.[2]

Most commonly, however, human sacrifices, and in general all such sacrifices as were not eaten, were burned; and this usage is found not only among the Hebrews and Phœnicians, with whom fire-sacrifices were common, but among the Arabs, who seem to have admitted the fire-offering in no other case. In the more advanced rituals the use of fire corresponds with the conception of the gods as subtle beings, moving in the air, whose proper nourishment is the fragrant smoke of the burning flesh, so that the burnt-offering, like the fat of the vitals in ordinary victims, is the food of the gods, and falls under the head of sacrificial gifts. But in the Levitical ritual this explanation is sedulously excluded in the case of the sin-offering; the fat is burned on the altar, but the rest of the flesh, so far as it is not eaten by the priests, is burned outside the camp, *i.e.* outside the walls of Jerusalem, so that in fact the burning is merely an additional precaution added to

stantly assumes sacrificial forms, for the tribesman's life is sacred even if he be a criminal, and he must not be killed in a common way. This principle is finally extended to all religious executions, in which, as the Hebrews and Moabites say, the victim is devoted, as a *ḥerem*, to the god (Stele of Mesha, l. 17). In one peculiar sacrifice at Hierapolis (*Dea Syr.* xlix.) the victims were suspended alive from trees, and the trees were then set on fire. The fire is perhaps a later addition, and the original rite may have consisted in suspension alone. The story of a human victim hung up in the temple at Carrhæ by the Emperor Julian (Theod., *H. E.* iii. 21), and the similar stories in the Syriac Julian-romances (ed. Hoffm. p. 247, etc.), are too apocryphal to be used, though they probably reflect some obsolete popular superstition.

[1] *Dea Syria*, lviii.

[2] Deut. xxi. 4.

the older rule that the sacred flesh must not be left exposed to human contact. Now the Levitical sin-offering is only a special development of the old piacular holocaust, and thus the question at once suggests itself whether in its first origin the holocaust was a subtle way of conveying a gift of food to the god; or whether rather the victim was burned, because it was too sacred to be eaten and yet must not be left undisposed of. In the case of the Arabian holocaust, which is confined to human victims, this is certainly the easiest explanation; and even among the Hebrews and their neighbours it would seem that human sacrifices were not ordinarily burned on the altar or even within the precincts of the sanctuary, but rather outside the city. It is plain from various passages of the prophets, that the sacrifices of children among the Jews before the captivity, which are commonly known as sacrifices to Moloch, were regarded by the worshippers as oblations to Jehovah, under the title of king,[1] yet they were not presented at the temple, but consumed outside the town at the Tophet in the ravine below the temple.[2] From Isa. xxx. 33 it appears that Tophet means a pyre, such as is prepared for a king. But the Hebrews themselves did not burn their dead, unless in very exceptional cases,[3] and

[1] Jer. vii. 31, xix. 5, xxxii. 35; Ezek. xxiii. 39; Mic. vi. 7. The form Moloch (LXX.), or rather Molech (Heb.), is nothing but *Melech*, "king," read with the vowels of *bosheth*, "shameful thing"; see Hoffmann in Stade's *ZATW.* iii. (1883) p. 124. In Jer. xix. 5 delete עלות לבעל with LXX.

[2] The valley of Hinnom is the Tyropœon; see *Enc. Bib.*, arts. "Jerusalem" and "Hinnom."

[3] Saul's body was burned (1 Sam. xxxi. 12), possibly to save it from the risk of exhumation by the Philistines, but perhaps rather with a religious intention, and almost as an act of worship, since his bones were buried under the sacred tamarisk at Jabesh. In Amos. vi. 10 the victims of a plague are burned, which is to be understood by comparing Lev. xx. 14, xxi. 9; Amos ii. 1, and remembering that plague was a special mark of divine wrath (2 Sam. xxiv.), so that its victims might well be regarded as intensely taboo.

burial was equally the rule among their Phœnician neighbours, as is plain from researches in their cemeteries,[1] and apparently among all the Semites. Thus, when the prophet describes the deep and wide pyre "prepared for the king," he does not draw his figure from ordinary life, nor is it conceivable that he is thinking of the human sacrifices in the valley of Hinnom, a reference which would bring an utterly discordant strain into the imagery. What he does refer to is a rite well known to Semitic religion, which was practised at Tarsus down to the time of Dio Chrysostom, and the memory of which survives in the Greek legend of Heracles - Melcarth,[2] in the story of Sardanapalus, and in the myth of Queen Dido. At Tarsus there was an annual feast at which a very fair pyre was erected, and the local Heracles or Baal burned on it in effigy.[3] This annual commemoration of the death of the god in fire must have its origin in an older rite, in which the victim was not a mere effigy but a theanthropic sacrifice, *i.e.* an actual man or sacred animal, whose life, according to the antique conception now familiar to us, was an embodiment of the divine-human life.

The significance of the death of the god in Semitic religion is a subject on which I must not enter in this connection; we are here concerned with it only in so far as the details, scenic or mythical, of the death of the god throw light on the ritual of human sacrifice. And for

[1] This is true also of Carthage; Tissot, *La Prov. d'Afrique*, i. 612; Justin, xix. 1. But at Hadrumetum in the second century B.C. the dead were burned; see Berger in *Revue archéol.*, Juillet–Décembre, 1889, p. 375.

[2] For the burning of the Tyrian Heracles, cf. *Clem. Recog.* x. 24, where we read that the sepulchre of the god was shown "apud Tyrum, ubi igni crematus est." It is a plausible conjecture, very generally accepted, that in Herod. vii. 167 the legend of the self-immolation of Melcarth has got mixed up with the story of the death of Hamilcar.

[3] See O. Müller, "Sandon und Sardanapal," in *Rhein. Mus.*, Ser. i, Bd. iii.

this purpose it is well to cite also the legend of the death of Dido as it is related by Timæus,[1] where the pyre is erected outside the walls of the palace, *i.e.* of the temple of the goddess, and she leaps into it from the height of the edifice. According to Justin, the pyre stood "at the end of the town"; in fact the sanctuary of Cœlestis, which seems to represent the temple of Dido, stood a little way outside the citadel or original city of Carthage, on lower ground, and, at the beginning of the fourth century of our era, was surrounded by a thorny jungle, which the popular imagination pictured as inhabited by asps and dragons, the guardians of the sanctuary.[2] It can hardly be doubted that the spot at which legend placed the self-sacrifice of Dido to her husband Sicharbas was that at which the later Carthaginian human sacrifices were performed.[3]

We have therefore a series of examples all pointing to human sacrifice beneath and outside the city. At Hierapolis the victims are cast down from the temple, but we do not read that they are burned; at Jerusalem they are burned in the ravine below the temple, but not cast down. At Carthage the two rites meet, the sacrifice is outside the city and outside the walls of the temple; but the divine victim leaps into the pyre, and later victims, as Diodorus tells us,[4] were allowed to roll into a fiery pit from a sort of scaffold in the shape of an image of the god with outstretched arms. In this last shape of the rite the object plainly is to free the worshippers from the guilt of

[1] *Fr. Hist. Gr.* i. 197; cf. Justin, xviii. 6. On Dido as identical with Tanith (Tent), ἡ δαίμων τῆς Καρχηδόνος, see the ingenious conjectures of G. Hoffmann, *Phœn. Inschr.* p. 32 *sq.*

[2] Tissot, i. 653. Silius Ital., i. 81 *sqq.*, also describes the temple of Dido as enclosed in a thick grove, and surrounded by awful mystery.

[3] The name Sichar-bas, סכר־בעל, "commemoration of Baal," is not a divine title, but is to be understood from Ex. xx. 24. סכר is the Phœnician form of Heb. זכר.

[4] Diod. xx. 14.

bloodshed; the child was delivered alive to the god, and he committed it to the flames. For the same reason, at the so-called sacrifice of the pyre at Hierapolis, the holocausts were burned alive,[1] and so was the Harranian sacrifice of a bull to the planet Saturn described by Dimashcī.[2] This last sacrifice is the lineal descendant of the older human sacrifices of which we have been speaking; for the Carthaginian Baal or Moloch was identified with Saturn, and at Hierapolis the sacrificed children are called oxen. But in the more ancient Hebrew rite the children offered to Moloch were slaughtered before they were burned.[3] And that the burning is secondary, and was not the original substance of the rite, appears also from the use of Hierapolis, where the sacrifice is simply flung from the temple. So, too, although Dido in Timæus flings herself into the fire, there are other forms of the legend of the sacrifice of a Semite goddess, in which she simply casts herself down into water.[4]

When the burning came to be the essence of the rite, the spot outside the city where it was performed might naturally become itself a sanctuary, though it is plain from the descriptions of the temple of Dido that the sanctuary was of a very peculiar and awful kind, and separated from contact with man in a way not usual in the shrines of ordinary worship. And when this is so, the deity of this awful sanctuary naturally comes to be regarded as a separate divinity, rejoicing in a cult which

[1] *Dea Syria*, xlix. [2] Ed. Mehren, p. 40 (Fr. trans. p. 42).

[3] Ezek. xvi. 20, xxiii. 39; Gen. xxii. 10. The inscriptions in Gesenius, *Mon. Phœn.* p. 448 *sq.*, which have sometimes been cited in this connection, are now known to have nothing to do with human sacrifice.

[4] The Semiramis legend at Hierapolis and Ascalon; the legend of the death of Astarte at Aphaca (Meliton), which must be identified with the falling of the star into the water at the annual feast, just as in another legend Aphrodite after the death of Adonis throws herself from the Leucadian promontory (Ptol., *Nov. Hist.* vii. p. 198, West.).

the other gods abhor. But originally, we see, the human sacrifice is offered to the ordinary god of the community, only it is not consumed on the altar in the sanctuary, but cast down into a ravine outside, or burned outside. This rule appears to be universal, and I may note one or two other instances that confirm it. Mesha burns his son as a holocaust to Chemosh, not at the temple of Chemosh, but on the wall of his beleaguered city;[1] being under blockade, he could not go outside the wall. Again, at Amathus the human sacrifices offered to Jupiter Hospes were sacrificed "before the gates,"[2] and here the Jupiter Hospes of the Roman narrator can be none other than the Amathusian Heracles or Malika, whose name, preserved by Hesychius, identifies him with the Tyrian Melcarth. Or, again, Malalas[3] tells us that the 22nd of May was kept as the ★ anniversary of a virgin sacrificed at the foundation of Antioch, at sunrise, "half-way between the city and the river," and afterwards worshipped like Dido as the Fortune of the town.

All this is so closely parallel to the burning of the flesh of the Hebrew sin-offerings outside the camp, that it seems hardly doubtful that originally, as in the Hebrew sin-offering, the true sacrifice, *i.e.* the shedding of the blood, took place at the temple, and the burning was a distinct act. An intermediate stage is exhibited in the sacrifice of the red heifer, where the whole ceremony takes place outside the camp, but the blood is sprinkled in the direction of the sanctuary (Num. xix. 4). And in support of this view let me press one more point that has come out in our evidence. The human holocaust is not burned on an altar, but on a pyre or fire-pit constructed for the occasion. This appears both in the myths of Dido and Heracles and

[1] 2 Kings iii. 27. [2] Ovid, *Metaph.* x. 224; cf. Movers, i. 408 *sq.*
[3] P. 200 of the Bonn ed.

in actual usage. At Tarsus a very fair pyre is erected yearly for the burning of Heracles; in the Carthaginian sacrifice of boys the victims fall into a pit of flame, and in the Harranian ox-sacrifice the victim is fastened to a grating placed over a vault filled with burning fuel; finally, Isaiah's Tophet is a broad and deep excavation filled with wood exactly like the fiery trench in which, according to Arabic tradition, the victims of ʿAmr b. Hind and the martyrs of Nejrān found their end.[1] All these arrangements are totally unlike the old Semitic altar or sacred stone, and are mere developments of the primitive fireplace, made by scooping a hollow in the ground.[2] It appears, then, that in the ritual of human sacrifice, and therefore by necessary inference in the ritual of the holocaust generally, the burning was originally no integral part of the ceremony, and did not take place on the altar or even within the sanctuary, but in a place apart, away from the habitations of man. For human sacrifices and for solemn

[1] *Aghānī*, xix. 129; Ibn Hishām, p. 24 (Ṭab. i. 925; Sūra, 85, 4 *sqq.*).

[2] It seems to me that תפת is properly an Aramaic name for a fireplace, or for the framework set on the fire to support the victim, which appears in the Harranian sacrifice and, in a modified form, at Carthage. For we are not to think of the brazen Saturn as a shapely statue, but as a development of the dogs of a primitive fireplace. I figure it to myself as a pillar or cone with a rude head and arms, something like the divine symbol so often figured on Carthaginian Tanith cippi. Now the name for the stones on which a pot is set, and then for any stand or tripod set upon a fire, is in Arabic اثفيّة *Othfiyā*, in Syriac ܬܦܝܐ, *Tfāyā*, of which we might, according to known analogies, have a variant *tfāth*. The corresponding Hebrew word is אִשְׁפָּת (for *shfāth*), which means an ashpit or dunghill, but primarily must have denoted the fireplace, since the denonominative verb שִׁפַּת is "to set on a pot." In nomad life the fireplace of one day is the ash-heap of the next. Now, at the time when the word תפת first appears in Hebrew, the chief foreign influence in Judæan religion was that of Damascus (2 Kings xvi.), and there is therefore no improbability in the hypothesis that תפת is an Aramaic word. The pronunciation *tofeth* is quite precarious, for LXX. has ταφεθ, and the Massorets seem to have given the loathsome thing the points of *bosheth*.

piacula this rule continued to be observed even to a late date, but for ordinary animal holocausts the custom of burning the flesh in the court of the sanctuary must have established itself pretty early. Thus, as regards the Hebrews, both the early narrators of the Pentateuch (the Jahvist and the Elohist) presuppose the custom of burning holocausts and other sacrifices on the altar,[1] so that the fusion is already complete between the sacred stone to receive the blood, and the hearth on which the flesh was burned. But the oldest history still preserves traces of a different custom. The burnt-sacrifices of Gideon and Manoah are not offered on an altar, but on the bare rock;[2] and even at the opening of Solomon's temple the fire-offerings were not burned on the altar, but in the middle of the court in front of the *naos*, as was done many centuries later at Hierapolis on the day of the Pyre-sacrifice. It is true that in 1 Kings viii. 64 this is said to have been done only because "the brazen altar that was before the Lord" was not large enough for so great an occasion; but, according to 1 Kings ix. 25, the holocausts and ordinary sacrifices which Solomon offered three times in the year were in like manner offered (not on the brazen altar, but) on an altar "built" by the king, *i.e.* a structure of stones; and indeed we have no unambiguous notice of a permanent altar of burnt-offering in the temple of Jerusalem till the reign of Ahaz, who had one constructed on the model of the altar of Damascus. This altar, and not the brazen altar, was again the model for the altar of the second temple, which was of stone, not of brass, and it is plain from the narrative of 2 Kings xvi., especially in the form of the text which has been preserved by the Septuagint,

[1] Gen. viii. 20, xxii. 9. Ex. xx. 24 makes the holocaust be slaughtered on the altar, but does not expressly say that it was burned on it.

[2] Judg. vi. 20, xiii. 19; Judg. vi. 26, the more modern story of Gideon's offering, gives the modern ritual.

that Ahaz's innovation was not merely the introduction of a new architectural pattern, but involved a modification of the whole ritual.[1]

We may now pass on to the case of ordinary fire-offerings, in which only the fat of the vitals is consumed on the altar. It is easy to see that when men began to shrink from the eating of sacrificial flesh, they would not necessarily at once take refuge in entire abstinence. The alternative was to abstain from partaking of those parts in which the sacred life especially centred. Accordingly we find that in ordinary Hebrew sacrifices the whole blood is poured out at the altar as a thing too sacred to be eaten.[2] Again, the head is by many nations regarded as a special seat of the soul, and so, in Egyptian sacrifice, the head was not eaten, but thrown into the Nile,[3] while among the Iranians the head of the victim was dedicated to Haoma, that the immortal part of the animal might return to him. But a not less important seat of life, according to Semitic ideas, lay in the viscera, especially in the kidneys and the liver, which in the Semitic dialects are continually named as the seats of emotion, or more broadly in the fat of the omentum and the organs that lie in and near it.[4] Now it is precisely this part of the

[1] See *Additional Note* K, *The Altar at Jerusalem*. I may add that, in 1 Kings xviii., Elijah's altar does not seem to be a raised structure, but simply a circle marked out by twelve standing stones and a trench.

[2] Among the Hottentots blood is allowed to men but not to women; the female sex being among savages excluded from many holy privileges. Similarly the flesh of the Hebrew sin-offering must be eaten only by males (Lev. vi. 22 [29]), and among the Caffres the head, breast and heart are man's part (Lichtenstein, p. 451).

[3] Herod. ii. 39. The objection to eating the head is very widely spread; *e.g.*, in Bavaria, as late as the fifteenth century (Usener, *Religionsgesch. Untersuchungen*, ii. 84). Some Arabs objected to eating the heart (Wustenfeld, *Reg.* p. 407).

[4] The Arabic *Khilb* (Heb. חֵלֶב, Syr. *ḥelbā*) primarily denotes the omentum or midriff, but includes the fat or suet connected therewith; see Lev. iii. 3. An Arab says of a woman who has inspired him with passion,

victim, the fat of the omentum with the kidneys and the lobe of the liver, which the Hebrews were forbidden to eat, and, in the case of sacrifice, burned on the altar.

The ideas connected with the kidney fat and its appurtenances may be illustrated by the usages of primitive peoples in modern times. When the Australians kill an enemy in blood revenge, "they always abstract the kidney fat, and also take off a piece of the skin of the thigh" [or a piece of the flank].[1] "These are carried home as trophies. . . . The caul fat is carefully kept by the assassin, and used to lubricate himself"; he thinks, we are told, that thus the strength of the victim enters into him.[2] When the Basutos offer a sacrifice to heal the sick, as soon as the victim is dead, "they hasten to take the epiploon or intestinal covering, which is considered the most sacred

"she has overturned my heart and torn my midriff" (Lane, p. 782). So in Ps. xvii. 10 the sense is not "they have closed their fat (unfeeling) heart," but "they have shut up their midriff," and thus are insensible to pity. From this complex of fat parts the fat of the kidneys is particularly selected by the Arabs, and by most savages, as the special seat of life. One says, "I found him with his kidney fat," meaning I found him brisk and all alive (Lane, p. 1513). In Egypt, according to Burckhardt (*Ar. Prov.* No. 301), "when a sheep is killed by a private person, some of the bystanders often take away the kidneys, or at least the fat that incloses them, as due to the public from him who slaughters the sheep." This, I take it, is a relic of old sacrificial usage; what used to be given to the god is now given in charity. For Greek ideas about the kidney fat see Mr. Platt's note on *Iliad*, φ. 204, in *Journ. Phil.* xix. (1890) 46.

[1] The thigh is a seat of life and especially of procreative power, as appears very clearly in the idiom of the Semites (*Kinship*, p. 38). From this may be explained the sacredness of the *nervus ischiadicus* among the Hebrews (Gen. xxxii. 33), and similar superstitions among other nations. Is this also the reason why the "fat thigh bones" are an altar-portion among the Greeks? The nature of the lameness produced by injury to the sinew of the thigh socket is explained by the Arabic lexx., *s.v.* حارِقَة; the man can only walk on the tips of his toes. This seems to have been a common affection, for poetical metaphors are taken from it.

[2] Brough Smyth, ii. 289, i. 102; cf. Lumholtz, *Among Cannibals* (Lond 1889), p. 272.

part, and put it round the patient's neck. . . . The gall is then poured on the head of the patient. After a sacrifice the gall bladder is invariably fastened to the hair of the individual for whom the victim has been slain, and becomes a sign of purification."[1]

The importance attached by various nations to these vital parts of the body is very ancient, and extends to regions where sacrifice by fire is unknown. The point of view from which we are to regard the reluctance to eat of them is that, being more vital, they are more holy than other parts, and therefore at once more potent and more dangerous. All sacrificial flesh is charged with an awful virtue, and all *sacra* are dangerous to the unclean or to those who are not duly prepared; but these are so holy and so awful that they are not eaten at all, but dealt with in special ways, and in particular are used as powerful charms.[2]

We see from the case of the Basuto sacrifice that it is by no means true that all that man does not eat must be given to the god, and the same thing appears in other examples. The Hebrews pour out the blood at the altar, but the Greeks use it for lustration and the old Arabs as a cure for madness. The Persians restore the head and with it the life to Haoma, while the Tauri, according to Herodotus (iv. 103), in their human sacrifices, bury the body or cast it down from the cliff on which the temple stands, but fix the head on a pole above their houses as a sacred guardian. Among the Semites, too, the magical use of a dried head had great vogue. This sort of charm

[1] Casalis, p. 250.

[2] This may be illustrated by the case of the blood of sacrificial victims. Among the Greeks bull's blood was regarded as a poison; but for this belief there is no physiological basis: the danger lay in its sacred nature. But conversely it was used under divine direction as a medicine; Ælian, *N. A.* xi. 35. On blood as a medicine see also Pliny, *H. N.* xxviii. 43, xxvi. 8; and Adams's *Paulus Ægineta*, iii. 25 *sq.*

is mentioned by Jacob of Edessa,[1] and hares' heads were worn as amulets by Arab women.[2] So, too, when we find bones, and especially dead men's bones, used as charms,[3] we must think primarily of the bones of sacrifices. Nilus's Saracens at least broke up the bones and ate the marrow, but the solid osseous tissue must from the first have defied most teeth unless it was pounded, and so it was particularly likely to be kept and used as a charm. Of course the sacred bones may have been often buried, and when fire was introduced they were likely to be burned, as is the rule with the Caffres.[4] As the sacrifices of the Caffres are not fire-sacrifices, it is clear that in this case the bones are burned to dispose of the holy substance, not to provide food for the gods. But even when the bones or the whole carcase of a sacrosanct victim are burned, the sacred virtue is not necessarily destroyed. The ashes of sacrifice are used, like the blood, for lustrations of various kinds, as we see in the case of the red heifer among the Hebrews; and in agricultural religions such ashes are very commonly used to give fertility to the land. That is, the sacred elements, after they cease to be eaten, are still used in varied forms as a means of communicating the divine life and life-giving or protective virtue to the worshippers, their houses, their lands, and all things connected with them.

In the later fire-rituals, the fat of the victim, with its blood, is quite specially the altar food of the gods. But between the practice which this view represents and the

[1] Qu. 43; see more examples in Kayser's notes, p. 142, and in a paper by Jahn, *Ber. d. sächs-Ges. d. Wiss.* 1854, p. 48. For the magical human head, of which we read so much in the latest forms of Semitic heathenism, see Chwolsohn, ii. 150 *sqq.*, and the *Actes* of the Leyden Congress, ii. 365 *sq.*

[2] *Diw. Hudh.* clxxx. 9; *ZDMG.* xxxix. 329.

[3] Examples, *infra*, *Additional Note* B, p. 448. The very dung of cattle was a charm in Syria (Jacob of Edessa, Qu. 42), to which many parallels exist, not only in Africa, but among the Aryans of India.

[4] Maclean, p. 81.

primitive practice, in which the whole body was eaten, we must, I think, in accordance with what has just been said, insert an intermediate stage, which can still be seen and studied in the usage of primitive peoples. Among the Damaras the fat of particular animals "is supposed to possess certain virtues, and is carefully collected and kept in vessels of a particular kind. A small portion dissolved in water is given to persons who return home safely after a lengthened absence; . . . the chief makes use of it as an unguent for his body."[1] So too "dried flesh and fat" are used as amulets by the Namaquas.[2] Among the Bechuanas lubrication with grease is part of the ceremony of admission of girls into womanhood, and among the Hottentots young men on their initiation into manhood are daubed with fat and soot.[3] Grease is the usual unguent all over Africa, and from these examples we see that its use is not merely hygienic, but has a sacred meaning. Indeed, the use of various kinds of fat, especially human fat, as a charm, is common all over the world, and we learn from the Australian superstition, quoted above, that the reason of this is that the fat, as a special seat of life, is a vehicle of the living virtue of the being from which it is taken. Now we have seen, in speaking of the use of unguents in Semitic religion,[4] that this particular medium has in some way an equivalent value to blood, for which it may be substituted in the covenant ceremony, and also in the ceremony of bedaubing the sacred stone as an act of homage. If, now, we remember that the oldest unguents are animal fats, and that vegetable oil was unknown to the Semitic nomads,[5] we are plainly led to the conclusion

[1] C. J. Andersson, *Lake Ngami*, p. 223.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 330. The dried flesh reminds us of the Arabian custom of drying strips of sacrificial flesh on the days of Minā (Wellh. p. 80).

[3] *Ibid.* p. 465; Kolben, i. 121.

[4] *Supra*, p. 233.

[5] Fränkel, *Fremdwörter*, p. 147.

that unction is primarily an application of the sacrificial fat, with its living virtues, to the persons of the worshippers. On this view the anointing of kings, and the use of unguents on visiting the sanctuary, are at once intelligible.[1]

The agricultural Semites anointed themselves with olive oil, and burned the sacrificial fat on the altar. This could be done without any fundamental modification of the old type of sacred stone or altar pillar, simply by making a hollow on the top to receive the grease; and there is some reason to think that fire-altars of this simple kind, which in certain Phœnician types are developed into altar candlesticks, are older than the broad platform-altar proper for receiving a burnt-offering.[2] But there are evidences even in the Old Testament that it was only gradually that the burning of the fat came to be an integral part of the altar ritual. In 1 Sam. ii. 15 we find a controversy between the priests and the people on this very topic. The worshippers maintain that the priest has no claim to his fee of flesh till the fat is burned; but the priests assert their right to have a share of raw flesh at once. It is assumed in the argument that if the priests held back their claim till they had burned the fat, the flesh would be already cooked—so the worshippers at least did not wait to see the fat burned. And probably the priests had precedent on their side, for the old law of Ex. xxiii. 18 only requires that the fat of a festal sacrifice shall be burned before daybreak—the sacrifice itself having taken place in the evening.

I fear that these details may seem tedious, but the cumulative evidence which they afford that the burning of

[1] The use of unguents by witches when they desire to transform themselves into animal shape,—as we find it, for example, in Apuleius's novel,—belongs to the same region of superstition, and to that most primitive form of the superstition which turns on the kinship of men with animals.

[2] See below, *Additional Note* K.

the flesh or fat held quite a secondary place in ancient sacrifice, and was originally no integral part of the oblation at the altar, is of the greatest importance for the history of sacrificial ideas. They show how impossible it is to regard animal sacrifices as primarily consisting in a gift of food to the gods, and how long it was before this notion superseded the original notion of communion between men and their gods in the life of the sacrifice.

I do not suppose that it is possible, on the basis of the evidences that have come before us, to reconstruct from step to step the whole history of the development of fire-sacrifices. But we can at least see in a general way how the chief modifications of sacrificial ritual and idea came in.

Originally neither the flesh nor the life of the victim could be regarded as a gift or tribute—*i.e.* as something which belonged to the worshipper, and of which he divested himself in order to make it over to the object of his worship. It is probable that sacrifice is older than the idea of private property, and it is certain that its beginnings go back to a time when the owner of a sheep, an ox, or a camel had no right to dispose of its life according to his own good pleasure. Such an animal could only be slain in order that its life might be distributed between all the kin and the kindred god. At this stage the details of the ritual are shaped by the rule that no part of the life must be lost, and that therefore the whole body, which is the vehicle of the life, must be distributed and used up in the holy ritual. In the first instance, therefore, everything must be eaten up, and eaten while it is still alive—fresh and raw. Gradually this rule is modified, partly because it is difficult to insist, in the face of growing civilisation, on the rule that even bones, skin and offal must be devoured, and partly because there is increasing reluctance to partake of the

holy life. This reluctance again is connected with the growth of the distinction between degrees of holiness. Not every man is holy enough to partake of the most sacred sacraments without danger. What is safe for a consecrated chief or priest is not safe for the mass of the people. Or even it is better that the most sacred parts of the victim should not be eaten at all; the blood and the fat are medicines too powerful to be taken internally, but they may be sprinkled or daubed on the worshippers, while the sacrificial meal is confined to the parts of the flesh in which the sacred life is less intensely present. Or, finally, it is most seemly and most safe to withdraw the holiest things from man's use altogether, to pour out the whole blood at the altar, and to burn the fat. All this applies to ordinary sacrifices, in which the gradual concentration of the holiness of the victim in its fat and blood tends to make the rest of the flesh appear less and less holy, till ultimately it becomes almost a common thing. But, on special occasions, where the old ritual is naturally observed with antique rigidity, and where, therefore, the victim is treated at the altar as if it were a tribesman, the feeling of sacred horror against too close an approach to things most holy extends to the whole flesh, and develops itself, especially in connection with actual human sacrifice, into the rule that no part of such victims may be eaten, but that the whole must be reverently burned.

If we may generalise from the case of Arabia, where the holocaust was confined to human victims and the fat of ordinary sacrifices was not burned, it would appear that it was human sacrifice that first gave rise to the use of fire as a safe means of disposing of the bodies of the holiest victims. From this practice that of burning the fat in common sacrifices may very well have been derived. But the evidence is not sufficient to justify a positive con-

clusion on the matter, and it is quite possible that the use of fire began among the Northern Semites in connection with ordinary sacrifices, simply as a means of dealing with such parts of the victim as were not or could not be eaten, and yet were too holy to be left undisposed of. The Hebrew ritual of ordinary sacrifices is careful to prescribe that what is not eaten on the first or second day shall be burned.[1] This is evidently a mere softening of the old rule that the flesh of the victim must be consumed without delay, while it is still alive and quivering, into the rule that it must not be allowed to putrefy and decompose; and this again, since the close connection between putrefaction and fermentation is patent even to the unscientific observer, seems also to be the principle on which ferments are excluded from the altar. The use of fire in sacrifice, as the most complete and thorough means of avoiding putrefaction in whatever part of the victim cannot or may not be eaten, must have suggested itself so naturally wherever fire was known, that no other reason is necessary to explain its wide adoption. The burial of the sacrificial flesh, of which we have found one or two examples, does not appear to have met with so much favour, and indeed was not so satisfactory from the point of view indicated by the rules of Hebrew ritual.[2]

The use of fire in this sense does not involve any fundamental modification in the ideas connected with sacrifice. The critical point in the development is when the fat of ordinary victims, or still more, the whole flesh of the holocaust, is burned within the sanctuary or on the altar, and is regarded as being thus made over to the deity. This point claims to be examined more fully, and must be reserved for consideration at our next meeting.

[1] Lev. vii. 15 *sqq.* [2] See *Additional Note* L, *High Places.*

LECTURE XI

SACRIFICIAL GIFTS AND PIACULAR SACRIFICES—THE SPECIAL IDEAS INVOLVED IN THE LATTER

In connection with the later Semitic sacrifices, fire is employed for two purposes, apparently quite independent of one another. Its ordinary use is upon the altar, where it serves to sublimate, and so to convey to deities of an ethereal nature, gifts of solid flesh, which are regarded as the food of the gods. But in certain Hebrew piacula the sacrificial flesh is burned without the camp, and is not regarded as the food of the gods. The parts of the victim which in the highest form of piacula are burned outside the camp are the same which in lower forms of the sin-offering were eaten by the priests as representatives of the worshippers, or which in ordinary sacrifices would have been eaten by the worshippers themselves. Here, therefore, the fire seems to play the same part that is assigned to it under the rule that, if an ordinary sacrifice is not eaten up within one or two days, the remnant must be burned. All sacrificial flesh is holy, and must be dealt with according to fixed ritual rules, one of which is that it must not be allowed to putrefy. Ordinary sacrificial flesh may be either eaten or burned, but sin-offerings are too holy to be eaten except by the priests, and in certain cases are too holy to be eaten even by them, and therefore must be burned, not as a way of conveying them to the deity, but simply as a way of fitly disposing of them.

It is commonly supposed that the first use of fire was upon the altar, and that the burning outside the camp is a later invention, expressing the idea that, in the case of a sacrifice for sin, the deity does not desire a material gift, but only the death of the offender. The ritual of the Hebrew sin-offering lends itself to such an interpretation readily enough, but it is impossible to believe that its origin is to be explained on any such view. If the sin-offering is merely a symbolical representation of a penal execution, why is the flesh of the victim holy in the first degree? and why are the blood and fat offered upon the altar? But it is unnecessary to press these minor objections to the common view, which is refuted more conclusively by a series of facts that have come before us in the course of the last lecture. There is a variety of evidence that fire was applied to sacrifices, or to parts of sacrifices, as an alternative to their consumption by the worshippers, before the altar became a hearth, and before it came to be thought that what was burned was conveyed, as etherealised food, to the deity. The Hebrew piacula that were burned outside the camp represent an older form of ritual than the holocaust on the altar, and the thing that really needs explanation is the origin of the latter.

Originally all sacrifices were eaten up by the worshippers. By and by certain portions of ordinary sacrifices, and the whole flesh of extraordinary sacrifices, ceased to be eaten. What was not eaten was burned, and in process of time it came to be burned on the altar and regarded as made over to the god. Exactly the same change took place with the sacrificial blood, except that here there is no use of fire. In the oldest sacrifices the blood was drunk by the worshippers, and after it ceased to be drunk it was all poured out at the altar. The tendency evidently was to convey directly to the godhead

every portion of a sacrifice that was not consumed by the worshipper; but how did this tendency arise?

I daresay that some of you will be inclined to say that I am making a difficulty of a matter that needs no explanation. Is it not obvious that a sacrifice is a consecrated thing, that consecrated things belong to the god, and that the altar is their proper place? No doubt this seems to be obvious, but it is precisely the things that seem obvious which in a subject like ours require the most careful scrutiny. You say that consecrated things belong to the god, but we saw long ago that this is not the primitive idea of holiness. A holy thing is taboo, *i.e.* man's contact with it and use of it are subject to certain restrictions, but this idea does not in early society rest on the belief that it is the property of the gods. Again, you say that a sacrifice is a consecrated thing, but what do you mean by this? If you mean that the victim became holy by being selected for sacrifice and presented at the altar, you have not correctly apprehended the nature of the oldest rites. For in them the victim was naturally holy, not in virtue of its sacrificial destination, but because it was an animal of holy kind. So long as the natural holiness of certain animal species was a living element in popular faith, it was by no means obvious that holy things belong to the god, and should find their ultimate destination at the altar.

In later heathenism the conception of holy kinds and the old ideas of taboo generally had become obsolete, and the ritual observances founded upon them were no longer understood. And, on the other hand, the comparatively modern idea of property had taken shape, and began to play a leading part both in religion and in social life. The victim was no longer a naturally sacred thing, over which man had very limited rights, and which he was required to treat as a useful friend rather than a chattel, but was

drawn from the absolute property of the worshipper, of which he had a right to dispose as he pleased. Before its presentation the victim was a common thing, and it was only by being selected for sacrifice that it became holy. If, therefore, by presenting his sheep or ox at the altar, the owner lost the right to eat or sell its flesh, the explanation could no longer be sought in any other way than by the assumption that he had surrendered his right of property to another party, viz. to the god. Consecration was interpreted to mean a gift of man's property to the god, and everything that was withdrawn by consecration from the free use of man was conceived to have changed its owner. The blood and fat of ordinary sacrifices, or the whole flesh in the case of the holocaust, were withdrawn from human use; it was held, therefore, that they had become the property of the god, and were reserved for his use. This being so, it was inevitable that the burning of the flesh and fat should come to be regarded as a method of conveying them to the god; and as soon as this conclusion was drawn, the way was open for the introduction of the modern practice, in which the burning took place on the altar. The transformation of the altar into the hearth, on which the sacrificial flesh was consumed, marks the final establishment of a new view of holiness, based on the doctrine of property, in which the inviolability of holy things is no longer made to rest on their intrinsic supernatural quality, but upon their appropriation to the use and service of the gods. The success of this new view is not surprising, for in every department of early society we find that as soon as the notion of property, and of transfers of property from one person to another, gets firm footing, it begins to swallow up all earlier formulas for the relations of persons and things. But the adaptation of old institutions to new ideas can seldom be effected without

leaving internal contradictions between the old and the new, which ultimately bring about the complete dissolution of the incongruous system. The new wine bursts the old bottles, and the new patch tears the old garment asunder.

In the case of ordinary sacrifices, the theory that holy things are the property of the deity, and that the consecration of things naturally common implies a gift from man to his god, was carried out with little difficulty. It was understood that at the altar the whole victim is made over to the deity and accepted by him, but that the main part of the flesh is returned to the worshipper, to be eaten sacrificially as a holy thing at the table of the god. This explanation went well enough with the conception of the deity as a king or great lord, whose temple was the court at which he sat to receive the homage of his subjects and tenants, and to entertain them with princely hospitality. But it did not satisfactorily account for the most characteristic feature in sacrifice, the application of the blood to the altar, and the burning of the fat on the sacred hearth. For these, according to the received interpretation, were the food of the deity; and so it appeared that the god was dependent on man for his daily nourishment, although, on the other hand, all the good things that man enjoyed he owed to the gift and favour of his god. This is the weak point in the current view of sacrifice which roused the indignation of the author of Psalm l., and afforded so much merriment to later satirists like Lucian. The difficulty might be explained away by a spiritualising interpretation, which treated the material altar gift as a mere symbol, and urged that the true value of the offering lay in the homage of the worshipper's heart, expressed in the traditional oblation. But the religion of the masses never took so subtle a

view as this, and to the majority of the worshippers even in Israel, before the exile, the dominant idea in the ritual was that the material oblation afforded a physical satisfaction to the god, and that copious offerings were an infallible means of keeping him in good humour. So long as sacrifice was exclusively or mainly a social service, performed by the community, the crassness of this conception found its counterpoise in the ideas of religious fellowship that have been expounded in Lecture VII.[1] But in private sacrifice there was little or nothing to raise the transaction above the level of a mere bargain, in which no ethical consideration was involved, but the good understanding between the worshipper and his god was maintained by reciprocal friendly offices of a purely material kind. This superficial view of religion served very well in times of prosperity, but it could not stand the strain of serious and prolonged adversity, when it became plain that religion had to reckon with the sustained displeasure of the gods. In such circumstances men were forced to conclude that it was useless to attempt to appease the divine wrath by gifts of things which the gods, as lords of the earth, already possessed in abundance. It was not only Jehovah who could say, "I will take no bullock out of thy house, nor he-goats from thy folds; for every beast of the forest is Mine, and the cattle on a thousand hills." The Baalim too were in their way lords of nature, and even from the standpoint of heathenism it was absurd to suppose that they were really dependent on the tribute of their worshippers. In short, the gift-theory of sacrifice was not enough to account for the rule that sacrifice is the sole and sufficient form of every act of worship, even in religions which had not realised, with the Hebrew prophets, that what the true God requires of

[1] *Supra*, p. 263 *sqq.*

His worshippers is not a material oblation, but "to do justice, and love mercy, and walk humbly with thy God."

If the theory of sacrifice as a gift or tribute, taken from man's property and conveyed to the deity, was inadequate even as applied to ordinary oblations, it was evidently still more inadequate as applied to the holocaust, and especially to human sacrifice. It is commonly supposed that the holocaust was more powerful than ordinary sacrifices, because the gift to the god was greater. But even in ordinary sacrifices the whole victim was consecrated and made over to the god; only in the holocaust the god kept everything to himself, while in ordinary sacrifices he invited the worshipper to dine with him. It does not appear that there is any good reason, on the doctrine of sacrificial tribute, why this difference should be to the advantage of the holocaust. In the case of human sacrifices the gift-theory led to results which were not only absurd but revolting—absurd, since it does not follow that because a man's firstborn son is dearer to himself than all his wealth, the life of that son is the most valuable gift that he can offer to his god; and revolting, when it came to be supposed that the sacrifice of children as fire-offerings was a gift of food to a deity who delighted in human flesh.[1] So detestable a view of the nature of the gods cannot fairly be said to correspond to the general character of the old Semitic religions, which ought to be judged of by the ordinary forms of worship and not by exceptional rites. If the gods had been habitually conceived as cannibal monsters, the general type of ritual would have been gloomy and timorous, whereas really it was full of joyous and even careless confidence. I conclude, therefore, that the child-devouring King of the later Moloch-worship owes his cannibal attributes, not to

[1] Ezek. xvi. 20, xxiii. 37.

the fundamental principles of Semitic religion, but to false logic, straining the gift-theory of sacrifice to cover rites to which it had no legitimate application. And this conclusion is justified when we find that, though human sacrifices were not unknown in older times, the ancient ritual was to burn them without the camp—a clear proof that their flesh was not originally regarded as a food-offering to the deity.[1]

On the whole, then, the introduction of ideas of property into the relations between men and their gods seems to have been one of the most fatal aberrations in the development of ancient religion. In the beginnings of human thought, the natural and the supernatural, the material and the spiritual, were confounded, and this confusion gave rise to the old notion of holiness, which turned on the idea that supernatural influences emanated, like an infection, from certain material things. It was necessary to human progress that this crude conception should be superseded, and at first sight we are disposed to see nothing but good in the introduction of the notion that holy things are forbidden to man because they are reserved for the use of the gods, and that the danger associated with illegitimate invasion of them is not due to any deadly supernatural influence, directly proceeding from the holy object, but to the wrath of a personal god, who will not suffer his property to be tampered with. In one direction this modification was undoubtedly beneficial, for the vague dread of the unknown supernatural, which in savage society is so strong that it paralyses progress of every kind, and turns man aside from his legitimate task of subduing nature to his use, receives a fatal blow as soon as all supernatural processes are referred to the will and

[1] Compare the remarks on the sacrifice of the firstborn, *infra*, *Additional Note* E.

powers of known deities, whose converse with man is guided by fixed laws. But it was in the last degree unfortunate that these fixed laws were taken to be largely based on the principle of property; for the notion of property materialises everything that it touches, and its introduction into religion made it impossible to rise to spiritual conceptions of the deity and his relations to man on the basis of traditional religion. On the other hand, the more ancient idea of living communion between the god and his worshippers, which fell more and more into the background under the theory of sacrificial gifts, contained an element of permanent truth wrapped up in a very crude embodiment, and to it therefore all the efforts of ancient heathenism towards a better way of converse with the divine powers attach themselves, taking hold of those forms and features of sacrifice which evidently involved something more than the mere presentation to the deity of a material tribute. And as the need for something more than the ordinary altar gifts supplied was not habitually present to men's minds, but forced itself upon them in grave crises of life, and particularly in times of danger, when the god seemed to be angry with his people, or when at any rate it was of importance to make sure that he was not angry, all the aspects of worship that go beyond the payment of gifts and tribute came to be looked upon as having a special atoning character, that is, as being directed not so much to maintain a good understanding with the deity, as to renew it when it was interrupted.

When the idea of atonement is taken in this very general form, there is obviously no sharp line between atoning and ordinary sacrifices; for in ordinary life the means that are used to keep a man in good humour will often suffice to restore him to good humour, if they are

sedulously employed. On this analogy a mere gift, presented at a suitable moment, or of greater value than usual, was often thought sufficient to appease the divine wrath; a general atoning force was ascribed to all sacrifices, and the value of special piacula was often estimated simply by the consideration that they cost the worshipper more than an everyday offering. We have seen that even human sacrifices were sometimes considered from this point of view; and in general the idea that every offence against the deity can be appraised, and made good by a payment of a certain value, was not inconsistent with the principles of ancient law, which deals with offences against persons on the doctrine of retaliation, but admits to an almost unlimited extent the doctrine that the injured party may waive his right of retaliation in consideration of a payment by the offender. But it is not the doctrine of ancient law that an injured party can be compelled to accept material compensation for an offence; and therefore, even on ordinary human analogies, no religious system could be regarded as complete which had not more powerful means of conjuring the divine displeasure than were afforded by the mere offer of a gift or payment. In point of fact, all ancient religions had sacrificial ceremonies of this more powerful kind, in which the notion of pleasing the god by a gift either found no expression at all, or evidently did not exhaust the significance of the ritual; and these are the sacrifices to which the distinctive name of *piacula* is properly applied.

It is sometimes supposed that special piacula did not exist in the older Semitic religions, and were invented for the first time when the gift-theory of sacrifice began to break down. But this supposition is incredible in itself, and is not consistent with the historical evidence. It is incredible that a gift should have been the oldest known

way of reconciling an offended god, for in ordinary life atonement by fine came in at a relatively late date, and never entirely superseded the *lex talionis*; and it is certain, from what we have learned by observing the old form of piacular holocausts, that these sacrifices were not originally regarded as payments to the god, but arose on quite different lines, as an independent development of the primitive sacrifice of communion, whose atoning efficacy rested on the persuasion that those in whose veins the same life-blood circulates cannot be other than friends, bound to serve each other in all the offices of brotherhood.

It has appeared in the course of our inquiry that two kinds of sacrifice, which present features inconsistent with the gift-theory, continued to be practised by the ancient Semites; and to both kinds there was ascribed a special efficacy in persuading or constraining the favour of the gods. The first kind is the mystic sacrifice, represented by a small class of exceptional rites, in which the victim was drawn from some species of animals that retained even in modern times their ancient repute of natural holiness. Sacrifices of this sort could never fall under the gift-theory, for creatures naturally holy are not man's property, but, so far as they have an owner at all, are the property of the god. The significance attached to these sacrifices and the nature of their peculiar efficacy, has already received sufficient attention. The other kind of offering which was thought of as something more than a mere gift, consisted of holocausts, and other sacrifices, whose flesh was not conveyed to the god and eaten at his table, but burned without the camp, or buried, or cast away in a desert place. This kind of service we have already studied from a formal point of view, considering the way in which its ritual was differentiated from the old communion sacrifice, and also

the way in which most sacrifices of the kind were ultimately brought under the class of sacrificial gifts, by the introduction of the practice of burning the flesh on the altar or burying it in the *ghabghab*; but we have not yet considered how these successive modifications of ritual were interpreted and made to fit into the general progress of social institutions and ideas. Some notice of this side of the subject is necessary to complete our study of the principles of ancient sacrifice, and to it the remainder of the present lecture will be devoted.

It must, however, be remembered that in ancient religion there was no authoritative interpretation of ritual. It was imperative that certain things should be done, but every man was free to put his own meaning on what was done. Now the more complicated ritual prestations, to which the elaborate piacular services of later times must be reckoned, were not forms invented, once for all, to express a definite system of ideas, but natural growths, which were slowly developed through many centuries, and in their final form bore the imprint of a variety of influences, to which they had been subjected from age to age under the changing conditions of human life and social order. Every rite therefore lent itself to more than one interpretation, according as this or that aspect of it was seized upon as the key to its meaning. Under such circumstances we must not attempt to fix a definite interpretation on any of the developments of ancient ritual; all that we can hope to do is to trace in the ceremonial the influence of successive phases of thought, the presence of which is attested to us by other movements in the structure of ancient society, or conversely to show how features in ritual, of which the historical origin had been forgotten, were accounted for on more modern principles, and used to give support to new ideas that were struggling for practical recognition.

From the analysis of the ritual of holocausts and other piacula given in the last two lectures, it appears that through all the varieties of atoning ceremony there runs a common principle: the victim is sacrosanct, and the peculiar value of the ceremony lies in the operation performed on its life, whether that life is merely conveyed to the god on the altar, or is also applied to the worshippers by the sprinkling of the blood, or some other lustral ceremony. Both these features are nothing more than inheritances from the most primitive form of sacramental communion; and in the oldest sacrifices their meaning is perfectly transparent and unambiguous, for the ritual exactly corresponds with the primitive ideas, that holiness means kinship to the worshippers and their god, that all sacred relations and all moral obligations depend on physical unity of life, and that unity of physical life can be created or reinforced by common participation in living flesh and blood. At this earliest stage the atoning force of sacrifice is purely physical, and consists in the redintegration of the congenital physical bond of kinship, on which the good understanding between the god and his worshippers ultimately rests. But in the later stage of religion, in which sacrifices of sacrosanct victims and purificatory offerings are exceptional rites, these antique ideas were no longer intelligible; and in ordinary sacrifices those features of the old ritual were dropped or modified which gave expression to obsolete notions, and implied a physical transfer of holy life from the victim to the worshippers. Here, therefore, the question arises why that which had ceased to be intelligible was still preserved in a peculiar class of sacrifices. The obvious answer is that it was preserved by the force of use and precedent.

It is common, in discussions of the significance of

piacular ritual, to begin with the consideration that piacula are atonements for sin, and to assume that the ritual was devised with a view to the purchase of divine forgiveness. But this is to take the thing by the wrong handle. The characteristic features in piacular sacrifice are not the invention of a later age, in which the sense of sin and divine wrath was strong, but are features carried over from a very primitive type of religion, in which the sense of sin, in any proper sense of the word, did not exist at all, and the whole object of ritual was to maintain the bond of physical holiness that kept the religious community together. What we have to explain is not the origin of the sacrificial forms that later ages called piacular, but the way in which the old type of sacrifice came to branch off into two distinct types. And here we must consider that, even in tolerably advanced societies, the distinction between piacular and ordinary offerings long continued to be mainly one of ritual, and that the former were not so much sacrifices for sin, as sacrifices in which the ceremonial forms, observed at the altar, continued to express the original idea that the victim's life was sacrosanct, and in some way cognate to the life of the god and his worshippers. Thus, among the Hebrews of the pre-prophetic period, it certainly appears that a peculiar potency was assigned to holocausts and other exceptional sacrifices, as a means of conjuring the divine displeasure; but a certain atoning force was ascribed to all sacrifices; and, on the other hand, sacrifices of piacular form and force were offered on many occasions when we cannot suppose the sense of sin or of divine anger to have been present in any extraordinary degree. For example, it was the custom to open a campaign with a burnt-offering, which in old Israel was the most solemn piaculum; but this did not imply any feeling that war was a divine judgment and a

sign of the anger of Jehovah.[1] It appears rather that the sacrifice was properly the consecration of the warriors; for the Hebrew phrase for opening war is "to consecrate war" ★ (קדש מלחמה), and warriors are consecrated persons, subject to special taboos.[2] Here, therefore, it lies near at hand to suppose that the holocaust is simply the modification, on lines which have been already explained, of an ancient form of sacramental communion.[3] The Greeks in like manner commenced their wars with piacular sacrifices of the most solemn kind; indeed, according to Phylarchus,[4] a human victim was at one time customary, which is certainly not true for historical times; but I have no doubt that the statement of Phylarchus corresponds to a wide-spread tradition such as might easily arise if the offerings made on occasion of war were of the exceptional and sacrosanct character with which legends of actual human sacrifice are so frequently associated.[5] One illus-

[1] The burnt-offering at the opening of a campaign appears in Judg. vi 20 (cf. ver. 26), xx. 26; 1 Sam. vii. 9, xiii. 10. In Judg. xi. 31 we have, instead of a sacrifice before the war, a vow to offer a holocaust on its successful termination. The view taken by the last redactor of the historical books (Judg., Sam., Kings), that the wars of Israel with its neighbours were always chastisements for sin, is not ancient; cf. Gen. xxvii. 29, xlix. 8; Num. xxiv. 24; Deut. xxxiii. 29.

[2] Isa. xiii. 3; Jer. vi. 4, li. 28; Joel iv. [iii.] 9; Mic. iii. 5. See *supra*, p. 158, and *Additional Note* C.

[3] I conjecture that the form of gathering warriors together by sending round portions of a victim that has been hewn into pieces (1 Sam. xi. 7; cf. Judg. xix. 29) had originally a sacramental sense, similar to that expressed by the covenant form in which the victim is cut in twain; cf. *Additional Note* H, and the Scythian custom noticed by Lucian, *Toxaris*, § 48. A covenant by hewing an ox into small pieces was also in use among the Molossians; Zenobius, ii. 83.

[4] *Ap.* Porph., *De Abst.* ii. 56.

[5] Even in the palmy days of Hellenic civilisation we find evidence of a deeply-rooted belief in the potency of human sacrifice to ensure victory in war. So late as the time of Pelopidas, the propriety of such sacrifice was formally discussed, and upheld by historical as well as mythical precedents (Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, 21). But the historical precedents reduce themselves, on closer examination, to the single and wholly exceptional case of the sacrifice of three captives before the battle of Salamis. On the other hand,

tration of Phylarchus's statement will occur to everyone, viz. the sacrifice of Iphigenia; and here it is to be noted that, while all forms of the legend are agreed that Agamemnon must have committed some deadly sin before so terrible an offering was required of him, there is no agreement as to what his sin was. It is not therefore unreasonable to think that in the original story the piaculum was simply the ordinary preliminary to a campaign, and that later ages could not understand why such a sacrifice should be made, except to atone for mortal guilt.[1]

If, now, it be asked why the ordinary preliminary to a campaign was a sacrifice of the exceptionally solemn kind which in later times was deemed to have a special reference to sin, the answer must be that the ritual was fixed by immemorial precedent, going back to the time when all sacrifices were of the sacramental type, and involved the shedding of a sacrosanct life. At that time every sacrifice was an awful mystery, and not to be performed except on great occasions, when it was most necessary that the bond of kindred obligation between every member of the community, divine and human, should be as strong and fresh as possible. The outbreak of war was plainly such an occasion, and it is no hazardous conjecture that the rule of commencing a campaign with sacrifice dates from the most primitive times.[2] Accordingly the ceremonial to be observed in sacrifice on such an occasion would be protected by well-established tradition, and the victim would

additions might easily be made to the list of legendary precedents, *e.g.* the case of Bombus (Zenobius, ii. 84).

[1] The opening of a campaign appears also in Africa as one of the rare occasions that justify the slaughter of a victim from the tribal herds; see above, p. 297.

[2] There is also some reason to think that in very ancient times a sacrifice was appointed to be offered after a victory. See *Additional Note* M, *Sacrifice by Victorious Warriors.*

continue to be treated at the altar with all the old ritual forms which implied that its blood was holy and akin to man's, long after the general sanctity of all animals of sacrificial kind had ceased to be acknowledged in daily life. And in the same way sacrifices of exceptional form, in which the victim was treated as a human being, or its blood was applied in a primitive ceremonial to the persons of the worshippers, or its flesh was regarded as too sacred to be eaten, would continue to be offered on all occasions which were marked out as demanding a sacrifice, by some very ancient rule, dating from the time when the natural sanctity of sacrificial kinds was still recognised. In such cases the ancient ceremonial would be protected by immemorial custom; while, on the other hand, there would be nothing to prevent a more modern type of ritual from coming into use on occasions for which there was no ancient sacrificial precedent, *e.g.* on such occasions as arose for the first time under the conditions of agricultural life, when the old sanctity of domestic animals was very much broken down. Sacrifices were vastly more frequent with the agricultural than with the pastoral nations of antiquity, but, among the older agricultural Semites, the occasions that called for sacrifices of exceptional or piacular form were not numerous, and may fairly be regarded as corresponding in the main to the rare occasions for which the death of a victim was already prescribed by the rules of their nomadic ancestors.

This, it may be said, is no more than a hypothesis, but it satisfies the conditions of a legitimate hypothesis, by postulating the operation of no unknown or uncertain cause, but only of that force of precedent which in all times has been so strong to keep alive religious forms of which the original meaning is lost. And in certain cases, at any rate, it is very evident that rites of exceptional

form, which later ages generally connected with ideas of sin and atonement, were merely the modern representatives of primitive sacraments, kept up through sheer force of habit, without any deeper meaning corresponding to the peculiar solemnity of their form. Thus the annual piacula that were celebrated, with exceptional rites, by most nations of antiquity, are not necessarily to be regarded as having their first origin in a growing sense of sin or fear of divine wrath,—although these reasons operated in later times to multiply such acts of service and increase the importance attached to them,—but are often nothing more than survivals of ancient annual sacrifices of communion in the body and blood of a sacred animal. For in some of these rites, as we have seen in Lecture VIII.,[1] the form of communion in flesh too holy to be eaten except in a sacred mystery is retained; and where this is not the case, there is at least some feature in the annual piaculum which reveals its connection with the oldest type of sacrifice. It is a mistake to suppose that annual religious feasts date only from the beginnings of agricultural life, with its yearly round of seed-time and harvest; for in all parts of the world annual sacraments are found, and that not merely among pastoral races, but even in rude hunting tribes that have not emerged from the totem stage.[2] And though some of these totem sacraments involve actual communion in the flesh and blood of the sacred animal, the commoner case, even in this primitive stage of society, is that the theanthropic victim is deemed too holy to be eaten, and therefore, as in the majority of Semitic piacula, is burned, buried, or cast into a stream.[3] It is certainly

[1] *Supra*, p. 290 *sqq.*

[2] For examples of annual sacraments by sacrifice of the totem, see Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, i. 44 *sq.* (iv. 232 *sq.*), and *supra*, p. 295, note 2.

[3] I apprehend that in most climates the vicissitudes of the seasons are certainly not less important to the savage huntsman or to the pastoral

illegitimate to connect these very primitive piacula with any explicit ideas of sin and forgiveness; they have their origin in a purely naturalistic conception of holiness, and mean nothing more than that the mystic unity of life in the religious community is liable to wear out, and must be revived and strengthened from time to time.

Among the annual piacula of the more advanced Semites which, though they are not mystical sacrifices of an "unclean" animal, yet bear on their face the marks of ★ extreme antiquity, the first place belongs to the Hebrew Passover, held in the spring month Nisan, where the primitive character of the offering appears not only from the details of the ritual,[1] but from the coincidence of its season with that of the Arabian sacrifices in the month Rajab. Similarly in Cyprus, on the first of April, a sheep was offered to Astarte (Aphrodite) with ritual of a character evidently piacular.[2] At Hierapolis, in like manner, the chief feast of the year was the vernal ceremony of the Pyre, in which animals were burned alive—an antique ritual which has been illustrated in the last lecture. And again, among the Harranians, the first half of Nisan was

barbarian than to the more civilised tiller of the soil. From Doughty's account of the pastoral tribes of the Arabian desert, and also from what Agatharchides tells us of the herdsmen by the Red Sea, we perceive that in the purely pastoral life the seasons when pasture fails are annual periods of semi-starvation for man and beast. Among still ruder races, like the Australians, who have no domestic animals, the difference of the seasons is yet more painfully felt; so much so, indeed, that in some parts of Australia children are not born except at one season of the year; the annual changes of nature have impressed themselves on the life of man to a degree hardly conceivable to us. In pastoral Arabia domestic cattle habitually yean in the brief season of the spring pasture (Doughty, i. 429), and this would serve to fix an annual season of sacrifice. Camels calve in February and early March; Blunt, *Bed. Tribes*, ii. 166.

[1] *Supra*, p. 344. Note also that the head and the inwards have to be eaten, *i.e.* the special seats of life (Ex. xii. 9).

[2] Lydus, *De Mens.* iv. 45; cf. *Additional Note* G. The κώδιον marks the sacrifice as piacular, whether my conjecture κωδίῳ ἰσχιασμίνοι for κωδίῳ ἰσχιασμένον is accepted or not.

marked by a series of exceptional sacrifices of piacular colour.[1]

So remarkable a concurrence in the season of the great annual piacular rites of Semitic communities leaves little doubt as to the extreme antiquity of the institution. Otherwise the season of the annual piacula is not material to our present purpose, except in so far as its coincidence with the yeaning time appears to be connected with the frequent use of sucking lambs and other very young animals as piacular victims. This point, however, seems to be of some importance as an indirect evidence of the antiquity of annual piacula. The reason often given for the sacrifice of very young animals, that a man thus got rid of a sacred obligation at the very cheapest rate, is not one that can be seriously maintained; while, on the other hand, the analogy of infanticide, which in many savage countries is not regarded as murder if it be performed immediately after birth, makes it very intelligible that, in those primitive times when a domestic animal had a life as sacred as that of a tribesman, new-born calves or lambs should be selected for sacrifice. The selection of an annual season of sacrifice coincident with the yeaning-time may therefore be plausibly referred to the time when sacrificial slaughter was still a rare and awful event, involving responsibilities which the worshippers were anxious to reduce, by every device, within the narrowest possible limits.

The point which I took a little time ago, that sacrifices of piacular form are not necessarily associated with a sense of sin, comes out very clearly in the case of annual piacula. Among the Hebrews, under the Law, the annual expiation

[1] *Fihrist*, p. 322. Traces of the sacredness of the month Nisan are found also at Palmyra (*Enc. Brit.*[9] xviii. 199, note 2), and among the Nabatæans, as Berger has inferred from a study of the inscriptions of Madāïn-Ṣāliḥ.

on the great Day of Atonement was directed to cleanse the people from all their sins,[1] *i.e.* according to the Mishnic ★ interpretation, to purge away the guilt of all sins, committed during the year, that had not been already expiated by penitence, or by the special piacula appointed for particular offences;[2] but there is little trace of any such view in connection with the annual piacula of the heathen Semites; and even in the Old Testament this interpretation appears to be modern. The Day of Atonement is a much less ancient institution than the Passover; and in the Passover, though the sprinkled blood has a protecting efficacy, the law prescribes no forms of humiliation and contrition, such as are enjoined for the more modern rite. Again, the prophet Ezekiel, whose sketch of a legislation for Israel, on its restoration from captivity, is older than the law of Leviticus, does indeed provide for two annual atoning ceremonies, in the first and in the seventh month;[3] but the point of these ceremonies lies in an elaborate application of the blood to various parts of the temple, with the object of "reconciling the house." This reference of the sacrifice reappears also in Lev. xvi.; the sprinkling of the blood on the great Day of Atonement "cleanses the altar, and makes it holy from all the uncleanness of the children of Israel."[4] Here an older and merely physical conception of the ritual breaks through, which has nothing to do with the forgiveness of sin; for uncleanness in the Levitical ritual is not an ethical conception. It seems that the holiness of the altar is liable to be impaired, and requires to be annually refreshed by an application of holy blood—a conception which it would be hard to justify from the higher teaching of the Old Testa-

[1] Lev. xvi. 30. [2] *Yoma*, viii. 8, 9.

[3] Ezek. xlv. 19, 20 (LXX.).

[4] Lev. xvi. 19; cf. ver. 33, where the atonement extends to the whole sanctuary.

ment, but which is perfectly intelligible as an inheritance from primitive ideas about sacrifice, in which the altar-idol on its part, as well as the worshippers on theirs, is periodically reconsecrated by the sprinkling of holy (*i.e.* kindred) blood, in order that the life-bond between the god it represents and his kindred worshippers may be kept fresh. This is the ultimate meaning of the yearly sprinkling with a tribesman's blood, which, as Theophrastus tells us, was demanded by so many altars of antiquity,[1] and also of the yearly sprinkling where the victim was not a man, but a sacrosanct or theanthropic animal.

Of all this, however, the later ages of antique religion understood no more than that ancient tradition prescribed certain annual rites of peculiar and sometimes of awful character as indispensable to the maintenance of normal relations between the gods and the worshipping community. The neglect of these rites, it was believed, entailed the wrath of the gods; the Carthaginians, for example, in their distress in the war with Agathocles, believed that Cronus was angry because slaves had been substituted for the noble boys that were his proper victims. But it does not appear that they looked behind this and concluded that the god could not demand periodical sacrifices of such price except as an atonement for the ever-recurring sins of the nation. Ancient religion was so entirely ruled by precedent, that men did not deem it necessary to have an adequate moral explanation even of the most exorbitant demands of traditional ritual; they were content to explain them by some legend that told how the ritual first came to be set up. Thus Diodorus,

[1] Examples of annual human sacrifice in the Semitic field at Carthage, Porph., *De Abst.* ii. 27 (from Theophrastus), Pliny, *H. N.* xxxvi. 29; at Dumætha, or Duma, in Arabia, *De Abst.* ii. 56. At Laodicea in Syria the annual sacrifice of a deer was held to be a substitute for the more ancient sacrifice of a virgin. (See below, *Additional Note* F.)

when he mentions the Carthaginian human sacrifices, suggests the probability that they preserve the memory of Cronus devouring his children;[1] and the Phœnicians themselves appear, from the fragments of Philo Byblius, to have traced back the custom of sacrificing children to a precedent set by the God El, whom the Greeks identify with Cronus.[2]

Indeed, among the Semites the most current view of annual piacula seems to have been that they commemorate a divine tragedy—the death of some god or goddess.[3] The origin of such myths is easily explained from the nature of the ritual. Originally the death of the god was nothing else than the death of the theanthropic victim; but when this ceased to be understood it was thought that the piacular sacrifice represented an historical tragedy in which the god was killed. Thus at Laodicea the annual sacrifice of a deer in lieu of a maiden, which was offered to the goddess of the city, is associated with a legend that the goddess was a maiden who had been sacrificed to consecrate the foundation of the town, and was thenceforth worshipped as its Fortune, like Dido at Carthage; it was therefore the death of the goddess herself that was annually renewed in the piacular rite. The same explanation applies to such scenic representations as were spoken of in the last lecture,[4] where the deity is annually burned in effigy, since the substitution of an effigy for a

[1] Diod. xx. 14.

[2] Euseb., *Præp. Ev.* i. 10. 21, 33. Thus it would seem that even the unenlightened Israelites addressed in Mic. vi. 7 had a profounder sense of sin than was current among the heathen Semites.

[3] I have not noted any Semitic example of another type of explanatory legend of which there are various instances in Greece, viz. that the annual piaculum was appointed as the punishment of an ancient crime for which satisfaction had to be made from generation to generation: Pausan. ix. 8. 2 (at Potniæ), vii. 19 *sq.* (at Patræ in Achaia). In both cases, according to the legend, the sacrifice was originally human.

[4] *Supra*, p. 364 *sqq.*

human sacrifice, or for a victim representing a god, is very common in antique and barbarous religions.[1] And in like manner the annual mourning for Tammuz or Adonis, which supplies the closest parallel in point of form to the fasting and humiliation on the Hebrew Day of Atonement, is the scenic commemoration of a divine tragedy in which the worshippers take part with appropriate wailing and lamentation. That the rites of the Semitic Adonia[2] were connected with a great sacrificial act, may safely be inferred on general principles; and that the sacrifice was piacular in form, follows from Lucian's account of the ritual of Byblus: "When they have done wailing they first burn a sacrifice[3] to Adonis as to one dead"—the offering therefore was a holocaust as in other annual piacula, and probably corresponds to the annual sacrifice of swine on April 2, at Cyprus, which Joannes Lydus connects with the Adonis legend.[4]

The Adonia therefore seem to me to be only a special form of annual piaculum, in which the sacrifice has come to be overshadowed by its popular and dramatic accompaniments.[5] The legend, the exhibition of the dead god in effigy,[6] the formal act of wailing, which filled all the streets

[1] Thus the Romans substituted puppets of rushes or wool for human offerings in the Argea and the worship of Mania. In Mexico, again, human victims were habitually regarded as incarnations of the deity, but also paste images of the gods were made and eaten sacramentally.

[2] I use this word as a convenient general term describing a particular type of ritual, without committing myself to the opinion that all rites of the type were in connection with the worship of the same god. It is not even certain that there was a god Adonis. What the Greeks took for a proper name is perhaps no more than a title, *Adon*, "lord," applicable to various deities, *CIL.* viii. 1211.

[3] Καταγίζουσι; for the sense of the word compare Lucian, *De Luctu*, 19.

[4] *Supra*, p. 290 *sq.* If this be so, the Cyprian Adonis was originally the Swine-god, and in this as in many other cases the sacred victim has been changed by false interpretation into the enemy of the god. Cf. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, viii. 22 *sq.*, 31.

[5] In Greece, where the Adonia were no part of the State religion, the celebration seems to have been limited to these.

[6] This is part of the genuine Semitic ritual, not merely Greek or

and was not confined to the sanctuary, took much greater hold of the imagination than the antique piaculum at the temple, and became one of the most deeply rooted parts of popular religion.[1] Late in the Middle Ages, in A.D 1064 and again in 1204, the Arabic historian Ibn al-Athīr[2] records sporadic revivals, on a great scale, of the ancient lament for the dead god. In the former case a mysterious threat was circulated from Armenia to Chuzistan, that every town which did not lament the dead "king of the Jinn" should utterly perish; in the latter a fatal disease raged in the parts of Mosul and Irac, "and it was divulged that a woman of the Jinn called Omm ʿOncōd (Mother of the Grape-cluster) had lost her son, and that everyone who would not make lamentation for him would fall a victim to the epidemic." In this case the form of the lamentation is recorded: "O Omm ʿOncōd, excuse us, ʿOncōd is dead, we knew it not."

It seems to me that one characteristic feature in these late observances is entirely true to the spirit of the old Semitic heathenism. The mourning is not a spontaneous expression of sympathy with the divine tragedy, but obligatory and enforced by fear of supernatural anger. And a chief object of the mourners is to disclaim responsibility for the god's death—a point which has already come before us in connection with theanthropic sacrifices, such as the "ox-murder at Athens."

When the original meaning of the theanthropic ritual was forgotten, and the death of the god was explained by

Alexandrian; see Lampridius, *Heliog.* vii.: "Salambonam etiam omni planctu et iactatione Syriaci cultus exhibuit." As it is not disputed that Salambo or Salambas = צלם בעל, "the image of Baal," it is strange that scholars should have been misled by Hesychius and the *Etym. Magn.* into making Salambo a name of the Oriental Aphrodite.

[1] *Dea Syria*, 6 (Byblus); Ammianus, xx. 9. 15 (Antioch).

[2] Ed. Tornberg, x. 28; cf. Bar Hebræus, *Chron. Syr.* ed. Bedjan, p. 242.

legendary history as a thing of the far past, the obligatory mourning at the annual piaculum was continued by force of usage, and presumably gave rise to various speculations which can only be matter of conjecture to us. But it is reasonable to suppose that ceremonies which were currently interpreted as the commemoration of a mythical tragedy could not suggest to the mass of the worshippers any ethical ideas transcending those embodied in the myth. The legends of the deaths of Semitic gods that have come down to us are singularly devoid of moral significance, and it is difficult to believe that they could excite any deeper feeling than a vague sentimental sympathy, or a melancholy conviction that the gods themselves were not exempt from the universal law of suffering and death. And with the common crowd I apprehend that the main feeling involved was generally that which we have seen to survive in the latest manifestations of heathen sentiment—the feeling that a bereaved deity is an angry deity, who may strike blindly all round at those who are not careful to free themselves from the suspicion of blame.

Among the agricultural Semites, where the Baal was mainly worshipped as the giver of vegetative increase and the quickening spirit of vegetative life, the annual mourning for the dead god seems often to have been brought into relation to agriculture and the cycle of agricultural feasts. In the Baal religion all agricultural operations, but particularly the harvest and vintage, are necessarily viewed as in some degree trenching on the holy things of the god, and must be conducted with special religious precautions.[1] Thus among the Hebrews the spring piaculum of the Passover, which in its origin belongs to the pre-agricultural stage of Semitic society, was connected in the Pentateuchal system with the opening of the corn-harvest,

[1] *Supra*, p. 158.

and in like manner the great Day of Atonement precedes the vintage feast. Mr. Frazer has brought together a good deal of evidence connecting the Adonia—or rather certain forms of the Adonia[1]—with the corn-harvest; the death of the god being held to be annually repeated in the cutting of the divine grain.[2] Similarly the wailing for 'Oncōd, the divine Grape-cluster, seems to be the last survival of an old vintage piaculum. I can only touch on this point here, since the developments of religion connected with agriculture lie beyond the scope of the present volume. The dread of the worshippers, that the neglect of the usual ritual would be followed by disaster, is particularly intelligible if they regarded the necessary operations of agriculture as involving the violent extinction of a particle of divine life. Here, in fact, the horror attending the service is much the same as in the case of the original theanthropic sacrifice, only it is a holy fruit that suffers instead of a holy animal.

In the brighter days of Semitic heathenism, the annual celebration of the god's death hardly suggested any serious thought that was not presently drowned in an outburst of mirth saluting the resurrection of the Baal on the following morning; and in more distressful times, when the gloomier aspects of religion were those most in sympathy with the prevailing hopelessness of a decadent nation,—such times as those in which Ezekiel found the women of Jerusalem

[1] The rites of Byblus cannot be connected either with vintage or harvest, for both of these fall in the dry season, and the Byblian god died when his sacred river was swollen with rain. Here the pre-agricultural spring piaculum seems to have retained its old place in the yearly religious cycle.

[2] *The Golden Bough*, vol. v. chap. ix. The evidence adduced by Mr. Frazer is not all applicable without limitation to the Semitic Adonia—Greek and Alexandrian forms of the mourning were probably coloured by Greek and Egyptian influence. The Semitic evidence points to Babylonia as the source of the Semitic corn piaculum; it is therefore worth noting that Bezold finds Tammuz and the following month Ab designated as the harvest months of N. Babylonia in the fourteenth century B.C. (*Tell el-Amarna Tablets*, Brit. Mus. 1892, p. xxix).

mourning for Tammuz,—the idea that the gods themselves were not exempt from the universal law of death, and had ordered this truth to be commemorated in their temples by bloody, or even human sacrifices, could only favour the belief that religion was as cruel as the relentless march of adverse fate, and that man's life was ruled by powers that were not to be touched by love or pity, but, if they could be moved at all, would only be satisfied by the sacrifice of man's happiness and the surrender of his dearest treasures. The close psychological connection between sensuality and cruelty, which is familiar to students of the human mind, displays itself in ghastly fashion in the sterner aspects of Semitic heathenism; and the same sanctuaries which, in prosperous times, resounded with licentious mirth and carnal gaiety, were filled in times of distress with the cowardly lamentations of worshippers, who to save their own lives were ready to give up everything they held dear, even to the sacrifice of a firstborn or only child.

On the whole the annual piacula of Semitic heathenism appear theatrical and unreal, when they are not cruel and repulsive. The stated occurrence of gloomy rites at fixed seasons, and without any direct relation to human conduct, gave the whole ceremony a mechanical character, and so made it inevitable that it should be either accepted as a mere scenic tragedy, whose meaning was summed up in a myth, or interpreted as a proof that the divine powers were never thoroughly reconciled to man, and only tolerated their worshippers in consideration of costly atonements constantly renewed. I apprehend that even in Israel the annual piacula, which were observed from an early date, had little or no share in the development of the higher sense of sin and responsibility which characterises the religion of the Old Testament. The Passover is a rite of the most primæval antiquity; and in the local cults,

annual mournings, like the lamentation for Jephthah's daughter, — which undoubtedly was connected with an annual sacrifice, like that which at Laodicea commemorated the mythical death of the virgin goddess,—had been yearly repeated from very ancient times. Yet, only after the exile, and then only by a sort of afterthought, which does not override the priestly idea that the annual atonement is above all a reconsecration of the altar and the sanctuary, do we find the annual piaculum of the Day of Atonement interpreted as a general atonement for the sins of Israel during the past year. In the older literature, when exceptional and piacular rites are interpreted as satisfactions for sin, the offence is always a definite one, and the piacular rite has not a stated and periodical character, but is directly addressed to the atonement of a particular sin or course of sinful life.

The conception of piacular rites as a satisfaction for sin appears to have arisen after the original sense of the theanthropic sacrifice of a kindred animal was forgotten, and mainly in connection with the view that the life of the victim was the equivalent of the life of a human member of the religious community. We have seen that when the victim was no longer regarded as naturally holy, and equally akin to the god and his worshippers, the ceremony of its death was still performed with solemn circumstances, not appropriate to the slaughter of a mere common beast. It was thus inevitable that the victim should be regarded either as a representative of the god, or as the representative of a tribesman, whose life was sacred to his fellows. The former interpretation predominated in the annual piacula of the Baal religions, but the latter was that naturally indicated in such atoning sacrifices as were offered on special emergencies and did not lend themselves to a mythical interpretation. For in old times

the circumstances of the slaughter were those of a death which could only be justified by the consent, and even by the active participation, of the whole community, *i.e.* of the judicial execution of a kinsman.[1] In later times this rule was modified, and in ordinary sacrifices the victim was slain either by the offerer, or by professional slaughterers, who formed a class of inferior ministers at the greater sanctuaries.[2] But communal holocausts and piacula continued to be slain by the chief priests, or by the heads of the community or by their chosen representatives, so that the slaughter retained the character of a solemn public act.[3] Again, the feeling that the slaying involves a grave responsibility, and must be justified by divine permission, was expressed by the Arabs, even in ordinary slaughter, by the use of the *bismillah*, *i.e.* by the slaughterer striking the victim in the name of his god.[4] But in many piacula this feeling was carried much further, and care was taken to slay the victim without bloodshed, or to make believe that it had killed itself.[5] Certain

[1] *Supra*, p. 284 *sq.*

[2] In *CIS.* No. 86, the ministers of the temple include a class of slaughterers (זבחם), and so it was at Hierapolis (*Dea Syria*, xliii.). Among the Jews, at the second temple, the Levites often acted as slaughterers; but before the captivity the temple slaughterers were uncircumcised foreigners (Ezek. xliv. 6 *sqq.*; cf. *O.T. in J. Ch.* 2nd ed., p. 260 *sqq.*).

[3] Thus in the Old Testament we find young men as sacrificers in Ex. xxiv. 5; the elders in Lev. iv. 15, Deut. xxi. 4; Aaron in Lev. xvi. 15; cf. *Yoma*, iv. 3. All sacrifices, except the last named, might, according to the Rabbins, be killed by any Israelite.

The choice of "young men," or rather "lads," as sacrificers in Ex. xxiv. is curiously analogous to the choice of lads as executioners. Judg. viii. 20 is not an isolated case, for Nilus also (p. 67) says that the Saracens charged lads with the execution of their captives.

[4] The same feeling is expressed in Lev. xvii. 11; Gen. viii. 3 *sqq.*

[5] The blood that calls for vengeance is blood that falls on the ground (Gen. iv. 10). Hence blood to which vengeance is refused is said to be trodden under foot (Ibn Hishām, p. 79, *ult.*, p. 861, l. 5), and forgotten blood is covered by the earth (Job xvi. 18). And so we often find the idea that a death in which no blood is shed, or none falls upon the ground, does not call for vengeance; while, on the other hand, a simple blow calls for

holocausts, like those of the Pyre-festival at Hierapolis, were burned alive; and other piacula were simply pushed over a height, so that they might seem to kill themselves by their fall. This was done at Hierapolis, both with animals and with human victims; and, according to the Mishna, the Hebrew scapegoat was not allowed to go free in the wilderness, but was killed by being pushed over a precipice.[1] The same kind of sacrifice occurs in Egypt, in a rite which is possibly of Semitic origin,[2] and in Greece, in more than one case where the victims were human.[3]

All such forms of sacrifice are precisely parallel to those which were employed in sacred executions, *i.e.* in the judicial slaying of members of the community. The criminal in ancient times was either stoned by the whole congregation, as was the usual form of the execution among the ancient Hebrews; or strangled, as was commonly done among the later Jews; or drowned, as in the Roman punishment for parricide, where the kin in the narrower sense is called on to execute justice on one of its own members; or otherwise disposed of in some way which either avoids bloodshed or prevents the guilt of blood from being fixed on an individual. These coincidences between the ritual of sacrifice and of execution are not accidental; in each case they had their origin in the scruple against shedding

blood-revenge, if it happens to draw blood through the accident of its falling on a sore (Mofaḍḍal al-Ḍabbī, *Amthāl*, p. 10, ed. Constant. AH. 1300). Infanticide in Arabia was effected by burying the child alive; captive kings were slain by bleeding them into a cup, and if one drop touched the ground it was thought that their death would be revenged (*supra*, p. 369, note 1). Applications of this principle to sacrifices of sacrosanct and kindred animals are frequent; they are strangled or killed with a blunt instrument (*supra*, p. 343; note also the club or mallet that appears in sacrificial scenes on ancient Chaldean cylinders, Menant, *Glyptique*, i. 151), or at least no drop of their blood must fall on the ground (Bancroft, iii. 168).

[1] *Dea Syria*, lviii.; *Yoma*, vi. 6.

[2] Plutarch, *Is. et Os.* § 30; cf. *Additional Note* F.

[3] At the Thargelia, and in the Leucadian ceremony.

kindred blood; and, when the old ideas of the kinship of man and beast became unintelligible, they helped to establish the view that the victim whose life was treated as equivalent to that of a man was a sacrifice to justice, accepted in atonement for the guilt of the worshippers. The parallelism between piacular sacrifice and execution came out with particular clearness where the victim was wholly burnt, or where it was cast down a precipice; for burning was the punishment appointed among the Hebrews and other ancient nations for impious offences,[1] and casting from a cliff is one of the commonest forms of execution.[2]

The idea originally connected with the execution of a tribesman is not exactly penal in our sense of the word: the object is not to punish the offender, but to rid the community of an impious member—ordinarily a man who has shed the sacred tribal blood. Murder and incest, or offences of a like kind against the sacred laws of blood, are in primitive society the only crimes of which the community as such takes cognisance; the offences of man against man are matters of private law, to be settled between the parties on the principle of retaliation or by the payment of damages. But murder, to which as the typical form of crime we may confine our attention, is an inexpiable offence, for which no compensation can be taken; the man who has killed his kinsman or his covenant ally, whether of design or by chance, is impious,

[1] Gen. xxxviii. 24; Lev. xx. 14, xxi. 9; Josh. vii. 15.

[2] The Tarpeian rock at Rome will occur to everyone. Among the Hebrews we find captives so killed (2 Chron. xxv. 12), and in our own days the Sinai Arabs killed Prof. Palmer by making him leap from a rock; cf. also 2 Kings viii. 12, Hos. x. 14, from which it would seem that this was the usual way of killing non-combatants. I apprehend that the obscure form of execution "before the Lord," mentioned in 2 Sam. xxi. 9 (and also Num. xxv. 4), is of the same sort, for the victims fall and are killed; הוקע will answer to إوقع. Note that this religious execution takes place at the season of the Paschal piaculum. ★

and must be cut off from his community by death or outlawry. And in such a case the execution or banishment of the culprit is a religious duty, for if it is not performed the anger of the deity rests on the whole kin or community of the murderers.

In the oldest state of society the punishment of a murderer is not on all fours with a case of blood-revenge. Blood-revenge applies to manslaughter, *i.e.* to the killing of a stranger. And in that case the dead man's kin make no effort to discover and punish the individual slayer; they hold his whole kin responsible for his act, and take vengeance on the first of them on whom they can lay hands. In the case of murder, on the other hand, the point is to rid the kin of an impious person, who has violated the sanctity of the tribal blood, and here therefore it is important to discover and punish the criminal himself. But if he cannot be discovered, some other means must be taken to blot out the impiety and restore the harmony between the community and its god, and for this purpose a sacramental sacrifice is obviously indicated, such as Deut. xxi. provides for the purging of the community from the guilt of an untraced murder.[1] In such a case it was inevitable that the sacrifice, performed as it was with circumstances closely akin to those of an execution, should come to be regarded as a surrogate for the death of the true culprit. And this interpretation was all the more readily established because, from an early date, the alliance of different kins had begun to give rise to cases of homicide in which the line of distinction was no longer clear between murder and manslaughter, between the case where the culprit himself must die, and the case where any life

[1] Here the responsibility for the bloodshed falls on the nearest town (ver. 2); cf. *Agh.* ix. 178, l. 26 *sq.*, where the blood-wit for a man slain is charged to the nearest homestead.

kindred to his may suffice. Thus in the time of David[1] the Israelites admit that a crime calling for expiation was committed by Saul when he slew the Gibeonites, who were the sworn allies of Israel. But, on the other hand, the Gibeonites claim satisfaction under the law of blood-revenge, and ask that in lieu of Saul himself certain members of his house shall be given up to them. And in this way the idea of substitution is brought in, even in a case which is, strictly speaking, one of murder.

In all discussion of the doctrine of substitution as applied to sacrifice, it must be remembered that private sacrifice is a younger thing than clan sacrifice, and that private piacula offered by an individual for his own sins are of comparatively modern institution. The mortal sin of an individual—and it is only mortal sin that has to be considered in this connection—was a thing that affected the whole community, or the whole kin of the offender. Thus the inexpiable sin of the sons of Eli is visited on his whole clan from generation to generation;[2] the sin of Achan is the sin of Israel, and as such is punished by the defeat of the national army;[3] and the sin of Saul and "his bloody house" (*i.e.* the house involved in the blood-shed) leads to a three years' famine. Accordingly it is the business of the community to narrow the responsibility for the crime, and to free itself of the contagious taint by fixing the guilt either on a single individual, or at least on his immediate kin, as in the case of Achan, who was stoned and then buried with his whole family. Hence, when a tribesman is executed for an impious offence, he dies on behalf of the community, to restore normal relations between them and their god; so that the analogy with sacrifice is very close in purpose as well as in form. And so the cases in which the anger of the god can be traced

[1] 2 Sam. xxi. [2] 1 Sam. ii. 27 *sqq.* [3] Josh. vii. 1, 11

to the crime of a particular individual, and atoned for by his death, are very naturally seized upon to explain the cases in which the sin of the community cannot be thus individualised, but where, nevertheless, according to ancient custom, reconciliation is sought through the sacrifice of a theanthropic victim. The old explanation, that the life of the sacrosanct animal is used to retie the life-bond between the god and his worshippers, fell out of date when the kinship of races of men with animal kinds was forgotten. A new explanation had to be sought; and none lay nearer than that the sin of the community was concentrated on the victim, and that its death was accepted as a sacrifice to divine justice. This explanation was natural, and appears to have been widely adopted, though it hardly became a formal dogma, for ancient religion had no official dogmas, but contented itself with continuing to practise antique rites, and letting everyone interpret them as he would. Even in the Levitical law the imposition of hands on the head of the victim is not formally interpreted as a laying of the sins of the people on its head, except in the case of the scape-goat.[1] And here the carrying away of the people's guilt to an isolated and desert region (ארץ גזרה) has its nearest analogies, not in ordinary atoning sacrifices, but in those physical methods of getting rid of an infectious taboo which characterise the lowest forms of superstition. The same form of disinfection recurs in the Levitical legislation, where a live bird is made to fly away with the contagion of leprosy,[2] and in Arabian custom, when a widow before remarriage makes a bird fly away with the uncleanness of her widowhood.[3] In ordinary burnt-

[1] Lev. xvi. 21. [2] Lev. xiv. 7, 53; cf. Zech. v. 5 *sqq.*

[3] *Tāj al-'Arūs, s.v.* فض, VIII. (Lane, *s.v.*; *O. T. in J. Ch.*, 1st ed., p. 439; Wellh.[1] p. 156). An Assyrian parallel in *Records of the Past*, ix. 151. It is indeed probable that in the oldest times the outlawry of a

offerings and sin-offerings the imposition of hands is not officially interpreted by the Law as a transference of sin to the victim, but rather has the same sense as in acts of blessing or consecration,[1] where the idea no doubt is that the physical contact between the parties serves to identify them, but not specially to transfer guilt from the one to the other.

In the Levitical ritual, all piacula, both public and private, refer only to sins committed unwittingly. As regards the sin-offering for the people this is quite intelligible, in accordance with what has just been said; for if the national sin can be brought home to an individual, he of course must be punished for it. But the private sin-offerings presented by an individual, for sins committed unwittingly, and subsequently brought to his knowledge, appear to be a modern innovation; before the exile the private offences for which satisfaction had to be made at the sanctuary were not mortal sins, and gave no room for the application of the doctrine of life for life, but were atoned for by a money payment, on the analogy of the satisfaction given by payment of a fine for the offences of man against man (2 Kings xii. 16). And, on the whole, while there can be no doubt that public piacula were often regarded as surrogates for the execution of an offender, who either was not known or whom the community hesitated to bring to justice, I very much doubt whether private offerings were often viewed in this light; even the sacrifice of a child, as we have already seen, was conceived rather as the greatest and most exorbitant gift that a man can offer.[2] The very idea of an execution implies a

criminal meant nothing more than freeing the community, just in this way, from a deadly contagion.

[1] Gen. xlviii. 14; Num. viii. 10; Deut. xxxiv. 9; cf. 2 Kings ii. 13 *sqq.*

[2] The Greek piacula for murder were certainly not regarded as executions, but as cathartic rites.

public function, and not a private prestation, and so I apprehend that the conception of a satisfaction paid to divine justice could not well be connected with any but public piacula. In these the death of the victim might very well pass for the scenic representation of an execution, and so represent the community as exonerating itself from all complicity in the crime to be atoned for. Looked at in this view, atoning rites no doubt served in some measure to keep alive a sense of divine justice and of the imperative duty of righteousness within the community. But the moral value of such scenic representation was probably not very great; and where an actual human victim was offered, so that the sacrifice practically became an execution, and was interpreted as a punishment laid on the community by its god, the ceremony was so wholly deficient in distributive justice that it was calculated to perplex, rather than to educate, the growing sense of morality.

Christian theologians, looking on the sacrifices of the Old Testament as a type of the sacrifice on the cross, and interpreting the latter as a satisfaction to divine justice, have undoubtedly over-estimated the ethical lessons embodied in the Jewish sacrificial system; as may be inferred even from the fact that, for many centuries, the official theology of the Church was content to interpret the death of Christ as a ransom for mankind paid to the devil, or as a satisfaction to the divine honour (Anselm), rather than as a recognition of the sovereignty of the moral law of justice. If Christian theology shows such variations in the interpretation of the doctrine of substitution, it is obviously absurd to expect to find a consistent doctrine on this head in connection with ancient sacrifice;[1]

[1] Jewish theology has a great deal to say about the acceptance of the merits of the righteous on behalf of the wicked, but very little about atonement through sacrifice.

and it may safely be affirmed that the influence of piacular sacrifices, in keeping the idea of divine justice before the minds of ancient nations, was very slight compared with the influence of the vastly more important idea that the gods, primarily as the vindicators of the duties of kinship, and then also of the wider morality which ultimately grew up on the basis of kinship, preside over the public exercise of justice, give oracles for the detection of hidden offences, and sanction or demand the execution of guilty tribesmen. Of these very real functions of divine justice the piacular sacrifice, when interpreted as a scenic execution, is at best only an empty shadow.

Another interpretation of piacular sacrifice, which has great prominence in antiquity, is that it purges away guilt. The cleansing effect of piacula is mainly associated with the application to the persons of the worshippers of sacrificial blood or ashes, or of holy water and other thing of sacred virtue, including holy herbs and even the fragrant smoke of incense. This is a topic which it would be easy to illustrate at great length and with a variety of curious particulars; but the principle involved is so simple that little would be gained by the enumeration of all the different substances to which a cathartic value was ascribed, either by themselves or as accessories to an atoning sacrifice. A main point to be noted is that ritual purity has in principle nothing to do with physical cleanliness, though such a connection was ultimately established by the common use of water as a means of lustration. Primarily, purification means the application to the person of some medium which removes a taboo, and enables the person purified to mingle freely in the ordinary life of his fellows. It is not therefore identical with consecration, for the latter often brings special taboos with it. And so we find that the ancients used purifica-

tory rites after as well as before holy functions.[1] But as the normal life of the member of a religious community is in a broad sense a holy life, lived in accordance with certain standing precepts of sanctity, and in a constant relation to the deity of the community, the main use of purificatory rites is not to tone down, to the level of ordinary life, the excessive holiness conveyed by contact with sacrosanct things, but rather to impart to one who has lost it the measure of sanctity that puts him on the level of ordinary social life. So much indeed does this view of the matter predominate, that among the Hebrews all purifications are ordinarily reckoned as purification from uncleanness; thus the man who has burned the red heifer or carried its ashes, becomes ceremonially unclean, though in reality the thing that he has been in contact with was not impure but most holy;[2] and similarly the handling of the Scriptures, according to the Rabbins, ★ defiles the hands, *i.e.* entails a ceremonial washing. Purifications, therefore, are performed by the use of any of the physical means that re-establish normal relations with the deity and the congregation of his worshippers—in short, by contact with something that contains and can impart a divine virtue. For ordinary purposes the use of living water may suffice, for, as we know, there is a sacred principle in such water. But the most powerful cleansing media are necessarily derived from the body and blood of sacrosanct victims, and the forms of purification embrace such rites as the sprinkling of sacrificial blood or ashes on the person, anointing with holy unguents, or fumigation with the smoke of incense, which from early times was a favourite accessory to sacrifices. It seems probable, however, that the religious value of incense was

[1] See *infra*, *Additional Note* B, p. 446 *sq.*, and *supra*, p. 351 *sq.*
[2] Num. xix. 8, 10.

originally independent of animal sacrifice, for frankincense was the gum of a very holy species of tree, which was collected with religious precautions.[1] Whether, therefore, the sacred odour was used in unguents or burned like an altar sacrifice, it appears to have owed its virtue, like the gum of the *samora* tree,[2] to the idea that it was the blood of an animate and divine plant.

It is easy to understand that cathartic media, like holiness itself, were of various degrees of intensity, and were sometimes used, one after another, in an ascending scale. All contact with holy things has a dangerous side; and so, before a man ventures to approach the holiest sacraments, he prepares himself by ablutions and other less potent cathartic applications. On this principle ancient religions developed very complicated schemes of purificatory ceremonial, but in all grave cases these culminated in piacular sacrifice; "without shedding of blood there is no remission of sin."[3]

In the most primitive form of the sacrificial idea the blood of the sacrifice is not employed to wash away an impurity, but to convey to the worshipper a particle of holy life. The conception of piacular media as purificatory, however, involves the notion that the holy medium not only adds something to the worshipper's life, and refreshes its sanctity, but expels from him something that is impure. The two views are obviously not inconsistent, if we conceive impurity as the wrong kind of life, which is dispossessed by inoculation with the right kind. Some idea of this sort is, in fact, that which savages associate with the uncleanness of taboo, which they commonly

[1] Pliny, xii. 54. The right even to see the trees was reserved to certain holy families, who, when engaged in harvesting the gum, had to abstain from all contact with women and from participation in funerals.

[2] *Supra*, p. 133.

[3] Heb. ix. 22.

ascribe to the presence, in or about the man, of "spirits" or living agencies; and the same idea occurs in much higher forms of religion, as when, in mediæval Christianity, exorcisms to expel devils from the catechumen are regarded as a necessary preliminary to baptism.

Among the Semites the impurities which were thought of as cleaving to a man, and making him unfit to mingle freely in the social and religious life of his community, were of very various kinds, and often of a nature that we should regard as merely physical, *e.g.* uncleanness from contact with the dead, from leprosy, from eating forbidden food, and so forth. All these are mere survivals of savage taboos, and present nothing instructive for the higher developments of Semitic religion. They were dealt with, where the uncleanness was of a mild form, mainly by ablutions; or where the uncleanness was more intense, by more elaborate ceremonies involving the use of sacrificial blood,[1] of sacrificial ashes,[2] or the like. Sometimes, as we have seen, the Hebrews and Arabs conveyed the impurity to a bird, and allowed it to fly away with it.[3]

There is, however, one form of impurity, viz. that of bloodshed, with which important ethical ideas connected themselves. Here also the impurity is primarily a physical one; it is the actual blood of the murdered man, staining the hands of the slayer, or lying unatoned and unburied on the ground, that defiles the murderer and his whole community, and has to be cleansed away. We have

[1] Lev. xiv. 17, 51. [2] Num. xix. 17.

[3] *Supra*, p. 422. In the Arabian case the woman also threw away a piece of camel's dung, which must also be supposed to have become the receptacle for her impurity; or she cut her nails or plucked out part of her hair (cf. Deut. xxi. 12), in which, as specially important parts of the body (*supra*, p. 324, note 2), the impure life might be supposed to be concentrated; or she anointed herself with perfume, *i.e.* with a holy medium, or rubbed herself against an ass, sheep or goat, presumably in order to transfer her uncleanness to the animal.

already seen[1] that the Semitic religions provide no atonement for the murderer himself, that can restore him to his original place in his tribe, and this principle survives in the Hebrew law, which does not admit piacula for mortal sins. The ritual idea of cleansing from the guilt of blood is only applicable to the community, which disavows the act of its impious member, and seeks the restoration of its injured holiness by a public sacrificial act. Thus in Semitic antiquity the whole ritual conception of the purging away of sin is bound up with the notion of the solidarity of the body of worshippers—the same notion which makes the pious Hebrews confess and lament not only their own sins, but the sins of their fathers.[2] When the conception that the community, as such, is responsible for the maintenance of holiness in all its parts, is combined with the thought that holiness is specially compromised by crime,—for in early society bloodshed within the kin is the typical form, to the analogy of which all other crimes are referred,—a solid basis is laid for the conception of the religious community as a kingdom of righteousness, which lies at the root of the spiritual teaching of the Hebrew prophets. The stricter view of divine righteousness which distinguishes Hebrew religion from that of the Greeks even before the prophetic period, is mainly connected with the idea that, so far as individuals are concerned, there is no atonement for mortal sin.[3] This principle indeed is common to all races in the earliest stages of law and religion; but among the Greeks it was early broken down, for reasons that have been already explained,[4] while among the Hebrews it subsisted, without change, till a date when the conception of sin was sufficiently developed to

[1] *Supra*, pp. 359 *sq.*, 423.
[2] Hos. x. 9; Jer. iii. 25; Ezra ix. 7; Ps. cvi. 6.
[3] Ex. xxi. 14.
[4] *Supra*, p. 360

permit of its being interpreted, as was done by the prophets, in a way that raised the religion of Israel altogether out of the region of physical ideas with which primitive conceptions of holiness are bound up.

We had occasion a moment ago to glance at the subject of confession of sin and lamentation over it. The connection of this part of religion with piacular sacrifice is important enough to deserve a separate consideration.

Among the Jews the great Day of Expiation was a day of humiliation and penitent sorrow for sin, for which a strict fast and all the outward signs of deep mourning were prescribed.[1] Similar forms of grief were observed in all solemn supplications at the sanctuary, not only by the Hebrews,[2] but by their neighbours.[3] On such occasions, where the mourners assemble at a temple or high place, we must, according to the standing rules of ancient religion, assume that a piacular sacrifice formed the culminating point of the service;[4] and conversely it appears probable that forms of mourning, more or less accentuated, habitually went with piacular rites, not only when they were called for by some great public calamity, but on other occasions too. For we have already seen that in the annual piacula of the Baal religion there was also a formal act of mourning, which, however, was not an expression of penitence for sin, but a lament over the dead god. In this last case the origin and primary significance of the obligatory lamentation is sufficiently transparent; for the death of the god is originally nothing else than

[1] According to *Yoma*, viii. 1, washing, unguents, and the use of shoes were forbidden.

[2] 1 Sam. vii. 6; Isa. xxxvii. 1; Joel ii. 12 *sqq.* [3] Isa. xv. 2 *sqq.*

[4] In Hos. vii. 14 the mourners who howl upon their beds are engaged in a religious function. And as ordinary mourners lie on the ground, I take it that the beds are the couches on which men reclined at a sacrificial banquet (Amos ii. 8, vi. 4), which here has the character, not of a joyous feast, but of an atoning rite.

the death of the theanthropic victim, which is bewailed by those who assist at the ceremony, exactly as the Todas bewail the slaughter of the sacred buffalo.[1] On the same principle the Egyptians of Thebes bewailed the death of the ram that was annually sacrificed to the god Amen, and then clothed the idol in its skin and buried the carcase in a sacred coffin.[2] Here the mourning is for the death of the sacrosanct victim, which, as the use of the skin indicates, represents the god himself. But an act of lamentation was not less appropriate in cases where the victim was thought of rather as representing a man of the kindred of the worshippers; and primarily, as we know, the theanthropic victim was equally akin to the god and to the sacrificers.

I think it can be made probable that a form of lamentation over the victim was part of the oldest sacrificial ritual, and that this is the explanation of such rites as the howling (ὀλολυγή) which accompanied Greek sacrifices, and in which, as in acts of mourning for the dead, women took the chief part. Herodotus (iv. 189) was struck with the resemblance between the Greek practice and that of the Libyans, a race among whom the sacredness of domestic animals was very marked. The Libyans killed their sacrifices without bloodshed, by throwing them over their huts[3] and then twisting their necks. Where bloodshed is avoided in a sacrifice, we may be sure that the life of the victim is regarded as human or theanthropic, and the howling can be nothing else than an act of mourning. Among the Semites, in like manner, the shouting (*hallel*, *tahlīl*) that accompanied

[1] *Supra*, p. 299 *sq.*

[2] Herod. ii. 42. In Egypt an act of mourning went also with other sacrifices, notably in the great feast at Busiris; Herod. ii. 40, 61.

[3] This is analogous to the Paschal sprinkling of blood on the lintel and doorposts.

sacrifice may probably, in its oldest shape, have been a wail over the death of the victim, though it ultimately took the form of a chant of praise (Hallelujah), or, among the Arabs, degenerated into a meaningless repetition of the word *labbaika*. For it is scarcely legitimate to separate the Semitic *tahlīl* from the Greek and Libyan ὀλολυγή, and indeed the roots הלל and ילל (Ar. ولول), "to chant praises" and "to howl," are closely connected.[1]

Another rite which admits of a twofold interpretation is the sacrificial dance. Dancing is a common expression of religious joy, as appears from many passages of the Old Testament, but the limping dance of the priests of Baal in ★ 1 Kings xviii. 26 is associated with forms of mournful supplication, and in Syriac the same verb, in different conjugations, means "to dance" and "to mourn."

In ordinary sacrificial service, the ancient attitude of awe at the death of the victim was transformed into one of gladness, and the shouting underwent a corresponding change of meaning.[2] But piacular rites continued

[1] On this topic consult, but with caution, Movers, *Phœn.* i. 246 *sq.* The Arabic *ahalla*, *tahlīl*, is primarily connected with the slaughter of the victim (*supra*, p. 340). Meat that has been killed in the name of an idol is *mā ohilla lighairi 'llāh*, and the *tahlīl* includes (1) the *bismillāh* of the sacrificer, (2) the shouts of the congregation accompanying this act, (3) by a natural extension, all religious shouting. If, now, we note that the *bismillāh* is the form by which the sacrificer excuses his bold act, and that *tahlīl* also means "shrinking back in terror" (see Nöldeke in *ZDMG.* xli. 723), we can hardly doubt that the shouting was originally not joyous, but an expression of awe and anguish. The derivation of اهلّ from هلال, the new moon (Lagarde, *Orientalia*, ii. 19; Snouck-Hurgronje, *Het mekkaansche Feest*, p. 75), is tempting, but must be given up. Compare on the whole matter, Wellh. p. 110 *sqq.* Cf. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 180, note 4.

[2] This transition was probably much easier than it seems to us; for shouting in mourning and shouting in joy seem both to be primarily directed to drive away evil influences. Of course, men, like children, are noisy when they are glad, but the conventional shrill cries of women in the East (*zaghārīt*) are not natural expressions of joy, and do not differ materially from the sound made in wailing. The Hebrew word *rinna* is used both of shouts of joy and of the cry of suppliants at a religious fast (Jer.

to be conducted with signs of mourning, which were interpreted, as we have seen, sometimes as a lamentation for the death of the god, and sometimes as forms of penitent supplication, and deprecation of divine wrath.

That feelings of contrition find an expression in acts of mourning, is an idea so familiar to us that at first sight it seems to need no explanation; but a little reflection will correct this impression, and make it appear by no means unreasonable to suppose that the forms of mourning observed in supplicatory rites were not primarily expressions of sorrow for sin, or lamentable appeals to the compassion of the deity, but simply the obligatory wailing for the death of a kindred victim. The forms prescribed are identical with those used in mourning for the dead; and if it be urged that this is merely an expression of the most pungent grief, I reply that we have already found reason to be chary in assuming that certain acts are natural expressions of sorrow, and to recognise that the customs observed in lamentation for the dead had originally a very definite meaning, and could not become general expressions of grief till that meaning was forgotten.[1] And it is surely easier to suppose that the ancient rites of lamentation for the victim changed their sense, when men fell out of touch with the original meaning of them, than that they were altogether dropped for a time, and then resumed with a new meaning.

Again, the idea that the gods have a kindred feeling with their worshippers, and are touched with compassion when they see them to be miserable, is no doubt familiar even to early religions. But formal acts of worship in antiquity,

xiv. 12). In Arabic the root is used mainly of plaintive cries, as of mourning women.

[1] *Supra*, p. 322 *sq.*, p. 336 *sq.*

as we have seen from our analysis of sacrificial rites, are directed, not merely to appeal to the sentiment of the deity, but to lay him under a social obligation. Even in the theology of the Rabbins, penitence atones only for light offences, all grave offences demanding also a material ★ prestation.[1] If this is the view of later Judaism, after all that had been taught by the prophets as to the worthlessness of material offerings, in the eyes of a God who looks at the heart, it is hardly to be thought that in heathen religions elaborate forms of mourning and supplication were nothing more than appeals to divine compassion. And, in fact, there is no doubt that some of the forms which we are apt to take as expressions of intense grief or self-abasement before the god, had originally quite another meaning. For example, when the worshippers gash their own flesh in rites of supplication, this is not an appeal to the divine compassion, but a purely physical means of establishing a blood-bond with the god.[2] Again, the usage of religious fasting is commonly taken as a sign of sorrow, the worshippers being so distressed at the alienation of their god that they cannot eat; but there are very strong reasons for believing that, in the strict Oriental form in which total abstinence from meat and drink is prescribed, fasting is primarily nothing more than a preparation for the sacramental eating of holy flesh. Some savage nations not only fast, but use strong purges before venturing to eat holy meat;[3] similarly the Harranians fasted on the eighth ★ of Nisan, and then broke their fast on mutton, at the same time offering sheep as holocausts;[4] the modern Jews fast from ten in the morning before eating the Passover; and

[1] *Yoma*, viii. 8, חשובה מכפרת על עבירות קלות.

[2] *Supra*, p. 321 *sqq.* [3] Thomson, *Masai Land*, p. 430.

[4] *Fihrist*, p. 322. In Egypt a fast preceded the sacrificial meal at the great feast of Busiris, where the victim is clearly theanthropic, Herod. ii. 40, 61.

even a modern Catholic must come to the communion with an empty stomach. On the whole, then, the conclusion seems to be legitimate, that the ritual of penitent confession and humiliation for sin follows the same law that we have found to hold good in other departments of ritual observance; the original interpretation turns on a physical conception of holiness, and it is only gradually and incompletely that physical ideas give way to ethical interpretation.

To the account that has been given of various aspects of the atoning efficacy of sacrifice, and of ritual observances that go with sacrifice, I have still to add some notice of a very remarkable series of ceremonies, in which the skin of the sacrosanct victim plays the chief part. In Nilus's sacrifice the skin and hair of the victim are eaten up like the rest of the carcase, and in some piacula, *e.g.* the Levitical red heifer, the victim is burned skin and all. Usually, however, it is flayed; and in later rituals, where rules are laid down determining whether the skin shall belong to the sacrificer or be part of the priest's fee, the hide is treated merely as an article of some commercial value which has no sacred significance.[1] But we have seen that in old times all parts of the sacrosanct victim were intensely holy, even down to the offal and excrement, and whatever was not eaten or burned was used for other sacred purposes, and had the force of a charm. The skin, in particular, is used in antique rituals either to clothe the idol or to clothe the worshippers. The meaning

[1] By the Levitical law (Lev. vii. 8) the skin of the holocaust goes to the ministrant priest; in other cases it must be inferred that it was retained by the owner. In the Carthaginian tariffs the usage varies, one temple giving the hides of victims to the priests and another to the owner of the sacrifice (*CIS.* Nos. 165, 167). At Sippar in Babylonia the sacrificial dues paid to the priest included the hide (*Beiträge zur Assyriologie*, vol. i. (1890) pp. 274, 286).

of both these rites was sufficiently perspicuous at the stage of religious development in which the god, his worshippers, and the victim were all members of one kindred.

As regards the draping of the idol or sacred stone in the skin, it will be remembered that in Lecture V. we came to the conclusion that in most cases sacred stones are not naturally holy, but are arbitrary erections which become holy because the god consents to dwell in them. We also find a widespread idea, persisting even in the ritual of the Jewish Day of Atonement, that the altar (which is only a more modern form of the sacred stone) requires to be consecrated with blood, and periodically reconsecrated in the same way.[1] In fact it is the sacred blood that makes the stone holy and a habitation of divine life; as in all the other parts of ritual, man does not begin by persuading his god to dwell in the stone, but by a theurgic process he actually brings divine life to the stone. All sanctuaries are consecrated by a theophany; but in the earliest times the sacrifice is itself a rudimentary theophany, and the place where sacred blood has once been shed is the fittest place to shed it again. From this point of view it is natural, not only to pour blood upon the altar-idol, but to anoint it with sacred fat, to fix upon it the heads and horns of sacrifices, and so forth. All these things are done in various parts of the world,[2] and when the sacred stone is on the way to become an idol, and primarily an animal-idol, it is peculiarly appropriate to dress it in the skin of the divine victim.

On the other hand, it is equally appropriate that the

[1] Ezek. xliii. 18 *sqq.*; Lev. viii. 15; Ezek. xlv. 18 *sqq.*; Lev. xvi. 33.

[2] The heads of oxen are common symbols on Greek altars, and this is only a modern surrogate for the actual heads of victims. The horns of the Semitic altar have perhaps the same origin.

worshipper should dress himself in the skin of a victim, and so, as it were, envelop himself in its sanctity. To ★ rude nations dress is not merely a physical comfort, but a fixed part of social religion, a thing by which a man constantly bears on his body the token of his religion, and which is itself a charm and a means of divine protection. Among African nations, where the sacredness of domestic animals is still acknowledged, one of the few purposes for which a beast may be killed is to get its skin as a cloak; and in the Book of Genesis (iii. 21) the primitive coat of skin is given to the first men by the Deity Himself. Similarly Herodotus, when he speaks of the sacrifices and worship of the Libyans,[1] is at once led on to observe that the ægis or goat-skin, worn by the statues of Athena, is nothing else than the goat-skin, fringed with thongs, which was worn by the Libyan women; the inference implies that it was a sacred dress.[2] When the dress of sacrificial skin, which at once declared a man's religion and his sacred kindred, ceased to be used in ordinary life, it was still retained in holy and especially in piacular functions. We have several examples of this within the Semitic field: the Assyrian Dagon-worshipper who offers the mystic fish-sacrifice to the Fish-god draped in a fish-skin; the old Phœnician sacrifice of game by men clothed in the skin of

[1] Herod. iv. 188 *sqq.*; that the victims were goats is suggested by the context, but becomes certain by comparison of Hippocrates, ed. Littré, vi. 356.

[2] The thongs correspond to the fringes on the garment prescribed by Jewish law, which had a sacred significance (Num. xv. 38 *sqq.*). One of the oldest forms of the fringed garment is probably the *raḥṭ* or *ḥauf*, a girdle or short kilt of skin slashed into thongs, which was worn by Arab girls, by women in their courses, and also, it is said, by worshippers at the Caaba. From this primitive garment are derived the thongs and girdles with lappets that appear as amulets among the Arabs (*barīm*, *morassa'a*; the latter is pierced, and another thong passed through it); compare the magical thongs of the Luperci, cut from the skin of the piaculum, whose touch cured sterility.

their prey; the Cyprian sacrifice of a sheep to the Sheep-goddess, in which sheep-skins are worn.[1] Similar examples are afforded by the Dionysiac mysteries and other Greek rites, and by almost every rude religion; while in later cults the old rite survives at least in the religious use of animal masks.[2] When worshippers present themselves at the sanctuary, already dressed in skins of the sacred kind, the meaning of the ceremony is that they come to worship as kinsmen of the victim, and so also of the god. But when the fresh skin of the victim is applied to the worshipper in the sacrifice, the idea is rather an imparting to him of the sacred virtue of its life. Thus in piacular and cathartic rites the skin of the sacrifice is used in a way quite similar to the use of the blood, but ★ dramatically more expressive of the identification of the worshipper's life with that of the victim. In Greek piacula the man on whose behalf the sacrifice was performed simply put his foot on the skin (*κώδιον*); at Hierapolis the pilgrim put the head and feet over his own head while he knelt on the skin;[3] in certain late Syrian rites a boy is initiated by a sacrifice in which his feet are clothed in slippers made of the skin of the sacrifice.[4] These rites do not appear to have suggested any idea, as to the meaning of piacular sacrifice, different from those that have already come before us; but as the skin of a sacrifice is the oldest form of a sacred garment, appropriate to the performance of holy functions, the figure of a "robe of righteousness," which is found both in the Old Testa-

[1] *Supra*, pp. 293, 310; and *Additional Notes* F and G. Note also that the hereditary priests of the Palmetum were dressed in skins (Strabo, xvi. 4. 18). Cf. the "girdle," or rather "kilt of skin," worn by the prophet Elijah (2 Kings i. 8).

[2] Such masks were used by the Arabs of Nejrān in rites which the Bishop Gregentius, in the laws he made for his flock (chap. xxxiv.), denounces as heathenish (Boissonade, *Anecd. Gr.* vol. v.).

[3] *Dea Syria*, lv. [4] *Actes* of the Leyden Congress, ii. 1. 336 (361).

ment and in the New, and still supplies one of the commonest theological metaphors, may be ultimately traced back to this source.

On the whole it is apparent, from the somewhat tedious discussion which I have now brought to a close, that the various aspects in which atoning rites presented themselves to ancient worshippers have supplied a variety of religious images which passed into Christianity, and still have currency. Redemption, substitution, purification, atoning blood, the garment of righteousness, are all terms ★ which in some sense go back to antique ritual. But in ancient religion all these terms are very vaguely defined; they indicate impressions produced on the mind of the worshipper by features of the ritual, rather than formulated ethico-dogmatical ideas; and the attempt to find in them anything as precise and definite as the notions attached to the same words by Christian theologians is altogether illegitimate. The one point that comes out clear and strong is that the fundamental idea of ancient sacrifice is sacramental communion, and that all atoning rites are ultimately to be regarded as owing their efficacy to a communication of divine life to the worshippers, and to the establishment or confirmation of a living bond between them and their god. In primitive ritual this conception is grasped in a merely physical and mechanical shape, as indeed, in primitive life, all spiritual and ethical ideas are still wrapped up in the husk of a material embodiment. To free the spiritual truth from the husk was the great task that lay before the ancient religions, if they were to maintain the right to continue to rule the minds of men. That some progress in this direction was made, especially in Israel, appears from our examination. But on the whole it is manifest that none of the ritual systems of antiquity was able by mere natural development to

shake itself free from the congenital defect inherent in every attempt to embody spiritual truth in material forms. A ritual system must always remain materialistic, even if its materialism is disguised under the cloak of mysticism.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ADDITIONAL NOTE A (p. 138)

GODS, DEMONS, AND PLANTS OR ANIMALS

The object of this note is to consider some difficulties that may be felt with regard to the argument in the text.

1. The importance which I have attached to Arabian superstitions about the *jinn*, as affording a clue to the origin of local sanctuaries, may appear to be excessive when it is observed that the facts are almost all drawn from one part of the Semitic field. What evidence is there, it may be asked, that these Arabian superstitions are part of the common belief of the Semitic race? To this I reply, in the first place, that the Arabian conception proves upon analysis to have nothing peculiar about it. It is the ordinary conception of all primitive savages, and involves ideas that only belong to the savage mind. To suppose that it originated in Arabia, for special and local reasons, after the separation of the other Semites, is therefore to run in the teeth of all probability. Again, the little we do know about the goblins of the Northern Semites is in full agreement with the Arabian facts. The demons were banished from Hebrew religion, and hardly appear in the Old Testament except in poetic imagery. But the שְׂעִירִים or hairy ones, the לִילִית or nocturnal goblin, are exactly like the Arabian *jinn* (Wellhausen, p. 148).

The main point, however, is that the savage view of nature, which ascribes to plants and animals discourse of reason, and supernatural or demoniac attributes, can be shown to have prevailed among the Northern Semites as well as the Arabs. The savage point of view is constantly found to survive, in connection with practices of magic, after it has been superseded in religion proper; and the superstitions of the vulgar in modern civilised countries are

not much more advanced than those of the rudest nations. So too among the Semites, magical rites and vulgar superstitions are not so much survivals from the higher official heathenism of the great sanctuaries as from a lower and more primitive stage of belief, which the higher forms of heathen worship overshadowed but did not extinguish. And the view of nature that pervades Semitic magic is precisely that savage view which we have found to underlie the Arabian belief in the *jinn*. Of the magical practices of the ancient Syrians, which persisted long after the introduction of Christianity, some specimens are preserved in the *Canons* of Jacob of Edessa, edited in Syriac by Lagarde, *Rel. iur. eccl. ant.* (Leipz. 1856), and translated by Kayser, *Die Canones Jacob's von Edessa* (Leipz. 1886). One of these, used in cases of sickness, was to dig up the root of a certain kind of thorn called "ischiac," and make an offering to it, eating and drinking beside the root, which was treated as a guest at the feast (Qu. 38). Another demoniac plant of the Northern Semites is the Baaras, described by Josephus, *B. J.* vii. 6. 3, which flees from those who try to grasp it, and whose touch is death so long as it is rooted in the ground. This plant seems to be the mandrake (Ar. *yabrūh*), about which the Arabs tell similar stories, and which even the ancient Germans thought to be inhabited by a spirit. When the plants in Jotham's parable speak and act like men, this is mere personification; but the dispute of the mallow and the mandrake, which Maimonides relates from the forged *Nabatæan Agriculture* (Chwolsohn, *Ssabier*, ii. 459, 914), and which prevents the mallow from supplying her prophet with responses, is a genuine piece of old Semitic superstition. In matters of this sort we cannot doubt that even a forger correctly represents popular beliefs. As regards animals, the demoniac character of the serpent in the Garden of Eden is unmistakable; the serpent is not a mere temporary disguise of Satan, otherwise its punishment would be meaningless.[1] The practice of serpent charming, repeatedly referred to in the Old Testament, is also connected with the demoniac character of the creature; and in general the idea that animals can be constrained by spells, *e.g.* prevented from injuring flocks and vineyards (Jacob of Ed., Qu. 46), rests on the same

[1] So in the legends of Syriac saints, the proper form of Satan, which he is compelled to resume when met with the name of Christ or the sign of the cross, is that of a black snake (*Mar Ḳardagh*, ed. Abbeloos, p. 39; Hoffmann, *Syr. Akten*, p. 76).

view, for the power of wizards is over demons and beings that are subject to the demons.

One of the most curious of the Syrian superstitions is as follows:—When caterpillars infest a garden, the maidens are assembled; a single caterpillar is taken, and one of the girls is constituted its mother. The insect is then bewailed and buried, and the mother is conducted to the place where the other caterpillars are, amidst lamentations for her bereavement. The whole of the caterpillars will then disappear (*op. cit.* Qu. 44). Here it is clearly assumed that the insects understand and are impressed by the tragedy got up for their benefit. The Syriac legends of Tūr ʿAbdīn, collected by Prym and Socin (Gött. 1881), are full of beasts with demoniac powers. In these stories each kind of beast forms a separate organised community; they speak and act like men, but have supernatural powers, and close relations to the *jinn* that also occur in the legends. In conclusion, it may be observed that the universal Semitic belief in omens and guidance given by animals belongs to the same range of ideas. Omens are not blind tokens; the animals know what they tell to men.

2. If the argument in the text is correct, it may be asked why there are not direct and convincing evidences of Semitic totemism. You argue, it may be said, that traces of the old savage view of nature, which corresponds to totemism, are still clearly visible in the Semitic view of demons. But in savage nations that view is habitually conjoined with the belief that one kind of demon—or, more correctly, one kind of plants or animals endowed with demoniac qualities—is allied by kinship with each kindred of men. How does this square with the Arabian facts, in which all demons or demoniac animals habitually appear as man's enemies? The general answer to this difficulty is that totems, or friendly demoniac beings, rapidly develop into gods when men rise above pure savagery; whereas unfriendly beings, lying outside the circle of man's organised life, are not directly influenced by the social progress, and retain their primitive characteristics unchanged. When men deem themselves to be of the same blood with a particular animal kind, every advance in their way of thinking about themselves reacts on their ideas about the sacred animals. When they come to think of their god as the ancestor of their race, they must also think of him as the ancestor of their totem animals, and, so far as our observation goes, they tend to figure him as having animal form. The animal god concentrates on his

own person the respect that used to be paid to all animals of the totem kind, or at least the respect paid to them is made to depend on the worship he receives. Finally, the animal god, who, as a demoniac being, has many human attributes, is transformed into an anthropomorphic god, and his animal connections fall quite into the background. But nothing of this sort can happen to the demoniac animals that are left outside, and not brought into fellowship with men. They remain as they were, till the progress of enlightenment—a slow progress among the mass of any race—gradually strips them of their supernatural attributes. Thus it is natural that the belief in hostile demons of plant or animal kinds should survive long after the friendly kinds have given way to individual gods, whose original totem associations are in great measure obliterated. At the stage which even the rudest Semitic peoples had reached when they first become known to us, it would be absurd to expect to find examples of totemism pure and simple. What we may expect to find is the fragmentary survival of totem ideas, in the shape of special associations between certain kinds of animals on the one hand, and certain tribes or religious communities and their gods on the other hand. And of evidence of this kind there is, we shall see, no lack in Semitic antiquity. For the present I will only cite some direct evidences of kinship or brotherhood between human communities and animal kinds. Ibn al-Mojāwir relates that when the B. Hārith, a tribe of South Arabia, find a dead gazelle, they wash it, wrap it in cerecloths and bury it, and the whole tribe mourns for it seven days (Sprenger, *Postrouten*, p. 151). The animal is buried like a man, and mourned for as a kinsman.[1] Among the Arabs of Sinai the *wabr* (the coney of the Bible) is the brother of man, and it is said that he who eats his flesh will never see father and mother again. In the Harranian mysteries the worshippers acknowledged dogs, ravens and ants as their brothers (*Fihrist*, p. 326, l. 27). At Baalbek, the γενναῖος, or ancestral god of the town, was worshipped in the form of a lion (Damascius, *Vit. Isid.* § 203; cf. גר בעל, "leontopodion," Löw, *Aram. Pflanzennamen*, p. 406; G. Hoffmann, *Phoen.*

[1] Similarly we are told by Sohailī in his com. on Ibn Hishām (ed. Wüst. ii. 41 *sq.*) of more than one instance in which an orthodox Muslim wrapped a dead snake in a piece of his cloak and buried it. 'Omar II. is said to have done so. In this case the snake was "a believing Jinnī," an explanation that seems to be devised to justify an act of primitive superstition; cf. Damīrī, i. 233.

Inschr. 1889, p. 27). On the banks of the Euphrates, according to *Mir. Ausc.* 149 *sq.*, there was found a species of small serpents that attacked foreigners, but did not molest natives, which is just what a totem animal is supposed to do.

3. If the oldest sanctuaries of the gods were originally haunts of a multiplicity of *jinn*, or of animals to which demoniac attributes were ascribed, we should expect to find, even in later times, some trace of the idea that the holy place is not inhabited by a single god, but by a plurality of sacred denizens. If the relation between the worshipping community and the sanctuary was formed in the totem state of thought, when the sacred denizens were still veritable animals, all animals of the sacred species would multiply unmolested in the holy precincts, and the individual god of the sanctuary, when such a being came to be singled out from the indeterminate plurality of totem creatures, would still be the father and protector of all animals of his own kind. And accordingly we do find that Semitic sanctuaries gave shelter to various species of sacred animals,—the doves of Astarte, the gazelles of Tabāla and Mecca, and so forth. But, apart from this, we may expect to find traces of vague plurality in the conception of the godhead as associated with special spots, to hear not so much of the god as of the gods of a place, and that not in the sense of a definite number of clearly individualised deities, but with the same indefiniteness as characterises the conception of the *jinn*. I am inclined to think that this is the idea which underlies the Hebrew use of the plural אלהים, and the Phœnician use of אלם, in a singular sense, on which cf. Hoffmann, *op. cit.* p. 17 *sqq.* ★ Merely to refer this to primitive polytheism, as is sometimes done, does not explain how the plural form is habitually used to designate a single deity. But if the *Elōhīm* of a place originally meant all its sacred denizens, viewed collectively as an indeterminate sum of indistinguishable beings, the transition to the use of the plural in a singular sense would follow naturally, as soon as this indeterminate conception gave way to the conception of an individual god of the sanctuary. Further, the original indeterminate plurality of the *Elōhīm* appears in the conception of angels as *Bnē Elōhīm*, "sons of Elohim," which, according to linguistic analogy, means "beings of the Elohim kind." In the Old Testament the "sons of God" form the heavenly court, and ordinarily when an angel appears on earth he appears alone and on a special mission. But, in some of the oldest Hebrew traditions, angels

frequent holy places, such as Bethel and Mahanaim, when they have no message to deliver (Gen. xxviii. 12, xxxii. 2). That the angels, as "sons of God," form part of the old Semitic mythology, is clear from Gen. vi. 2, 4, for the sons of God who contract marriages with the daughters of men are out of place in the religion of the Old Testament, and the legend must have been taken over from a lower form of faith; perhaps it was a local legend connected with Mount Hermon (B. Enoch vi. 6; Hilary on Ps. cxxxiii.). Ewald (*Lehre der Bibel*, ii. 283) rightly observes that in Gen. xxxii. 28-30 the meaning is that an angel has no name, *i.e.* no distinctive individuality; he is simply one of a class; cf. p. 126, note, *supra*. Yet in wrestling with him Jacob wrestles with אלהים (cf. Hos. xii. 4).

That the Arabic *jinn* is not a loan-word, as has sometimes been supposed, is shown by Nöldeke, *ZDMG.* xli. 717.

ADDITIONAL NOTE B (p. 153)

HOLINESS, UNCLEANNESS AND TABOO

Various parallels between savage taboos, and Semitic rules of holiness and uncleanness, will come before us from time to time; but it may be useful to bring together at this point some detailed evidences that the two are in their origin indistinguishable.

Holy and unclean things have this in common, that in both cases certain restrictions lie on men's use of and contact with them, and that the breach of these restrictions involves supernatural dangers. The difference between the two appears, not in their relation to man's ordinary life, but in their relation to the gods. Holy things are not free to man, because they pertain to the gods; uncleanness is shunned, according to the view taken in the higher Semitic religions, because it is hateful to the god, and therefore not to be tolerated in his sanctuary, his worshippers, or his land. But that this explanation is not primitive can hardly be doubted, when we consider that the acts that cause uncleanness are exactly the same which among savage nations place a man under taboo, and that these acts are often involuntary, and often innocent, or even necessary to society. The savage, accordingly,

imposes a taboo on a woman in childbed, or during her courses, and on the man who touches a corpse, not out of any regard for the gods, but simply because birth and everything connected with the propagation of the species on the one hand, and disease and death on the other, seem to him to involve the action of superhuman agencies of a dangerous kind. If he attempts to explain, he does so by supposing that on these occasions spirits of deadly power are present; at all events the persons involved seem to him to be sources of mysterious danger, which has all the characters of an infection, and may extend to other people unless due precautions are observed. This is not scientific, but it is perfectly intelligible, and forms the basis of a consistent system of practice; whereas, when the rules of uncleanness are made to rest on the will of the gods, they appear altogether arbitrary and meaningless. The affinity of such taboos with laws of uncleanness comes out most clearly when we observe that uncleanness is treated like a contagion, which has to be washed away or otherwise eliminated by physical means. Take the rules about the uncleanness produced by the carcases of vermin in Lev. xi. 32 *sqq.*; whatever they touch must be washed; the water itself is then unclean, and can propagate the contagion; nay, if the defilement affect an (unglazed) earthen pot, it is supposed to sink into the pores, and cannot be washed out, so that the pot must be broken. Rules like this have nothing in common with the spirit of Hebrew religion; they can only be remains of a primitive superstition, like that of the savage who shuns the blood of uncleanness, and such like things, as a supernatural and deadly virus. The antiquity of the Hebrew taboos, for such they are, is shown by the way in which many of them reappear in Arabia; cf. for example Deut. xxi. 12, 13, with the Arabian ceremonies for removing the impurity of widowhood (*supra*, pp. 422, 428, n.). In the Arabian form the ritual is of purely savage type; the danger to life that made it unsafe for a man to marry the woman was transferred in the most materialistic way to an animal, which it was believed generally died in consequence, or to a bird. So too in the law for cleansing the leper (Lev. xiv. 4 *sqq.*) the impurity is transferred to a bird, which flies away with it; compare also the ritual of the scape-goat. So, again, the impurity of menstruation was recognised by all the Semites,[1] as in fact it is by all primitive

[1] The precept of the Coran, ii. 222, rests on ancient practice; see Baiḍāwī on the passage, *Ḥamāsa*, p. 107, last verse, and *Agh.* xvi. 27, 31.

and ancient peoples. Now among savages this impurity is distinctly connected with the idea that the blood of the *menses* is dangerous to man, and even the Romans held that "nihil facile reperiatur mulierum profluuio magis mirificum," or more full of deadly qualities (Pliny, *H. N.* vii. 64). Similar superstitions are current with the Arabs, a great variety of supernatural powers attaching themselves to a woman in this condition (Cazwīnī, i. 365). Obviously, therefore, in this case the Semitic taboo is exactly like the savage one; it has nothing to do with respect for the gods, but springs from mere terror of the supernatural influences associated with the woman's physical condition. That unclean things are tabooed on account of their inherent supernatural powers or associations, appears further from the fact that just these things are most powerful in magic; menstruous blood in particular is one of the strongest of charms in most countries, and so it was among the Arabs (Cazwīnī, *ut supra*). Wellhausen has shown how closely the ideas of amulet and ornament are connected (*Heid.* p. 164 *sq.*), but has not brought out the equally characteristic fact that unclean things are not less potent. Such amulets are called by the Arabs *tanjīs*, *monajjasa*; and it is explained that the heathen Arabs used to tie unclean things, dead men's bones and menstruous rags, upon children, to avert the *jinn* and the evil eye (*Cāmūs*, *s.v.*); cf. Jacob of Edessa, *op. cit* Qu. 43.

We have seen, in the example of the swine, that prohibitions against using, and especially eating, certain animals belong in the higher Semitic religions to a sort of doubtful ground between the unclean and the holy. This topic cannot be fully elucidated till we come to speak of sacrifice, when it will appear probable that most of these restrictions, if not all of them, are parallel to the taboos which totemism lays on the use of sacred animals as food. Meantime it may be observed that such prohibitions, like those

For the Syrian heathen, *Fihrist*, p. 319, l. 18. According to Wāhidī, *Asbāb*, women in their courses were not allowed to remain in the house, which is a common savage rule. According to Mofaḍḍal al-Ḍabbī, *Amthāl*, p. 24, l. 20, the *ʿārik* was isolated from her people in a hut, which, as may be inferred from the story, was on the outskirts of the hamlet or encampment. The same custom is indicated in the legend of the fall of Ḥaṭra, Ṭab. i. 829. 3. Girls at their first menstruation seem to have been strictly confined to a hut or tent; see the *Lisān* on the term *moʿṣir*. This is also common all over the world. Widows were similarly confined; see the Lexx *s.v.* حفش. See Goldziher, *Abhand.* i. 207 *sq.*

that have been already considered, manifest their savage origin by the nature of the supernatural sanction attached to them. As the elk clan of the Omahas believe that they cannot eat the elk without boils breaking out on their bodies, so the Syrians, with whom fish were sacred to Atargatis, thought that if they ate a sprat or an anchovy they were visited with ulcers, swellings and wasting disease.[1] In both cases the punishment of the impious act is not a divine judgment, in our sense of that word, but flows directly from the malignant influences resident in the forbidden thing, which, so to speak, avenges itself on the offender. With this it agrees that the more notable unclean animals possess magical powers; the swine, for example, which the Saracens as well as the Hebrews and Syrians refused to eat (Sozomen, vi. 38), supplies many charms and magical medicines (Cazwīnī, i. 393).

The irrationality of laws of uncleanness, from the standpoint of spiritual religion or even of the higher heathenism, is so manifest, that they must necessarily be looked on as having survived from an earlier form of faith and of society. And this being so, I do not see how any historical student can refuse to class them with savage taboos. The attempts to explain them otherwise, which are still occasionally met with, seem to be confined to speculative writers, who have no knowledge of the general features of thought and belief in rude societies. As regards holy things in the proper sense of the word, *i.e.* such as are directly connected with the worship and service of the gods, more difficulty may reasonably be felt; for many of the laws of holiness may seem to have a good and reasonable sense even in the higher forms of religion, and to find their sufficient explanation in the habits and institutions of advanced societies. At present the most current view of the meaning of restrictions on man's free use of holy things is that holy things are the god's property, and I have therefore sought (*supra*, p. 142 *sqq.*) to show that the idea of property does not suffice to explain the facts of the case. A man's property consists of things to which he has an exclusive right; but in holy things the worshippers have rights as well as the gods, though their rights are subject to definite restrictions. Again, an owner is bound to respect other people's property while he preserves his own; but

[1] Menander, *ap.* Porph., *De Abst.* iv. 15; Plut., *De Superst.* x.; Selden, *De Diis Syris*, Synt. ii. Cap. 3. For savage parallels, see Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, i. 16 *sq.* (cf. iv. 291, 294).

the principle of holiness, as appears in the law of asylum, can be used to override the privileges of human ownership. In this respect holiness exactly resembles taboo. The notion that certain things are taboo to a god or a chief means only that he, as the stronger person, and not only stronger but invested with supernatural power, and so very dangerous to offend, will not allow anyone else to meddle with them. To bring the taboo into force it is not necessary that there should be prior possession on the part of god or chief; other people's goods may become taboo, and be lost to their original owner, merely by contact with the sacred person or with sacred things. Even the ground on which a king of Tahiti trod became taboo, just as the place of a theophany was thenceforth holy among the Semites. Nor does it follow that because a thing is taboo from the use of man, it is therefore in any real sense appropriated to the use of a god or sacred person; the fundamental notion is merely that it is not safe for ordinary people to use it; it has, so to speak, been touched by the infection of holiness, and so becomes a new source of supernatural danger. In this respect, again, the rules of Semitic holiness show clear marks of their origin in a system of taboo; the distinction that holy things are employed for the use of the gods, while unclean things are simply forbidden to man's use, is not consistently carried out, and there remain many traces of the view that holiness is contagious, just as uncleanness is, and that things which are to be retained for ordinary use must be kept out of the way of the sacred infection. Of things undoubtedly holy, but not in any way used for the divine service, the consecrated camels of the Arabs afford a good example. But in old Israel also we find something of the same kind. By the later law (Lev. xxvii. 27) the firstling of a domestic animal that could not be sacrificed, and which the owner did not care to redeem, was sold for the benefit of the sanctuary, but by the old law (Ex. xiii. 13, xxxiv. 20) its neck was broken—a less humane rule than that of Arabia, where animals tabooed from human use were allowed to run free.[1]

Of the contagiousness of holiness there are many traces exactly similar to taboo. Among the Syrians the dove was most holy, and he who touched it became taboo for a day (*Dea Syria*, liv.). In Isa. lxv. 5 the heathen *mystæ* warn the bystander not to

[1] This parallel shows that the Arabian institution is not a mere degenerate form of an older consecration to positive sacred uses.

approach them lest he become taboo.[1] The flesh of the Hebrew sin-offering, which is holy in the first degree, conveys a taboo to everyone who touches it, and if a drop of the blood falls on a garment, this must be washed, *i.e.* the sanctity must be washed out, in a holy place, while the earthen pot in which the sacrifice is sodden must be broken, as in the case where dead vermin falls in a vessel and renders it unclean (Lev. vi. 27 *sq.* [Heb. ver. 20 *sq.*]; cf. Lev. xvi. 26, 28). At Mecca, in the times of heathenism, the sacred circuit of the Caaba was made by the Bedouins either naked, or in clothes borrowed from one of the *Ḥoms*, or religious community of the sacred city. Wellhausen has shown that this usage was not peculiar to Mecca, for at the sanctuary of Al-Jalsad ★ also it was customary for the sacrificer to borrow a suit from the priest; and the same custom appears in the worship of the Tyrian Baal (2 Kings x. 22), to which it may be added that, in 2 Sam. vi. 14, David wears the priestly ephod at the festival of the in-bringing of the ark. He had put off his usual clothes, for Michal calls his conduct a shameless exposure of his person; see also 1 Sam. xix. 24. The Meccan custom is explained by saying that they would not perform the sacred rite in garments stained with sin, but the real reason is quite different. It appears that sometimes a man did make the circuit in his own clothes, but in that case he could neither wear them again nor sell them, but had to leave them at the gate of the sanctuary (Azracī, p. 125; B. Hishām, p. 128 *sq.*). They became taboo (*ḥarīm*, as the verse cited by Ibn Hishām has it) through contact with the holy place and function. If any doubt remains as to the correctness of this explanation, it will, I trust, be dispelled by a quotation from Shortland's *Southern Districts of New Zealand* (p. 293 *sq.*), which has been given to me by Mr. Frazer. "A slave or other person not sacred would not enter a 'wahi tapu,' or sacred place, without having first stripped off his clothes; for the clothes, having become sacred the instant they entered the precincts of the 'wahi tapu,' would ever after be useless to him in the ordinary business of his life."[2]

[1] The suffix shows that the verb is transitive; not "for I am holier than thou," but "for I would sanctify thee." We should therefore point it as *Piel*, and compare Ezek. xliv. 19, xlvi. 12, where precautions are laid down to prevent the people from being consecrated by approach to holy garments and holy flesh.

[2] It is perhaps on this principle that a man found encroaching on a *ḥimā* is punished by being stripped of his clothes, etc.; *Muḥ in Med.* p. 385

In the case of the garment stained by the blood of the sin-offering, we see that taboos produced by contact with holy things, like those due to uncleanness, can be removed by washing. In like manner, among the Jews the contact of a sacred volume or a phylactery "defiled the hands," and called for an ablution, and the high priest on the Day of Atonement washed his flesh with water, not only when he put on the holy garments of the day, but when he put them off (Lev. xvi. 24; cf. Mishna, *Yōmā*, viii. 4). In savage countries such ablutions are taken to be a literal physical removal of the contagious principle of the taboo, and all symbolical interpretations of them are nothing more than an attempt, in higher stages of religious development, to justify adhesion to traditional ritual.

These examples may suffice to show that it is impossible to separate the Semitic doctrine of holiness and uncleanness from the system of taboo. If anyone is not convinced by them, I am satisfied that he will not be convinced by an accumulation of evidence. But as the subject is curious in itself, and may possibly be found to throw light on some obscure customs, I will conclude this part of the subject by some additional remarks, of a more conjectural character, on the costume worn at the sanctuary.

The use of special vestments by priestly celebrants at religious functions is very widespread, and has relations which cannot be illustrated till we come to speak of sacrifice.[1] But it is certain that originally every man was his own priest, and the ritual observed in later times by the priests is only a development of what was originally observed by all worshippers. As regards the matter of vestments, it was an early and widespread custom to make a difference between the dress of ordinary life and that donned on sacred occasions. The ancient Hebrews, on approaching the presence of the Deity, either washed their clothes (Ex. xix. 10) or changed them (Gen. xxxv. 2), that is, put on their best clothes, and the women also wore their jewels (Hos. ii. 13 [15]; cf. Sozomen's account of the feast at Mamre, *H. E.* ii. 4).

The washing is undoubtedly to remove possible uncleanness,

(Wajj), Belādhorī, p. 9 (Naci'). The story that 'Amr Mozaiciā tore his clothes every night, that no one else might wear them (Ibn Doraid, p. 258), is perhaps a reminiscence of an old taboo attached to royalty.

[1] See what is said of the skin of the victim as furnishing a sacred dress, *supra*, p. 437 *sq.*

and in Gen. xxxv. 2 the change of garments has the same association. But the instances given above show that, if it was important not to carry impurity into the sanctuary, it was equally necessary not to carry into ordinary life the marks of contact with holy places and things. As all festive occasions in antiquity were sacred occasions, it may be presumed that best clothes were also holy clothes, reserved for festal purposes. They were perfumed (Gen. xxvii. 15, 27), and perfume among the Semites is a very holy thing (Pliny, xii. 54), used in purifications (Herod. i. 198), and applied, according to Phœnician ritual, to all those who stood before the altar, clad in the long byssus robes, with a single purple stripe, which were appropriated to religious offices (Silius, iii. 23 *sqq.*; cf. Herodian, v. 6. 10). Jewels, too, such as women wore in the sanctuary, had a sacred character; the Syriac word for an earring is *c'dāshā*, "the holy thing,"[1] and generally speaking jewels serve as amulets.[2] On the whole, therefore, holy dress and gala dress are one and the same thing, and it seems, therefore, legitimate to suppose that in early times best clothes meant clothes that were taboo for the purposes of ordinary life. But of course the great mass of people in a poor society could not keep a special suit for sacred occasions. Such persons would either wash their clothes after as well as before any specially sacred function (Lev. vi. 27, xvi. 26, 28), or would have to borrow sacred garments. Shoes could not well be washed, unless they were mere linen stockings, as in the Phœnician sacred dress described by Herodian; they were therefore put off before treading on holy ground (Ex. iii. 5; Josh. v. 15, etc.).[3]

Another Hebrew usage that may be noted here is the ban (Heb. *ḥérem*), by which impious sinners, or enemies of the com-

[1] The Arabic *codās* is doubtless an ancient loanword from this; but *cadīs*, an old Yemenite name for pearls (see *Tāj*, *s.v.*), is probably an independent expression of the same idea.

[2] As amulets, jewels are mainly worn to protect the chief organs of action (the hands and the feet), but especially the orifices of the body (ear-rings; nose-rings, hanging over the mouth; jewels on the forehead, hanging down and protecting the eyes). In Doughty, ii. 199, a man stuffs his ears with cotton before venturing to descend a well haunted by *jinn*. Similarly the lower orifices of the trunk are protected by clothing, which has a sacred meaning (*supra*, p. 437, note 2). Similar remarks apply to tattooing, staining with stibium and henna, etc.

[3] [A person about to consult the oracle of Trophonius, after being washed and anointed, put on a linen shirt and *shoes of the country*, ὑποδησάμενος ἐπιχωρίας κρηπῖδας (Pausanias, ix. 39).—J. G. Frazer.]

munity and its god, were devoted to utter destruction. The ban is a form of devotion to the deity, and so the verb "to ban" is sometimes rendered "consecrate" (Micah iv. 13) or "devote" (Lev. xxvii. 28 *sq.*). But in the oldest Hebrew times it involved the utter destruction, not only of the persons involved, but of their property; and only metals, after they had passed through the fire, were added to the treasure of the sanctuary (Josh. vi. 24, vii. 24; 1 Sam. xv.). Even cattle were not sacrificed, but simply slain, and the devoted city must not be rebuilt (Deut. xiii. 16; Josh. vi. 26).[1] Such a ban is a taboo, enforced by the fear of supernatural penalties (1 Kings xvi. 34), and, as with taboo, the danger arising from it is contagious (Deut. vii. 26; Josh. vii.); he that brings a devoted thing into his house falls under the same ban himself.

ADDITIONAL NOTE C (p. 158)

TABOOS ON THE INTERCOURSE OF THE SEXES

According to Herodotus, ii. 64, almost all peoples, except the Greeks and Egyptians, *μίσγονται ἐν ἱροῖσι καὶ ἀπὸ γυναικῶν ἀνιστάμενοι ἄλουτοι ἐσέρχονται ἐς ἱρόν*. This is good evidence of what the Greeks and Egyptians practised; but the assertion about other nations is incorrect, at least as regards the Semites and parts of Asia Minor,[2] whose religion had much in common with theirs. As regards the evidence, it comes to the same thing whether we are told that certain acts were forbidden at the sanctuary, or to pilgrims bound for the sanctuary, or that no one could enter the sanctuary without purification after committing them. We find that among the Arabs sexual intercourse was forbidden to pilgrims to Mecca. The same rule obtained among

[1] In Judg. ix. 45 the site is sown with salt, which is ordinarily explained with reference to the infertility of saline ground. But the strewing of salt has elsewhere a religious meaning (Ezek. xliii. 24), and is a symbol of consecration. Similarly Hesychius explains the phrase, *ἀρὰς ἐπισπεῖραι· ἔθος Κυπρίων σπειρόντων κριθὰς μεθ' ἁλὸς καταρᾶσθαί τισιν.*

[2] See the inscription of Apollo Lermenus, *Journ. Hell. Studies*, viii. 380 *sqq.*; this was not a Greek cult.

the Minæans in connection with the sacred office of collecting frankincense (Pliny, *H. N.* xii. 54). Among the Hebrews we find the restriction in connection with the theophany at Sinai (Ex. xix. 15) and the use of consecrated bread (1 Sam. xxi. 5); Sozomen, ii. 4, attests it for the heathen feast at Mamre; and Herodotus himself tells us that among the Babylonians and Arabs every conjugal act was immediately followed, not only by an ablution, but by such a fumigation as is still practised in the Sūdān (Herod. i. 198). This restriction is not directed against immorality, for it applies to spouses; nor does it spring from asceticism, for the temples of the Semitic deities were thronged with sacred prostitutes; who, however, were careful to retire with their partners outside the sacred precincts (Herod. i. 199, ἔξω τοῦ ἱροῦ; cf. Hos. iv. 14, which curiously agrees in expression with *Ḥam.* p. 599, second verse, where the reference is to the love-making of the Arabs just outside the *ḥimā*).

The extension of this kind of taboo to warriors on an expedition is common among rude peoples, and we know that it had place among the Arabs, and was not wholly obsolete as late as the second century of Islām; see *Agh.* xiv. 67 (Ṭabarī, ed. Kosegarten, i. 144), xv. 161; Al-Akhṭal, *Dīw.* p. 120, l. 2; cf. Masʿūdī, vi. 63–65, *Fr. Hist. Ar.* p. 247 *sq.* See also Note I, *infra*, p. 481 *sqq.* In the Old Testament, war and warriors are often spoken of as consecrated,—a phrase which seems to be connected, not merely with the use of sacred ceremonies at the opening of a campaign, but with the idea that war is a holy function, and the camp a holy place (Deut. xxiii. 10–15). That the taboo on sexual intercourse applied to warriors in old Israel cannot be positively affirmed, but is probable from Deut. xxiii. 10, 11, compared with 1 Sam. xxi. 5, 6 [E.V. 4, 5]; 2 Sam. xi. 11. The passage in 1 Sam., which has always been a *crux interpretum*, calls for some remark. It seems to me that the text can be translated as it stands, if only we take יקדש as a plural, which is possible without adding ו. David says, "Nay, but women are forbidden to us, as has always been my rule when I go on an expedition, so that the gear (clothes, arms, etc.) of the young men is holy even when it is a common (not a sacred) journey; how much more so when [Prov. xxi. 27] to-day they will be consecrated, gear and all." David distinguishes between expeditions of a common kind, and campaigns which were opened by the consecration of the warriors and their gear. He hints that his present excursion is of the

second kind, and that the ceremony of consecration will take place as soon as he joins his men; but he reminds the priest that his custom has been to enforce the rules of sanctity even on ordinary expeditions. יקדש should perhaps be pointed as *Pual*. The word עצרה might more exactly be rendered "taboo," for it is evidently a technical expression. So in Jer. xxxvi. 5, "I am עצור, I cannot go into the temple," does not mean "I am imprisoned" (cf. ver. 19), but "I am restrained from entering the sanctuary by a ceremonial impurity." It seems to me that the proverbial עצור ועזוב, one of those phrases which name two categories, under one or other of which everybody is included, means "he who is under taboo, and he who is free"; cf. also נעצר, 1 Sam. xxi. 7 [8], and עצרה, "tempus clausum." The same sense ★ appears in Arabic *mo'sir*, applied to a girl who is shut up under the taboo which, in almost all early nations, affects girls at the age of puberty.

ADDITIONAL NOTE D (p. 212)

★ THE SUPPOSED PHALLIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SACRED POSTS AND PILLARS

That sacred posts and pillars among the Semites are phallic symbols is an opinion which enjoys a certain currency, mainly through the influence of Movers; but, as is so often the case with the theories of that author, the evidence in its favour is of the slenderest. For the pre-Hellenistic period Movers relies on 1 Kings xv. 13, 2 Chron. xv. 16, taking מפלצת, after the Vulgate, to mean *simulacrum Priapi*; but this is a mere guess, not supported by the other ancient versions. He also appeals to Ezek. xvi. 17, which clearly does not refer to phallic worship, but to images of the Baalim; the passage is imitated from Hos. ii. Many recent commentators suppose that יד, "hand," in Isa. lvii. 8, means the phallus. This is the merest conjecture, and even if it were certain, the use of יד in the sense of cippus, sign-post, would still have to be explained, not by supposing that every monument or road mark was a phallic pillar, but from the obvious symbolism which gives us the word finger-post. The Phœnician cippi

dedicated to Tanith and Baal Hamman often have a hand figured on them, but a real hand, not a phallus.

In ancient times obscene symbols were used without offence to denote sex, and female symbols of this kind are found in many Phœnician grottoes scratched upon the rock. Herodotus, ii. 106, says that he saw in Syria Palæstina stelæ engraved with γυναικὸς αἰδοῖα, presumably *massēboth* dedicated to female deities; but how this can support the view that the *massēba* represents ἀνδρὸς αἰδοῖον I am at a loss to see. Indeed, the whole phallic theory seems to be wrecked on the fact that the *massēba* represents male and female deities indifferently. At a later date the two great pillars that stood in the Propylæa of the temple of Hierapolis are called *phalli* by Lucian (*Dea Syr.* xvi.). Such twin pillars are very common at Semitic temples; even the temple at Jerusalem had them, and they are shown on coins representing the temple at Paphos; so that Lucian's evidence seems important, especially as he tells us that they bore an inscription to the effect that "these phalli were set up by Dionysus to his mother Hera." But the inscription appears to have been in Greek, and proves only that the Greeks, who were accustomed to phallic symbols in Dionysus-worship, and habitually regarded the licentious sacred feasts of the Semites as Dionysiac, put their own interpretation on the pillars. In § xxviii. of Lucian's work it clearly appears that the meaning and use of the pillars was an open question. Men were accustomed to ascend them, and spend a week on the top—like the Christian Stylites of the same region. Lucian thinks that this too was done because of Dionysus, but the natives said either that at the immense height (which is stated at 30 fathoms) they held near converse with the gods and prayed for the good of all Syria, or that the practice was a memorial of the Flood, when men were driven by fear to ascend trees and mountains. It is not easy to extract anything phallic out of these statements.

Besides this, Movers (i. 680) cites the statement of Arnobius, *Adv. Gentes*, v. 19 (p. 212), that phalli, as signs of the grace of the deity, were presented to the *mystæ* of the Cyprian Venus; but the use of the phallus as an amulet—which was very widespread in antiquity—can throw no light on the origin of sacred pillars. Everything else that he adduces is purely fantastic, and without a particle of evidence, and I have not found anything in more recent writers to strengthen his argument.

ADDITIONAL NOTE E (p. 245)

SACRED TRIBUTE IN ARABIA—THE GIFT OF FIRSTLINGS

I HAVE stated in the text that the idea of sacred tribute has little or no place among the nomadic Arabs, and it will hardly be disputed that, broadly speaking, this statement accords with the facts. But it is important to determine, with as much precision as possible, whether the conception of tribute and gifts of homage paid to the deity had any place at all in the old religion of the purely nomadic Semites, and if it had, to define that place with exactness. As the full discussion of this question touches on matters which go beyond the subject of Lecture VII., I have reserved the topic for an Additional Note.

Among the agricultural Semites the idea of a sacred tribute appears mainly in connection with first-fruits and tithes of agricultural produce. Animal sacrifices were ultimately brought under the category of gifts of homage; and so, when they were not presented as freewill offerings, but in accordance with ritual laws that demanded certain definite oblations for definite occasions, they also came to be looked upon as a kind of tribute. But we have seen that, even in the later rituals, there was a clear distinction between cereal oblations, which were simply payments to the god, and animal sacrifices, which were used to furnish a feast for the god and his worshippers together. The explanation that the victim is wholly given up to the god, who then gives back part of it to the worshipper, that he may feast at the temple as the guest of his deity, is manifestly too artificial to be regarded as primitive; and if, on the other hand, we look on a sacrifice simply as a feast provided by the worshipper, at which the god is the chief guest, it does not appear that, according to ancient ideas, any payment of tribute, or even any gift, is involved. Hospitality is not placed by early nations under the category of a gift; when a man slaughters an animal, everyone who is present has his share in the feast as a matter of course, and those who eat do not feel that any present has been made to them. And in like manner it seems very doubtful whether the oblations of milk which were poured out before certain Arabian idols can in any proper sense be called gifts,—*i.e.* transfers of valuable property,—for in the desert it is still a shame

to sell milk (Doughty, i. 215, ii. 443), and a draught from the milk-bowl is never refused to anyone. In a society where milk and meat are never sold, and where only a churl refuses to share these articles of food with every by-passer, we must not look to the sacrificial meal as a proof that the Arabs paid tribute to their gods.

The agricultural tribute of first-fruits and tithes is a charge on the produce of the land, paid to the gods as Baalim or landlords. In this form tribute cannot appear among pure nomads. But tribute is also paid to kings who are not landlords, by subjects who are not their tenants. An example of such a tribute is the royal tithe in Israel, which was paid by the free landowners; and on this analogy it seems quite conceivable that a sacred tribute paid to the god, as king or chief of his worshippers, might arise in a purely nomadic community. In examining this possibility, however, we must have regard to the actual constitution of Arabian society.

Among the free tribes of the Arabian desert there is no taxation, and the chiefs derive no revenue from their tribesmen, but, on the contrary, are expected to use their wealth with generosity for the public benefit. A modern sheikh or emir, according to Burckhardt's description (*Bed. and Wah.* i. 118), is expected to treat strangers in a better style than any other member of the tribe, to maintain the poor, and to divide among his friends whatever presents he may receive. "His means of defraying these expenses are the tribute he exacts from the Syrian villages, and his emoluments from the Mecca pilgrim caravan,"—in short, black-mail. Black-mail is merely a regulated form of pillage, and the gains derived from it correspond to those which in earlier times came directly from the plundering of enemies and strangers. In ancient Arabia the chief took the fourth part of the spoils of war (*Ḥam.* p. 336, last verse; Wācidī, ed. Kremer, p. 10), and had also certain other perquisites, particularly the right to select for himself, before the division, some special gift, such as a damsel or a sword (the so-called *ṣafāyā*, *Ḥam.* p. 458, last verse, and Abū ʿObaida, *ap.* Reiske, *An. Musl.* i. 26 *sqq.* of the notes).[1] Among the Hebrews, in like manner, the chief received a liberal share of the booty (1 Sam. xxx. 20), including some choice gift corresponding to the *ṣafāyā* (Judg. v. 30, viii. 24). In the

[1] Among the Arabs, a sacrifice (*nacīʿa*) preceded the division of the spoil; see below, *Additional Note* M.

Levitical law a fixed share of the spoil is assigned to the sanctuary (Num. xxxi. 28 *sqq.*), just as in the Moslem theocracy the chief's fourth is changed to a fifth, payable to Allah and his prophet, but partly used for the discharge of burdens of charity and the like, such as in old times fell upon the chiefs (Sura viii. 42). These fixed sacred tributes are modern, both in Arabia and in Israel; but even in old times the spoils of war were a chief source of votive offerings. The votive offerings of the Arabs frequently consisted of weapons (Wellh. p. 112; cf. 1 Sam. xxi. 9); and, among the Hebrews, part of the chief's booty was generally consecrated (Judg. viii. 27; 2 Sam. viii. 10 *sq.*; Micah iv. 13). Similarly, Mesha of Moab dedicates part of his spoil to Chemosh; and in Greece the sacred tithe occurs mainly in the form of a percentage on the spoils of war. It is obvious, however, that the apportionment of a share of booty to the chief or to the god does not properly fall under the category of tribute. And on the general Arabian principle that a chief must not tax his own tribesmen, it does not appear that there was any room for the development of a system of sacred dues, so long as the gods were tribal deities worshipped only by their own tribe. Among the Arabs tribute is a payment to an alien tribe or to its chiefs, either by way of black-mail, or in return for protection. A king who receives gifts and tribute is a king reigning over subjects who are not of his own clan, and whom, therefore, he is not bound to help and protect at his own expense. I apprehend that the oldest Hebrew taxation rested on this principle; for even Solomon seems to have excluded the tribe of Judah from his division of the kingdom for fiscal purposes (1 Kings iv. 7 *sqq.*), while David, as a prosperous warrior, who drew vast sums from conquered nations, probably raised no revenue from his Israelite subjects. As regards Saul, we know nothing more than that he enriched his own tribesmen (1 Sam. xxii. 7). The system of taxation described in 1 Sam. viii. can hardly have been in full force till the time of Solomon at the earliest, and its details seem to indicate that, in fiscal as in other matters, the developed Hebrew kingship took a lesson from its neighbours of Phœnicia, and possibly of Egypt.

To return, however, to the Arabs: the tributes which chiefs and kings received from foreigners were partly transit dues from traders (Pliny, *H. N.* xii. 63 *sqq.*). In such tribute the gods had their share, as Pliny expressly relates for the case of the incense

traffic, and as Azracī (p. 107) appears to imply for the case of Greek merchants at Mecca. Commerce and religion were closely connected in all the Semitic lands; the greatest and richest temples are almost always found at cities which owed their importance to trade.

Of the other kind of tribute, paid by a subject tribe to a prince of alien kin, a lively picture is afforded by *Agh.* x. 12, where we find Zohair b. Jadhīma sitting in person at the fair of ʿOkāẓ to collect from the Hawāzin, who frequented this annual market, their gifts of ghee, curds and small cattle. In like manner the tribute of the pastoral Moabites to the kings of the house of ʿOmri was paid in sheep (2 Kings iii. 4); and on such analogies we can very well conceive that sacrificial oblations of food might be regarded as tribute, wherever the worshippers were not the tribesmen but the clients of their god. But to suppose that sacrifices generally were regarded by the ancient Semitic nomads as tributes and gifts of homage, is to suppose that the typical form of Semitic religion is clientship, a position which is altogether untenable.

Thus it would seem that all we know of the social institutions of the Arabs is in complete accordance with the results, obtained in the text of these lectures, with regard to the original meaning of sacrifice. The conclusion to which the ritual points, viz. that the sacrifice was in no sense a payment to the god, but simply an act of communion of the worshippers with one another and their god, is in accord with the relations that actually subsisted between chiefs and their tribesmen; and when we read that in the time of Mohammed the ordinary worship of household gods consisted in stroking them with the hand as one went out and in (*Muh. in Med.* p. 350), we are to remember that reverent salutation was all that, in ordinary circumstances, a great chieftain would expect from the meanest member of his tribe. At the pilgrimage feasts of the Arabs, as of the Hebrews, no man appeared without a gift; but this was in the worship of alien gods.

In a payment of tribute two things are involved—(1) a transfer of property, and (2) an obligation, not necessarily to pay on a fixed scale, but at least to pay something. That an Arabian sacrifice cannot without straining be conceived as a transfer of property, has appeared in the course of this note, and is shown from another point of view in Lecture XI. (*supra*, p. 390 *sqq.*). And in most sacrifices the second condition is also

unfulfilled, for in Arabia it is left to a man's free will whether he will appear before the god and do sacrifice, even in the sacred month of Rajab.

It seems, however, to be probable that the absolute freedom of the individual will in matters of religious duty, as it appears among the Arabs in the generations immediately preceding Islam, was in part due to the breaking up of the old religion. There can, for example, be hardly a doubt that the ascetic observances during a war of blood-revenge, which in the time of the prophet were assumed by a voluntary vow, were at one time imperatively demanded by religious custom (*infra*, *Note I*). Again, there were certain religious restrictions on the use of a man's property which, even in later times, do not seem to have been purely optional, *e.g.* the prohibition of using for common work a camel which had produced ten female foals. But, in older times at least, such a camel was not given over in property to the god; the restriction was simply a taboo (*supra*, p. 149).

There is, however, one Arabian sacrifice which has very much the aspect of a fixed due payable to the god, viz. the sacrifice of firstlings (فرع, *fara'*). It has already been remarked (*supra*, p. 227, note 3) that the accounts which have been handed down to us about the *fara'* are confused and uncertain; but although the word seems to have been extended to cover other customary sacrifices, it appears properly to denote "the foal or lamb which is first cast." This is the definition given in the *ḥadīth*, which in such matters has always great weight, and it is confirmed by the proverb in Maidānī, ii. 20 (Freytag, *Ar. Pr.* ii. 212). As we also learn from the *ḥadīth* (*Lisān*, *s.v.*) that the custom was to sacrifice the *fara'* when it was still so young that the flesh was like glue and stuck to the skin, it would seem that this sacrifice must be connected with the Hebrew sacrifice of the firstborn of kine and sheep, which according to the oldest law (Ex. xxii. 30) was to be offered on the eighth day from birth. There is an unfortunate ambiguity about the definition of the Arabian *fara'*, for the first birth may mean either the first birth of the dam, or the first birth of the year, and Maidānī takes it in the latter sense, making *fara'* a synonym of *roba'*, *i.e.* a foal which, being born in the *rabī'*, or season of abundant grass, when the mother was well fed, naturally grew up stronger and better than foals born later (cf. Gen. iv. 4). But apart from the analogy of the Hebrew firstlings, which are quite unambiguously explained as firstborn (פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם, Ex.

xxxiv. 19), there are other uses of the Arabic word *fara'* which make Maidānī's interpretation improbable; and the presumption is that, however the rule may have been relaxed or modified in later times, there was a very ancient Semitic custom, anterior to the separation of the Arabs and Hebrews, of sacrificing the first-born of domestic animals. The conclusion that this offering was, for nomadic life, what the offering of first-fruits was among agricultural peoples, viz. a tribute paid to the gods, seems so obvious that it requires some courage to resist it. Yet, from what has been already said, it seems absolutely impossible that, at the very early date when the Hebrews and Arabs lived together, any tribute could have been paid to the god as chief or king; and, even in the form of the sacrifice of firstlings which is found among the Hebrews, there seem to be indications that the parallelism with the offering of first-fruits is less complete than at first sight it seems to be.

The first-fruits are an annual gift of the earliest and choicest fruits of the year, but the firstlings are the first offspring of an animal. Their proper parallel in the vegetable kingdom is therefore found in the law of Lev. xix. 23 *sqq.*, which ordains that for three years the fruit of a new orchard shall be treated as "uncircumcised," and not eaten, that the fourth year's fruit shall be consecrated to Jehovah, and that thereafter the fruit shall be common. The characteristic feature in this ordinance, from which its original meaning must be deduced, is the taboo on the produce of the first three years, not the offering at the temple paid in the fourth year. And that some form of taboo lies also at the bottom of the sacrifice of firstlings, appears from the provision of the older Hebrew law that, if a firstling ass is not redeemed by its owner, its neck shall be broken (Ex. xxxiv. 20). We see, however, that the tendency was to bring all such offerings under the category of sacred tribute; for by the later law (Lev. xxvii. 27) the ass that is not redeemed is to be sold for the benefit of the sanctuary, and even in the older law all the firstborn of men must be redeemed.

Primarily, a thing that is taboo is one that has supernatural qualities or associations, of a kind that forbid it to be used for common purposes. This is all that is involved, under the older law, in the holiness of the firstling ass; it is such an animal as the Arabs would have allowed to go free, instead of killing it. But in the very earliest times all domestic animals had a certain measure of holiness, and were protected by certain taboos which

prevented them from being used by man as mere chattels; and so it would appear that the holiness of the firstborn, which is congenital (Lev. xxvii. 26), is only a higher form of the original sanctity of domestic animals. The correctness of this conclusion can be verified by a practical test; for if firstlings are animals of special intrinsic holiness, the sacrifices to which they are appropriate will be special acts of communion, piacular holocausts or the like, and not mere common sacrificial meals. And this is actually the case in the oldest Hebrew times; for the Passover, which is the sacrifice of firstlings *par excellence*, is an atoning rite of a quite exceptional kind (*supra*, p. 406).[1]

Further, there is a close connection between the firstlings and the piacular holocaust; both are limited to males, and the holocaust of Samuel (1 Sam. vii. 9) is a sucking lamb, while from Ex. xxii. 30 we see that firstlings were offered on the eighth day (or, probably, as soon after it as was practicable; cf. Lev. xxii. 27).

The consecration of first-born male children (Ex. xiii. 13, xxii. 28, xxxiv. 20) has always created a difficulty. The legal usage was to redeem the human firstlings, and in Num. iii. this redemption is further connected in a very complicated way with the consecration of the tribe of Levi. It appears, however, that in the period immediately before the exile, when sacrifices of first-born children became common, these grisly offerings were supposed to fall under the law of firstlings (Jer. vii. 31, xix. 5; Ezek. xx. 26). To conclude from this that at one time the Hebrews actually sacrificed all their first born sons is absurd; but, on the other hand, there must have been some point of attachment in ancient custom for the belief that the deity asked for such a sacrifice. In point of fact, even in old times, when exceptional circumstances called for a human victim, it was a child, and by preference a first-born or only child, that was selected by the peoples in and around Palestine.[2] This is

[1] That the paschal sacrifice was originally a sacrifice of firstlings is clearly brought out by Wellhausen, *Prolegomena*, chap. iii. § 1, 1. Ultimately the paschal lamb and the firstlings fell apart; the former was retained, with much of its old and characteristic ritual, as a domestic sacrifice, while the latter continued to be presented at the sanctuary and offered on the altar, the whole flesh being the perquisite of the priest (Num. xviii. 18). But in the law of Deuteronomy (xii. 17 *sqq.*, xv. 19 *sqq.*) the firstlings have not yet assumed the character of a sacred tribute.

[2] 2 Kings iii. 27; Philo Byblius in *Fr. Hist. Gr.* iii. 571; cf. Porph., *De Abst.* ii. 56, τῶν φιλτάτων τινά.

commonly explained as the most costly offering a man can make; but it is rather to be regarded as the choice, for a special purpose, of the most sacred kind of victim. I apprehend that all the prerogatives of the firstborn among Semitic peoples are originally ★ prerogatives of sanctity; the sacred blood of the kin flows purest and strongest in him (Gen. xlix. 3; Deut. xxi. 17). Neither in the case of children, nor in that of cattle, did the congenital holiness of the first-born originally imply that they must be sacrificed or given to the deity on the altar, but only that if sacrifice was to be made they were the best and fittest, because the holiest, victims. But when the old ideas of holiness became unintelligible, and holy beasts came to mean beasts set aside for sacrifice, an obvious extension of this new view of holiness demanded that the human first-born should be redeemed, by the substitution of an animal victim (Gen. xxii.); and from this usage, again, the Moloch sacrifices were easily developed in the seventh century, when ordinary means seemed too weak to conjure the divine anger.

In the Passover we find the sacrifice of firstlings assuming the form of an annual feast, in the spring season. Such a combination is possible only when the yeaning time falls in spring. So far as sheep are concerned, there were two lambing times in ancient Italy, some sheep yeaning in spring, others in autumn. That the same thing was true of Palestine may perhaps be inferred from the old versions of Gen. xxx. 41, 42.[1] But in Arabia all cattle, small and great, yean in the season of the spring pasture, so that here we have the necessary condition for a spring sacrifice of firstlings,[2] and also a reason, more conclusive than the assertion of the *Lisān* (*supra*, p. 228), for identifying the Arabian Rajab sacrifices with the sacrifice of firstlings.

[1] Not from the text itself; cf. Bochart, Pars I. Lib. ii. cap. 46.

[2] Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, i. 429; Blunt, *Bedouin Tribes*, ii. 166: "The calving time for camels is in February and early March." Of course there are exceptions to this rule; but the *ṣaifī* or summer foal is held by the Arabs to be a weakling (*Ḥamāsa*, p. 389, l. 25).

ADDITIONAL NOTE F (p. 294)

SACRIFICES OF SACRED ANIMALS

In the text I have spoken only of animals corresponding to Julian's definition of the creatures suited for mystical piacula, viz. that they were such as were ordinarily excluded from human diet. But there are other animals which, though not strictly forbidden food in the times of which we have record, retained a certain reputation of natural holiness, which gave them a peculiar virtue when used in sacrifice. Of course, when the sacredness of an animal species ceases to be marked by the definite taboos that we find in the case of the swine, the dog, or the dove, the proof that it was once held to be holy in a particular religious circle becomes dependent on circumstantial evidence, and more or less vague. But it seems worth while to cite one or two examples in which the point can be fairly well made out, or at least made sufficiently probable to deserve further examination.

1. Deer and antelopes of various kinds were sacred animals in several parts of the Semitic field; see *Kinship*, p. 227 *sq.* They were not, indeed, forbidden food, but they had special relations to various deities. Troops of sacred gazelles occur down to a late date at sanctuaries, *e.g.* at Mecca and Tabāla (Wellh. p. 106), and in the island spoken of by Arrian, vii. 20. Moreover, stags or gazelles occur as sacred symbols in South Arabia, in connection with ʿAthtar-worship; at Mecca, probably in connection with the worship of Al-ʿOzzā; and in Phœnicia, both on gems and on coins of Laodicea ad Mare. Further, Ibn Mojāwir speaks of a South Arab tribe which, when a gazelle was found dead, solemnly buried it and mourned for seven days (see p. 444).

No kind of wild quadruped was an ordinary sacrificial animal among the Semites, and even the Arabs regard a gazelle as a mean substitute for a sheep; but in certain rituals we find the stag or gazelle as an exceptional sacrifice. The most notable case is the annual stag sacrifice at Laodicea on the Phœnician coast, which was regarded as a substitute for a more ancient sacrifice of a maiden, and was offered to a goddess whom Porphyry calls Athena (*De Abst.* ii. 56), while Pausanias (iii. 16. 8) identifies her with the Brauronian Artemis, and supposes that the cult was

introduced by Seleucus. But the town (Ramitha in Phœnician, according to Philo, *ap.* Steph. Byz.) is much older than its re-christening by Seleucus, and if the goddess had really been Greek, she would not have been identified with Athena as well as with Artemis. She was, in fact, a form of Astarte, the ancient Tyche of the city, who, according to the usual manner of the later euhemeristic Syrians, was supposed to have been a virgin, immolated when the city was founded, and thereafter worshipped as a deity (Malalas, p. 203). Here, therefore, we have one of the many legends of the death of a deity which are grafted on a rite of annual human sacrifice, or on the annual sacrifice of a sacred animal, under circumstances that showed its life to be taken as having the value of a human life on the one hand, or of the life of the deity on the other. The stag, whose death has such significance, is a theanthropic victim, exactly as in the mystic sacrifices discussed in the text.

Of the stag or gazelle as a Phœnician sacrifice we have further evidence from Philo Byblius (Euseb., *Pr. Ev.* i. 10. 10) in the legend of the god Usous, who first taught men to clothe themselves in the skins of beasts taken in hunting, and to pour out their blood sacrificially before sacred stones. This god was worshipped at the sanctuary he instituted, at an annual feast, and doubtless with the ceremonies he himself devised, *i.e.* with libations of the blood of a deer or antelope—for these are the important kinds of game in the district of the Lebanon—presented by worshippers clad in deer-skins. The wearing of the skin of the victim, as we have seen at p. 438, is characteristic of mystical and piacular rites. Most scholars, from Scaliger downwards, have compared Usous with Esau; but it has not been observed that the scene of Isaac's blessing, where his son must first approach him with the savoury flesh of a gazelle, has all the air of a sacrificial scene. Moreover, Jacob, who substitutes kids for gazelles, wears their skin upon his arms and neck. The goat, which here appears as a substitute for the game offered by the huntsman Esau, was one of the chief Hebrew piacula, if not the chief of all. In Babylonia and Assyria also it has an exceptional place among sacrifices; see the representation in Menant, *Glyptique*, vol. i. p. 146 *sqq.*, vol. ii. p. 68. What is obsolete in common life often survives in poetic phrase and metaphor, and I am tempted to see in the opening words of David's dirge on Saul ("The gazelle, O Israel, is slain on thy high places," 2 Sam. i. 19) an allusion to some ancient sacrifice of

similar type to that which so long survived at Laodicea. The sacred deer of Icarus, according to Arrian, could only be taken for sacrifice.

2. The wild ass was eaten by the Arabs, and must have been eaten with a religious intention, since its flesh was forbidden to his converts by Symeon the Stylite. Conversely, among the Harranians the ass was forbidden food, like the swine and the dog; but there is no evidence that, like these animals, it was sacrificed or eaten in exceptional mysteries. Yet when we find one section of Semites forbidden to eat the ass, while another section eats it in a way which to Christians appears idolatrous, the presumption that the animal was anciently sacred becomes very strong. An actual ass-sacrifice appears in Egypt in the worship of Typhon (Set or Sutech), who was the chief god of the Semites in Egypt, though Egyptologists doubt whether he was originally a Semitic god. The ass was a Typhonic animal, and in certain religious ceremonies the people of Coptus sacrificed asses by casting them down a precipice, while those of Lycopolis, in two of their annual feasts, stamped the figure of a bound ass on their sacrificial cakes (Plut., *Is. et Os.* § 30); see, for the meaning of these cakes, *supra*, pp. 225, note 3, 240, note 1; and for sacrifice by casting from a precipice, *supra*, pp. 374, 418. Both forms indicate a mystic or piacular rite, and stand on one line with the holocausts of living men to Typhon mentioned by Manetho (*ibid.* § 73). If it could be made out that these rites were really of Semitic origin, the ass would be a clear case of an ancient mystic piaculum within our field; but meantime the matter must rest doubtful. It may, however, be noted that the old clan name Hamor ("he-ass") among the Canaanites in Shechem, seems to confirm the view that the ass was sacred with some of the Semites; and the fables of ass-worship among the Jews (on which compare Bochart, *Hierozoicon*, Pars I. Lib. ii. cap. 18) probably took their rise, like so many other false statements of a similar kind, in a confusion between the Jews and their heathen neighbours. As regards the eating of wild asses' flesh by the Arabs, I have not found evidence in Arabic literature that in the times before Mohammed it had any religious meaning, though Cazwīnī tells us that its flesh and hoofs supplied powerful charms, and this is generally a relic of sacrificial use. On the religious associations of the ass in classical antiquity, and the uses of the ass's head as a charm, see the *Compte-rendu de la*

Comm. Imp. Archéol. (St. Petersburg) for 1863, and the *Berichte d. sächs. Ges. d. Wiss.*, 1854, p. 48.

It has been supposed that the "golden" Set, worshipped by the Semitic Hyksos in the Delta, was a Sun-god (E. Meyer, *Gesch. des Alt.* i. p. 135). If this be so, the horses of the sun may have succeeded to the older sanctity of the ass; for the ass is much more ancient than the horse in the Semitic lands.

3. To these two examples of sacred quadrupeds I am inclined to add one of a sacred bird. The quail sacrifice of the Phœnicians is said by Eudoxus (*ap.* Athen. ix. 47) to commemorate the resurrection of Heracles. But this was an annual festival at Tyre, in the month Peritius (February—March), *i.e.* just at the time when the quail returns to Palestine, immense crowds appearing in a single night (Jos., *Ant.* viii. 5. 3, compared with Tristram, *Fauna*, p. 124). An annual sacrifice of this sort, connected with a myth of the death of the god, can hardly be other than the mystical sacrifice of a sacred animal; and it is to be noted that the ancients regard quail's flesh as dangerous food, producing vertigo and tetanus, while on the other hand an ointment made from the brain is a cure for epilepsy (Bochart, II. i. 15). Lagarde (*Gr. Uebers. der Provv.* p. 81) once proposed to connect the Arabic سُمَانَى, "quail," with the god Eshmun-Iolaos, who restored Heracles to life by giving him a quail to smell at; if this be right, the god-name must be derived from that of the bird, and not *vice versâ*.

ADDITIONAL NOTE G (p. 310)

THE SACRIFICE OF A SHEEP TO THE CYPRIAN APHRODITE

INSTEAD of a note on this subject, I here print a paper read before the Cambridge Philological Society in 1888, of which only a brief abstract has hitherto been published:—

The peculiar rite which forms the subject of the present paper is known to us from a passage in Joannes Lydus, *De Mensibus*, iv. 45, which has been often referred to by writers on ancient religion, but, so far as my reading goes, without any notice being

taken of a most serious difficulty, which it seems impossible to overcome without a change of the text. Lydus in the chapter in question begins by describing the practices by which women of the higher and lower classes respectively did honour to Venus on the Calends of April. Here, of course, he is speaking of Roman usage, as is plain from the general plan of his book and from the ceremonies he specifies. The honourable women did service to Venus ὑπὲρ ὁμονοίας καὶ βίου σώφρονος. This agrees with the worship of Venus *verticordia*, the patroness of female virtue, whose worship Ovid connects with the Calends of April (*Fasti*, iv. 155 *sq.*), and Mommsen conjectures to have been mentioned under that day in the *Fasti Præn.* Again, Lydus says that the women of the common sort bathed in the men's baths, crowned with myrtle, which agrees with Ovid (*ibid.* 139 *sq.*), Plutarch (*Numa*, c. 19), and the service of *Fortuna virilis* in the *Fast. Præn.* The transition from this Roman worship of Venus to the Cyprian ritual of the same day, is made by a remark as to the victims proper to the goddess. Venus, he says, was worshipped with the same sacrifices as Juno, but in Cyprus πρόβατον κωδίῳ ἐσκεπασμένον συνέθυον τῇ Ἀφροδιτῇ· ὁ δὲ τρόπος τῆς ἱερατείας ἐν τῇ Κύπρῳ ἀπὸ τῆς Κορίνθου παρῆλθέ ποτε. As Lydus goes on to say that thereafter (εἶτα δέ), on the second of April, they sacrificed wild boars to the goddess, on account of the attack of that animal on Adonis, it is clear that the sacrifice of a sheep took place on the first of April, and that Engel (*Kypros*, ii. 155) entirely overlooks the context when he says that, according to Lydus, the ordinary sacrifices of Aphrodite were the same as those of Hera, but that in Cyprus a favourite sacrifice to the former goddess was a sheep with a woolly fleece. Lydus does not say that a sheep was a favourite Cyprian sacrifice to Aphrodite, but that it was the sacrifice appropriated to the first of April. The very point of the passage is that the Roman feast of the first of April appears in Cyprus with variations in detail.

This coincidence cannot be accidental, and the explanation is not far to seek. The Cyprian Aphrodite is the Semitic Astarte, and her ritual is throughout marked with a Semitic stamp. It is to Semitic ritual, therefore, that we must look for the origin of the April feast. Now, among the Syrians, Nisan is the month corresponding to April, and on the first three days of Nisan, as we learn from the *Fihrist*, the Syrians of Harran, who clung to

the ancient Astarte-worship far into the Middle Ages, visited the temple of the goddess in groups (Lydus's *συνέθυον*), offered sacrifices, and burned living animals. The burning of living animals answers to the ceremonies observed at Hierapolis in the great feast of the Syrian goddess at the incoming of spring, when, as we read in Lucian, goats, sheep and other living creatures were suspended on a pyre, and the whole was consumed. The feast, therefore, is an annual spring feast of Semitic origin. The Roman observance was less solemn, and of a popular kind rather than part of the State religion. Macrobius (*Sat.* i. 12. 12–15) tells us, indeed, that at Rome this festival was not ancient, but was introduced for an historical reason which he omits to record. Now, a new ritual at Rome was almost certainly a borrowed one, and there is ample evidence (for which it is enough to refer to Preller's *Römische Mythologie*) that the most influential centre of Venus-worship in the West, and that which had most to do with the development of her cult in Italy, was the great temple at Eryx, the ארך of the Carthaginians. From Phœnician inscriptions it is certain that the goddess of Eryx (עשתרת ארך, *CIS.* No. 140, cf. No. 135) was Astarte; and thus it is easily understood that the Asiatic festival found its way to Rome. A festival so widespread, and one which held its ground so long, is well worthy of careful examination.

When Lydus, in passing from the Roman to the Cyprian rite, says *ἐτιμᾶτο δὲ ἡ Ἀφροδίτη τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἷς καὶ ἡ Ἥρα*, I cannot find with Engel that he makes any general statement that, as a rule, the same sacrifices were appropriate to Venus and to Juno. Oriental worships allowed a far greater range in the choice of victims for a single deity or temple than was customary in Greece or Rome. For the Carthaginian temples of Baal this appears from extant inscriptions; and as regards Astarte-Aphrodite, Tacitus (*Hist.* iii. 2) tells us that at Paphos, and Ælian (*Nat. An.* x. 50) that at Eryx, the worshipper chose any kind of sacrifice he pleased. This liberty, which was evidently surprising to the Romans and the Greeks, was probably due to the syncretism which established itself at an early date at all the great Semitic sanctuaries; one deity, as we see in the case of Hierapolis, combining a number of characters which originally belonged to different gods, and uniting at a single temple a corresponding variety of ancient rituals. Such syncretism was probably very ancient among the cosmopolitan Phœnicians; and throughout the Semitic world it received

a great impulse by the breaking up of the old small States through Assyrian, Babylonian and Persian conquests. The political and religious cosmopolitanism of the East under the Macedonians rested on a basis which had been prepared centuries before.

In the West no such powerful political agencies were at work to develop an early tendency to syncretism, nor was it so easy to confound the well-marked individualities of the Western Pantheon as to combine the hazy personalities of different Baals or Astartes. When the need for cosmopolitan forms of worship arose, Eastern gods and rituals were borrowed, as in the case of Sarapis; and the old acknowledged worships still retained their individual peculiarities. It is known that neither Juno nor Hera admitted such a free choice of victims for her shrine as was permitted at Eryx and Paphos. Their ordinary sacrifice was a cow; for, like other goddesses, they preferred victims of their own sex (Arnobius, vii. 19). But, so far as the Oriental Aphrodite had a preference, it was for male victims. So Tacitus tells us for Paphos, and Plautus also in the *Pœnulus* has "sex agnos immolavi Veneri." This preference was presumably connected with the androgynous character ascribed to the Eastern goddess in Cyprus and elsewhere, and of itself is sufficient to separate her sacrifices, as a whole, from those of Juno and Hera.[1] Besides, the favourite victim of Aphrodite was the goat (Tac. *Hist.* iii. 2), which, except at Sparta (Pausanias, iii. 15. 9) and in the annual piacular sacrifice of Hera Acræa at Corinth (Hesychius, *s.v.* αἰξ αἶγα; Zenobius on the same proverb; Schol. on Eurip., *Medea*), was excluded from the altars of Hera. Juno has relations to the goat at Lanuvium, but at Rome her cultus was closely related to that of Jupiter, from whose offerings the goat was strictly excluded (Arnobius, vii. 21).

I have perhaps spent too much time on this argument, for surely the context itself is sufficient to show that Lydus is not speaking of Venus-worship in general. What he says is that on the Calends of April—a special occasion—Venus was worshipped at Rome with the sacrifices of Juno. And as he is speaking of a ritual in which the worshippers were women, I think we may go a step further, and recall the fact that the Calends of every month were sacred to Juno Lucina, to whom on that day the *regina*

[1] The preference for male victims seems, however, to have other connections also; see p. 299, *supra*.

sacrorum offered in the Regia a sow or ewe-lamb (Macrob. i. 15. 19). The functions of Lucina, as the patroness of virtuous matrons and the family life of women, were so nearly identical with those of Venus *verticordia*, that their sacrifices might well be the same. And if this be so, it was natural for Lydus to pass on as he does to a remark on the Cyprian ritual, where the same sacrifices occur with characteristic variations. The sex of the victims is different, for a reason already explained, and the sacrifices are divided between two days. But the victims are still the sheep and the pig, so that the fundamental identity of the Roman and the Eastern service of the day receives fresh confirmation.

So far all is plain; but now we come to the unsolved difficulty. It lies in the phrase *πρόβατον κωδίῳ ἐσκεπασμένον*. These words describe the characteristic peculiarity, for the sake of which our author turns aside to mention the Cyprian rite, and it seems to be in relation to this feature that he observes that "the manner of the priestly service" was derived from Corinth. Unfortunately we know nothing of the Corinthian ritual referred to. The Corinthian Aphrodite-worship was Oriental in type, and any feature in it which reappears at Cyprus is almost certainly Phœnician. That Cyprus borrowed from Corinth is far less likely than that both borrowed from the East, and the authority of Lydus is not enough to outweigh this probability. The allusion to Corinth, however, is of value as teaching us that the peculiar rite was not merely local; and further, the allusion to "priestly service" shows that the sacrifice in question—as indeed is implied in the word *συνέθυον*—was not a private offering, but a public rite performed at a great temple. But this does not explain the words *κωδίῳ ἐσκεπασμένον*. It is plain that the meaning cannot be "a sheep with a woolly fleece," as Engel renders, nor does it seem possible to understand with the Duc de Luynes (*Num. et Insc. Cypr.* p. 6), "un bélier couvert de toute sa toison." If the words could bear this meaning, the rendering would be plausible enough, for we have seen that in the Syrian form of the festival the victims were given to the flames alive. But if Lydus had meant that the victim was consumed by fire, skin and all, he would have given *κωδίῳ* the article, and would have used a more precise word than *συνέθυον*. And can *κώδιον* be used of the sheep-skin on the sheep, or *ἐσκεπασμένον* of the natural coat? The plain sense of the words is that the sheep was wrapped in a sheep-skin when it was presented for sacrifice, not

that its skin was left upon it, or wrapped round the sacrificial flesh before it was laid on the altar.

If the skin had been that of a different kind of animal, we might have explained the rite by the same principle of make-believe which we find in the Roman offering of the *cervaria ovis*, the sheep that was made to pass for a stag; for the ordinary meaning of skin-wearing in early religion is to simulate identification with the animal whose skin is worn. But to wrap a sheep in a sheep-skin is like gilding gold. I propose therefore to change a single letter, and read ἐσκεπασμένοι, a change which produces a sense good in itself and strongly recommended by the context and by analogy.

The significance of the κώδιον or sheep-skin in ancient ritual has been illustrated by Lobeck in his *Aglaophamus*, and by Preller in his commentary on Polemo. It always appears in connection with atoning and mystic rites, and in the majority of Greek examples the practice appears to have been that the person to be purged of guilt set his feet, or his left foot, upon the skin of a sacrificed ram. But this was not the only way of using the κώδιον. In Thessaly there was, according to Dicæarchus, a ceremony, observed at the greatest heat of summer, in which the worshippers ascended Mount Pelion to the temple of Zeus Acræus, clad in new sheep-skins (*Fr. Hist. Gr.* ii. 262). When Pythagoras was purified by the priests of Morgus in Crete, he was made to lie beside water (the sea by day, the river by night), wrapped in the fleece of a black lamb, and descended to the tomb of Zeus clad in black wool (Porph., *Vita Pyth.* § 17). Again, the first sacrifice of every worshipper at Hierapolis was a sheep. Having partaken of the flesh, the sacrificer laid the skin on the ground, and knelt on it, taking up the feet and head over his own head. In this posture he besought the deity to accept his offering. Here it is evident that the ceremony expresses the identification of the sacrificer with the victim. He has taken its flesh into his body, and he covers himself with its skin. It is, as it were, the idea of substitution turned outside in. The direct symbolism of vicarious sacrifice, where an animal's life is accepted in place of the life of a human being, is to treat the victim as if it were a man. At Tenedos, for example, the bull-calf sacrificed to Bacchus wears the cothurnus, and the mother cow is treated like a woman in child-bed. But in our case the symbolism is inverted; instead of making believe that the victim is a man, the ritual makes believe

that the man is the victim, and so brings the atoning force of the sacrifice into immediate application to him.

It is evident that if this kind of symbolism be applied, not to purification of an individual, but to a general and public atoning service, the priests, as the representatives of the community on whose behalf the rite is performed, are the persons to whom the skin of the victim must be applied. And if there are many priests and only one victim, it will be convenient not to use the actual skin of the sacrifice, which only one can wear at a time, but to clothe all the ministers in skins of the same kind. This, according to my conjecture, is what was done in Cyprus. And here I would ask whether the context, which alludes to the manner of the priestly service, does not show that some reference to the priests has been already made or implied. Such a reference the proposed emendation supplies.

Upon this view of the passage it is necessarily involved that the rite described was expiatory. And that it was so seems to appear from several arguments. The sacrifice of the following day consisted in wild boars, and was explained in connection with the Adonis myth, so that its Semitic origin is not doubtful. Even in Greece the pig is the great purificatory sacrifice; but in Semitic religion the offering of this animal is not a mere ordinary *piaculum*, but a mystic rite of the most exceptional kind (*supra*, p. 290). Now, if the sacrifice of the second day of the feast was mystic, and therefore piacular in the highest degree, we may be sure that the first day's sacrifice was no ordinary sacrificial meal of a joyous character. For a man must first be purified, and then sit down gladly at the table of the gods, and not conversely. Again, the Syrian and Roman rites, which we have found reason to regard as forms of the same observance, were plainly piacular or purificatory. In Rome we have the women bathing, which is a form of lustration, and wearing myrtle, which had purifying virtues, for it was with myrtle twigs that the Romans and Sabines in the time of Romulus purged themselves at the temple of Venus Cloacina (Preller, *Röm. Myth.* 3rd ed., i. 439). And in the Syrian rite, where animals are burnt alive to the goddess, the atoning nature of the sacrifice is unmistakable, and the idea of a mere sacrificial feast is entirely excluded.

A further argument for the atoning character of the rite may be derived from the choice of the victim, for next to the swine the ram was perhaps the commonest sin-offering in antiquity (cf

Hesychius, *s.v.* Ἀφροδισία ἄγρα); so much so, that Stephani, in the *Compte-rendu*, 1869, p. 130 *sqq.*, explains the frequent occurrence of rams' heads and the like in ancient ornament as derived from the association of the animal with the power of averting calamity. Such ornaments are in fact ἀποτρόπαια. It is always dangerous to apply general arguments of this kind to the interpretation of a particular ritual; for the same victim may be an atoning sacrifice in one rite and an ordinary sacrifice in another, and it by no means follows that because, for example, a piacular bull was offered to Zeus, the same piaculum would be appropriate to the Eastern Aphrodite. But in the case of the sheep used as a sin-offering, we have evidence that there was no limitation to a single deity; for when Epimenides was brought to Athens to check the plague, he suffered black and white sheep to stray at will from the Areopagus, and ordered each to be sacrificed, where it lay down, to the nameless deity of the spot (Diog. Laert. i. 10). This form of atonement came from Crete, which was one of the stepping-stones by which Oriental influence reached Greece, so that the example is the more appropriate to our present argument. And that, in point of fact, sheep or rams were offered as piacular sacrifices at the altars of the Eastern Aphrodite, seems to follow from the Hierapolitan ritual already mentioned. The same thing is implied for Carthage in the *Pœnulus* of Plautus, where the sacrifice of six male lambs is directed to propitiate the angry goddess.

These considerations will, I hope, be found sufficient to justify my general view of the Cyprian rite, and to support the proposed correction of the text. The sacrifice was piacular, and the κώδιον was therefore appropriate to the ritual; but on the received text the use of it is entirely unintelligible, whereas the correction ἐσκεπασμένοι restores a sense which gives to this feature the same character as it possesses in analogous ceremonies. But the most interesting aspect of the ceremony is only brought out when we connect it with a fact which I have hitherto kept in the background, because its significance depends on a theory of piacular and mystic sacrifice which is not yet generally accepted. A sheep, or a sheep's head, is a religious symbol of constant occurrence on Cyprian coins; and some of these coins show us a figure, which experts declare to be that of Aphrodite, clinging to the neck and fleece of a running ram. This device has been compared with others, which appear to be Eastern though not Cyprian,

in which Aphrodite rides on a ram (see De Luynes, *Num. Cypr.* Pl. v. 3, vi. 5, and the references in Stephani, *Compte-rendu* for 1869, p. 87). The inference is that in Cyprus the sheep was the sacred animal of Aphrodite-Astarte. In this connection it is important to note that the sheep is of frequent occurrence on Semitic votive cippi of the class dedicated to Tanith (a form of Astarte) and Baal-Ḥammān. Examples will be found in *CIS.* Pt. I. Nos. 398, 419, and in a cippus from Sulci, figured in Perrot and Chipiez, iii. 253. The figures on this class of cippi are of various kinds, and sometimes convey allusions to sacrifices (*CIS.* p. 282 *sq.*), but it appears to have been essential to introduce a figure or symbol of the deity. And when animals are figured, they appear to be such symbols. Thus we find fish, which are known to have been sacred to Astarte, and forbidden food to her worshippers; a bull or cow couching, the symbol of the Sidonian Astarte; the elephant, which was not a sacrifice; the horse, which appears so often on the coins of Carthage, and is certainly a divine symbol, as it is sometimes winged. On these analogies I conclude that among the Carthaginians, as in Cyprus, the sheep was sacred to and symbolic of Astarte. To speak quite exactly, one ought to say to a particular type of Astarte; for as this goddess, in the progress of syncretism so characteristic of Semitic religion, absorbed a great number of local types, she had a corresponding multiplicity of sacred animals, each of which was prominent at particular sanctuaries or in particular rites. Thus the dove-Aphrodite is specially associated with Ascalon, and the Cow-goddess with Sidon, where she was identified with Europa, the bride of the bull-Zeus (*Dea Syria*, iv.), and, according to Philo Byblius, placed the head of a bull upon her own. The sheep-Astarte is another type, but it also seems to have its original home in Canaan, for in Deut. vii. 13 the produce of the flock is called "the Ashtaroth of the sheep." A phrase like this, which has descended from religion into ordinary life, and is preserved among the monotheistic Hebrews, is very old evidence for the association of Astarte with the sheep; and it is impossible to explain it except by frankly admitting that Astarte, in one of her types, had originally the form of a sheep, and was a sheep herself, just as in other types she was a dove or a fish.

To this it may be objected that the ram or sheep is not the symbol of Tanith, but of the associated male deity Baal-Ḥammān, who in a terra-cotta of the Barre collection (Perrot et Chipiez, iii,

73) is represented with ram's horns, and laying his hand on the head of a sheep. But the inscription (*CIS.* No. 419), cited above, is dedicated to Tanith, not to Tanith and Baal-Ḥammān conjointly, from which it appears that the accompanying symbol was appropriate to the goddess as well as to her male partner.

It is reasonable that the same animal symbol should belong to the male and female members of a syzygy; and in the case of a goddess who was often represented as androgynous, it is not even necessary to suppose that her symbol would be the ewe and her partner's the ram. But in fact the sheep-symbols on the Tanith cippi, which are commonly called rams, are hornless, and so presumably stand for ewes. On the other hand, all wild sheep and many domestic breeds are horned in both sexes, so that there is no difficulty about a horned Sheep-goddess. The triangle surmounted by a circle, with horns bent outwards, which is commonly found on Tanith cippi, is probably a symbol of the god or the goddess indifferently. And here the horns, being concave outwards, can neither be bull's horns nor the horns of the crescent moon, but must be the horns of sheep.

The Cypriote coins of Aphrodite, in which she clings in a swimming attitude to a running ram, recall the legend of Helle and the golden ram, but they also are obviously parallel to the type of Europa and the bull. On this analogy we ought to remember that the male god specially associated with the ram is Hermes, and that the Cyprian goddess was worshipped in an androgynous form, to which Theophrastus gives the name of Hermaphroditus. I have already cited this androgynous character to explain why the Paphian (and apparently the Punic) Aphrodite preferred male victims; it now supplies an additional reason for supposing that it was the androgynous or bearded Astarte that was specially connected with the ram. On one of the cippi already cited, in which Tanith is figured under the symbol of a sheep (*CIS.* 419), the inscription is not, as usually, "to the Lady Tanith," but "to my Lord Tanith." If this is not a sculptor's error it points in the same direction. And it seems not unlikely that the standing title, תנת פן בעל, which has given rise to so much discussion, means nothing more than Tanith with Baal's face—the bearded goddess.

If, now, the Cyprian goddess was a Sheep-deity, our rite presents us with a piacular sacrifice in which priests, disguised as sheep, offer to the Sheep-goddess an animal of her own kind. The

ceremony, therefore, is exactly parallel to the Roman Lupercalia, a purificatory sacrifice to Faunus under the name of Lupercus. The image of Lupercus at the Lupercal was naked, and was clad in a goat-skin (Justin, xliii. 1. 7). Here, at the great lustration of 15th February, the Luperci, who have the same name as their god, sacrifice goats and run about the city naked, daubed with mud and girt with goat-skins, applying to the women who desire to participate in the benefits of the rite strokes of thongs which were cut from the skins of the victims, and were called *februa*. Both sacrifices are complete types of that most ancient form of sacramental and piacular mystery in which the worshippers attest their kinship with the animal-god, and offer in sacrifice an animal of the same kind, which, except on these mystical occasions, it would be impious to bring upon the altar.

ADDITIONAL NOTE H (p. 315)

FURTHER REMARKS ON THE BLOOD COVENANT

An evidence for the survival among the Arabs of the form of covenant described by Herodotus, in which blood is drawn from the parties themselves, seems to lie in the expression *miḥāsh*, "scarified," for "confederates" (Nābigha, xxiv. 1, ed. Ahlw. = xvii. 1, ed. Derenb.). Goldziher, in an interesting review of my *Kinship* (*Litbl. f. or. Phil.* 1886, p. 25 [see *Kin.*[2] 58, n. 1]), thinks the term properly means "the burnt ones," which is the traditional interpretation, and suggests that we have in it an example of a covenant by fire, such as Jauharī (see Wellh.[1] p. 124) and Nowairī (Rasm., *Add.* p. 75, l. 11 *sqq.*) speak of under the head of *nār al-hūla*. It does not, however, seem that in the latter case the fire touched the parties; what we are told is that every tribe had a sacred fire, and that, when two men (obviously two tribesmen) had a dispute, they were made to swear beside the fire, while the priests cast salt on it. An oath by ashes and salt is mentioned by Al-A'shā in a line cited by Wellhausen from *Agh.* xx. 139, and as the ashes of the cooking pot (*ramād al-cidr*) are a metonym for hospitality, there is perhaps nothing more in the

oath by fire and salt than an appeal to the bond of common food that unites tribesmen. This does not indeed fully account for the fact that the fire is called "the fire of terror," and that the poetical references to it show the oath to have really been a terrible one, *i.e.* dangerous to the man that perjured himself; but it is to be remembered that, according to Arabian belief, a man who broke an oath of purgation was likely to die by divine judgment (Bokhārī, iv. 219 *sq.*, viii. 40 *sq.*). I think, therefore, that in the present state of the evidence we must not attempt to connect the *miḥāsh* with the *nār al-hūla*. If the former term really means "burnt ones," we must rather suppose that the reference is to the practice of branding with the tribal mark or *wasm* (which is also called *nār*, Rasm., *Add.* p. 76); for we learn from *Agh.* vii. 110, l. 26, that the *wasm* was sometimes applied to men as well as to cattle. But ماحش primarily means "to scarify," and as it is plain from the article in the *Lisān* that the traditional explanation of the word was uncertain, I take it that the best and most natural view is to interpret *miḥāsh* as "scarified ones."

In process of time the Arabs came to use various substitutes for the blood of covenant, *e.g. robb*, *i.e.* inspissated fruit juice (or perhaps the lees of clarified butter), perfumes, and even holy water from a sacred spring (*Kinship*, p. 259; Wellh.[1] p. 121). In all these cases we can still see that there was something about the substitute which made it an equivalent for blood. As regards "living water," this is obvious from what has been said in Lecture V. p. 173 *sqq.* on the holiness of sacred springs. Again, perfumes were habitually used in the form of unguents; and unguents—primarily sacred suet—are equivalent to blood, as has appeared in Lecture X. p. 383 *sqq.* If *robb* in this connection means lees of butter, the use of it in covenant making is explained by the sacredness of unguents; but if, as the traditions imply, it is fruit juice, we must remember that, in other cases also, vegetable juices are looked upon as a kind of blood (*supra*, pp. 133, 230). Compare what Lydus, *De mensibus*, iv. 29, says of the use of bean juice for blood in a Roman ceremony, with the explanation that the bean (κύαμος) κύει αἷμα: the whole passage is notable, and helps to explain the existence of a bean-clan, the *gens Fabia*, at Rome; cf. also the Attic hero Κυαμίτης.

The Hebrew phrase כרת ברית, "to make (*literally*, to cut) a covenant," is generally derived from the peculiar form of sacrifice mentioned in Gen. xv., Jer. xxxiv. 18, where the victim is cut in

twain and the parties pass between the pieces; and this rite again is explained as a symbolic form of imprecation, as if those who ★ swore to one another prayed that, if they proved unfaithful, they might be similarly cut in pieces. But this does not explain the characteristic feature in the ceremony—the passing between the pieces; and, on the other hand, we see from Ex. xxiv. 8, "this is the blood of the covenant which Jehovah hath cut with you," that the dividing of the sacrifice and the application of the blood to both parties go together. The sacrifice presumably was divided into two parts (as in Ex. *l.c.* the blood is divided into two parts), when both parties joined in eating it; and when it ceased to be eaten, the parties stood between the pieces, as a symbol that they were taken within the mystical life of the victim. This interpretation is confirmed by the usage of Western nations, who practised the same rite with dogs and other extraordinary victims, as an atoning or purificatory ceremony; see the examples collected by Bochart, *Hierozoicon*, lib. ii. capp. 33, 56. There are many examples of a sacrifice being carried, or its blood sprinkled, round the place or persons to which its efficacy is to extend.

ADDITIONAL NOTE I (p. 333)

THE TABOOS INCIDENT TO PILGRIMAGES AND VOWS

The subject of the taboos, or sacred restrictions, imposed on a pilgrim or other votary, is important enough to deserve a detailed examination. These restrictions are sometimes optional, so that they have to be expressed when the vow is taken; at other times they are of the nature of fixed and customary rules, to which every one who takes a vow is subject. To the latter class belong, *e.g.* the restrictions imposed upon every Arab pilgrim—he must not cut or dress his hair, he must abstain from sexual intercourse, and from bloodshed and so forth; to the former class belong the special engagements to which the Hebrews give the name of *ĕsār* or *issār* (obligatio), *e.g.* Ps. cxxxii. 3 *sq.*, "I will not enter my house or sleep on my bed until," etc.; Acts xxiii. 14, "We will not eat until we have killed Paul." It is to be observed that

restrictions of the optional class are evidently more modern than the other, and only come in when the fixity of ancient custom begins to break down; in old Arabia it was the rule that one who was engaged on a blood-feud must abstain from women, wine and unguents, but in the time of the prophet we find these abstinences made matter of special engagements, *e.g.* Wācidī, ed. Kremer, 182. 6 = Ibn Hishām, 543. 8; *Agh.* vi. 99. 24, 30. Where the engagement is optional, it naturally assumes the character of an incentive to prompt discharge of the vow; the votary stimulates his own zeal by imposing on himself abstinence from certain of the comforts of life till his task is discharged; see Marzūcī as quoted by Reiske, Abulfeda, vol. i. p. 18 of the *Adnotationes*, where the phrase *mā taktarithu 'l-nafsu bihi* may be compared with the אסר לענות נפש of Num. xxx. 14. But the stated abstinences which go as a matter of course with certain vows cannot be explained on this principle, and when they are examined in detail it becomes manifest that they are simply taboos incident to a state of consecration, the same taboos, in fact, which are imposed, without a vow, on everyone who is engaged in worship or priestly service in the sanctuary, or even everyone who is present in the holy place. Thus the Hebrew Nazarite was required to abstain from wine, and from uncleanness due to contact with the dead, and the same rules applied to priests, either generally or when they were on service (Lev. x. 9, xxi. 1 *sqq.*). Again, the taboo on sexual intercourse which lay on the Arabian pilgrim applies, among the Semites generally, to everyone who is engaged in an act of worship or present in a holy place (see above, p. 454); and the prohibition of bloodshed, and therefore also of hunting and killing game, is only an extension of the general rule that forbids bloodshed on holy ground. Further, when the same taboos that attach to a pilgrim apply also to braves on the war-path, and especially to men who are under a vow of blood-revenge (*Diw. Hodh.* cvi. 14), it is to be remembered that with the Semites, and indeed with all primitive peoples, war is a sacred function, and the warrior a consecrated person (cf. pp. 402, 455). The Arabic root *ḥalla* (Heb. חלל) applied to the discharge (*lit.* the untying) of a vow, is the same which is regularly used of emergence from a state of taboo (the *iḥrām*, the *'idda* of widowhood, etc.) into ordinary life.

Wellhausen observes that the Arabic *nadhara* and the Hebrew נזר both mean primarily "to consecrate." In an ordinary vow a

man consecrates some material thing, in the vow of pilgrimage or war he consecrates himself for a particular purpose. The Arabs have but one root to express both forms of vow, but in Hebrew and Syriac the root is differentiated into two: נדר, ܢܕܪ, "to vow," but נזיר, ܢܙܝܪ, "a consecrated person." The Syriac *nĕzīr*, notwithstanding its medial *z*, is not a mere loan-word from the Old Testament, but is applied, for example, to maidens consecrated to the service of Belthis (Is. Ant. i. 212, l. 130).

In the case of pilgrimage, it seems that the votary consecrates himself by devoting his hair, which is part of himself, as an offering at the sanctuary. Whether the consecration of the warrior was originally effected in the same way, and the discharge of the vow accomplished by means of a hair-offering, can only be matter of conjecture, but is at least not inconceivable. If it was so, the deity to whom the hair was dedicated must have been the kindred god of the clan, who alone, in primitive religion, could be conceived as interested in the avenging of the tribal blood; and we may suppose that the hair-offering of the warriors took place in connection with the "sacrifice of the home-comers," to be spoken of in Note M, *infra*. It must, however, be observed that all over the world the head and hair of persons under taboo are peculiarly sacred and inviolable, and that the primitive notions about the hair as a special seat of life, which have been spoken of at p. 324, are quite sufficient to account for this, without reference to the hair-offering, which is only one out of many applications of these ideas. It is easy, for example, to understand why, if an important part of the life resides in the hair, a man whose whole life is consecrated—*e.g.* a Maori chief, or the Flamen Dialis, or in the Semitic field such a person as Samuel or Samson—should either be forbidden to cut his hair at all, or should be compelled, when he does so, to use special precautions against the profanation of the holy growth. From Ezek. xliv. 20 we may conclude that some Semitic priests let their hair grow unpolled, like Samuel, and that others kept it close shaved, like the priests of Egypt; both usages may be explained on a single principle, for the risk of profaning the hair could be met by not allowing it to grow at all, as well as by not allowing it to be touched. Among the Hebrews, princes as well as priests were consecrated persons, and *nazīr* sometimes means a prince, while *nezer*, "consecration," means "a diadem." As a diadem is in its origin nothing more than a fillet to confine hair that is worn long, I apprehend that

in old times the hair of Hebrew princes, like that of a Maori chief, was taboo, and that Absalom's long locks (2 Sam. xiv. 26) were the mark of his political pretensions, and not of his vanity. When the hair of a Maori chief was cut, it was collected and buried in a sacred place or hung on a tree; and it is noteworthy that Absalom's hair was cut annually at the end of the year—*i.e.* in the sacred season of pilgrimage, and that it was collected and weighed, which suggests a religious rite similar to that mentioned by Herod. ii. 65.

While the general principle is clear, that the restrictions laid on persons under a vow were originally taboos, incident to a state of consecration, it is not to be supposed that we can always explain these taboos in detail; for, in the absence of direct evidence, it is often almost impossible for modern men to divine the workings of the primitive mind.

Something, however, may be said about two or three rules which seem, at first sight, to lend colour to the notion that the restrictions are properly privations, designed to prevent a man from delaying to fulfil his vow. The Syrian pilgrim, during his whole journey, was forbidden to sleep on a bed. With this rule Wellhausen compares the custom of certain Arabs, who, during the *iḥrām*, did not enter their houses by the door, but broke in from behind,—a practice which is evidently an evasive modification of an older rule that forbade the house to be entered at all. The link required to connect the Syrian and Arabian rules is supplied by Ps. cxxxii. 3, and with the latter may also be compared the refusal of Uriah to go down to his house during a campaign (2 Sam. xi. 11), and perhaps also the Hebrew usage of living in booths at the Feast of Tabernacles, to which there are many parallels in ancient religion. From the point of view of taboo, this rule is susceptible of two interpretations: it may either be a precaution against uncleanness, or be meant to prevent the house and bed from becoming taboo, and unfit for profane use, by contact with the consecrated person. In favour of the second view may be cited the custom of Tahiti, where the kings habitually abstained from entering an ordinary house, lest it should become taboo, and be lost to its owner. However this may be, the Syrian practice can hardly be separated from the case of priests like the Selli at Dodona, who were ἀνιπτόποδες χαμαιεῦναι, nor the rule against entering a house from the similar restriction imposed on the religious order of the Rechabites (Jer. xxxv. 9 *sq.*). The

Rechabites, like the Nazarites and Arabian votaries, abstained also from wine, and the same abstinence was practised by Egyptian priests (Porph., *De Abst.* iv. 6) and by the Pythagoreans, whose whole life was surrounded by a network of taboos. These parallels leave no doubt that the rule of abstinence is not an arbitrary privation, but a taboo incident to the state of consecration. From Judg. xiii. 4 it would seem that fermented drinks fall into the same class with unclean meats; compare the prohibition of ferments in sacrifice. Again, the Arabian rule against washing or anointing the head is not ascetic, but is simply a consequence from the inviolability of the head, which must not be touched in a way that might detach hairs. The later Arabs did not fully understand these rules, as appears from the variations of the statements by different authorities about one and the same vow; cf., for example, the references given at the beginning of this note for the vow of Abū Sofyān. Finally, the peculiar dress prescribed to the Arabian pilgrim is no doubt a privation to the modern Moslem, but the dress is really nothing else than the old national garb of Arabia, which became sacred under the influence of religious conservatism, combined with the principle already explained (*supra*, p. 451), that a man does not perform a sacred function in his everyday clothes, for fear of making them taboo.

ADDITIONAL NOTE K (pp. 379, 384)

THE ALTAR AT JERUSALEM

That there was always an altar of some kind before the temple at Jerusalem might be taken for granted, even without the express mention of it in 2 Kings xi. 11, xii. 9 [10], (1 Kings viii. 22, 54); but this passage throws no light on the nature of the altar. Let us consider separately (*a*) the altar of burnt-offering, (*b*) the brazen altar.

(*a*) According to 1 Kings x. 25, Solomon *built* an altar of burnt-offering, and offered on it three times a year. A built altar is an altar of stone, such as Ahaz's altar and the altar of the second temple were. There is no other trace of the existence of

such an altar before the time of Ahaz, and the verse, which is omitted by the Septuagint, belongs to a series of fragmentary notices, which form no part of the original narrative of Solomon's reign, and are of various dates and of uncertain authority. Apart from this passage, we first read of a built altar in 2 Kings xvi., viz. that which Ahaz erected on the model of the altar (*i.e.* the chief altar) at Damascus. Ahaz's innovation evidently proved permanent, for the altar of the second temple was also a platform of stone. According to the Massoretic text of 2 Kings xvi. 14, as it is usually translated, a brazen altar was removed to make way for Ahaz's altar, but this sense is got by straining a corrupt text; ויקרב cannot govern the preceding accusative, and to get sense we must either omit את המזבח at the beginning of the verse or read על for את. The former course, which has the authority of the LXX., seems preferable; but in either case it follows that we must point וַיִּקְרַב, and that the whole verse is an elaborate description of the new ritual introduced by the king. The passage in fact now runs thus (ver. 12): "The king went up upon the new altar (ver. 13) and burned his holocaust and his cereal oblation, and poured out his libation; and he dashed the blood of the peace-offerings that were for himself against the altar (ver. 14) of brass that was before Jehovah, and drew nigh from before the *naos*, between the *naos* and the (new) altar (cf. Ezek. viii. 16; Joel ii. 17) and applied it (*i.e.* some of the blood) to the northern flank of the altar." The brazen altar, therefore, stood quite close to the *naos*, and the new altar stood somewhat further off, presumably in the middle of the court, which since Solomon's time had been consecrated as the place of burnt-offering. Further, it appears that the brazen altar was essentially an altar for the sprinkling of blood; for the king dashes the blood of his *shelāmīm* against it before applying the blood to the new altar. But, according to ver. 15, he ordains that in future the blood of sacrifices shall be applied to the new or great altar, while the brazen altar is reserved for one particular kind of offering by the king himself (לי לבקר, E.V. "for me to inquire by"). The nature of this offering is not clear from the words used in ver. 15, but from ver. 14 it appears that it consisted of *shelāmīm* offered by the king in person. In short, the old altar is not degraded but reserved for special use; henceforth none but the king himself is to pour sacrificial blood upon it.

(*b*) It appears, then, that the brazen altar was an ancient and

sacred thing, which had existed long before Ahaz, and continued after his time. Yet there is no separate mention of a brazen altar either in the description of Solomon's temple furniture (1 Kings vii.) or in the list of brazen utensils carried off by the Chaldæans. The explanation suggested by Wellhausen (*Prolegomena*, Eng. tr., p. 44, n. 1), that the making of the brazen altar has been omitted from 1 Kings vii. by some redactor, who did not see the need of a new brazen altar in addition to that which the priestly author of the Pentateuch ascribes to Moses, does not fully meet the case, and I can see no way out of the difficulty except to suppose that the brazen altar of 2 Kings xvi. is identical with one of the two pillars Jachin and Boaz. In the old time there was no difference between an altar and a sacred stone or pillar, and the brazen pillars are simply the ancient sacred stones—which often occur in pairs—translated into metal. Quite similarly in Strabo (iii. 5. 5), the brazen pillars of Hercules at Gades, which were twelve feet high, are the place at which sailors do sacrifice. Of course an altar of this type belongs properly to the old fireless type of sacrifice; but so long as the holocaust was a rare offering, it was not necessary to have a huge permanent hearth altar; it was enough to erect from time to time a pyre of wood in the middle of the court. It is true that 2 Kings xvi. speaks only of one brazen altar used for the sprinkling of the sacrificial blood, but it is intelligible that usage may have limited this function to one of the two pillars.

I am inclined therefore to think that the innovation of Ahaz lay in the erection of a permanent altar hearth, and in the introduction of the rule that in ordinary cases this new altar should serve for the blood ritual as well as for the fire ritual. One can thus understand the fulness with which the ritual of the new altar is described, for the rule of Ahaz was that which from his time forward was the law of the sanctuary of Jerusalem. I feel, however, that there still remains a difficulty as regards the burning of the fat of the *shelāmīm*, which was practised in Israel even before the royal period (1 Sam. ii. 16). In great feasts it would appear that the fat of ordinary offerings was burned, along with the holocaust, on the pavement of the court (1 Kings viii. 64), but what was done with it on other occasions it is not so easy to say. It is very noteworthy, however, that the details of the capitals of the brazen pillars are those of huge candlesticks or cressets. They had bowls (1 Kings vii. 41) like those of the

golden candlestick (Zech. iv. 3), and gratings like those of an altar hearth. They seem therefore to have been built on the model of those altar candlesticks which we find represented on Phœnician monuments; see *CIS.* Pt. I. pl. 29, and Perrot and Chipiez, *Hist. de l'Art*, vol. iii. figs. 81 *sqq.* The similarity to a candlestick, which strikes us in the description of the Hebrew pillars, is also notable in the twin detached pillars which are represented on coins as standing before the temple at Paphos. See the annexed figure. Similar cressets, with worshippers before them in the act of adoration, are figured on Assyrian engraved stones; see, for example, Menant, *Glyptique Orient.* vol. ii. fig. 46. In most of the Assyrian examples it is not easy to draw the line between the candelabrum and the sacred tree crowned with a star or crescent moon. The Hebrew pillar altars had also associations with the sacred tree, as appears from their adornment of pomegranates, but so had the golden candlestick, in which the motive of the ornament was taken from the almond tree (Ex. xxxvii. 17 *sqq.*).

It seems difficult to believe that the enormous pillars of Solomon's temple, which, if the measures are not exaggerated, were twenty-seven feet high, were actually used as fire altars; but if they were, the presumption is that the cressets were fed with the suet of the sacrifices. And perhaps this is after all a less violent supposition than that the details of a Phœnician altar candelabrum were reproduced in them in a meaningless way. At any rate there can be no doubt that one type of fire altar among the Phœnicians and Assyrians was a cresset rather than a hearth, and as this type comes much nearer to the old cippus than the broad platform fitted to receive a holocaust, I fancy that it must be regarded as the oldest type of fire altar. In other words, the permanent fire altar began by adding to the sacred stone an arrangement for consuming the fat of ordinary sacrifices, at a time when holocausts were still burned on a pyre. If the word "Ariel," "hearth of El," originally meant such a pillar altar, we get rid of a serious exegetical difficulty in 2 Sam. xxiii. 20; for on this view it will appear that Benaiah's exploit was to overthrow the twin fire pillars of the national sanctuary of Moab—an act which in these days probably needed more

courage than to kill two "lion-like men," as the English Version has it. On the stele of Mesha (l. 12), an *Ariel* appears as something that can be moved from its place, which accords with the view now suggested. Compare the twin pillars of the Tyrian Baal, one of which shone by night (Herod. ii. 44). It will be observed that this line of argument lends some plausibility to Grotius's suggestion that the *ḥammānīm* of Isa. xvii. 8, xxvii. 9, etc., are πυρεῖα.

Finally, it may be noted that Amos ix. 1 becomes far more intelligible if the altar at Bethel was a pillar crowned by a sort of capital bearing a bowl like those at Jerusalem. For then it will be the altar itself that is overthrown, as the context and the parallelism of chap. iii. 14 seem to require: "smite the capital till the bowls ring again, and dash them in pieces on the heads of the worshippers."

[See G. B. Gray, *Sacrifice in the Old Testament*, 130 *sqq.* (Oxford, 1925).]

ADDITIONAL NOTE L (p. 387)

HIGH PLACES

In the text of the lectures I have tried to work out the history of the fire altar, and show how the place of slaughter and the pyre ultimately met in the altar hearth. In the present note I will give some reasons for thinking that the gradual change of view, which made the burning and not the slaughter the chief thing in sacrifice, also left its mark in another way, by influencing the choice of places for worship.

It has been observed in Lecture V. (p. 172) that the sanctuaries of the Northern Semites commonly lay outside and above the town. This does not seem to have been the case in Arabia, where, on the contrary, most sanctuaries seem to have lain in moist hollows, beside wells and trees. And even in the Northern Semitic lands we have found traces of sanctuaries beside fountains, beneath the towns, which were older than the high places on the hills. At Jerusalem the sanctity of Gihon and En-rogel is older than that of the waterless plateau of Zion above the town.

Now, in the discussion of the natural marks of holy places, we

saw how well-watered spots, thickets and the like, might naturally come to be taken as sanctuaries, and we also found it to be intelligible that mountain ranges should be holy tracts; but we have not found any natural reason for fixing a sanctuary on a bare and barren eminence. It is often supposed that altars were built on such spots because they were open to the heaven, and nearer than other points of earth to the heavenly gods; but this explanation takes a great deal for granted that we have no right to assume. On the other hand, if the explanation of the origin of burnt-offering given above is correct, it is obvious that the barren and unfrequented hill-top above a town would be one of the most natural places to choose for burning the holocaust. In process of time a particular point on the hill would become the established place of burning, and, as soon as the burnt flesh began to be regarded as a food-offering presented to the deity, the place of burning would be itself a sanctuary. Ultimately it would become the chief sanctuary of the town, and be fitted up with all the ancient apparatus of sacred posts and sacrificial pillars.

That the high places, or hill sanctuaries, of the Semites were primarily places of burnt-sacrifice cannot be proved by direct evidence, but may, I think, be made probable, quite apart from the argument that has just been sketched. In Arabia we read of only one sanctuary that had "a place of burning," and this is the hill of Cozah at Mozdalifa. Among the Hebrews the sacrifice of Isaac takes place on a mountain (Gen. xxii. 2), and so does the burnt-sacrifice of Gideon. The annual mourning on the mountains at Mizpah in Gilead must have been connected with a sacrifice on the mountains, which, like that of Laodicea, was thought to represent an ancient human sacrifice (Judg. xi. 40). In Isa. xv. 2 the Moabites in their distress go up to the high places to mourn, and presumably to offer atoning holocausts. It is to offer burnt-sacrifice that Solomon visits the high place at Gibeon (1 Kings iii. 4), and in general, קטר, "to burn sacrificial flesh" (not as E.V., "to burn incense"), is the usual word applied to the service of the high places. A distinction between a high place (*bāma*) and an altar (*mizbeăḥ*) is acknowledged in the Old Testament down to the close of the kingdom (2 Kings xxiii. 15; Isa. xxxvi. 7); but ultimately *bāma* is the name applied to any idolatrous shrine or altar.

ADDITIONAL NOTE M (p. 403)

SACRIFICE BY VICTORIOUS WARRIORS

According to Abū 'Obaida, the Arabs, after a successful foray, sacrificed one beast from the spoil, and feasted upon it before the division of the booty (*Ḥam.* p. 458; Reiske, *An. Musl.* i. 26 *sqq.* of the notes; cf. *Lisān*, x. 240). This victim is called *nacī'a*, or more fully *nacī'at al-coddām*, "the *nacī'a* of the home-comers." The verb نَقَعَ is used generally of sacrificing for a guest, but its primary sense is to split or rend, so that the name of *nacī'a* seems to denote some peculiar way of killing the victim. Now it appears from the narrative of Nilus that the victims of the Saracens were derived from the choicest part of the booty, from which they selected for sacrifice, by preference a handsome boy, or, if no boys had been captured, a white and immaculate camel. The camel exactly corresponds to the *nacī'a* of the Arabs, and the name probably means a victim torn to pieces in the way described by Nilus It seems probable, therefore, that the sacrifice made for warriors on their return from a foray was not an ordinary feast, but an antique rite of communion, in which the victim was a sacred animal, or might even be an actual man.

That the warriors on their return should unite in a solemn act of service is natural enough; the thing falls under the same category with the custom of shaving one's head at the sanctuary on returning from a journey, and is, in its oldest meaning, simply a retying of the sacred links of common life, which may have grown weak through absence from the tribal seat. But of course a sacrifice of this kind would in later times appear to be piacular or lustral, and accordingly, in the Levitical law, an elaborate purification is prescribed for warriors returning from battle, before they are allowed to re-enter their homes (Num. xxxi. 19 *sqq.*). In ancient Arabia, on the other hand, where warriors were under the same taboos as a man engaged on pilgrimage, the *nacī'a* was no doubt the means of untying the taboo, and so returning to ordinary life.

These remarks enable us to put the sacrifice of captives, or of certain chosen captives, in a somewhat clearer light. This sacrifice is not an act of blood-revenge, for revenge is taken in hot blood on the field of battle. The captive is simply, as Nilus

puts it, the choicest part of the prey, chosen for a religious purpose; and the custom of preferring a human victim to a camel is probably of secondary growth, like other customs of human sacrifice. It seems, however, to be very ancient, for Saul undoubtedly spares Agag in order that he may be sacrificed, and Samuel actually accomplishes this offering by slaying him "before the Lord" in Gilgal. And in this, as in other cases of human sacrifice, the choice of an alien instead of a tribesman is not of the essence of the rite, for Jephthah looses his vow on his return from smiting the Ammonites by the sacrifice of his own daughter.

According to the Arabian lexicographers, the term *nacī'a* may be applied to sacrifices made on various occasions other than return from war, *e.g.* to a coronation feast, or that which a man makes for his intimates on his marriage; while ultimately the word appears to assume a very general sense, and to be applied to any slaughter to entertain a guest. For the occasions on which the Arabs were wont to kill a victim, which are very much the same as those on which slaughter of the sacred cattle is permitted by African peoples (*supra*, p. 298), note the verse cited in *Lisān*, vi. 226, x. 240 (and with a variation, *Tāj*, v. 519, l. 2), where the desirable meats include the *khors*, the *'idhār*, and the *nacī'a*. The first, which is the name applied to the broth given to women in child-bed, denotes also the feast made at a birth; the *'idhār* is the feast at a circumcision. In *Journ. Phil.* xiv. 124, I have connected the *khors* with the Hebrew חרשים, "charms." Charmed food is of course primarily holy food.

NOTES TO THE THIRD EDITION

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NOTES TO THE THIRD EDITION

P. 1. The Semites.[1]—The term, conveniently applied to the group of closely related peoples occupying a well-defined area (see p. 5 *sq.*), is derived from a classification in Gen. x. which is neither ethnographical nor linguistic, but, rather, political or cultural. So, the very intimate connexion between Egypt and the Phœnician coast (and notably the city of Gebal or Byblus) goes back to the third millennium B.C.; the history of Elam was powerfully influenced by its western (Semitic) neighbours, and the combination of Elam and Lud (p. 6)—which were naturally connected by the trade route between Susa and Sardes—could be justified at all events when both were under Assyrian domination in the seventh century B.C. (see G. R. Driver, p. 76). As regards the Hittites and Philistines (p. 10 *sq.*), what is now known of the Hatti in Asia Minor and of the Ægean civilization has opened new chapters in history. The influence of both upon Syria and Palestine can be clearly recognized; and "non-Semitic" though the Ægeans and Hittites were, it is not incorrect, on the strength of the Aramaic inscriptions found in North Syria and the references to the Philistines and Hittites in the Old Testament, to agree that on settling down they were speedily "Semitized."[2] As a matter of fact, it is simpler to determine Semitic *language* than Semitic *culture*, and the term is preferably used as a purely linguistic one.[3] There is less readiness now to look for "Phœnician" influence, for example, in Caria (p. 175 n. 2 end), or Lycia (p. 178 n. 4 end), or Delos (pp. 200 n. 1, 202 n. 1), or to discern it in the sacrifice of swine at Argus and Pamphylia (p. 291 n. 1). The various problems of influence, Phœnician and other, are found to be much more complex. It is necessary to recognize (*a*) a very ancient and close interconnexion between the Semitic and other areas, and (*b*) a considerable similarity of custom throughout South-West Asia, Egypt, and along North Africa; and to allow for some decisive waves of influence

[1] See G. A. Barton, *Sketch of Semitic Origins, Social and Religious*, chs. i. ii. (New York, 1902); Lagrange, *Études sur les Religions Sémitiques*[2], ch. i. (Paris, 1905); Nöldeke, art. "Semitic Languages," *Ency. Brit.*[11] (1911); S. A. Cook, *Cambridge Ancient History*, i.[2] (1924), ch. v., and Bibliography, *ib.* p. 630 *sqq.*; G. R. Driver, *People and the Book*, ch. iii. (ed. Peake, 1925); and in general, F. Hommel, *Ethnologie und Geographie des Alten Orients* (Munich, 1926).

[2] See articles "Philistines" in *E.Bi.* and *Ency. Brit.*; *Camb. Anc. Hist.*, vol. ii. ch. xii., vol. iii. ch. vi.

[3] Richardson, *American Journ. of Sem. Lang.*, xli. 10.

passing more forcefully now in one direction and now in another.[1] The "comparative" method of research has brought to light most striking parallels among Semitic, Egyptian, Old Indian, Greek, and other beliefs and customs, and it is necessary to allow, as in the case of languages, for (1) actual borrowing, due to migration, trade, war, etc., (2) a common ancestry, whether more immediate and obvious or more remote and hypothetical, and (3) those elementary physiological and psychological processes which are admittedly the common possession of all mankind.

The *linguistic* relationship that has been claimed between (*a*) Semitic and Sumerian, and between (*b*) the latter and Bantu, or Chinese, or Turkish, or Basque, etc., is uncertain.[2] On the other hand, that between Semitic and Egyptian is self-evident and far more significant.[3] Besides a broad ethnological connexion between Semites and Hamites (cf. p. 298, and Seligman, *JRAI.* xliii. 593), there is close cultural affinity between the tribes of North Africa and Arabia, areas which are geologically one. And while natives of North-East Africa can freely cross over into South Arabia, the influence of Syrians, Arabs, and other "Semites" upon Egypt (and North-East Africa) has at one time or another been decisive. Indeed, just as Coptic betrays the influence, though of course at a relatively late date, of "exchanges with Semitic neighbours" (Griffith, *Ency. Brit.* ix. 60), so, at a very remote date, before the rise of the language we call "Egyptian," intercourse between Egypt and the Semitic area may account for the remarkable points of contact between the two linguistic types. A suggestive analogy may perhaps be furnished by Amharic, whose Semitic features "give one the impression of having been superimposed on an alien (possibly) Hamitic basis" (Ambruster, *Initia Amharica*, i. 2 *sq.*). This language has diverged more than any other known Semitic tongue from the old Semitic type. A non-Semitic mode of thought is blended

[1] Cf. S. Eitrem, *Opferritus und Voropfer der Griechen und Römer*, 2; the theory of direct borrowing does not explain the facts.

[2] See, for (*a*) Ball, *Proc. of the British Academy*, 1915, vii., and his commentary on Job (Oxford, 1922), especially Burney's Preface. For (*b*) cf. Drexel in the *Semaine d'Ethnologie Religieuse*, 1922 (Enghien, 1923), 171 *sqq.*, and the literature in C. Autran, *Sumérien et Indo-Européen* (1925).

[3] Erman (see F. Ll. Griffith in *Ency. Brit.* ix. 59 *sq.*); for other discussions see Nöldeke, *Ency. Brit.* xxiv. 619*d*, and his *Beitrage z. Semit. Sprachwissenschaft*, i. (1905), 29; W. F. Albright, "Notes on Egypto-Semitic Etymology," *AJSL.* xxxiv. 81–94, 215–55 (p. 97; the resemblance is closer with Assyrian and South Arabian than the other Semitic languages); A. Ember (*Oriens*, ii.); C. Brockelmann, *Grundriss der vergleich. Grammatik d. Semit. Sprachen*, i. (1908), 3 *sq.*; Hestermann, *Sprachen u. Völker i. Afrika*, viii. (1913), 221; for the older literature see Stübe, p. 6 n. 2.

with Semitic linguistic usage, so that Amharic construction is more difficult to the student of Semitic than to one ignorant of it. Apart from Arabic, no Semitic tongue is spoken by so large a number of people; and the rise and prominence of this partly Semitic and partly African language, suggest how, in a prehistoric age, long before the history of the Egyptian language can be traced, a Semitic wave could so influence the current language of North-East Africa as to account for the "Semitic" elements in the Egyptian language, and not the language alone. Such an hypothesis would at least be in accordance with known processes, whereas the theory of a single ancestor —an Egypto-Semitic linguistic type, and an Afrcan home of the Semites—goes beyond the available evidence, and relies upon too simple a view of the origin of parallels and analogies, linguistic and other. The search after ultimate origins, whether of races, or languages, or elements of culture or religion, lies outside the scope of scientific research; although theories of such origins are required by philosophical students.

The title and scope of the *Religion of the Semites* have sometimes been adversely criticized. The task of sketching the development of the main features of Semitic religion, or religions, is complicated by the evidence for the presence, within the Semitic area, of the most varied non-Semitic elements—Sumerian, Egyptian, Ægean, Hittite, and Iranian—before, to name a date, the Israelite monarchy. Moreover, even before this date Palestine and Syria possessed fairly high and well-organized systems of belief and practice, which would naturally influence Israelite or other tribes entering from the desert outside.[1] Consequently, the development of the religion of Israel, or rather of that of Palestine, which is so essential a part of the history of Semitic religion, now stands upon a new footing. Further, the conflicting claims of Arabia and of Babylonia-Assyria (see p. 13 *sq.*) have been repeatedly discussed; and, whereas Robertson Smith, with Wellhausen, Stade, and others, took the relatively simple conditions of Arabia for their starting-point, scholars now give more prominence to the abundant evidence for the antiquity and richness of the civilization of the old Mesopotamian lands.

But much of what Robertson Smith wrote is not only untouched, but can actually be supplemented by the Babylonian material.[2]

[1] On the pre-Israelite (or pre-monarchical) culture of Palestine, see *CAH.* ii. ch. xiii.

[2] See Lagrange, *Études sur les Religions Sémitiques*; Winckler and Zimmern, *Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament* (1903); R. Campbell Thompson, *Semitic Magic, its Origins and Development* (1908); A. Jeremias, *Handbuch d. altorient. Geisteskultur* (Leipzig, 1913), and especially the works of Jastrow.

Moreover, even as regards Arabia itself, he was fully aware of the higher culture in early Arabia to which the Minæan and Sabæan inscriptions testify, and he did not fail to point out that the Arabia of the old poets, the Arabia of the generations immediately preceding the rise of Islam, was one where the old religion was breaking up (p. 462), an age of extreme decadence and disintegration (pp. 46, 71, 282; cf. *Kinship*, p. 272 *sq.*). Similarly, there is an age of disintegration at and after the sweeping Assyrian conquests of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.: it is of the greatest importance for an estimate of the vicissitudes of Semitic religion (see pp. 35, 55, 65, 258, 358, 472). Further, the post-exilic Levitical sacrificial system is, in spite of its date, "primitive" (p. 240).[1] Properly speaking, nowhere can one find an absolutely *pure* society and an actually *primitive* stage of social and religious development. Theories of the development of religions naturally depend upon data selected from diverse social levels, of different ages, and at different stages of development; and Robertson Smith was concerned with the more permanent features, which "recur with striking uniformity" and "govern the evolution of faith and worship down to a late date" (p. 15; see the whole paragraph). Such features, he says, are of the greatest interest to the "philosophical student," and his method of inquiry—which has sometimes been misunderstood—leads to the more subtle problems of the science and theory of religion.

In the simpler life of Arabia, in contrast to the more complex and more sophisticated social systems of Babylonia and Assyria, Robertson Smith looks for the main elements of the religious life. Periods of decadence and disintegration manifest the lack of those factors that make for a coherent and progressive society; new creative ages reveal the pregnant ideas and beliefs which usher in new series of stages. So, "in many respects the religion of heathen Arabia . . . displays an extremely primitive type . . ." (p. 14). But this no more represents the actual primitive religion than "Classical Arabic," while preserving forms that have been further developed or have decayed in the cognate languages, represents the earliest form of Semitic.[2] The analogy is instructive. In certain respects the relation between modern Arab dialects and Classical Arabic resembles that between the old Semitic languages and their presumed ancestor. But in other respects the ancient South Arabian inscriptions (as might be expected) and also Hebrew and even Aramaic, are linguistically as well as historically older than Arabic. In Classical Arabic we find (after

[1] Jastrow (*Religious Belief in Bab. and Ass.*, 289 n.) comments on the preference in the Old Testament "for the lower form of culture over the higher."

[2] See *CAH.* i.[2] 188.

Nöldeke) an "excess of wealth," a modification of primitive forms, and a certain monotony that would not be found in a truly primitive tongue. Further, in the history of the Semitic languages similar processes recur as regards the decay of gutturals, the loss of case-endings, and the formation of the perfect; but in none of these examples are the genetic processes identical.

The facts of cultural development as a whole are obviously far more complex than those of language. They show that an essential similarity of type or process may lurk beneath the most striking differences, and that the points of resemblance and those of difference have each their own appropriate value. So, repeatedly a very similar attitude will recur in very different forms (*e.g.* the attitude to animals in totemism, theriomorphism, etc.). Again, a feature relatively primitive in some respects will recur amid conditions which in other respects are relatively advanced. Law and custom in the Old Testament represent a level sociologically less advanced than that in the earlier Babyonian code of Hammurabi, even as pre-Islamic Arabia is in various respects below the level of the Minæan and Sabæan culture. Finally, where genetic processes recur, the first step is neither absolutely primitive nor does it necessarily correspond in all respects to the first step elsewhere.[1] Accordingly, while Robertson Smith clearly admits the prominence of the "gift" idea in sacrifice, he is more concerned to determine the governing feature, namely, "communion," even as he considers the feeling of fear, however prominent in religion, to be less fundamental than the sentiment of kinship and alliance. But he no more attempts to reconstruct the actual primitive form of communion-sacrifice than one could venture to reconstruct, from the vicissitudes of the Semitic languages, the actual primitive and original Semitic tongue.

The history of the diverse elements of culture and of their interaction, as illustrated in the vicissitudes of an alphabet, or the textual history of manuscripts, or the development of a branch of learning, is excessively complicated. Only from the more intelligible and tangible examples can one hope to throw light upon those that are more obscure or abstruse. The Semitic languages themselves show how, as one goes back, the problems of origin increase in intricacy. The Classical Arabic, which stands at the head of a fairly long linguistic development, was once only one of other current Semitic dialects;

[1] To generalize: the process l^1, m^1, n^1, will recur in the form l^2, m^2, n^2, etc., and it may be possible to postulate an older L, M, N; but l^1, l^2, l^3, etc., although similar, are not identical; and the development l^1, l^2, l^3, etc., m^1, m^2, m^3, etc., is naturally not to be confused with l^1, m^1, n^1, etc. A common type of development is that symbolized by l^1, m^2, n^3.

and the Egyptian language, which has a much longer linguistic history, was once obviously neither Egyptian as known to us, and much less was it Semitic. Thus, the "Semites" as regards language and culture raise questions not merely of facts but of the treatment of facts, and Robertson Smith's leading theories soon involve questions of method. In the course of research one comes to see what problems seem tractable and what are insoluble, although the conditions of their solution may sometimes be recognized. The study of religion has become much more difficult in the thirty years and more that have elapsed since Robertson Smith's death, and it is symptomatic of the present situation that the rude totemism of Central Australia,[1] which has so remarkably confirmed his theory of the communion-sacrifice, has been regarded as "magic" rather than "religion," and, in any case, tends, along with much other new and important evidence, to force an entire reconsideration of the nature of "religion" and of its development.

P. 17 *sq.* MYTH AND RITUAL. — W. R. S.'s discussion of the relative value of myth and ritual is classical. As a general principle, religious ceremonial is prior to reflexion upon it, even as "political institutions are older than political theories" (p. 20). The practical religious life of a group is of greater value for the student than myth or dogma. The study of the "nature of the gods" is therefore of relatively less significance than is often recognized (p. 81 *sq.*); and, from the highest religious point of view no less than from the point of view of the critical study of religions, the really effective elements in a religion are not necessarily those that appear on the surface or are most clamant. Marett observes: "That ritual, or in other words a routine of external forms, is historically prior to dogma, was proclaimed years ago by W. R. S. and others; yet Social Anthropology is but to-day beginning to appreciate the psychological implications of this cardinal truth." [2] Similarly it has been remarked that the religious cult is "the centre which offers a relatively stable material upon which reflexion is exercised and out of which religious doctrines are fashioned. They express the meaning and value which the community attaches to its religious activity." [3]

When W. R. S. wrote he was protesting, as seems periodically to be necessary, against certain methods of interpreting myths.[4] There

[1] See, in the first instance, Sir Baldwin Spencer and F. J. Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia* (1899), and *Northern Tribes of Central Australia* (1904).

[2] R. R. Marett, *The Birth of Humility*, 13; cf. *Threshold of Religion*, ix. ("religion in its psychological aspect is, fundamentally, a mark of social behaviour").

[3] See more fully, G. Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion* (1914), 47 *sq.*

[4] Cf. Andrew Lang's notable article "Mythology" in the *Ency. Brit.*[11] vol. xix.

was the risk of going to another extreme and of making the distinction between myth and ritual too absolute; and since his day it has often been pointed out that myths are not necessarily derived from ritual, and that myth and ritual often react upon each other.[1] Numerous myths are undeniably of quite secondary value. They are based upon misunderstandings (*e.g.* of images, words, names); they are explanations of explanations, the key to an old tradition having been lost. Or they are the elaborate product of the more intelligent and sophisticated individuals, and are out of touch with the thought of the great mass of their contemporaries. Or they have been purified of earlier crudities; and fancy and imagination have played upon them, transforming them into a pleasing tale. But whether they acquire an antiquarian value in some cases or an æsthetic charm in others, the human interest of all such myths is not that which characterizes the myths of the simpler classes or communities. Thus, in Egypt it is instructive to contrast the homely myths of Osiris, Isis, and Horus, and the ideals of wifely affection and filial devotion which they contain, with those myths which reflect clearly enough political and theological tendencies to explain or simplify the interrelations of gods and of their domains.

"The myth that is an essential fact for the student of religion is that which enshrines some living religious idea or institution, or which proves the survival of some ritual or faith that belonged to an older system."[2] The ceremonial dance of certain North American Indians for the purpose of curing disease includes the dramatic rehearsal of a complicated myth which, in effect, invokes the unseen powers.[3] Frequently the recital of the god's great achievements is intended to strengthen the religion of the worshippers and encourage them to invoke or await his aid. Hence not only are the traditions of the god's deeds preserved, but knowledge is power, and to know how things happen is often felt to increase one's power (cf. Farnell, 190 *sq.*). And since there are occasions when talking about things brings them realistically to the mind, there are myths which are felt

[1] Reference may be made, *e.g.*, to D. G. Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, 112 *sq.* (New York, 1897); C. H. Toy, *Introd. to the History of Religions* (Boston, 1916), ch. vii.; and, most recently, Bronislaw Malinowski, *Myth in Primitive Psychology* (1926).

[2] R. Farnell, *Evolution of Religion*, 27. Malinowski (note above) illustrates myths as a direct expression of their subject-matter, statements of reality, products of a living faith, intimately connecting word and deed, legal charters, literature filling an emotional void—myths which are not, in any sense, mere theories, or merely intellectual explanations.

[3] Irving King, *The Development of Religion: a Study in Anthropology and Social Psychology*, 127 *sq.*

to be too "sacred" to be lightly mentioned. Thus, in a variety of ways the oral myths of a people will virtually correspond to the sacred writings of the more advanced stages of religion.[1] In general, when myth (belief, doctrine, etc.) and ritual (cult, etc.) converge or coalesce, it is at a stage prior to that where the myth is a more detached story or explanation, and is less in touch with its *milieu*. By "ritual" is meant properly what is social-religious and not solely religious. *Religious* ritual can undergo a change of value. No doubt the correct performance of such ritual was more important than a man's belief concerning its origin (p. 17); but empty ritual devoid of any organic meaning for the performer can hardly be of any psychological worth, nor can it, as such, lead to any progressive development.

Broadly speaking, myths deal with the powers of the gods, their life-history, and their past or present functions, and they range from the extremes of naïve anthropomorphism to the most highly specialized interests. They are specifically of *personal* interest, but, in general, they appeal differently to the different types of mind in normal mixed communities. Every myth admits of analysis. If by a myth is meant "a story of the gods, originating in an impression produced on the primitive mind by the more imposing phenomena of nature" (Skinner, *Genesis*, viii.), a distinction may be drawn between its value (*a*) for the light it throws upon ideas respecting the gods, and (*b*) as an example of the knowledge of its day. All myths reflect in varying forms and in varying degree the thought of their age, and for this reason they may be said to correspond, *mutatis mutandis*, to the more specialized types of literature of more advanced peoples. Especially instructive is the testimony of myths to characteristic modes of thought and regulative theories of the past. Among these is the "myth," if not, rather, the "theory," of a primitive Golden Age (see above, p. 300); and of particular importance for W. R. S.'s inquiry is the persistent conviction of an animal surrogate for an original human sacrifice (p. 365). Not unnaturally have writers sometimes spoken of certain recent sweeping theories as the modern representatives of the old-time "myth." Among such have been included the theory of a primitive "social contract (or compact)," "primitive promiscuity" (cf. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, 483), and even W. R. S.'s theory of the totem-sacrifice! Perhaps the common tendency to trace simple ancestries where peoples, languages, and the elements of civilizations are concerned is no less along the lines of early "mytho-

[1] Cf. Jane Harrison, *Themis*, 329; Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, 82 *sq.*, 101 (on the necessity of distinguishing between myths and fables).

logical" modes of thought.[1] In either case there is a tendency to go outside empirical data and to extend the explanation of a limited number of facts in order to cover larger fields. Obviously it is hazardous to look for clear-cut and more or less rationalized systems of belief and custom among communities who are devoid of the powers of reflexion, detachment, and systematization that characterize the modern mind; but all modern scientific or critical studies of the data of religion sooner or later pass from mere strings of facts to a treatment of them which betrays a conscious or unconscious philosophy of religion. The really important question is whether the philosophy or the methodology is the most effective one for the purpose. It must suffice to say that the most serious objections brought against W. R. S.'s methods (including his treatment of myth and ritual) appear to reflect theological or philosophical presuppositions and regulative principles opposed to his and no less in need of criticism.

The real value of the myth is to be tested by its place in the life and thought of its environment. At one time myth, ritual, and even ideas of gods, men, and the world are parts of one organic system; at another, they are no organic part of their environment, thought is more specialized, and there are specialized individuals. None the less, a purely secondary myth—just like some highly specialized theory—may contribute to a subsequent stage of development, while the rite, once an effective part of the life of a community and a guide for the modern interpreter, may become mechanical or fall out of touch with the movement of thought and thus lose the value it once had. Vicissitudes of this sort are always recurring in the actual history of religions, and, as W. R. S.'s argument shows, it is the constantly recurring stage, where myth and *social-religious* ritual are one and where the latter expresses the normal thought of the communty, which is of fundamental importance as a starting-point for the apprehension of the great permanent and pregnant steps in the history of religion.[2]

P. 31. Tentyra.—See *Ency. Brit.* s.v. "Dendera," and cf. Juvenal, *Sat.* xv. 35 *sqq.*, 75 *sq.*

P. 32. The Unity of Gods and Worshippers.—The idea of a social system embracing all aspects of life and thought—social, economic, political, and religious—and connecting gods and men,

[1] Cf. *CAH.* i.[2] 224 *sq.*, iii. 422 (on the "ancestor" of all alphabetical types), 425 *sq.*

[2] In a characteristic lecture, given in 1875, on "Theology and the Church" (*Lectures and Essays*, 309 *sqq.*), W. R. S. had already dealt with the relation between a living religion and a theology which is no longer in touch with the trend of thought; see the Introduction above.

stamps the whole book, and in the form in which W. R. S. develops it, is one of the most brilliant contributions to the study of religion.[1] Men are born into a system, an organism, a group-unit, which confers certain rights and entails certain obligations (p. 29). In every social group, with its common interests and aims, and dependent for its welfare on the welfare of its members, there is a moral and ethical unity. Early societies often have very definite notions of responsibility and retribution;[2] but although ideas of social justice and righteousness spontaneously arose even at an early age, the generous ideals did not usually extend beyond the borders of the group's immediate interests. Further, since the gods were "part and parcel of the same natural community with their worshippers" (p. 255), and were also guardians of morality (p. 268), the gods vindicated morality (p. 425), and religion was a moral force (p. 53). But it was not necessarily religion of a very high standard (p. 256 *sq.*). Disasters might be an indication that the solidarity of gods and men was broken, but there were well-understood ways of remedying evils (p. 320). The gods were supposed to look after their group of worshippers as a matter of course, and they needed them even as they themselves were needed. Such group-religion engendered confidence if not a self-centred complacence (cf. p. 266 *sq.*); and we have in it typical social religious conditions which throw into strongest relief the Hebrew prophets' teaching of the absolute righteousness of God (pp. 74, 81).

Defeat and disaster easily shake or destroy the group-unit with its system of social, political, and religious beliefs and practices; and the states of unrest and disorganization stand in striking contrast to the relatively coherent states which had preceded, and which follow when equilibrium is restored. It is this relative unity or solidarity which can be so often recognized and more often postulated that W. R. S. is emphasizing; and in the history of peoples or tribes or even individuals, states whether of unity or disunity are characterized throughout by typical related phenomena. To a certain extent, then, there is an elementary psychological similarity, varying in degree, among all groups: family or tribal, local or national, sex and age groups, economic and specialist groups or guilds. Each

[1] In the lecture referred to above, W. R. S. says: "Every society is bound together by a common aim and common principles. [A Christian] society must be bound together by its common Christianity" (p. 326); "Organized fellowship implies common interests, a common aim, some function in which the whole society visibly combines" (p. 329). Both passages are significant for his later ideas on religion in general.

[2] Cf. Maine, *Ancient Law* (ed. Pollock, 1907), 135. On the social group as a moral force, see especially Durkheim, 206 *sqq.*

group is held together by the beliefs and usages proper to its scope and purpose. Each group is more than the sum of its members, and can be regarded as a unit, and, as frequently in the Old Testament, as a person (*e.g.* Edom, Num. xx. 14 *sqq.*). It will feel as one.[1] There are rites to enhance or renew group-unity (cf. the commensality, pp. 269, 274), to arouse collective enthusiasm, or to manifest collective grief. There is apt to be, throughout, a very similar attitude to those outside the group; and there are initiation rites before the outsider can become a member of a self-conscious group.[2] There is a common responsibility and a common participation in both ills and benefits, so that in tribal groups the religion is essentially that of the whole group, and, to take a particular case, tribute is primarily for the common good, for the public feasts and sacrifices (pp. 247 *sqq.*).

Accordingly, group unity or disunity is essentially unity or disunity of sentiments, ideas, and interests, and the vicissitudes of groups and of the systems that unite them move *pari passu*. Even the rude totem-groups of Central Australia have their systems of beliefs and practices; and Durkheim has shown that whether totemism is to be called "religion" or "magic" depends upon preliminary definitions, and that where any social group has a certain social coherence and effectiveness it is meaningless to expatiate upon the "errors" or "delusions" upon which its system might seem to be based.[3]

The social group united by blood-ties appears as the most primitive of groups, but (*a*) there have been different types of kinship, and (*b*) a group-unit of blood-relatives is not necessarily a group-unit as regards certain social and religious duties. Further (*c*), the members of a cult-group or brotherhood, though not akin, will readily claim a relationship which at times is a very close one.[4] As pointed out by Crawley, *relation* is more fundamental than *relationship*, and friendship can be a stronger tie than blood-kinship. There is, in fact, what may be called a psychical bond, which can be superior to physical kinship; and it is instructive to observe that the feeling of closest unity can lead (*a*) to rites of union (sexual intercourse and marriage), or (*b*) to the absolute repudiation of marriage as being, so to speak,

[1] As in Paraguay where, if a child falls ill, all the relatives refrain from the food which is supposed to be injurious to it (Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, 423).

[2] Cf. Hutton Webster, *Secret Societies*, Eitrem, 465.

[3] *Op. cit.* bk. ii. ch. iii. On the interrelation between a social organization and its ideas (religious and other), see I. King, *op. cit.* 74, 92, *et passim*; cf. also Compte's remarks upon international anarchy and the absence of any general agreement on first principles (*Fundamental Principles*, i. § 70).

[4] See, *e.g.*, Cumont, *Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism*, ch. v., n. 82: the *fratres carissimos* among the votaries of Jupiter Dolichenus.

incestuous.[1] Kinship was not necessarily a matter of birth, it could be acquired (p. 273). Blood-relationship and the blood-covenant might seem the most elemental and powerful type of unity, and W. R. S. makes the social group the starting-point of religious development (cf. *Kinship*, 259); but the psychical factors are clearly not less powerful than the physiological, and it is convenient to regard all group-units psychologically as systems, the social group of kinsfolk being the most elemental.

Among the more primitive societies the social group is relatively unspecialized and undifferentiated, although men of outstanding personality are by no means wanting (see p. 591). More advanced communities are distinguished by specialization of thought and function, and of belief and of custom, and individuals come to belong to a number of special groups each with its appropriate interests. How the growing complexity of the social order affects the earlier religious system can be easily followed. Properly, every group is, of course, held together by its unifying ideas, and among simple social groups the group and the cult are one. In totemism the animal or plant species—usually edible—unites the group in such a way that without this symbol there could be no totemic clan (Durkheim, 150). How essentially the group and its religion or cult are one is seen when the group and the god bear the same name (cf. Gad, Atar-Samain, and see p. 509). One life, human and divine, runs through the religious group (cf. *Kinship*, index, s.v. *ḥayy*; also John xv. 4). But whereas at the bottom of the scale all the members of the simple social groups are equal—or, rather, appear to be equal—as regards religious privileges and obligations, in course of social development there are representative individuals (*e.g.* priest-kings) and classes (*e.g.* priests), and these stand in a closer relationship than the rest of the community to the god or gods of the now more complex society (cf. pp. 44, 48).

Primarily there is an interdependence of men and the gods, each needs the other, and there is much truth in the observation that the *do ut des* formula expresses the mechanism of the sacrificial system, especially when, as in totemism, the totem-class and the totem-species are, so to say, of the same substance (Durkheim, 341, 346 *sq.*). It is instructive, therefore, to contrast the two stages: (*a*) where there is an intimate interrelationship between the men and god(s) of the

[1] So, *e.g.*, among allies, Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 264 *sq.*, 451; see W. R. S., *Kinship*, 196 n. 1 (a boy and girl who have been suckled together may not marry). Among primitive peoples it is sometimes felt that a youth should not marry the sister of his mate, because he is as his own brother. On an East European rule forbidding the groomsman to marry into the family of the bride, see Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, ii. 377 *sq.* (with other examples of prohibition of marriage on account of certain notions of what constitutes intimate relationship).

group, and (*b*), where individuals—whether as prominent representatives or as humbler personages—claim the privileges without the responsibilities of the group-system, and where men retain one-sided conceptions of the relation between gods and men, forgetful of the more complete and self-sustaining system of beliefs and practices of which these conceptions are the fragmentary survivals.

But while W. R. S. shows how the effective system of convergent institutions and beliefs is of more importance than secondary myths and doctrines, and while the conception of a group-unit comprising gods and their worshippers has thrown new light upon the problems of religion, the unit or system is an essentially abstract or simple concept of immense methodological value. So far from complex groups being derived from some simple, pure, or homogeneous ancestor, it is as impossible to construct an absolutely undifferentiated group-system as it is to construct an undifferentiated Semitic or Egypto-Semitic ancestor of the Semitic or of the Semitic and Egyptian languages (p. 499). Such is the continuous flux everywhere, even among rudimentary peoples, that a certain elasticity is required in estimating groups.[1] Thus, in Australia, although the totem-clans are natural units, each with considerable autonomy, the tribe is both a larger unit and a complex system, rather than a commonwealth, of totem-clans. Moreover, different conditions prevail as regards groups of contiguous tribes and those more remote. Indeed, as a general rule it is possible to distinguish between the cults of individual clans and those of the tribe as a whole, between the spirits (or gods) of separate localities and those of the area as a whole (the "national" gods), and between the latter and the spirits or gods of more remote tribes and areas. Thus there are always factors outside any one group-system which are relevant for its earlier or later vicissitudes; and no system can be regarded as ultimately a closed one, although for practical methodological purposes it may be necessary to treat it as such.

The group with its members, its traditions, and its outlook, is a unit in space and time. It transcends the present and the visible. It is a spiritual or psychical unit, and that which makes it effective lies both within the empirical group and outside it.[2] In all practical

[1] Cf. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, *Material Culture*, 3 n., 8 *sqq.* (on the "unit social group"); also Marett, *Anthropology*, 170 (the "group" as a methodological necessity).

[2] As this paradox is true even of Central Australian totemism, Durkheim's definition of Religion may be quoted: "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them" (p. 47). Besides Durkheim, Irving King (*Development of Religion*) has suggestively developed the theory of the social-religious group.

and effective social-religious groups there is a fusion of the "sacred" and "divine" (the supernatural, supersensuous, etc.) and the "secular" and "human," the god or gods are both within the group-system and outside it, and this paradox marks the development of ideas of Immanence and Transcendence (cf. p. 565).

P. 37 and n. 5. PORTABLE SHRINES.—For the *'otfa* (also the related *maḥmal* and *merkab*), see Schwally, *Semitische Kriegsaltertümer*, i. 9 *sqq.*; Jaussen, *Coutumes des Arabes du pays de Moab*, 173 *sq.* (Paris, 1908); and Mrs. B. Z. Seligman, "Sacred Litters among the Semites," in *Sudan Notes and Records*, i. 268–282 (Cairo, 1918). The main features are: their sacred character, the sacrifice to them of a camel, their function in battle (as a palladium), and the part played by the sheikh's daughter who, dressed as a bride, sits in the litter and inspires the men to battle. According to Curtiss (*Bibl. World*, xxiii. 97), the Ruala offer a preliminary sacrifice to Abu'ḍ-Ḍuhur for victory, and sprinkle the blood upon the *merkab* of the camel on which is seated the sheikh's daughter or sister, who, perfumed and with exposed bosom, stirs the young warriors' enthusiasm (cf. R. C. Thompson, *Sem. Magic*, 158). While the portable shrine naturally recalls the Ark of the Israelites, the boat-shaped *ḍollah* (Jaussen, 173) recalls the boats represented on Mesopotamian seals and the custom of transporting deities in boats and chariots (cf. Thureau-Dangin, *Rituels Accad.* 147). In view of the religious duties of the modern sheikh as the guardian of the cult (Jaussen, 173, 296 *sq.*, 305, 314 *sqq.*, 326, 328, 362), and as the local Arab *weli* or saint is often regarded as originally a sheikh, it is possible that not only is the *'otfa* a survival, but that the part played by the female is also a survival of a more elaborate cult. A link in the chain may perhaps be found in the models of images of the female *Tyche*, sometimes in pairs, and seated on camels, discussed by Cumont, *Études Syriennes*, 270 *sqq.* (1917).

P. 42 and n. 4. COMPOUNDS OF *'abd*.—Cf. the Babylonian names compounded with *warad* and a divine name (Ranke, *Early Bab. Personal Names*, 174 *sqq.*). The Arabian compounds of *'abd* (on which see Wellh., 2–4) are well distributed over the whole peninsula. In several cases the second element is an ordinary personal name, and Wellhausen observes that it may be that of a venerated ancestor or primarily of a god (see also *Kinship*, 53 n. 1). For the name Obed-Edom (always written defectively, except 2 Chron. xxv. 24), cf. Phœn. עבראדם, and perhaps the Safa personal name אדם.[1] Esau, too, is possibly a divine name (cf. the Phœnician Usōos), and, besides the apparently feminine form in the Egyptian war-goddess Asit (W. M.

[1] The Phœn. מלכאדם may be otherwise explained (Lidzbarski, *Ephemeris*, i. 42).

Müller, *Asien und Europa*, 316 *sq.*), there are Egyptian references to a warrior-god "Edom" (Atum, *'tm*) and to a North Palestinian place-name "Shamash-atum," or the like.[1] This evidence would suggest that both Edom and Esau were divine names not originally or necessarily confined to the South of Palestine;[2] for analogies, cf. the wide distribution of the divine name Gad with its restriction as a tribal name to a particular part of Israel, also the Arab tribe named after the Queen of Heaven (Atar-Samain) mentioned along with the men of Kedar among the enemies of Ashurbanipal (*c.* 640 B.C.). For Uz (Uṣ, 'Auḍ), see Wellh., *Heid.*[1] 19, 58, [2] 66, Nöldeke, *Ency. of Religion and Ethics*, i. 662; and for abstract names like Gad (Τύχη), Sa'd (Luck), Manāt (Fate), Wadd (? Friendship), see Wellh.[2] 28, Hehn, *Bibl. und Bab. Gottesidee*, 140 *sq.*, Nöldeke, *op. cit.* 661.[3] On the identification of Yeush with Yaghuth, accepted by Nöldeke, *ZDMG.* xl. 184 and Wellh. *Heid.*[1] 17 *sqq.*, [2] 19 *sqq.* (on his citation from Yacut consult Fischer, *ZDMG.* lviii. 869), see now Meyer, *Israeliten*, 351 (Safa, Nabatæan, and other references). In the late Ptolemaic inscription from Memphis the form is Ιεγουθος, whereas the Septuagint form of Yeush is Ιεους, etc. On the South Arabian god Cain(an), with Nabatæan and other parallels, see Meyer, *op. cit.* 397 n.

P. 45 *sq.* KINSHIP OF GODS AND MEN.[4]—On the subject in general see Nöldeke, *E.Bi.* "Names" §§ 44–48, and his *Beiträge zur semit. Sprachwissenschaft*, i. 90 *sqq.*; on the filial relation in particular, see N. Schmidt, *E.Bi.* "Son of God" §§ 3–5. For the corresponding Babylonian names of the type Marduk(Shamash, etc.)-abī, also Abum-ili and Ishtar-ummi, see Ranke, *Early Bab. Personal Names*, 189, 249; Baudissin, *Adonis und Esmun*, 40 n. 1; and for the compounds of *abil* (son), *mār* and *mārtum* (child), see the latter, 43 n. 1.[5] In Egypt the idea of the kinship, if not the essential identity of ruler and god—with the queen as Isis—is realistically elaborated (cf. Sir J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*[3], ii. 131), and the god's love for his royal son or for the king's newborn heir is familiar.[6] Such names as Thotmes

[1] Cf. Ed. Meyer (and B. Luther), *Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstamme*, 278 *sq.*, 298.

[2] See Nöldeke, *E.Bi.* col. 1182 n. 1, on a common origin of the legends of Esau and Usōos.

[3] Cf. in Egypt, Shay "Fate," see A. Gardiner, *ERE. s.v.* Personification (Egyptian). The conception of Fate is old (see Fichtner-Jeremias, *MVAG.* 1922, ii.), that of Time or Age (Æon) is relatively late.

[4] To p. 45 n. 1 (cf. p. 57, l. 5) add Dhorme, *La Religion Assyro-Babylonienne* (Paris, 1910), 166 *sqq.*, 185.

[5] Semitic names denoting the relationship of the god to the worshipper are classified by M. Noth, *ZDMG.* lxxxi. 1–45.

[6] On the persistence of this, see Norden, *Geburt des Kindes*, 132 *sq.*

(Thut-mose), usually interpreted "child of Thoth," can now be explained as "T. is born" (Sethe, *ZDMG.* 1926, p. 50). The name אמאשמן (n. 2, l. 10), like אמעשתרת in the Eshmunazar inscription (*CIS.* i. 3, l. 14) is taken to be an error for אמתע ("handmaid of A."); but Lidzbarski interprets the second name as "my mother is Astarte." Baudissin (*Adonis*, 42, 517 n.) observes that, generally speaking, the names compounded with Astarte do not reflect any ethical idea; the goddess—in contrast to the Babylonian Ishtar—is more of a productive nature-power, and is far less interested in mankind than are the male deities.

To the South Arabian compounds of אב (end of n. 2) add the female אבנעם (*CIS.* iv. 194). Names indicating relationship with a deity are rare in Arabia, with the exception of the old compounds of *'am*, "kinsman," or more specifically "paternal uncle"; on the Babylonian compounds of *ammi* (? of West Semitic origin), see *KAT.* 480 *sqq.* This rarity is remarkable, but it is possible that Arab nomenclature, as handed down, is the result of a secondary development (so Nöldeke; see Baudissin, 43 n. 2). Buchanan Gray, in turn (*Hebrew Proper Names*, 255), notes that there is a tendency for names indicating Yahweh as father, brother, or kinsman, to fall out of use; though in this case it is because "the earlier idea of man's kinship with the gods faded away even from popular thought before the higher prophetic conceptions of man's unlikeness to Yahweh." While the *disappearance* of such names may thus be explained, their *construction*—obviously under appropriate religious and psychological conditions—is well illustrated in the Abyssinian names cited by Nöldeke (*Beit.*, i. 103). Here are such names as Walda(or Sartsa)-Krĕstōs "son of Christ," Walda-Amlāk "son of God," W.-Sellāsē "son of the Trinity," Sartsa-Dengel "offspring of the Virgin," W.-Maryām, W.-Gabriel, etc., Walatta-Sellāsē (or Amlāk), Aḥwa(or Eḥta)-Krĕstōs "brother (or sister) of Christ"; also other terms indicating close connexion, *e.g.* lips, neck, sweat, etc., of Christ, shoes of St. George, etc. etc.[1]

The custom of naming the eldest son after his grandfather (to which W. R. S. refers) is frequent in Palestine (*JPOS.* v. 197). It does not seem to be traceable before the papyri of the Jewish or Palestinian colony in Elephantine of the fifth century B.C. It is found among the Jews of Palestine a couple of centuries later.[2]

[1] Specifically Phœnician are the compounds of בר ("limb, member") and the divine names Eshmun, Melkart, Astarte, and Ṣid; cf. Cooke, *North Semitic Inscriptions*, 41, 95.

[2] See G. B. Gray in the *Wellhausen-Festschrift*, *ZATW.* (1914), pp. 161 *sqq.*; cf. his *Heb. Prop. Names*, 3 *sqq.*

Nöldeke's analogies (n. 2 end) refer rather to compounds of *abu* in the sense of protector; cf. Gen. xlv. 8 (*ZDMG.* xlii. 480 n. 1), and hardly meet the case.[1] Terms of relationship are, of course, used in a highly metaphorical manner.[2] In modern Egypt " mother " and " sister " are terms for female friends who are of an earlier or of a contemporary generation, as the case may be; and elsewhere, not only is the term " mother " often used of the women of the same generation or class as a man's mother, but all the terms of kinship are employed systematically in a classificatory manner, and the " mother " or " father " is the woman whom his father might otherwise have married, or the man who might otherwise have taken his mother.[3]

When W. R. S. emphasizes the " literal " kinship of gods and men in the " congenital physical bond " (pp. 30, l. 2; 50, l. 2; 400), it is to be understood that the convictions of kinship were developed to an extreme that would seem incredible were it not that the grossly anthropomorphic ideas of Allah in Mohammedan countries and the systematic development of the ideas in all their implications (*e.g.* the marriage of gods and men; below, p. 513) prove that, what clearly can only be regarded as psychical or spiritual, could be interpreted, expressed, or grasped only in crude physical terms by people at relatively early stages of mental development.

Further, although his remarks on the kinship of gods and men are strictly independent of the problem of totemism (contrast Lagrange, *Études*, 112), it is necessary to raise the very important question whether the god as " father " represents an idea earlier or more primitive than the god as " brother." In totemism the " totem " is so much on an equality with the members of the clan that the profound difference between it and a god who is feared, reverenced, and invoked in case of need, has often been felt by scholars to be a fatal defect in W. R. S.'s arguments. Yet the view that, under certain conditions, gods are more likely to be thought of as brothers than as fathers cannot be set aside, although the once prevalent theory of widespread primitive polyandry can no longer be held (see further below, p. 610 *sq.*). Favourable to the idea of the " brotherhood " of the god is, *e.g.*, the belief that earth is the common mother of gods and men (p. 517). Sometimes a god is specifically called

[1] On *abu*, cf. S. A. Cook, *Moses and Hammurabi*, 12 n. 1.

[2] Thus, the Wapokomo of British East Africa speak of the river Tana (Tsana), upon which their existence depends and which is an integral part of their life and thought, as their brother (Miss A. Werner, *Journ. of African Soc.* (1913), p. 361.

[3] Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 450 *sq.*; see further, Mrs. Brenda Z. Seligman, " Studies in Semitic Kinship," in the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies* (London), iii. i. (1923) 51 n., 54, 67.

"brother."[1] In Sumerian, Shamash is identified with a god whose name means "great brother" (Nielsen, *op. cit.* 265; see Schollmeyer, *Sum.-bab. Hymnen*, 12), and in his code Hammurabi is the brother (*tālim*) of the god Zamama. In the Hymn of Victory of Thotmes III., in the "Utterance of Amon-Re, lord of Thebes," it is said, "I have caused (thy enemies) to see thy majesty as thy two brothers (*i.e.* Horus and Set) . . . thy two sisters (*i.e.* Isis and Nephthys), I have set them as a protection behind thee" (Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, ii. 266). In certain types of monarchical religion where the rulers are at least quasi-divine the deities could easily be regarded as fathers or as brothers; and under the influence of ideas of divine kingship Julia Sohæmia, the mother of Elgabalus, is styled Mater Deum, Venus Cœlestis, etc. (see Baudissin, 48 n. 2). Such régimes would foster ideas of hierarchies of greater or national deities and of lesser deities.[2] In fact, not only is the relative inferiority of certain deities and other supernatural beings recognized already in the "Pyramid Texts" of Egypt (*c.* 2800 B.C.), but the relative and at times absolute superiority of certain individuals over the rest, by reason of their religious or other pre-eminence, would place them in a uniquely close relationship with the great god or gods and set them upon a more equal footing with the lesser ones. How far difference of divine rank can be recognized in the Israelite conceptions of Yahweh is uncertain; but a distinction has sometimes been drawn between Yahweh as the national god of Israel and the less restricted Elohim, God of Nature and of the whole world, though the difference has often been exaggerated.[3] In any event, the *apparent* equality of the totem and the rest of the totem group is not without parallels in the higher stages, and the conception of a Supreme God to be feared and reverenced solely from afar is not the only one prevalent in the higher religions. See further on Immanence and Transcendence, pp. 563 *sqq*.

[1] Babylonian examples are cited by Dhorme, 197, and Nielsen, *Dreieinige Gott*, 79 *sq.*, 93 *sq.* (*e.g.* the name Aḫu-ṭab). On Heb. ii. 11 (Christ's brethren), see the commentary of Moffatt.

[2] In the Amarna Letters the kings who are on equal terms are "brothers." When kings enter into the relation of "fatherhood" and "sonship," there is a recognition of the supremacy of the superior and of the allegiance due to him; cf. the Scandinavian example cited by H. M. Chadwick, *The Heroic Age*, 374 (Cambridge, 1912). Frazer (*GB.* v. 50 *sq.*) suggests that religious prostitution in the rites of the marriage of Astarte and Adonis could lead to "sons" and "daughters" of the deities, who would have brother, sister, and parent deities like their fathers and mothers before them.

[3] See Kuenen, *Hexateuch*, 58 *sq.*, n. 19; Driver, *Lit. of the Old Test.* 13 n.; Orr, *Problem of the Old Test.* 225.

P. 50. Marriage of Gods and Men.—The belief in supernatural parentage is widespread and ancient; and the evidence is so abundant and impressive as to give rise to the theory that early man was ignorant of the physiological processes of conception and birth.[1] On the other hand, the evidence goes to show that (*a*) only the more exceptional or abnormal births are supposed to be of non-human origin, or that (*b*) only part of the babe is of human origin, the rest being due, *e.g.*, to an ancestral spirit, or (*c*) that both human and non-human factors are involved, conception being, in some cases, not the direct result of intercourse, or, as among the A-kam-ba, women being supposed to have, in addition to their husbands, spiritual spouses to whom are due their offspring (Frazer, *Tot. Ex.* ii. 423 *sq.*). Finally (*d*) the explicit conviction that the god can grant child-birth or restrain it (Gen. xv. 3, xvi. 2, xxv. 21, etc.) is typical; cf. the numerous personal names denoting a child as a gift (above, p. 108 n. 2).

On the most obvious interpretation of Gen. iv. 1, Eve "got" (produced or created, קנה) a man with (the co-operation of) Yahweh" (cf. Skinner, *ad loc.*); and in the saying of the Talmud (*Kiddush.* 30 *b*), "there are three partners in every human birth: God, father, and mother."[2] The innumerable beliefs in *some* essential spiritual or supernatural factor in conception and birth range from the crudest ideas to the most elaborate discussions of traducianism and creationism (see Toy, *Introd. to the Hist. of Rel.*, §§ 32 *sqq.*). The evidence as a whole points rather to the persisting predominance of particular sentiments and ideas of a spiritual character than to any persisting ignorance of the significance of the physical processes.[3] In Central Australia the spirit of an animal or plant totem-species enters a woman and a child is born; in Melanesia a spirit-animal or plant enters and the child that is born is identified with the species. When, at the other end of the scale, the old Greeks speak of human beings originating through the operations of trees and rocks upon passing women, and when men spring up from the stones dropped by Deucalion and Pyrrha, and the men of Ægina are descended from ants, it is evident that they can hardly be said to differ in kind from the beliefs of the totem

[1] See, in general, Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, esp. ch. i. (Spiritual Conception); Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, iv. 61 *sq.*; Saint-Yves, *Les Vierges mères et les naissances miraculeuses* (1908); cf. also *ERE.* art. "Religion," 678, § 23; Malinowski, *Psyche*, iv. 110 *sqq.*

[2] I. Abrahams, *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, 2nd ser. (Camb., 1924), 150, 176. On the meaning of קנה, see Burney, *Journ. of Theol. Stud.* xxvii. 162 *sqq.*

[3] That conception and birth were mysterious phenomena is seen, *e.g.*, in Job x. 10 *sq.*; Eccles. xi. 5; cf. H. Wheeler Robinson in *The People and the Book* (ed. Peake, 1925), 369 *sq.*

tribes of Australia.[1] In the modern East procreative powers are freely attributed to the *jinn*, to spirits of the dead, and to the *welis*. The *jinn* are believed to intermarry with men and women, or to disturb their conjugal life; and it would seem that in Babylonia tormented victims offered male or female images to evil spirits in order that they themselves might be left alone (Lagrange, 230). Women still visit the tombs of saints and *welis*, and other sacred shrines, in the hope of offspring, and the spirit of the saint or sacred ancestor is the reputed father of the child. Whatever may be due to whole-hearted faith, not in olden times alone has the part of the powerful spirit been played by some "sacred" man.[2]

The idea of a conjugal relationship between a deity and a land, people, or ruler is familiar; and Jahweh's marriage relationship with his people is realistically developed when, in Ezek. xxiii. 4, he is represented as having children by two wives, Oholah (Samaria), and Oholibah (Jerusalem). W. R. S. (*Prophets of Israel*, 170 *sq.*, 410 *sq.*), describing the marriage symbolism in Israelite religion, observes that the physical usage was the earlier, otherwise the allegorical use (in Hosea, etc.) could hardly be explained. It is also obvious on psychological grounds that what is really fundamental is a conviction of a relationship between people and god, so intimate as to find only in the marriage symbolism its most suggestive and fruitful expression.

Gods are "married" to other gods, (*a*) to provide them with consorts, on the human analogy, (*b*) to enhance their functions by the addition of particular female attributes, or (*c*) to unite different cults. Of particular significance is (*d*) Yahweh's "marriage" relation with Israel which was believed to guarantee her prosperity. Similarly the marriage of the Queen-Archon with the bull-god Dionysus in the festival of the Anthesteria was presumably to benefit the land by uniting the god and—in this case—its leading representative. In Babylonia the marriage of Ninurta and Gula or Bau was an important spring festival celebrating the union of the young sun-god with the goddess of vegetation. With this more or less magical fertility rite may be compared the *hieros gamos* of Zeus and Hera, where, however,

[1] J. L. Myres, in *Anthropology and the Classics*, 128.

[2] See Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion*, 107, 116 *sqq.*, 123; Frazer, *GB.* v. 76 *sq.*, 79 *sqq.* In the Syriac story of the "Merchant of Harran" the barren woman is cured by a stone which she imagines to be from the block which Jacob had rolled from the well near Harran, and which could cure barrenness; and the merchant who has deceived her, marvels at her faith and can only wonder what a genuine fragment would have accomplished (Burkitt, *Euphemia and the Goth*, 155 *sqq.*).

other *motifs* may participate, *e.g.*, an idealization and symbol of the marriage of ordinary mortals.[1]

Not uncommon is the marriage of girls (*a*) to rivers, lakes, etc. (even fishing-nets), to ensure the productivity and fertility of the latter, and (*b*) to images, etc., for their own benefit (Frazer, *GB.* ii. 147 *sq.*). Virgins were frequently dedicated, betrothed, or married to deities (cf. the Phœnician name אלשחבעל "espoused of Baal"); and in such cases the bride might be (1) set apart for the god, or (2) a sacrificial victim, or (3) appropriated by the men who administer the cult.[2] When a vow is made on behalf of a girl she cannot be married until the vow is paid (Canaan, *JPOS.* vi. 59); and, according to Curtiss, *Prim. Sem. Rel.* 167 *sq.*, if a girl is dedicated to a saint it is a question whether or no she may marry. At Remtha in Hauran when a man is dangerously ill a daughter or sister may be vowed to ez-Zab'i, and when she is of marriageable age, she is dressed as a bride, taken to his shrine, and the first of the saint's descendants who sees her can take her as his wife, or dispose of her in marriage to any suitor who will pay him a dowry (Curtiss, *Expositor*, Dec. 1904, p. 464). Other gods than Bel of Babylon were provided with couches (see Frazer on Pausanias ii. 17, 3).[3] The consecration of the couch of Nebo at Calah on the occasion of his annual marriage is minutely described.[4] In Babylon the *entu* or bride of the god was of the highest caste, the wife of the patron god of the city (*CAH.* 1[2], 536); the great Sargon, who "knew not his father," and had for mother an *enitu*, was apparently the offspring of a "sacred" marriage.[5] Generally speaking, when a girl is dedicated it is not always clear whether it is to temple-harlotry or to absolute chastity.[6]

When Antiochus Epiphanes proposed to marry the goddess

[1] Farnell, *Cults*, i. 184, 192; *Greece and Babylon*, 263 *sq.* On the marriage of Adonis and Aphrodite celebrated at Alexandria in 273 B.C., see Frazer, *GB.* v. 224; Gressmann, *Expositor*, iii. (1921), 426 *sqq.* The Egyptian dynastic marriage was both divine and human, the queen being the "god's wife" (Moret, *Du Caractère Relig. de la Royauté Pharaonique*).

[2] See for (2) Farnell, *Greece and Bab.* 266; cf. the "Bride of the Nile," Frazer, *GB.* vi. 38 *sqq.*; and for (3) *GB.* ii. 150 *sq.* and v. 67 *sq.* (in Kikuyu the offspring are regarded as the deity's children).

[3] Apollo was nightly closeted with his prophetess during the months when he gave oracles at Patara (*GB.* ii. 135).

[4] *Journ. of Amer. Or. Soc.* xviii. 1897; i. 153; see *GB.* ii. 130.

[5] See further p. 613. The story of Paulina and the god Anubis (Josephus, *Antiq.* xviii. 3) at least shows what was considered credible; cf. also the stories of Nectanebus and Olympias, and see O. Weinreich's monograph (*Der Trug des Nektanebos*, Leipzig, 1911).

[6] For the latter, see in general Fehrle, *Die kultische Keuschheit im Altertum* (Giessen, 1910), and p. 614 below.

Nanæa in Elymais in order to seize the temple treasures as a "dowry" (2 Macc. i. 14)—a trick he is said to have tried at Hierapolis—and when Demetrius, son of Antigonus (*c.* 300 B.C.), had rooms at the back of the Parthenon, and was entertained by Athene, and when Anthony agreed to marry Athene at Athens for her dowry of a thousand talents, each as the "husband" of the goddess could legitimatize his claims.[1] Such marriages would be as intelligible in their day as when Reuben, Absalom, and Adonijah by their several actions laid claim to the rights and privileges of their fathers (see *Lectures*, 467 n. 2; *Kinship*, 109 *sq.*). In other words, the more conspicuous ideas associated with marriage are those not only of fertility and productivity, but also of appropriation and transmission of rights, the woman being the vehicle (even as parentage is at times ascribed solely to the father, the mother being the nurturer of the child), or the one in whom rights or powers are vested.[2] See further below, pp. 613, 637 *sq.*

P. 52. CHANGE OF SEX.—For examples of such changes see *Kinship*, 304 *sqq.* (Allat, Sowā, etc.). The male Ruḍa (רצון) becomes female (Lidzbarski, *Ephemeris*, iii. 92). Shamash, the sun-god, is treated as feminine in one of the Amarna Letters (Knudtzon, No. 323, from Askalon), also in South Arabia (*KAT.* 139; Nielsen, 321). In the treaty between Shubbiluliuma of Hatti and Mattiuaza of Mitanni, the goddess Shamash of Arinna, before whom a copy is placed, "grants kingship and queenship," and was presumably the patroness of the dynasty. 'Athtar in South Arabia was both *baal* and mother (Barton, *Semitic Origins*, 125 *sqq.*), and in Babylonia Ishtar was male as morning-star and female as evening-star. The god Tammuz has at times feminine titles (Jastrow, *Rel. Belief in Bab. and Ass.* 347 n.; Burney, *Judges*, xix.).

The goddesses of Babylonia are mostly colourless—merely feminines (Jastrow, 124 *sq.*), and Wellhausen remarks that the Semitic male and female deities are not, primarily at least, married couples. The

[1] In the Twenty-fifth Dynasty marriage with the Theban royal priestess, the "adoratrix of the god," secured the Pharaoh's position (*CAH.* iii. 268, 273; *GB.* ii. 134).

[2] Among the Garos of Assam "a woman is merely the vehicle by which property descends from one generation to another" (Frazer, *Tot. Ex.* iv. 297, citing Playfair, *The Garos*, 71 *sq.*). On an African custom for the eldest son to inherit all his father's wives, see *FOT.*, i. 541 and n. 3. The mock king at the Babylonian Sacæa took the king's concubines (*GB.* ix. 355), and the supposed incarnation of the dead king in Bunyoro during his reign of a week had the royal widows (Frazer, *GB.* abbreviated ed., p. vi, citing Roscoe, *Soul of Central Africa*, 200). In Mexico the youth who represented the god Tezcatlipoca was married to four girls representing the four seasons, and was subsequently sacrificed (*GB.* ix. 278 *sq.*).

causes of change of sex are not necessarily due to change in type of kinship. The desire to possess a deity with feminine attributes will account for the transformation, in the Far East, of the male Avalokiteshvara into the Chinese and Japanese Kuanyin, the goddess of mercy (Bertholet and Lehmann, *Lehrbuch d. Rel. gesch.* i. 238). But the deity can be alike male and female. Thus Gudea addresses the mother-goddess Gatumdag as mother and father (Dhorme, 166), Ningirsu is both "mother" and "lord" (*CAH.* i.[2] 208), and Ikhnaton's sun-god is mother and father—in that order.[1] Besides the bi-sexual references to Yahweh (Deut. xxxii. 18; Isa. xlvi. 3), there are striking phrases in the Odes of Solomon (in xix. the Father is milked by the Holy Spirit).[2] But whereas impassioned religious feeling finds in its deity the highest male and female attributes, only at a secondary stage does art represent it as hermaphrodite (cf. Lagrange, 139).[3]

P. 52. MOTHER EARTH.—Pindar's belief (*Nem.* vi. i. 2; cf. Hesiod, *Works*, 108) finds its parallel in Ecclesiasticus xl. 1, less clearly in Job i. 21. Greek influence might be suspected in these passages, but, in its more undeveloped forms, the idea is not strange to the Semites.[4] After all, the Semites were at an early date in touch with Hittite, Mitannian, and other northern peoples, and the line between Semitic and Greek thought must not be drawn too rigidly (cf. p. 495 *sq.*). As against Dieterich (*Mutter Erde*), Nilsson (*Greek Rel.* 122) argues that Earth as "all mother," represents the idea of Nature rather than a real divinity. Her person is that of a woman whose lower limbs are hidden in the ground; it is the conception that seems to lie behind Ps. cxxxix. 15. Man is formed from the earth.[5] He is moulded—the Hebrew verb is used of the potter's craft; cf. Prometheus, and

[1] Breasted, *Rel. and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, 318, 330, 334; cf. Farnell, *Evol. of Rel.* 180 (from a North American tribe, "Who is my mother, who is my father? Only Thou, O God").

[2] Cf. the hymns of Namdev and Tukaram to Vithoba (Krishna); see Bouquet, in *Theology*, viii. 203, Macnicol, *Indian Theism*, 123, 218.

[3] Sex is secondary when, elsewhere, the bull-roarer is used in connexion with fertility-rites: in New Guinea it is produced when the yams are ready for digging, and is then called "mother of yams" (Haddon, *Study of Man*, 305 *sq.*). In another case it is differentiated into male and female (*Journ. of Royal Anthrop. Inst.* xiv. 312). Frazer also cites the use of "male" and "female" flutes used after circumcision rites in German North Guinea (Schellong, *Internat. Archiv f. Ethnog.* ii. 156).

[4] See Nöldeke, *Archiv f. Relig.* viii. 161 *sq.*; Baudissin, 20 n. 1, 443 *sq.*, 505 *sq.*

[5] For Berosus (p. 43 above) see Lagrange, 386, and for other Bab. evidence, *ib.* 229, 385; *KAT.* 497; Dhorme, *Archiv f. Relig.* viii. 550 *sq.*; L. W. King, *Seven Tablets of Creation*, i. xxxiii *sq.* Ea made men of clay, and of clay Aruru made Engidu. Proper names meaning "son (daughter) of the earth" (*abil*, *mār* [*mārat*] *irṣitim*) are cited by Ranke.

Khnum of Egypt; Ishtar is also called the potter. The metaphorical use of the word "seed," and the common association of human life with the rest of nature, is perhaps of more significance than the difference which is drawn between animal or human life and vegetable life, and which is emphasized by W. R. S. when he seeks to trace the development of the primitive sacrifice.

That the account of creation, as it stands in Gen. ii., is absolutely more primitive than that in ch. i. (p. 106 n. 1) is not easily determined. Already in ii. 5 *sq.* two conceptions can be distinguished (flood [?] and rain as sources of fertility, Skinner, *Gen.* 55 *sq.*). In ch. i. plants and animals are produced from the earth by the divine command. "The earth itself is conceived as endowed with productive power" (Skinner, 23). Similarly, Yahweh "calls" for the corn in Ezek. xxxvi. 29, and it responds; while the Babylonian Tablet of Creation opens with a reference to the time when neither heaven nor earth nor the gods had been "named." In Babylonian speculation a mental image (*zikru*) seems to precede physical creation (Skinner, 31 *sq.*, see Hehn in the *Sachau-Festschrift*, 46)—that the Platonic archetypal ideas have their forerunner among early and primitive peoples was observed long ago by Tylor (*Primitive Culture*[4], ii. 244 *sq.*). Evidently some intrinsic or immanent productive power is implied in Gen. i., as also in the case of the processes of birth which the god is believed to control (p. 513). It is noteworthy that the brooding (?) spirit in Gen. i. 2 plays no further part in the biblical cosmogony; it may have come in from another (? Phœnician) cosmogony.[1] Skinner (*Gen.* 18) suggests that the spirit perhaps symbolizes "an immanent principle of life and order in the as yet undeveloped chaos." It is, in effect, difficult to grasp with precision the ideas of growth and production that prevailed among ancient and primitive peoples, and precisely how far processes were natural or supernatural, or merely taken for granted (see pp. 535, 586). At all events, the idea that the earth has a certain inherent power or life of its own, and that man is in some way bound up therewith, explains how, in Manichæan dualism, when all the "light" has been separated from the "dark," there remains the Dark Matter, the Clod (*Bōlos*) (Burkitt, *Rel. of the Manichees*, 65 *sq.*; S. A. Cook, *Journ. of Theol. Stud.* xxvi. 389).

P. 54. Fear and the Gods.—The "eloquent French writer," Renan (*Hist. d'Israel*, i. 29), quoting Statius (*Theb.* iii. 661), endorses

[1] See Meyer, *Israeliten*, 213 and n.; and on the way in which the idea of the creative efficacy of the divine spirit (*rūʾḥ*) verges on immanence and pantheism, see Baudissin, 443 *sq.*, 505 *sq.*

a view current among the Epicurean philosophers, found in Lucretius, and still frequently reiterated. To some extent it is well founded.[1] Fear is undoubtedly a powerful element in Semitic religion.[2] Gloom is characteristic (see p. 258), and Baudissin (57 *sq.*) considers that fear of the gods and dependence upon them are typically Semitic. Yet W. R. S. finds divine immanence as well as "transcendence" among the Semites (p. 194). Fear of ghosts and of the dead is undoubtedly prominent in religion (pp. 323 n., 370 n. 1), and there is fear of the *jinn* (p. 123 *sq.*); but W. R. S. maintains that fear of the supernatural paralyses progress (pp. 154, 395), and is the negation of moral order. A working relationship with unseen forces appears in the most primitive societies (pp. 53, 137); and certainly, where fear predominates among primitive peoples, the communities are unstable and unprogressive. Ignorance of causes and ignorance of the important physiological functions are common sources of fear, and although fear is dormant and easily aroused, the conquest of nature and the victory over fear of the unknown are the beginning of social development (p. 121 *sq.*).

Anthropology and psychology support W. R. S. "The maxim that fear first made gods in the universe is certainly not true in the light of anthropology" (Malinowski, in *Science, Religion, and Reality*, ed. Needham, 82). Durkheim (224) positively asserts that the primitive regards his gods as friends, kinsmen, and protectors. So usual is this that in due course only the uncertain, arbitrary, and hostile spirits are respected. "Although fear is a cause, it is certainly not the sufficient reason of religion" (Galloway, *Philosophy of Rel.* 75). "There is no quality in fear that fits it to be the so-called original religious emotion" (Leuba, *Psychological Study of Rel.* 129). Fear is a running away, it is harmful; there is an emotional progression in religion, and fear yields to awe (*id.* 132). "Fear" does not explain the history of religion, whereas "awe" is another feeling, a recognition of greatness and a sense of a not unfriendly relation with the cosmos (*id.* 146 *sq.*). Fear is only true if we admit wonder, admiration, respect, and even love; though "reverence . . . or the sense of discipline would be impossible but for the dash of fear that they contain."[3] This is not

[1] The words are also found in Petronius, *Frag.* xxvii. 1 (cf. Servius, *ad* Virg. *Æn.* ii. 715), though Statius has the better claim. (So Mr. W. T. Vesey of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, in a private communication.)

[2] See Nöldeke, *ERE.*, "Arabs," 660*a*, and *Arch. f. Rel.*, 1898, pp. 361 *sqq.*; cf. Ar. *ittacā*, "be pious," etc., properly "be on one's guard." On the suggested connexion between *ilāh*, "god," and *'aliha*, "fear, dread," see Kautzsch, *E.Bi.* col. 3324, § 115; Fischer, *Islamica*, i. 391.

[3] Marett, *Psychol. and Folk-lore*, 160; *Threshold of Rel.* 13.

inhibition but self-restraint. Fear can crush and kill; but it is not the ignorance of peril, it is the consciousness of it, the renewal of self-confidence, the act of readjustment as a mental and moral growth, which mark the progressive steps (Crawley, *Tree of Life*, 291 *sq.*; cf. Durkheim, 223 *sq.*). The subject is of extreme methodological importance, and W. R. S. treats it dynamically; for the history of religions and of religion in general, the phases of awe, confidence, etc., are throughout more significant than those of fear, dread, etc.

P. 56. Al-Lat, Mother of the Gods.—The great mother-goddess Ishtar, patroness of birth (as her name Mylitta indicates, Herod. i. 131, 199), was "creator" (*bānat*), and "mistress" (*belit*) of the gods, and is ideographically described as a potter. The well-known type represents her with open breast and a suckling on her left arm. With another "mistress of the gods," Damkina (the Δαύκη of Damascius), the wife of Ea and mother of Marduk, and with Isis, the mother of Horus, Ishtar is a powerful intercessor in Assyria, and a prototype of the Madonna, and of the figure in the vision in Rev. xii.[1] Among the great "mothers" (Anahita, Cybele, etc.) is Lāt or rather Allat.[2] Apparently a sun-goddess (Wellh. 33), in Palmyra she is found coupled with Shamash (Cooke, 275 *sq.*), and the equation לת(א)והב—Ἀθηνόδωρος (the son of Zenobia) points to her identification with Athene, who is named in Greek inscriptions from Hauran (Wadd. 2203, etc.), appears on coins of Gabala, etc., and was worshipped at Emesa. An altar found at Cordova names, among Syrian deities, *νάζαια* (Al-'Ozzā) and (Ἀ)*θηνᾶ* Ἀλλα*θ* (*Arch. f. Rel.* xxii. 127). As Ἀλιλατ—Urania (Herod. iii. 8) she is mother of Orotal—Dionysus, to whom corresponds the Nabatæan Dushara. The mother and son are associated at Petra; but at Hejra (*CIS.* ii. 198) she stands second. For Allat as a chthonic goddess, see p. 566.

The Petra festival has been much discussed.[3] Mithraic and Christian influence has been suspected. Wellhausen and Lagrange urge that the cult of a child-god is contrary to Semitic feeling (cf. *De Syria Dea*, xxxv.). On the other hand, 'Aziz (עזיז) or Ares, venerated at Edessa, and named with Arṣu (ארצו) on a Palmyrene inscription (Cooke, 295 *sq.*), is the *bonus puer* of a Greek inscription at Soada and of Dacian inscriptions (see *Kinship*, 302).[4] Youthful gods

[1] *KAT.* 360 *sq.*, 428 *sq.*, 440; Nielsen, *Der dreieinige Gott*, i. 337 *sqq.*

[2] Nabatæan inscription from Ṣalḥad, Vogüé 8=*CIS.* ii. 185.

[3] See Wellhausen, 49; Lagrange, 189 n.; Cumont, *CR.* of the *Acad. d. Inscr.*, 1911, p. 293; W. Weber, *Arch. f. Rel.* xix. 331 *sqq.*

[4] With the Palmyrene inscription is the representation of various figures, including a woman with a child on her knees, *Beit. z. Assyriol.*, 1902, p. 221; Cumont, *Études Syr.* 272; Nielsen, 122 *sq.*

are by no means unknown (Baudissin, *Adonis*, Index, *s.v.* " jugendliche götter "), and the influence of Isis and Harpocrates is possible. Of greater interest is the relief found at Petra itself, representing a winged child contending with winged lion-headed monsters, which Dalman is tempted to associate with the cult of Dusares.[1]

Al-'Ozzā (p. 57 n.), with Allāt and Manāt, the three " daughters of Allah," in the Coran, is the " lady 'Ozzai " to whom a man in a South Arabian inscription offers a golden image on behalf of his sick daughter Amath-Ozzai (Nielsen, *Der dreieinige Gott*, 318). Human sacrifice and licentious practices distinguish her cult. Isaac of Antioch identified her with Beltis, and calls her the " Star " (see *Kinship*, 300 *sq.*, Wellh. 40 *sq.*).

P. 58. FEMALE DEITIES.—The prominence of female deities is also explained by the considerable share of women in labour and management (cf. Wellhausen, 208 *sq.*, and, on women's part in primitive agriculture, Frazer, *GB.* vii. 113 *sqq.*). There are many examples of mother-right (see the summary by E. Meyer, *Gesch. des Alt.* i. 1, § 10); but fluctuations in the position of women and recurring transitions from one type of kinship to another are to be recognized rather than any single sociological development. The position of women is not necessarily the measure to a people's civilization; and while, on the one hand, females in subjection to their husbands were not necessarily without rights and responsibilities, on the other hand, in Assyrian law, where the woman remains in her father's house, she has not the freedom that this type of marriage might have led us to expect.[2] The superior position of the mother's brother among the Bedouins,[3] and the Talmudic references to the resemblance between children and the mother's brother (*Kinship*, 195 n. 1), are among the elements that go to distinguish mother-kinship, though in themselves they are not necessarily derived from any such system; and in general the question of the relation between female deities and the treatment of women is much more complicated than when W. R. S. wrote.[4]

[1] Dalman (*Petra und seine Felsheiligtümer* [Leipzig, 1908], 355 *sq.*) refers to the winged Horus on the Louvre seal of Baal-nathan (Lidzbarski, *Ephem.* i. 140 n.), and the boy holding a serpent, on the Taanach altar (Sellin, *Tell Ta'annek*, i. 77; Vincent, *Canaan*, 185). See further Nielsen, *Handbuch d. altarab-Altertumskunde*, 230 *sq.*

[2] Koschaker, *MVAG.* 1921, pp. 60 *sqq.*; Ebeling in Gressmann, *Altorient. Texte z. A.T.*[2], 415, §§ 25 *sqq.*; cf. the much stronger Californian and other cases cited by Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, i. 657.

[3] See G. Jacob, *Studien*, iii.: *Leben d. vorislam. Bed.*[2] 40.

[4] It may be added that in Palestine many a modern shrine is consecrated to a female who is sometimes associated with a male, whose sister or daughter she is (Schumacher, *Jaulan*, 209; *Qy. St.* of the Palestine Explor. Fund, 1875, p. 209; 1877, p. 99).

P. 58 n. 1.—See *Keilinschrift Bibliothek*, ii. 251; cf. the now well-known hymn, L. W. King, *Seven Tablets of Creation*, i. 222 *sqq.*; Gressmann, *Altorient. Texte z. Alten Test.*[1], 85 *sq.*, [2] 257 *sqq.*; and excerpts in Peake, *People and the Book*, 50 *sq.*, Wardle, *Israel and Babylon*, 76 *sqq.*

P. 60. AUTHORITY.—W. R. S. is dealing with the ideas of government, administration and authority, human and divine, and the relationship between rulers and subjects. The "king" is properly a counsellor (p. 62 n.)—cf. the title *Sayyid* (speaker) and the Heb. *sōd* (counsel)—and had typical religious or priestly duties. Similarly the modern sheikh has certain religious duties: when there is war he will make vows to the ancestral *weli* or saint, offer sacrifices at the tomb venerated by the tribe, and proclaim a fast in case of drought. There was no absolute monarchy, and, except in so far as his special functions were concerned, even a Babylonian king had no more rights than a private citizen.[1] The authority of parents was, and is, weak (*Kinship*, 68 *sq.*), and Westermarck (*Moral Ideas*, i. 599 *sq.*, 607) contrasts this weakness among rudimentary peoples with the parental authority among those more civilized. None the less, an Arab father may expect an almost servile deference (*Lectures*, 563); there might be stern treatment of children (Prov. xix. 18, with Toy's note), and a rebellious son might be stoned (Deut. xxi. 21; cf. Targum on Eccles. iii. 2). Yet even as regards the wife there was no *patria potestas* in the Roman sense; she did not change her kin on marriage (*Kinship*, 66 n., 77, 122, 142, 203); and as regards the *'ebed* (servant), care must be taken not to read too much into the term (p. 68 *sq.*).

In the absence of an explicit constitution or organization, things are left to the will of a few individuals on the one hand, to custom on the other. For Arabia "the words *noblesse oblige* are no mere phrase but the complete truth." [2] In Israel there were things that ought or ought not to be done; and a distinction was drawn between the days of unrestrained individuality and the unifying tendency of the monarchy. As for Arabia, Wellhausen lays stress upon the *secular* ideas of Right: the religious root has withered away; Right is profane, and not, as in Israel, bound up with religion (*op. cit.* 14 *sq.*). In the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, law has been almost severed from religion, society is divided into classes, and the general conditions are more advanced than those presupposed by the Israelite collections of laws. Neither among the loosely knit Arabian tribes nor in a Babylonia shortly to fall before invading Kassites, can we expect to find a

[1] Jastrow, *Rel. Beliefs of Bab. and Ass.*, 384 *sq.* (with which cf. *CAH.*[2] i. 412). On the restriction of monarchical power in Israel, see Day, *AJSL.* xl. 98 *sqq.*

[2] Wellhausen, *Ein Gemeinwesen ohne Obrigkeit*, 7 (Göttingen, 1900).

starting-point for our conception of ancient authority, and another approach must be sought.

It would seem that self-redress is more marked among the lower and simpler stages of society (viz. the Lower and Higher Hunters), whereas among Agriculturists more attention is paid to the maintenance of order, and public control is more in evidence. The development of social order may be roughly correlated with advance in economic culture; and, as we advance from the Lower Hunters, we get larger societies, and by degrees provision is made for the administration of justice within these extended groups.[1] Periodical gatherings for religious, social, and judicial purposes are found among many primitive peoples (I. King, *Development of Religion*, 89 *sq.*, 100); and systematic lawlessness and lynch law, or the general absence of customary restraint, may be regarded not as a primary stage in the evolution of order, but as a transition between the decline and fall of one period of development and the inauguration of another. What is fundamental is the stage where religious custom and social custom are more or less closely interrelated parts of one organism or system.

In ordeals and oaths, in curses and blessings, and in regulative and restrictive taboos there is an implicit mechanism which is for the systematization of society.[2] W. R. S. himself (p. 162 *sq.*) comments upon the "instrinic power of holy things to vindicate themselves," and on the difference between man's confidence in it and the conviction that it is not safe to wait until the god vindicates himself (see below, p. 550). The difference is important, for here is to be sought the root of authority: the mechanism already implicit in the social structure and its development, on the one side, and, on the other, the individuals who by virtue of rank or ability are representatives, in one sense, of the group, and, in another, of this mechanism (see p. 591). Nowhere does there exist any vaguely abstract "group-mind"; and even in Australia, where there is a "common consent to the observance of certain rules" over very large tracts, it is the elders who commonly uphold and enforce the customary law.[3] The headmen will form a council, and at the great initiation ceremonies there will be an exchange of ideas leading to modification and uniformity.[4] Even among rudimentary peoples, where the group-mind, the social mechanism,

[1] Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, *The Material Culture of the Simpler Peoples*, 46 *sqq.*, 82.

[2] See, *e.g.*, Frazer, *Psyche's Task*[2] (1913; with the sub-title, "a discourse concerning the influence of superstitition on the growth of institutions").

[3] G. P. Wheeler, *The Tribe*, 9.

[4] Wheeler, 81; Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 143 *sqq.*, 181 *sqq.*; Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, i. 603 *sqq.*, 619.

and the absence of individual enterprise seem most predominant, important changes can be made. Spencer and Gillen (*Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 12 *sq.*, 14 *sq.*) comment on the authority exercised by powerful men in introducing changes that are felt to be beneficial to the tribe; and among the Omaha the words "and the people thought" are the preamble to every change, which, of course, is due not to an abstract "group-mind," but to the "authorities" for the time being (Hartland, *Primitive Law*, 204 *sqq.*, esp. 209).

Continuity amid change, and with the maintenance of the idea of authority—this is the fundamental conception the discussion of which W. R. S. opens. The great changes in the past can be ascribed to men who, by their superior personality, have wielded an authority which was above local vanity and rivalry. They were pre-eminently religious leaders (*e.g.* Moses and Mohammed, see p. 70), or primarily religious teachers or reformers like the prophets, or they were outstanding rulers, men whose rise was attended with significant social or political developments. Throughout, owing to the personal influence of such men, there was apt to be extreme arbitrariness and caprice, and an absence of stability (cf. W. R. S., *Prophets of Israel*, 94; *CAH.* i.[2] 210 *sq.*, 216); and owing to the divine authority claimed by or freely granted to them, the problem of "true" or "false" in the sphere of religion (*e.g.* as regards prophets, "sacred" men, or Messiahs) quickly arose. In Babylonia the divine authority of rulers, priests, and judges meant that misfortune and wrong-doing could shake confidence alike in the representative individuals or in the god or gods whose mouthpiece, vehicle, or representative they were supposed to be (cf. Jastrow, *Rel. Beliefs*, 275 *sq.*). In the old Egyptian tale of the "Eloquent Peasant," the underlying idea is that "the norm of just procedure is in the hands of the ruling class; if they fail, where else shall it be found?"[1] When reliance is placed upon some pre-eminent authority, forged sayings may be attributed to him and circulated by interested though conflicting parties (as in the case of Mohammed, *Ency. Brit.* xvii. 414*c*, *d*). But authority is also found in the principle *vox populi vox dei*; and, says a tradition of Mohammed, "my people will never agree in an error" (*loc. cit.* 416*a*). The Coran remains the norm and authority of Islam;[2] but a written authority needs supplementing, and by the side of the Jewish "written law" there grew up the "oral law" (see W. R. S., *Old Test. in the Jewish Church*, 45 *sqq.*). The sacred myths and traditions of a people represent, strictly speaking, only the particular stage

[1] Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, 221.

[2] See C. H. Toy, "The Semitic Conception of Absolute Law," *Nöldeke-Festschrift*, 802.

of thought at which they severally arose; but a canonical literature extending—like the Old Testament, and more especially the whole Bible—over centuries of most vital development, affords a more objective basis for a dynamic conception of authority. The Bible, together with the apocryphal and pseudepigraphical writings of Jews and early Christians, presents a unique example of what has been called "the law of religious historiography"—the renovation and transformation of earlier authoritative sources in order to make them comply with the requirements of the present.[1] Renovation or rewriting is succeeded in course of time by reinterpretation; and it is proper to refer to W. R. S.'s anxiety in his *Old Testament in the Jewish Church* (especially the Preface and opening chapter) to show that there can be continuity in reinterpretation, however revolutionary the new stage might seem to be.

Society, viewed as a whole, is a moral force (cf. Wellhausen, *Heid.* 226); and, as W. R. S. points out, the group-unit includes the gods. But ultimate authority does not lie in the empirical and visible group which is developed by its more energetic and critical constituents, nor does it lie precisely in the system of ideas uniting the group and its outstanding individuals with the sphere of the supernatural or supersensuous as understood at the time. The great prophets, it is true, spoke as though they were recalling the people to an earlier ideal from which they had fallen, but the ideal of which they themselves became conscious did not, in the most conspicuous cases, lead back to an actual event of ancient history, but to a reinterpretation of it which was pregnant for the future. The system of ideas was enlarged, and, this being a general truth, ultimate authority is seen to lie in the ultimate whole of which the several groups and systems of ideas are the imperfectly developed parts. Ideas of governance and authority are apt to be undifferentiated among ancient or primitive peoples, and accordingly there is a relation between social order and the world order which often amounts to an identity. This accounts alike for the most impressive of religious beliefs and for the most extraordinary of magical practices. W. R. S. is mainly concerned with the ideas of social organization and of the organization of gods and worshippers; but the question of order in the social sphere and in the external world is of exceptional interest for the history of ideas, both of right and righteousness, and of the natural powers and functions of gods and of their human representatives. See below, p. 658.

P. 67 n. 3.—See further *KAT.* 470 *sqq.*; Lagrange, 99 *sqq.* The

[1] Kuenen, "The Critical Method," in the *Modern Review*, i. (1880), 705; cf. S. A. Cook, *Notes on O.T. History*, 62.

name of the Edomite king (Malik-ramu) is uncertain; see *KAT.* 467.

P. 68 n. 3.—The Phœnician reference is to Plautus, *Pœnulus*, 994, 1001, 1141 *sq.*—*auo auo donni hau amma silli hauon bene silli*, "hail, hail my lord! hail my mother! hail my son!" For another explanation, see L. H. Gray, *Amer. Journ. of Sem. Lang.* xxxix. 83. With the salutation compare (with Stübe) Meleager of Gadara:

> Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν Σύρος ἐσσί, Σελόμ· εἰ δ' οὖν σύγε φοίνιξ,
> Ἀὐδονίς· εἰ δ' Ἕλλην, χαῖρε· τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φράσον,

where Ἀὐδονίς is Scaliger's emendation (Wex, *Melet.* 29).

P. 70. Compounds of Imr, Amr.—On such compounds, see A. Fischer, *Islamica*, i. 4, 380 *sqq.* In the Hebrew Amariah, in S. Arabian names of the type עמאמר, אבאמר, and in the Palmyrene אמרשא (*αμρισαμσος*) another interpretation has been suggested: Yahweh (etc.) promises or commands (see *E.Bi.* "Amariah"; Cooke, 267). The Phœn. אשתנת "man of Tanith" is doubtful (*CIS.* i. 542). In the corresponding Babylonian names Amel-Sin (*KAT.* 537, 540), Amel-Marduk (Evīl-Merodach), Amel-Nusku, etc., the second element is a divine name. In S. Arabian אדם is used of one who belongs to a god (Hartmann, *Islam. Orient*, ii. 405). Methushael (Gen. iv. 18) is usually interpreted "man of god" (*mutu-sha-il*); but the relative particle is a difficulty (Gray, *Heb. Prop. Names*, 165 n.). Methuselah may be a deliberate alteration, as though "armed man" (Budde; see Skinner on Gen. v. 25). Apart from *mu-ut-Baal* in the Amarna Letters, 255 l. 3, the clearest example is the name of the Tyrian king of *circ.* 900 B.C., Μεθουάσταρτος, "man of Astarte" (Jos. *c. Ap.* i. 18; Nöldeke, *E.Bi.* col. 3286, § 42).

P. 74. Monotheism.—W. R. S. consistently denied that the Semites had any particular capacity for monotheism; see *Lectures and Essays*, 425 *sq.* (an article written in 1877), 612 (a review of Renan's *Histoire*, 1887). On the other hand, Nöldeke (*Sketches from Eastern History*, 5 [1892]) considers that there are strong tendencies to monotheism among the Semites, Baudissin (*ZDMG.* 1903, p. 836) holds that a clearer recognition of divine unity characterizes Semitic religion, and, not to mention other names, the division of opinion indicates that the problem of monotheism in general and of Semitic monotheism in particular stands in need of restatement.

In the first place, there are certain tendencies which make for polytheism (polydæmonism, etc.) and for monotheism (henotheism, etc.). So, as regards the former, (*a*) specialization of function provides deities with helpers and subordinates; (*b*) deities (spirits, etc.) are

postulated to account for new or strange phenomena that lie outside the usual activities of the known gods; (*c*) keener analysis of processes multiplies the gods (like the twelve Indigitamenta of Rome who presided over the twelve successive stages in the labours of the agriculturist); (*d*) personifications and abstractions multiply even to the extent of describing every phenomenon of the emotional or mental life as a "god";[1] (*e*) gods are differentiated, with the result that epithets, or manifestations, or embodiments become separate and distinct deities; (*f*) impersonal processes are replaced or supplemented by personal agencies (*e.g.*, the Indian wind-gods Vayu and Surya are more personal than Vata and Savitar); (*g*) gods are introduced from elsewhere by reformers, etc.; and (*h*) new gods arise when the old traditional gods are felt to be remote or useless.

Among the tendencies which make for monotheism are (*a*) co-ordination of attributes or functions, when one god takes over those of others; (*b*) the recognition of the points of similarity among different local, national, or functional gods; (*c*) the disinclination to tolerate rival powers; (*d*) social or political alliance or fusion, involving the co-ordination or fusion of gods; (*e*) the rise through historical circumstances of one god above others through pre-eminence of a city, priesthood, or ruler, or through spread of cult; and (*f*) the introduction of a new god who drives out or supersedes the rest. The rise of Re of Heliopolis in the Fifth Dynasty, and in Babylonia of Enlil of Nippur, later of Marduk (in the First Babylonian Dynasty), and later still of Asshur, are illustrations of (*e*). In the royal names Shamshi-Adad and in a divine name like Ishtar-Chemosh are unifying tendencies which make for monotheism (or rather henotheism); a combination of deities of different sexes may also perhaps be recognized in the Sabæan אלאלת (see Meyer, *Israel.* 212 n.). On the oft-cited tablet where Ninib (Ninurta) is Marduk of strength, Shamash Marduk of justice, and Adad, Nergal, etc., Marduk of rain, battle, etc., see Wardle, *Israel and Babylon*, 136.

Next, in the ebb and flow of religion there is a tendency for the masses to find the national religion—that of the rulers and priests—unintelligible, or out of touch with popular needs. The Great Gods, though not ignored or unknown, become remote, and the practical religion in the Mohammedan East is not that of Allah but of the local

[1] Cf. Nilsson, *Greek Religion*, 270, and *ERE.* s.v. "Personification." How to draw the line between a personification which is mythological and polytheistic and one that is purely poetical is a problem of methodology; for a recent discussion of the data, see Paul Heinisch, *Personifikationen und Hypostasen im A.T. und im Alten Orient* (*Biblische Zeitfragen*, ix. 10–12, Münster i. W., 1921).

saints.[1] All sorts of local and private beliefs and practices will flourish; outstanding men impress themselves upon the popular imagination, a remarkable case being the Sicilian cult of the Decollati or Executed Criminals.[2] Efforts, it is true, will be made to render the local cults orthodox, and everywhere typical problems arise touching the relation between the higher forms of religion (orthodox, national, etc.) and the lower (popular, private, etc.); see *CAH.* iii. 432 *sqq.* Again, besides the condemnation of a religion by reformers, there is the repeated recognition that the god is not to be restricted locally, nationally, or dogmatically. Indeed, Yahweh himself is said to be known to, though not explicitly recognized by, other peoples than his own (Isa. lxv. 1), and it is impressively set forth that the recognized worshippers of a god are not necessarily true ones (Matt. vii. 22 *sq.*, xxv. 41 *sqq.*; Lk. xiii. 25 *sqq.*). In other words, the history of the vicissitudes of religion is the constantly recurring consciousness that what at any time passes for religion is not final.

There are degrees of deity. At times pre-eminent individuals are regarded as at least semi-divine, or as more truly divine than the unseen, intangible gods of tradition; and, at times, gods are thought of as little more than supermen. But there is also an intense consciousness of a Divine Power for whom human symbolism is imperfect, and ordinary anthropomorphism too meanly human. There are, from time to time, great movements which give a new impetus to a religion; and when they can be analysed, it is seen that sooner or later they take account of popular needs. The usual adjustment between the more individualistic reformers, or the men of outstanding spiritual ability, and the environment as a whole, with its variety of needs and capabilities, will explain those steps which, viewed from the outside, look like a compromise, a deterioration, and a lapse from the original spiritual idealism (cf. *CAH.* iii. 470, 486 *sq.*). The ethical monotheism of the prophets did not by any means exclude later stages of henotheism, or even a virtual polytheism, and the prevalence of superstitions such as commonly rule among the simpler minds. To be sure, the prophets had introduced a new wave of religious idealism; but a distinction is to be drawn between the positive contributions of fresh spiritual movements and the subsequent systematization which makes the religion of a group seem closely akin to the earlier system prior to that movement, although it is vastly different owing to the new influences.

[1] Cf. also Lagrange, 25: "Dans la religion catholique . . . il faut que l'autorité lutte sans cesse contre la tendance qui frustrerait le Créateur du culte qui n'est dû qu'à lui. . . ."

[2] At Palermo. E. S. Hartland, *Folk-lore*, xxi. 172 *sqq.*

In such reforming movements, instead of a new god, an old one may be brought forward, and in a new dress (*e.g.* the Egyptian Aton, Apollo). Sometimes, the attributes of existing gods are so fixed that this is impossible: for the meanings of words cannot always be adjusted to suit new tendencies in religion. In the history of religion, besides the various changes of supreme importance which can be clearly recognized, others can certainly be assumed, as in the introduction of the fine ethical god Varuna of the Rig-Veda, who was known to the Hatti and Mitannians (*c.* fourteenth century), and subsequently became the Ahura-Mazda of Zoroastrianism. But the sort of reformation that can often be traced or definitely postulated must also be postulated to explain all other significant developments which have occurred in the history of religion. Besides the particular tendencies to polytheism and to monotheism, there are, then, the great vicissitudes of religion in history, and in particular, the numerous creative movements—naturally varying greatly in significance—which indicate the sort of process that, *mutatis mutandis*, must have been in operation, on however humble a scale, ages before the history of religion can be traced. Not only is the religion of any one period not final, but behind the recognized god or gods of any age is the Power which man has been seeking to formulate.

Hence, although much has been written on primitive monotheism, or on the Great Gods who are found among rudimentary peoples, the facts have not precisely the value set upon them.[1] These Supreme Beings are guardians of morality, founders of institutions, sometimes recognized by several tribes in common (*e.g.* in Australia; Durkheim, 285 *sq.*). At times they have a mythological rather than a religious value (Nilsson, 72), or they have a theoretical significance (Söderblom, 123), or they are found in circles where the crudest beliefs and practices are normal.[2] The belief in a Supreme Being or All-Father does not seem to depend upon the stage of social progress; in Borneo a low-grade tribe in the interior believes in a Supreme God while more advanced tribes on the coast are polytheists (I. King, 211 *sq.*). The really cardinal fact is threefold: (*a*) the insignificant place which the belief in a Supreme God often holds in the normal beliefs and customs of very rudimentary peoples; (*b*) the unique influence which theistic conceptions can have and have had in the

[1] See Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, ii. 670 *sqq.*; Söderblom, *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens* (1923); K. Th. Preuss, *Die höchste Gottheit bei den kulturarmen Völkern* (*Psych. Forsch.*, 1922).

[2] *e.g.* among the Yagans whom Darwin visited, and the Marinds of New Guinea. See *Semaine d'Ethnologie Religieuse à Tilbourg*, 1922 (1923), 316 *sqq.*, 384 *sqq.*, and Index, *s.v.* Monothéisme.

history of life and thought; and (*c*) the very secondary place which the belief in a Supreme Being can come to hold even in advanced societies, and its inability to exclude effective beliefs and practices encircling other gods, deified ancestors, etc.

Accordingly, monarchical monotheism in itself has not even the religious sentiment of the henotheist who places his own god above the rest (Lagrange, 24). Monotheism in itself is not necessarily the outcome of a deep religious spirit, but rather of philosophic thought (Jastrow, *Rel. Belief in Bab. and Ass.* 104 *sq.*, 417). The temperament and religious experience which makes for monotheism cannot be denied to primitive peoples.[1] Among the Semites one can trace gods behind the gods, *e.g.* Anu, Enlil, and Ea are above and behind the Great Gods (Jastrow, 247); and it was possible, as in the Code of Hammurabi, to speak of *Ilu* as distinct from the recognized and specified gods. There is a similar ambiguity in Egypt as regards God, *the* god, or *a* god.[2] But the use of *ilu*, *el*, etc., among the Semites cannot be claimed in support of a primitive Semitic monotheism,[3] although the distribution of the term testifies to the consciousness that there was some common element among the gods. On the other hand, Semitic religion reflects a subjective unity, a unity of feeling and purpose, not a unity of composition (cf. *Lectures*, 418 *sq.*, 426). There was not that systematizing power upon which monotheism as a doctrine depends; and ethical monotheism, the worship of the God of the national group, a God who was righteous and holy himself and demanded righteousness and holiness in the life of his people, more naturally deserves to be called monotheism than the more sporadic and more isolated examples which have not affected the historical development of the tribes among whom they are found.

A very important methodological principle is at stake. On the one hand there are the miscellaneous data for monotheisms and monotheistic movements; on the other, W. R. S.'s tendency (*a*) to emphasize the quality of the data of religion,[4] and (*b*) to sever sharply Christianity and the Bible from all other religion. On his view, the practical working of a religious belief, *i.e.* the social-religious system, is far more significant for the *systematic* treatment of religions

[1] Paul Radin, *Monotheism among Primitive Peoples* (1924)—a useful study.

[2] F. Ll. Griffith ("The Teaching of Amenophis," *Journ. of Eg. Arch.* xii. 230) observes that the commonest expression for an unspecified deity is "the god" the term "god" or possibly "a god" is not uncommon, and the two terms seem to belong to different phrases rather than different ideas.

[3] Bevan, *The Critical Review*, 1897, p. 413 *sq.*; Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* i. § 346 n.; Jastrow, 105; Lidzbarski, *Ephem.* ii. 38; Hehn. 150 *sqq.*

[4] Cf. *Prophets*, 88, 184, on the difference between the attitudes of Elisha and of Hosea to the religious movement at the rise of Jehu.

than either the more isolated and occasional data, or those which lay outside the development of religion—as he understood it. The earliest conceivable systems are therefore of greater value than isolated beliefs, however sublime in themselves—like the belief in a Supreme Being—unless these can be shown to have left their mark upon the system. Ultimate problems arise of methodology and theology which W. R. S. ignored ; and it may be urged that it is easier to perceive how systematized *animal*-cults (as totemism) can flourish by the side of and in spite of unsystematized beliefs in an All-Father, than to treat such cults as derivations from or degradations of a systematized social-religious cult in which the All-Father had an organic part, or to regard the idea of a Supreme Being as a *gradual* promotion of a cult-object to supremacy. Whatever consciousness there may have been among rudimentary peoples in prehistoric ages of a Supreme Being, the social-religious system of the day must always have been in an intelligible relationship with the current physical, economic, moral, mental, and all other *non-religious* conditions. See further below, pp. 669 *sqq.*

P. 76 n. 1.—See also Fraenkel, " Schutzrecht d. Araber," *Nöldeke-Festschrift*, 293 *sqq.*

P. 79 and n. 1. THE GĒR.[1]—Cf. the Phœnician names גראהל, גרהכל, among the graffiti of Abydos (Lidzbarski, *Ephem.* iii. 99 *sq.*), which describe the bearers as clients of the Tent and of the Temple. In *CIS.* i. 50 (גרמלך בן אהלמלך) the editors compare with the father's name the Phœn. אהלבעל and the S. Arab. אהלאל (add also אהלעזחר, and cf. the Heb. Oholah and Oholibamah), and they suggest that such names mean " tent of the god," *i.e.* sharing the same tent (similarly Lagrange, 118 n.). But, on the analogy of Shecaniah, " Yahweh dwells " (among his worshippers), the compounds would indicate rather that the bearer is the habitation of the god. The *gēr* can claim the help of his god, and at the present day a man passing a shrine will cry : " *anā ṭanīb ʿalēkī, yā sittī, yā Badrīyeh*," " I am a *ṭanīb* to you, O my lady, O Badriyeh." For *ṭanīb*, he who touches the tent-rope and invokes and expects protection, see *Kinship*, 49 n., and above, p. 76. In names of the type κοσγηρος the god (Cos) is, of course, the patron : " Allah is the *jār* of the righteous " (*Kinship*, p. 50 n. 1 ; cf. Nöldeke, *Sitz. Ber.*, Berlin, 1882, p. 1187 n. 6). On the *ʿār* as a conditional curse, a means of forcing a covenant relation whereby the weak gains the protection of others, see Westermarck, *Morocco*, i. 518 *sqq.*, and below, p. 692.

P. 80 n. 3.—*CIS.* ii. 904 does not recognize Euting's reading.

P. 80 n. 4.—For the Meccan custom Stübe refers to Snouck-

[1] For the Larnaca inscription (p. 77), see Cooke, 67 *sq.* ; Lagrange, 478 *sq.*

Hurgronje, *Mekka*, ii. 28 *sqq.*, 79 *sq.*, 151); see also Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Pèlerinage à la Mekke*, 201 *sqq.*

P. 92 n. 2.—It is still disputed whether Nimrod is a Libyan figure (E. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* i. § 361 n.), or Babylonian (Skinner, *Gen.* 209; Kraeling, *AJSL.* xxxviii. 214; Prince, *JAOS.* xl. 202; Hommel, *Eth. u. Geog.* 184 n., and many others).

P. 93 n.—Much older than these are the recently discovered Phœnician inscriptions of Abibaal and Elbaal, kings of Gebal (Byblus). For the usage, cf. the numerous local "kings" in the Amarna Letters (*e.g.* Gezer, Lachish, etc., Megiddo, Taanach, etc).

P. 94, etc. Baal.[1]—W. R. S.'s pages have been found to need some modification. The name Baal is known in Arabia (p. 109 n. 1), but it was not necessarily taken there by Aramæans (Wellh. 146, Lagr. 90), at least as the name of a god.[2] It is not a divine element in South Arabian nomenclature, El being used instead (Nielsen, *Dreieinige Gott*, 97 *sq.*); though Nöldeke is of opinion that a *god* Baal had once been known there (*ERE.* i. 664).[3] "Baal" could be applied at an early date to a heaven or sky god: a Baal of Heaven or Sky Baal occurs as the chief god in the Hamath inscription of *c.* 800 B.C. (Pognon, *Inscr. Sem.* No. 86), and in a treaty between Esarhaddon and Baal, king of Tyre (seventh century); and he is prominent in the Persian age.[4] Sky-gods are of long standing; in Egypt there are gods who are lords in heaven, and in Babylonia Damkina, wife of Ea, is queen (*sharrat*) of heaven and earth (*KAT.* 360), and Ishtar is queen or lady (*belit*) of heaven (*ib.* 425; cf. Amarna Letters, 23 l. 26). In Hittite treaties Teshub (a god of the Addu–Hadad–Ramman type) is lord of heaven and earth, and this title is borne by Sin and Shamash. In the Egypto-Hittite treaty the "Lord of Heaven" (Re-Sutekh [Set]) has with him a "queen of heaven." In the Amarna Letters Baal proper corresponds to Addu (or Hadad), and in Egyptian texts (especially of the thirteenth century) Baal is well known as a war-god, causing terror, and associated with the mountains. Here he is god of rain and storm, and evidently to be equated with Set.[5] He also has solar attri-

[1] See Lagrange, 83 *sqq.*; Paton, *ERE.* s.v.; Baudissin, *Adonis*, 25 *sqq.* On place-names compounded with Baal (p. 94 n. 6), see Gray, *Heb. Prop. Names*, 125 *sqq.*; *E.Bi.* col. 3312.

[2] Nor, according to Barton (75 n., 104 n. 5), is there reason to believe that the date-palm was of purely North Semitic origin.

[3] See now Nielsen, *Handbuch d. Altarab. Altertumskunde* (Copenhagen, 1927), i. 240 *sq.*

[4] Lidzbarski, *Ephem.* i. 243 *sqq.* (see first ii. 122); Hehn, 117 *sq.*; Nielsen, 297 *sqq.*

[5] Gressmann, *Baudissin-Festschrift*, 191 *sqq.* In Ptolemaic Egypt a denominative of the word *ba'al* is used in the sense *böse sein, freveln* (202, No. 48; cf. above,

butes, and the imagery associates with him the bull, who was elsewhere associated with Baal and Yahweh—in Babylonia with Enlil ("the sturdy bull"). The bull, a symbol of strength, prowess, and the roaring storm, was also a symbol of the power of the sun. The combination of solar and taurine epithets occurs with both the god and the Pharaoh; the latter "cries like Addu in the sky" and is also a sun-god. The Assyrian name Shamshi-Adad reflects the same tendency to connect the two chief gods and their attributes; it is a syncretizing, monotheizing tendency, and it suggests that Baal (Hadad) of Palestine would be a god of outstanding importance before he was succeeded by the Israelite Yahweh (see *CAH.* ii. 348 *sq.*).

In the Amarna Letters Baal is "*in* Heaven," perhaps the first stage in the title "Baal *of* Heaven."[1] Gods of the sky could none the less be localized on earth (Wellh. 211), and the Sky Baal in due course is worshipped by the side of other gods and becomes the god of particular cities. The Baal of Harran was Sin, the moon-god; but the particular attributes of the Baals afford no clue to the primary meaning of the term, and local Baals could have special attributes and functions as readily as do the modern *welis*. The distribution of the Baals as divine names would show that a certain similarity or connexion was felt to exist everywhere between them; but it does not follow that the local Baals gave rise to the conviction that there was a single supreme and clearly defined Baal, or that they are secondary differentiations of an original (prehistoric) Baal. The local saints, *welis*, and Madonnas are commonly the later forms of earlier local beings, and the relations between local or specialized deities and the Great Gods, whether rulers or merely otiose, would be as variable in the unknown past as they are in those periods where they can be more or less clearly recognized (cf. *CAH.* iii. 433).

A distinction may be drawn between *ba'al*, used of men and gods, and *'ēl*, used of the gods alone (Lagrange, 83 *sq.*, 97). But it may be questioned whether the primary meaning of *ba'al* is "inhabitant" or "owner" (above, p. 95 n. end). The idea of domination, at all events, does not necessarily involve a servile relationship (p. 94, cf. 109), although ideas of ownership and overrule (*e.g.* over a wife, *Kinship*, 92) are found, especially in the more complex society of Babylonia. On the other hand, property-rights come by "quickening" a place (p. 95 *sq.*)—the Baal "donne la fécondité du sol" (Lagrange, 98), or a man builds on the soil or cultivates it (p. 143). In other words, he makes things naturally effective. Already Toy (on Prov. iii. 27) has

p. 112 n.). "Waters of B." occurs from the Nineteenth Dynasty onwards (Gressmann, *op. cit.* Nos. 44–47).

[1] Gressmann, *op. cit.* 213. Shamash is also "*in*" (*ina*, *ishtu*) heaven.

suggested that *ba'al* signifies one who employs or controls a thing; and the compound expressions *ba'al* of tongue, wisdom, city, etc., suggest further that the primary idea of *ba'al* is that of a productive, effective agent, and, on this account, a possessor of rights (cf. p. 637).

The Baal "of" a place may be supposed to "own" it, but he is properly the god to be invoked when one is in his locality or requires his help. Gods are not merely to be feared or served, they are also to be used; and the conception of gods as *effective* causes is so common elsewhere, and so self-evident, as to lead us to expect it among the Semites. Gods are frequently causes of prosperity in general, or of particular activities, as when the earth becomes sterile and fertility ceases when Tammuz and Ishtar are in the Lower World. There are many nuances: the Greek *dæmon* causes a man to be what he is, and the Latin *genius* makes for the efficiency of people and the stability of things.[1] Among primitive peoples there are "species deities," archetypes, creators and sustainers of the various species of animals (in one case the guardian is an "elder brother") and of various objects of nature.[2] So, too, there are presiding "angels," tutelary and other similar deities, and στοιχεῖα (see *E.Bi.* art. "Elements"). Throughout, the fundamental notion seems to be that of the power which makes things effective, causes them to act as they should, and preserves their nature. Accordingly, the Baal-Berith, as W. R. S. says, "presides over covenants" (p. 95 n.), though it is significant that this function is elsewhere ascribed to specific gods (the Aryan Varuna and Mitra),[3] or there is an immanent process, when, by means of vague imprecations, covenants are safeguarded by unspecified powers or some implied mechanism (p. 555).

But kings are also effective powers. When Rameses II., hailed by his courtiers as "lord of heaven, lord of earth, Re," is also "lord of food, plentiful in grain," *i.e.* he is a veritable food-baal (cf. p. 537). The king is the visible god and the source of the land's fruitfulness (Breasted, *Eg. Records*, iii. § 265); the "magical" powers of chiefs and kings are well known (see Frazer, *GB.* i. ch. vi.). It is, to be sure, difficult to say that the Pharaoh or the god is an actual immanent principle, although in the Pyramid Texts the dead king is a veritable cosmic principle: he becomes "the outflow of the rain," while in the Twelfth Dynasty a dead king is said to rejoin the Sun and his "divine limbs" mingle with him that begat him.[4] The evidence is

[1] Nilsson, 283 *sq.*; cf. W. Warde Fowler, *Roman Ideas of Deity*, 17 *sqq.*

[2] Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[4], ii. 244 (cf. the "patrons" or "patterns").

[3] Meillet, *Journ. Asiat.* 1907, ii. 143; Bertholet-Lehmann, *Lehrbuch d. Rel. gesch.*, ii. 21.

[4] Breasted, *Development of Eg. Thought*, 125; *Eg. Rec.* i. § 491, ii. § 592.

more intelligible when the god or the divine king exercises control from outside. So, Yahweh gives command (Gen. i.) and he "calls" for the corn (p. 518); and the Aryan Varuna is an ethical god, the guardian of an immanent principle of cosmic and social order (p. 657). Among primitive peoples the ability to get, control, or multiply the vital things of life (food, rain, etc.) is often associated with special individuals whose powers are either general or specialized. In typical cases an essential substantial relationship is believed to subsist between the controller and the controlled. The most remarkable are the ceremonies recorded by Spencer and Gillen among certain totem-clans of Central Australia. They are of extreme interest (1) for their contribution to our knowledge of primitive social-religious cults and totemism in particular, and (2) for the illustration they afford of W. R. S.'s fundamental theory of the totem communion-sacrifice.[1] Here, (*a*) each of the clans is of the same essence or substance as its totem-species, and the difference between the clansmen and the species (emu, kangaroo, etc.) is ignored so far as the cult is concerned—a criterion of totemism; and (*b*) each clan, through its elders, is supposed, under appropriate conditions, to multiply or otherwise exercise control over its totem.[2] Thus it appears that where the idea prevails of some effective control there is between controller and controlled a unique relationship which, in the most striking examples, is a virtual or an actual identity. Hence the Semitic Baal-conception can hardly be isolated from the related ideas elsewhere.

Semitic Baalism is at the agricultural stage (pp. 113, 244). But this is not the earliest stage of society: the very notion of sacred places is earlier than the beginning of settled life (p. 118). For the primitive conceptions we are directed to the simpler Arab life (p. 101), or, with Lagrange (p. 98), to the cuneiform inscriptions of thousands of years earlier—the difference in method is highly typical. In any case, the Arab data are complex. Still, a distinction is drawn between

[1] Totemism has been defined as the cult of a social group, especially an exogamous one, which stands to a species of animal or plant (generally edible), or to an object or class of objects, in an intimate relationship; the totem is treated as a cognate to be respected, and not to be eaten or used, or at least only under certain restrictions. See W. H. Rivers, *The History of Melanesian Society*, ii. 75 (Cambridge, 1914).

[2] In order that the ceremonies may be successful, the clansmen, who usually refrain from eating their own totem, must on this occasion eat a little. Frazer (*Tot. Ex.* iv. 231) observes that the ceremony is utilitarian and magical, and the animal in no sense divine, a criticism which of course turns upon his definition of religion and magic. (The researches of Spencer and Gillen have been in some respects modified by those of Strehlow; but the main facts, so far as W. R. S.'s arguments are involved, are not affected.) See below, p. 586.

"Baal's land" and the "land" belonging to Athtar (*i.e.* Astarte or Ishtar, p. 99 n. 2), and it is possible to regard the land that bears fruit under the influence of the fertilizing power of Baal as his wife (*Prophets*, 172, 411). If so, it is easy to see that, under the marriage symbolism (the importance of which is indicated by W. R. S. *l.c.*), different views could prevail touching the respective functions of the male element and of the female element, and also of the power behind or over these (see p. 513).[1] With Lagrange (97 *sq.*) it is unnecessary to endeavour to restrict the nuances and developments of the idea of the Baal, although it is difficult to agree with him that "l'idée de propriété et par suite de domination rend compte de toutes ses nuances." For the most primitive or fundamental conception we seek some more pregnant and effective idea, in harmony with the practical character of early religion.

P. 99 n.—On the terms *ba'l*, *ghail*, see the *Kitāb al-kharāj* of Yaḥyā ibn Ādam (ed. Juynboll, 1896), 80 *sq.*—A. A. B.

P. 100 n.—See *CIS.* iv. 47; Barton, *Semitic Origins*, 86 *sq.*, 127, 128 n. 1; and, on water rights in South Arabia, Rhodokanakis, *Sitz. Ber.* of the Vienna Academy, 185, No. 3 (1917), 86, 97, 108.

P. 107. Aphaca.—See Lagrange, 129 n. 1, 159; Baudissin, *Adonis*, 80, 363 n. 1; Frazer, *GB.* v. 259 (and his description of the place, 28 *sq.*). On the local survival of cults associated with a female spirit or deity, see Rouvier, *Bullet. Arch.* 1900, p. 170; Curtiss, *Prim. Sem. Rel.* 153 *sq.* (a sacred fig-tree growing out of the ruins is known as "our lady Venus"). Paton (*Annual of the American School of Oriental Research in Jerusalem*, 1920, i. 56) refers to a fig-tree, a ruined shrine, and a spring, the abode of Sa'īdat Afkā, of whom is told a story evidently derived from the myth of Astarte and Adonis. In such cases, however, it is difficult to decide whether the story goes back to pre-Christian times, or has been from time to time resurrected by learned monks or travellers, and in this way impressed upon the peasantry.

P. 108 and n. 3. The Husband of the Land.—As W. R. S. shows in more detail elsewhere (*Prophets*, 172 *sq.*, 410 *sq.*), land and people form a natural unity, and it is the same whether the god marries the land and makes it productive or marries the stock of the nation.[2]

[1] Dusares, who is a North Arabian Baal (Wellhausen, 51), is "he of the *shara*," a term given to districts which, as it seems, were moist and luxuriant (cf. Nöldeke, *ERE.* i. 663). Although a connexion between the word and Ishtar is excluded by the guttural, the goddess does seem to represent the fertility of nature and to be the goddess of the fertilizing moisture of the soil (Baudissin, 21, 27; cf. *ZDMG.* lvii. 824).

[2] See on Mother-Earth (p. 518). Among the Yuin of Australia the notion is that a man owns the district where he was born (Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, 248 *sq.*).

The woman as land or field is a familiar notion; cf. Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, i. 309 *sq.* (Vedic Law). In the Amarna Letters, Rib-Addi, lamenting the famine, says, "My field is like a woman without a husband"; parallels to this are found in Old Egyptian, in the Talmudic "virgin soil" (קרקע בתולה), and *Taanith* 6*b*, "rain is the *ba'al* of the earth."[1] Rulers of a city are frequently compared to a bridegroom or husband.[2] Rameses II. is called "husband of Egypt," rescuing her from every enemy (Breasted, *Eg. Rec.* iii. § 490); and Rameses III. is an "abundant Nile" (iv. § 92), and "the great Nile, the great harvest-goddess of Egypt" (iv. p. 7 note *d*). Such kings both claim to be, and are recognized as, the cause of the land's material prosperity. Rameses II. is hailed as "lord of food, plentiful in grain, in whose footsteps is the harvest goddess." His word brings rain upon the mountains, for he is the incarnation of the god Re (iii. §§ 265, 268); and the god Ptah gives him "a great Nile," good harvests, and all prosperity (iii. §§ 404, 409). Similarly Amenemhet I. says, "I cultivated grain and loved the harvest-god" (i. § 483).

In general, the earth needs fertilization, and this comes through the god or a nature-god, or his representative. The procedure is sometimes most realistic.[3] Often fertility depends upon the conduct of the representative individual: the evil influence of a bad ruler upon nature and the agricultural prosperity of his country is familiar in ancient religion. But the fundamental belief in this interrelation or identity of man and nature is otherwise expressed when, at a more democratic stage, Israel's material prosperity depends upon the behaviour of the people, or when, at a more priestly stage, it depends upon the cultus, and upon the strict observance of the necessary religious rites. Social order and the order of nature are *in theory* one, but *in practice* special members of society are supposed to possess unique powers over nature, or by their conduct can exercise direct or indirect influence upon all that makes for human welfare.[4] The "husband" of

[1] Knudtzon, No. 74, rec. 7 *sq.*; *Alte Orient*, viii. 30; Sarowsky, *ZATW*. xxxii. 303 *sqq.*, xxxiii. 81 *sq.*

[2] Stübe refers to Schack, *Poesie u. Kunst d. Araber in Spanien u. Sicilien*, ii. 117 *sqq.*; G. Jacob, *Altarab. Parellelen z. A.T.* 16.

[3] The union of sky-god and earth-mother can be traced through the Mediterranean area: so A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, i. 779 *sq.*, ii. 677. In the isles of Leti, etc., Mr. Sun comes down once a year to fertilize the earth (Frazer, *GB*. ii. 99); and the Pueblo Indians entreat the Sun Father to embrace the Earth Mother (Frazer, *Tot. Ex.* ii. 237). Farnell (*Evol. Rel.* 194) cites an early English prayer: "Hail be thou, Earth, Mother of Men; wax fertile in the embrace of God, fulfilled with fruit for the use of men" (Grein, *Bibl. d. angel-sächs. Poesie*, ed. Wülcker, i. 316).

[4] For the interconnexion of man and "nature" (a conception which is by no means a primitive one), see also Aptowitzer, *MGWJ*. lxiv. 227, 305, lxv. 71, 164.

the land or people is therefore a particular form of various interrelated ideas of the cause of growth and fertility.

P. 119 *sqq.* (cf. 441 *sqq.*). THE JINN AND TOTEMISM.[1]—In contrast to the more or less systematized cults of settled communities are the miscellaneous beliefs in supernatural beings of vague individuality and, in particular, animal in form. They thus find analogies in some of the characteristics of totemism, and the question is raised, Are the *jinn* potential totems? It is to be noticed that (1) W. R. S.'s evidence for *jinn* and demons is not peculiar to any part of the Semitic field, to any period of its history, or to the Semitic area itself.[2] (2) No sharp dividing line can be drawn between *jinn* and other more or less related beings: the *jinn* of both ancient and modern times often recall the fairies, trolls, and goblins of western lands (*e.g.* they will help the poor), and it may even be questioned whether such beings should be called *jinn* (Lang, *JRAI.* xxx. No. 17). (3) There is no great gulf between the *jinn* and wild beasts on the one hand (p. 121 n. 1) and human beings on the other—the failure to distinguish clearly between human and animal is common among primitive peoples.[3]

The *jinn*, like "demons" and their kind, serve conveniently to explain whatever is not due to "natural" causes, or that has a supernatural origin, and cannot be associated with any of the known gods or spirits. The *jinn* are by reputation harmful and Satanic; they are hostile, whereas there are other animal beings which will give omens, assist in ordeals, and be generally helpful. Unusual phenomena will be ascribed either to *jinn* or demons, or to more friendly beings, according to the particular circumstances of each; so that sometimes the native is at a loss to whose charge to lay some more ambiguous occurrence. Of the springs in Palestine inhabited by supernatural beings, some are the centre of cults; the water has creative properties, and the "saint" is accepted as orthodox and Islamic. But sometimes there is a *jinn* who takes the shape of an animal, a

[1] On the *jinn*, see also Wellhausen, 208 *sqq.*; Goldziher, *Abhand.* i. 107 *sqq.*, 201; Jaussen, 318 *sqq.*; Nöldeke, *ERE.* i. 669 *sq.*; Geyer in the *Nöldeke-Festschrift*, i. 66 *sqq.*; Einszler, *ZDPV.* x. 160 *sqq.* For criticisms of W. R. S., see Westermarck, *JRAI.* 1899, pp. 252–68 (the nature of the Arab jinn as illustrated by the present beliefs of the people of Morocco), now superseded by his *Ritual and Belief in Morocco*, i. 262–413.

[2] For Assyrian parallels, see R. Campbell Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, 57 *sq.*

[3] To the Gilyak of Alaska every animal is as much a man as a Gilyak, and perhaps greater and wiser (*G.B.* viii. 206). Australians see no difficulty in drawing an emu or a kangaroo with a shield (R. H. Matthews, *Queensland Geog. Journal*, xvi. [1900–1] p. 81, cf. xiv. 10 *sq.*; cf. also Frazer, *Tot. Ex.* i. 131 *sq.* and 119). Jastrow, *Bab. Ass. Birth Omens* (Giessen, 1914, p. 70 *sq.*) deals with the birth of monsters and other data which would foster ideas of the identity of human and animal nature.

monster, or a negro; he may injure people, and must be placated, driven off by prayers (*JPOS.* iv. 64). Again, there are springs which have no cult, but are the abode of vague beings varying according to the particular traditions that encircle each.

The relation between the *jinn* and the "god" resembles that between the δαίμων and the θεός at another cultural stage. The *dæmon* is essentially undefined and has no real individuality, it is the suprasensual explanation of phenomena which a man is unable to explain from his ordinary experience; whereas a "god" is developed by religious need, and, through the cult, into a characteristic individuality.[1] Accordingly, the terms *jinn*, demon, *dæmon*, god, etc., are properly used to denote different sorts of powers, agencies, etc., the "god" being distinguished by his having a personality and a relative permanence, and by being the centre of a cult and of a system of ideas (cf. Meyer, *Gesch. Alt.* i. § 50 *sq.*). Of course, care must be taken not to draw the line too rigorously, ignoring transitional forms: the Babylonian "demons" appear to be more systematized figures than the *jinn*, there are well-understood relations between them and men, whereas the *jinn* is rather a class-god or species. The history of all these beings is the history of beliefs, ideas, etc. In this way, "gods" become degraded into "demons."[2] But the reverse development cannot, on psychological grounds, be so easily followed, and W. R. S. is careful to speak only of the development of *friendly* "demoniac beings" (p. 443).

It is necessary to distinguish, where possible, between totemic features, and those which are at most totemistic, and those which can only be called theriomorphic. The striking local animal cults of Egypt in the period of her decline hardly represent the "purely totemic" stage (p. 226; cf. p. 578). In West African Secret Societies the "Human Leopards" or "Human Lions" periodically act as though they were these animals. In Nigeria Mohammedan families have each a sacred animal (camel, goat, etc.) known as the "head" or the "source" of the house; it is never eaten, and is supposed to contain the spirits of the forefathers and to have witnessed the foundations of the house.[3] And this is in the midst of Islam! But what forms actual totemism took among ancient and rudimentary peoples it is impossible to guess; and the theory of totemism and its relation

[1] Cf. Nilsson, 164 *sqq.* All δαίμονες are θεῖοι, but very few are promoted to the rank of θεοί; see Lightfoot's note on Col. ii. 9.

[2] P. 120; cf. Goldziher, *Abhand.* i. 113 *sq.* (Cozah, etc.); *ZA.* viii. 333. Cf. the Ishtars as female idols in Mandæan (Lidzbarski, *Ephem.* i. 101 and n. 12) and the Reshaphim as demons in later Hebrew (Bacher, *REJ.* xxviii. 151).

[3] C. K. Meek, *Northern Tribes of Nigeria*, i. 174 (Oxford, 1925).

to religion is really a methodological one. To some extent all animal symbolism and imagery is a refuge from anthropomorphism when ordinary human imagery is inadequate; and Farnell, in some important pages, comments on the "unstable anthropomorphism" of Babylon and Assyria.[1] The problem of totemism is bound up with that of anthropomorphism, in that the animal imagery, etc., is either a reaction against the latter, or represents a stage prior to anthropomorphism itself. Naturally, animal cults cannot be derived from trees, springs, and stones, which, when regarded as sacred, are often thought of more or less along anthropomorphic lines. On the other hand, animals, by reason of their bodily and other characteristics (strength, cunning, etc.), are far more impressive, and have much more to contribute to man's growing knowledge of himself. In totemism there are rudimentary forms of these elements which recur in a more developed form where there are anthropomorphic deities;[2] and even when there are "All-Fathers" or "Supreme Gods" in rudimentary areas, these are often as little an integral part of the social cult as they are in more advanced societies (p. 529 *sq.*). Again, not only are there sometimes tendencies to regard the totem as an at least semi-divine being, but "individual totems," "spirit guardians," and "naguals" are on the road to become personal gods.[3] Hence the questions arise, (*a*) Into what does totemism develop? and (*b*) Is anthropomorphism primary, or, if not, what sort of cult (whether it deserves to be called "religious" or not) preceded it?

W. R. S. lays the strongest emphasis upon the necessity of overcoming fear and terror of the unknown (p. 122); ideas of friendliness, relationship, and kinship necessarily characterize the earliest and most primitive types of religious cult (p. 137). The *jinn* are essentially unfriendly, but they illustrate some typical varieties of theriomorphism. On the other hand, friendly demoniacal beings, theriomorphic or other, capable of becoming "gods," can hardly be called *jinn*. The *jinn*, like the totem, are a "species"; they illustrate the material of which totemism is made, and in this sense it can be said that if they had human kinsfolk they would be "potential totems" (cf. p. 130). The elements which constitute totemism are, taken separately, not strange to the Semites;[4] but this fact does not prove that *all* the Semitic peoples

[1] *Greece and Babylon*, 14 *sq.*, 54 *sqq.*; cf. *Attributes of God*, 22 *sqq.*

[2] Cf. S. A. Cook, *ERE.* "Religion," § 17 *sq.*

[3] Frazer, *Tot. Ex.* ii. 18 *sq.*; cf. 151, and i. 81 *sq.*, also ii. 139 *sq.*, 166, iv. 30 *sq.* The Wollunqua snake-totem of the Warramunga "seems to be a totem on the high road to become a god" (*ib.* i. 145). For Frazer's evidence for the *worship* of totems, see the Introduction, above, p. xli.

[4] For instance, in the district of Dan in Palestine the late Lord Kitchener found the tomb of a dog which had become transformed into a holy place under the

passed through that stage of animal cults which we call totemic. W. R. S.'s careful sentences on p. 125 (italicized in this edition) speak not of an actual evolution, say from A to B, but of ideas and usages in B which also find a more rudimentary expression in A. The difference is essential. He points out that primitive religious institutions are not to be explained by conceptions belonging to a more advanced stage beyond the "totem stage of thought" (p. 445, l. 11), because new gods, sanctuaries, cults, etc., can spring up at a later and post-totemic stage (p. 138). Of this earlier postulated totemic stage, there can only be survivals; but the postulate accounts for the triangular relationship between gods, men, and animals of which there are so many miscellaneous examples (p. 287 *sq.*).[1] It is true that W. R. S. is thought to have exaggerated the significance of totemism, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to point to any other theory which affords a better explanation of those religious data with which he is concerned.

P. 121 n. 1.—The association between demons and wild beasts may be illustrated by a verse of Ḥātīm aṭ-Ṭā'ī (ed. Schulthess, 1897), *Banu-l-jinni lam yuṭbakh bicidrin jazūruhā* (p. 27, line 18, of the Arabic text; p. 46 of the translation), "the sons of the Jinn whose victim is not cooked in a cauldron." This conception of the *jinn* as eaters of raw flesh agrees remarkably with what Spencer and Gillen say of the Australian beliefs: "The spirits kill and eat all manner of game, but always uncooked, for they are not supposed to have any fires" (*Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 516).—A. A. B.

P. 135. Astral Religion.[2]—Although there is evidence for a widespread interest in the heavenly bodies—and the Pleiades in particular were often carefully observed by primitive peoples (*G.B.* vii. 308 *sqq.*)—astral cults have not that prevalence or antiquity

name of the Sheikh Merzuk (*PEF. Qy. St.* 1877, p. 171). Men named "dog" and "whelp" are connected with the story of a shrine at Ma'alul, near Nazareth (Tyrwhitt Drake, *ib.* 1873, p. 58). In Syria and Egypt every one has a double, often in the form of an animal (Seligman, *Ridgeway Presentation Volume*, 138 *sq.*). For saints in animal form, see *JPOS.* vii. 12 sq.

[1] Similarly, F. B. Jevons, *Introd. to the History of Rel.* 127, speaks of the *disjecta membra* of totemism among Semites and Aryans. According to Meek (*op. cit.* ii. 186), the Nigerian tribes whose titles mean simply "Men" may be asserting that they have passed beyond those who are called Lions, Frogs, Buffaloes, etc. It is also possible that the familiar Cretan and other old Oriental representations of the subjugation of beasts (cf. Nilsson, 20) may refer to that consciousness of the difference between man and beast which also marks the Babylonian story of Engidu (*CAH.* iii. 228).

[2] See *Kinship*, 255 *sq.* Astral cults among the Arabs have been rather underestimated (*e.g.* by Wellhausen, *Heid.*[1] 175, 217; cf. 2nd ed. 211), see G. Jacob, *Bed. Leben*[2], 158. For the data, see Nöldeke, *ERE.* i. 660, and in general G. F. Moore, *E.Bi.* "Nature Worship," § 5.

sometimes ascribed to them. The relative prominence of cults of the heavenly bodies in religion and mythology "differs widely among peoples upon the same plane of culture and even of the same stock; they had a different significance to the settled population of Arabia from that which they had for the Arab nomad (in South Arabia the worship of the sun and moon is strikingly prevalent), and besides this economic reason there are doubtless historical causes for the diversity which are in great part concealed from us" (Moore). The indications of astral cults among the Western Semites certainly prove more numerous than was thought; but the references in the O.T. to the cults of the *later* Assyrian period stand in contrast to the scantiness in the literature referring to *earlier* periods, which, however, may come from late though simpler circles.[1]

In Babylonia the keen observation of the stars was bound up with the conviction that the will of the gods was reflected in them and could be discovered; and an elaborate system of astrology arose, based on the belief that occurrences in the heavens and occurrences on earth were ruled by the same laws—that is, that heaven and earth were part of one harmonious system. To adopt a modern formula, "heaven and earth are each the image or reflexion of the other" (*Himmelsbild* = *Weltbild*).[2] A modern theory also urges that numerous *motifs* of astral religion permeated ancient tradition.[3] But in general, when astral, mythical, and legendary *motifs* are supposed to occur in the stories of personages or events, it is obvious (1) that their presence does not prove that we have myth or legend, and (2) that, even in the latter, normal human traits could naturally be utilized, especially when stories of the heavenly bodies were concerned. The "anthropomorphic" treatment of things celestial is based upon terrestrial experience; the remote and the supersensuous (whether divine beings or planets regarded as divine) are spoken of in terms of the near and the known.

What is really important here is the emotional effect of myth and legend—of all that is supersensuous, idealizing, sublime, or artistic. It is in this respect that the myth or legend, with its peculiar treatment of nature or history, exercises so powerful an influence, and a "New

[1] Seals and other archæological data in Palestine point to a certain prevalence of astral ideas. See also G. B. Gray, *Sacrifice*, 297 *sq.* (lunar influence on the feasts), 148–178 (the later ideas of the sacrificial service in heaven).

[2] See especially Alfred Jeremias, *The O.T. in the Light of the Ancient East* (2 vols., 1911); *Handbuch der Altorient. Geisteskultur* (Leipzig, 1913); and for criticisms, Wardle, *Israel and Babylon*, ch. xii.

[3] The four wives of Jacob are the four phases of the moon; Abraham and Lot are Dioscuri and must separate; like Jacob and Esau, they are also respectively lunar and solar characters.

Jerusalem" appeals otherwise than does the Old.[1] The characteristic colouring which makes such tradition and literature effective stands in contrast to the secondary euhemerizing, rationalizing, and other processes which wash it out. Similarly, there is a characteristic tendency to de-divinize and de-spiritualize (p. 546). Both are typically *secondary* stages, although it is obvious that the material which receives the emotional, spiritual, or religious colouring had already undergone vicissitudes which in most cases cannot be recovered or reconstructed. It is not to be supposed that the *primary* stages are absolutely so; but, as in W. R. S.'s theory of the "communion" origin of sacrifice, it is the beginning of a fresh development, and not some absolute stage in the evolution of religion which we look for (cf. p. 499 and note 1).

P. 145 n. 1.—See Floyer, *Journ. Royal Asiatic Society*, 1892, p. 813. The clause cited from Bekrī reads "and (the tribe of) Thacīf have most right to Wajj."—A. A. B.

P. 148. RIGHT OF ASYLUM.—See Quatremère, "Les Asyles chez les Arabes," *Mem. Acad. Inscr.* xv. (1845), 307 *sqq.*; Goldziher, *Muh. Stud.* i. 236 *sqq.*; Jacob, *Altarab. Parallelen z. A.T.*, 12; Wellhausen, 184; Landberg, *Arabica*, ii. 1781; Westermarck, *Origin and Devel. of Moral Ideas*, ii. 628 *sqq.*; *ERE.* ii. 161 *sqq.*; and Frazer, *Tot. Ex.* i. 96 *sqq* (who refers to A. Hellwig's monographs on the subject, Berlin, 1903, Stuttgart, 1906), iv. 267 *sq.*, and *id. FOT.* iii. 19 *sq.* (on Ps. lxxxiv. 3). See next note.

P. 150 and n. 2. SACRED AREAS.—The South Arabian *ḏāt-ḥmy*, "she of the sacred enclosure" (Hommel; see Lagrange, 184 n. 3), is otherwise rendered "she of the burning heat" (Höyer, see Nielsen, 251 n.). With the "wall" as the watcher, cf. the Babylonian custom of giving significant names to gates, walls, etc., and the lustrations of the citadel in Iguvium, with prayer and sacrifice at each gate (Warde Fowler).[2]

As regards the protection of sacred animals (cf. pp. 142 n., 160), the Egyptian, in the so-called "Negative Confession," will testify that he has not taken away the birds or fishes of the gods; and in the Saïte age a man declares, "I gave food to the ibis, the hawk, the cat, and the jackal" (Breasted, *Anc. Rec.* i. 126, note *c*). Even in Central Australia there are, besides the sacred totem species, spots (generally caves) containing the objects of cult; everything there is sacred—no

[1] Cf. Cook in Peake's *People and the Book*, 60 *sq.*

[2] See *Kinship*, 162, on the root *ḥ-m-y*, and the *ḥām* as a term of relationship (the group which protects the woman against encroachment). From the root *ḥ-r-m* are derived the S. Arab. חרמת, מחרם, and the Nab. מחרמתא (sanctuary). See Cooke, 220; Lagrange, 184; G. R. Driver, *Journ. of Theol. Stud.* xxv. 294, 296.

plant may be pulled, no branch broken, even the animals that stray thither are safe (Frazer, *Tot. Ex.* i. 96). The sanctity of the saint's tomb in Palestine is well known; objects can be deposited there temporarily, and a man of authority was once beaten to death for cutting down a thorn-tree in the *weli's* ground.[1] As a general rule, the *weli* is expected to protect his own property (cf. the story, *JPOS.* v. 174), or the sanctity of the place is vindicated by his people, or there is, as it were, an inherent protecting force. Further, the sanctity of a place sanctifies everything; or something therein is especially sacred, so that *either* there seems to be a diffused sanctity, and everything participates in the sacred quality (cf. p. 156), *or* the sacred power is or can be localized, and any sound or movement in the area may be interpreted as a sign of the presence or response of the power invoked. Moreover, objects which are in the sacred area can retain their sanctity when taken outside. Conversely, the sacred object can sanctify a place, and it is presumably a survival of the sacred character of the horse in Persia when a stable is an asylum.[2]

P. 152 n. 2.—See now, *GB.* iii., and the articles on taboo in *Ency. Brit.* (N. W. Thomas) and *ERE.* (Marett).

P. 155 n. 1.—Cf. also Sir G. A. Smith, *E.Bi.* "Hermon," § 2; and E. Hommel, *JSOR.* x. 34 *sqq.*

P. 156 n. 1.—See Sir G. A. Smith, *E.Bi.* "Carmel," § 4 *sq.* On mountain cults in general, see *E.Bi.* col. 2065, § 2 and n. 3. A large proportion of the shrines in Palestine are on hilltops (Canaan, *JPOS.* iv. 4–7), and in time of drought people ascend the roof of a shrine in order to approach nearer to the deity (*id.* vi. 144 n. 1); cf. above, p. 230 n. 4.

P. 157 and note. Ancestor Cults.—This subject, over which W. R. S. passes rapidly, is bound up with (*a*) the deification of men who are not necessarily ancestors, or who may be only reputed ancestors, (*b*) the tendency to think of a supernatural being as a parent or ancestor (cf. p. 509 *sq.*), and (*c*) the old and recurrent theory that all deities were originally deified men. Euhemerist tendencies come to the fore when there is little difference between gods and pre-eminent men (cf. p. 43), when such men are treated as semi-divine (cf. Lagrange, 463 *sq.*), when respect, veneration, or love are felt for ancestors, or

[1] Canaan, *JPOS.* v. 175. The Turks are supposed to have lost the battle of Gaza in the Great War because they cut down a sacred tree and destroyed a certain shrine (*ib.*).

[2] *Folk-lore*, xii. 269. The horse was worshipped in Bahrein—a Persian cult? See *Kinship*, 243. It may perhaps be associated with the cult of Semiramis (see *GB.* ix. 407 n. 2). The horse was also sacred in the Vedic religion; see E. Meyer, *GA.* i. § 580; Loisy, *Sacrifice*, 397 *sq.*; *Camb. Hist. of India*, i. 119 *sq.*

when deities and ancestors are ceremonially represented by living representatives (see *GB.* ix. 385 *sq.*), or perhaps even as a reaction against theriomorphic ideas of divinity. In the case of the actual deification or divinization of great figures, especially kings (cf. pp. 44 *sq.*, 66), a distinction may be drawn between the rise of the cult after their death, and the practice of some sort of cult during their lifetime; psychological differences between meditation upon the dead in a supersensuous realm and upon the living should not be overlooked. Further, although there is typically the closest and most intimate relationship between a sacred man and his deity, as *e.g.* in Egypt where the Pharaoh is the god incarnate and his "son" in the flesh, there is also typically a recognized difference between the man and his god, even though it is apt at times to be obscured. Already in the early Pyramid Texts the Pharaoh is man, son of the god, and a god; and it is probable that the Divine Kingship throughout Egypt and South-West Asia involved a similar coexistence of most intimate relationship by the side of an essential difference.[1] The denunciation of the spiritual arrogance of Nebuchadrezzar (Dan. iv. 30 *sqq.*; cf. Judith iii. 8, vi. 2–4) and of the king of Tyre (Ezek. xxviii. 11 *sqq.*), and the "Fall of Lucifer" (Isa. xiv. 12), testify both to the persistence of the idea of the man-god and to the characteristic attitude of those teachers of Israel who were jealous of the sovereignty and supremacy of Yahweh. Such an attitude in Israel would be no less opposed to the deification of their own kings and to the worship of ancestors.

In the North Syrian inscription of Panammu, inscribed upon a colossal statue of the god Hadad, the dead king requests that his successor shall make mention of the name of the god and of himself, and shall pray that the soul of Panammu may eat and drink with the god (Cooke, No. 61; Lagrange, 492 *sqq.*). That Panammu could mediate on behalf of the living is not hinted; and, speaking generally, it is constantly an open question (1) whether prayers and sacrifices are made to the god (in this case, to Hadad) on behalf of the dead, or in the hope that the grateful dead will use their good services on behalf of the living; or (2) whether they are intended directly for the dead, either as a token of love or piety, or because the dead are, in a sense, more accessible and intelligible than the great and remote gods. For, when the powerful deities are felt to be afar off, a past ruler, leader, or holy man, powerful, helpful, and kindly, will be a far more historical

[1] Thus, the reforming king Ikhnaton is the beloved son of the self-begotten Aton, who makes him like himself and hears what is in his heart; he assigns to him his own length of years, and begets him every morning (Breasted, *Anc. Rec.* ii. §§ 991, 1010, etc.).

figure, and a more vivid nucleus of the god-idea in popular imagination and speculation.

In the vicissitudes of religion, divinization and de-divinization are typically alternating processes (see Toy, §§ 350 *sqq.*). The Babylonian god Tammuz appears in a list of primeval kings of Erech along with Gilgamesh the hero of the epic, and they rule for 100 and 126 years respectively (*CAH.* i.[2] 366 *sq.*). It is of course possible that an actual king Tammuz, becoming deified, was clothed in the characteristic garb of a vegetation god; but it is equally possible that a still earlier god had already in some circles become the victim of euhemerism. The stories of the patriarch Jacob are sometimes thought to be derived from a heroic figure of a de-divinized god, in which case there has been a certain rationalizing process, for which there are analogies. Otherwise, traits of a mythical and supernatural character have certainly attached themselves to an originally historical figure.[1] The complexity of such inquiries as these can be illustrated from the modern cults of Palestinian saints and *welis* where (1) there are clans and families who claim to have sprung from one or other of these; (2) where the well-known ancestor of a living sheikh is made a saint (Jaussen, 305), or where in this or in other ways a new cult springs into being, ready made; and (3) where the identity of the saint or *weli* has clearly undergone change in the course of ages. As a general rule, specific tendencies (to divinize *or* to rationalize) can be more clearly apprehended than the actual origin of the local beings who are, in a sense, the lineal descendants of the Baals—and in a few cases of the Astartes—of the past.[2]

The predominant part played by local, family, and somewhat private cults testifies to the imperious demand for readily accessible supernatural powers. Such cults are often made tolerably orthodox and are affiliated to the national religion; and although they may be repudiated, if not put down, by strict reforming movements ("Deuteronomic," Wahhabite, etc.), they come to the front again—though not in all their earlier form—because of the psychological needs they serve. Even on general principles, the cult of sacred beings who were regarded as ancestors, and of ancestors who were gods or heroic beings, is only to be expected in ancient times and among the Semites. The evidence has no doubt been exaggerated; hence perhaps Lagrange's

[1] E. Meyer now decides that Jacob was primarily a god; see *Israeliten*, 109 (Luther), 282; *Gesch. Alt.* i. §§ 308, 343 *sq.* Rachel's continued interest in her children, and the unexpected indifference of Abraham and Israel (Isa. lxiii. 16), may point to an earlier and fuller cult of the great ancestral figures.

[2] Cf. the Anatolian *dede*, the heroized ancestor who to most is nameless (Ramsay, *Expositor*, Nov. 1906, p. 460.

not unnecessary reaction (ch. ix.). To Vincent (*Canaan*, ch. iv., see 288 *sqq.*, 295), the archæological data suggest care for the dead, rather than a cult. But there was evidently a belief in their continued existence, and the denunciation of mourning customs by the Israelite reformers is highly significant.

The modern custom of burying the dead in the vicinity of a sacred tomb or shrine is partly in order to preclude interference, and partly also to secure a blessing (*JPOS.* iv. 7). Sacrifices are made at graves, and there are gatherings with distribution of food and prayers for the dead.[1] Of special interest are the annual assemblies at the synagogue of R. Meir near Tiberias and the burnings at Meiron at the tomb of R. Simeon ben Yochai.[2] The desire to keep one's name alive (*e.g.* by a monument, 2 Sam. xviii. 18) would also involve some ceremony (*CAH.* iii. 445). Throughout, we find the idea of the continuance of the individual by himself, or as part of his group, or by virtue of his relationship with the god (see p. 555). Even Abraham and Aaron are gathered each to his "people" (*'am*, Gen. xxv. 8; Num. xx. 24); and not only is *'am* also a divine name, but when the group itself bears a divine name (Gad, etc.) the one life which pervades the whole group is, in a sense, more explicitly divine than when its god stands apart, *e.g.* as a "father." Theoretically, the union of the group and its sacred being is essentially of the closest; the whole kindred conceives itself as having a single life in space and time (see above, p. 504 *sq.*). But in practice distinctions are made, and everywhere there are varying relations between the god, the group (as a whole), and special individuals. In Australian totemism the ancestors of the "Alcheringa times" are alike totem (animal or plant) and human (*Tot. Ex.* i. 188 *sq.*); ideas of human personality are undeveloped, and the visible totem-group and its ancestors are substantially one. With the growth of ideas of human nature, with increase of individuality, and especially with enhanced family or group sentiments there is a tendency to recognize supernatural beings of a more exclusive, more personal character, and ancestor cults easily arise. See pp. 591, 670.

The tendencies to replace a remote god by a human one, to find the link with the supernatural in specific dead individuals, and to think of gods along anthropomorphic lines have had so powerful an influence upon the development of social-religious ideas that ancestor worship has frequently commended itself as an explanation of the origin of religion. But there is always the question (see Crawley, *Tree of Life*, 174), Why "deify" a man, however much his character has won fear, respect, or love? There are elements in religion which can hardly be

[1] Doughty, i. 240; Canaan, *JPOS.* vi. 65 *sq.*; Jaussen, 313 *sqq.*

[2] Cf. Ewing, *Life of J. E. H. Thomson*, 146 *sqq.*, 151.

derived from ancestor worship, or which are independent of anthropomorphic forms (*e.g.* cults of trees, stones, springs); and whereas the broad developments in anthropomorphism have been towards more elevated ideas of human personality, in totemism—and even animals can be "ancestors"—the development has been towards anthropomorphism rather than away from it. The tendency to "deify" lies behind both theriomorphism and anthropomorphism; and the experience of a "sacred" person or thing is not to be confused with the way in which that experience has been formulated. See next note.

P. 161 and Additional Note B. THE SACRED.[1]—Here property rights are secondary because (1) they are subordinated to the claims of a sacred power, *e.g.* when animals stray upon a sacred area (cf. p. 543 *sq.*); (2) a holy thing as such is not necessarily the god's property, it may be a man's private cult-object; (3) even that which is the god's property may be a public rather than a private possession (cf. p. 147); and (4), in general, all worshippers have access, subject to certain restrictions, to what is sacred. The sacred is "restricted." The "holiness" of the gods rather than their intolerance is their distinctive mark; it is a specifically Semitic attribute (Cumont, ch. v. n. 47, after Clermont-Ganneau). Things are *either* sacred and holy *or* common and profane; they are also divided into *either* clean *or* unclean. The difference between the two classes of terms is very important (see p. 446). Sanctity or holiness is something intrinsic, inherent; and the "sacred" and "unclean" agree in their mechanical, automatic, and physical character. A man carries the "unclean" into the sanctuary, and can bring back the "sacred" into ordinary life (p. 453). Things become unwittingly "sacred" or "unclean"; and these states, induced by contagion, by physical means, etc., can be remedied physically (*e.g.* by washing). Certain acts set in motion, as it were, the "sacred" and "unclean."[2] Bloodshed is a sort of miasma, and in Athens homicides were tried in an unroofed court in order that the case might be conducted in a purer atmosphere.[3]

There is, of course, an essential distinction between the holy and the unclean (p. 153 *sq.*), and the question arises whether this difference, which Lagrange (150 *sq.*) properly emphasizes, is to be taken back to the beginning, or whether both may be supposed to have sprung from

[1] Wellhausen, 168 *sqq.*; G. A. Simcox, *E.Bi.* art. "Clean"; Lagrange, ch. iv.; Söderblom and Whitehouse, *ERE.* art. "Holiness"; Williger, *Hagios* (Giessen, 1922).

[2] It is as in a coal mine where fire-damp, when it comes in contact with a flame, explodes and brings death to the careless and to the innocent alike; see R. H. Kennett (and others) in *Early Ideals of Righteousness*, 10 (Edinburgh, 1910).

[3] Farnell, *Evolution of Religion*, 149.

the taboos of primitive peoples (cf. above, p. 446 foot; and see p. 152). Fear and irrational taboos have always been prejudicial to progress, whereas restrictions due to respect or awe for friendly powers "contain with them germinant principles of social progress and moral order" (p. 154). Admitted that the distinction between the holy and the unclean "marks a real advance above savagery" (*ib.*), we must draw a line between (1) this distinction, which is vital for very development, and (2) the confusion of blind fear and reverence which occurs repeatedly and precludes progress (p. 519 *sq.*). Hence it is simpler to start with a stage where religion, involving friendly relations (such as W. R. S. finds in totemism), can be recognized, than with some prior one where this distinction has not been made, even as it is simpler to start from a stage with both religion and its antithesis magic than from an assumed absolute priority of magic.

The unity of gods and men within the group is a fundamental part of W. R. S.'s argument. "The principle of sanctity and that of kinship are identical" (p. 289); "holiness means kinship to the worshippers and their god" (p. 400). In other words, the consciousness of the reality of the supersensuous power was characteristically one that united man to it in a way that could be formulated only in terms of most intimate relationship. In mysticism there are the well-known experiences of (*a*) a loss of the self, which approaches (*b*) identity with the unseen power; though the doctrine of an actual identity of the Self and the Other meets with condemnation at the hands of mystics themselves. Similarly, among rudimentary peoples there are rites of imitation of, and even of identification with, unseen powers, which are essentially only the more elemental and physical expression of experiences analogous to those in the spiritual and mystical religions at more advanced levels. Among rudimentary peoples these rites easily take forms and lead to consequences which must be regarded as contrary to the progressive development of religion; but "aberrations" are by no means wanting also at the higher stages. Theoretically, the entire group of gods and worshippers should be holy—this is the ideal (Ex. xix. 6, Num. xvi. 3). But in the history of religion distinctions are made. Among rudimentary peoples lines are drawn (1) between the full members and women, uninitiated and slaves; (2) between the special group in its ordinary, normal life and the "sacred" state when certain ceremonies are being performed collectively and various taboos are in force.[1]

There are ceremonies to confirm or to intensify the unity of gods

[1] The transition from one state to another, or from the "normal" to the "supernormal" and back again, has been handled at length by Van Gennep, *Les Rites de Passage* (1909).

and men, and there are offences which destroy it. Holiness and (ceremonial) cleanness are incompatible with uncleanness; and although men act as though there were a sort of automatic, self-vindicating process (pp. 162, 425 l. 5), they must also act on its behalf (p. 163). Both ritual and ethical offences weaken the unity; but the specifically ethical aspect of divine holiness, as taught by the Hebrew prophets, though it reshaped the earlier religion, was followed, even as it had been preceded, by a preponderating emphasis upon ceremonial holiness. Such a succession of stages—alternately ritual and ethical—is probably normal. Some types of uncleanness (*e.g.* sexual), though perfectly natural, are thought to stand in need of purificatory rites, and peoples or lands which do not conform to them are, on this account, "unclean."[1] Although, theoretically, one's own land is "sacred" and the group participates in the sacred life (cf. p. 160), in practice there are definite holy places, or new centres of sacred power will manifest themselves (tree, spring, etc.). Life tends to be systematized into sacred places, times, and individuals (who, *e.g.*, will assert the doctrine of divine proprietorship), and sacred states.[2] But the readiness to experience what is sacred or holy is logically prior to the particular experience, which is at once shaped and interpreted according to the circumstances.

Since W. R. S. wrote, the subject has been considerably extended by the study of ideas of Mana. Among many peoples there is explicit recognition of some supersensuous cause of all phenomena that are striking, marvellous, abnormal, etc., or that are beyond man's power, or that are impressive because of their significance and regularity. A power manifests itself in unusual forms of what is otherwise usual (special strength, cunning, productivity), or in natural phenomena essential to human welfare. Many specific terms have been collected from different parts of the world—the North American Orenda, Manitu, etc., the Oudah of the Pygmies, the Petara of the Sea Dyaks of Sarawak, and so forth.[3] Throughout, the reference is to some power, whether vague, or more precisely connected with a god or with powerful ancestors. If impersonal, it tends to become personal when venerated.

[1] An "unclean" land was a foreign one (p. 93), and Gentile women who did not perform the usual Jewish purificatory rites were "unclean" themselves, and communicated the state to their husbands (Büchler, *Jew. Quart. Rev.* xvii. [1926], 67 *sq.*, 79 *sq.*).

[2] The importance of this (largely unconscious) systematization is especially emphasized by Durkheim, who illustrates it in the most rudimentary, though highly efficacious forms in Central Australian totemism.

[3] Marett, *Threshold of Religion*, 13, 120 *sqq.*, and *ERE.* "Mana"; Durkheim, 192 *sqq.*; Crawley, *Idea of the Soul*; Hartland, *Ritual and Belief*, 36–160; I. King, ch. vi.

It is the power that is manifested in men of outstanding personality, and it is as the power of the mighty dead that it is most readily explained. Of the many terms with various nuances found among most widely severed peoples the Melanesian Mana is commonly adopted, but on the understanding that the particular Melanesian type of Mana is not the norm. It is properly a convenient term for co-ordinating great masses of related facts ancient and modern.[1]

The data of "Mana" range between the vague and more indefinite causes where, *e.g.*, sacred stones have curative properties, though there is no tradition or explanation of their efficacy, and the more specific gods. A bull-roarer may be effective in a general way in promoting fertility; but elementary reasoning enters when female fertility is combined with that of the soil, or, *e.g.*, the liver of a fierce animal imparts fierceness to the eater.[2] Further, a distinction must be drawn between Mana according as it is used in a good or in a bad way. Thus, the translation of the Egyptian *ḥīke'* by "magic" obscures the fact (*a*) that it is a power used also by the friendly and helpful gods, and (*b*) that there were anti-social, "irreligious," and harmful practices which would more naturally deserve that name. Even low down in the scale, among the Arunta of Central Australia, besides the power which is helpful and beneficent there is *arunkulta*, the evil influence, or an embodiment or manifestation of it.[3] It is therefore

[1] Thus, it includes the Indian Brahman, the Greek δύναμις (θεοῦ, χριστοῦ), the holy πνεῦμα, φῶς and χάρις, the ancient Egyptian *ḥīke'*, and the modern Arab *baraka*. See also *Orient. Lit. zeit.* 1923, col. 378 *sq.*; Nilsson, 81 *sq.* The *baraka* is a mysterious force vouchsafed to sacred men or to objects (oil, stones, bones) which have been in contact with sacred shrines, tombs, etc. It comes directly from living sheikhs or from dead spirits (*JPOS.* v. 177, 179). Westermarck (*Morocco*, i. 35–261) calls it "holiness" or "blessed virtue." On *ḥīke'*, magical arts, power, and mysterious ways of doing things, see A. H. Gardiner, *Proc. Soc. Bibl. Arch.* xxxvii. (1915), 253 *sqq.*, xxxviii. 52; Peet, *CAH.* i.², 354, ii. 199 *sqq.* In the Syriac Apocryphal Acts (ed. Wright, ii. 191, 258), the prayer of Judas Thomas enables divine power to enter water which heals the withered hands of a boy; and the "power of Jesus" enters anointing oil and gives it curative properties.

[2] On the question whether *Ēl* means "numen, mana," see Beth, *ZATW.* xxxvi. 129 *sqq.*, xxxviii. 87 *sqq.* The objection that in *orthodox Yahwism* it is not Mana (Kleinert, *Baudissin-Festschrift*, 283 *sq.*) seems to miss the point; the reflective and more orthodox view of an *Ēl*, as *e.g.* one that shows compassion (Jerahmeel), does not exclude the vaguer ideas of power (personal or impersonal) where the *Ēl* is less an object of close attention.

[3] Mana is powerful for life or for death; cf. W. R. Halliday, *Greek Divination, a Study of its Methods and Principles*, 99 *sqq.* (1913). See Marett, *Psychology and Folklore*, 64, 67, 163, 166 *sqq.*: the savage gets Mana only by observing strict chastity, or undergoing discipline; it is bestowed by an act of grace; received with fear and wonder, it can be lost if he becomes a drunkard; in the Iroquois

necessary to avoid the confusion of (1) the evidence for the recognition of power which could be used in a way contrary to the interests of a tribe with (2) the more theoretical if not controversial question of the best employment of such terms as Magic, Mana, etc.

Mana and Taboo are complementary.[1] The taboo arises out of precaution, heed, fear. Many typical taboos reflect an almost mystical detestation of what is felt to be offensive or repulsive; a few would prove suicidal if persisted in (cf. 640). Some are essentially in the interests of a particular class. In general, they range between the vaguest fears of consequences, the dread of offending some one or something, and the most intelligible of prohibitions. Taboo by itself is restrictive, whereas Mana connotes a power to be utilized. Mana by itself leads to the belief that the power lies wholly in man's hand, and can be set in motion by man. The data of Mana refer to the power which man can employ, the bad use of which is harmful and dangerous; the data of Taboo refer characteristically to the appropriate attitude that man must adopt where "sacred" things are concerned. Together, Mana and Taboo direct attention to the pragmatic side of religion—religion partly as an attitude that enables the man to face life, partly as a means of effective living. This practical aspect runs through all religion (*e.g.* Matt. vi. 32 *sq.*); and in the Old Testament the holy and righteous Yahweh is not merely the recipient of his people's prayers but acts on behalf of a people that complies with the conditions of the relationship between him and them. There is much truth in the distinction drawn by Malinowski,[2] that Religion is not a means to an end but an end in itself, whereas Magic is progressive, with a clear, definite aim—a "pseudo-science." But Religion fits a man to face any future, and it can lead to quietism; whereas typical Magic seeks to forestall or to compel the future, and tends to become the worst enemy of Religion. Yet this antithesis must not be pressed too far, for there are innumerable beliefs and practices which can be called "magico-religious," because they combine imitative and other seemingly irrelevant and irrational practices for the welfare of the group with a spirit of reverence and awe, and with regulative taboos conducive to the stability of the group. Mana alone and Taboo alone become, on psychological grounds, stagnant and devoid of progressive elements; whereas in combination the two are complementary, and stand at the head of series of developments. It is difficult to conceive the one without the other save in the secondary

phrase, if a man "lays down his own power" in its presence, he will be filled with a new power which is good, but if used for exploitation is bad.

[1] See especially Marett, *Threshold of Religion*.

[2] *Science, Religion, and Reality* (ed. Needham), 38, 81.

stages, and in this respect Mana and Taboo find an analogy in the equally complementary ideas of Divine Immanence and Transcendence (p. 564).

The widespread conception of Mana emphasizes the fact that man's attention is commonly directed first to the strange, mysterious, and abnormal phenomena; a cause is demanded primarily for them, and only later, as it seems, for those more regular, but vital or impressive. Inquiry into the relation between (*a*) the cause of both these classes of phenomena and (*b*) the cause of all other and more familiar activities could not arise until the dawn of Science; and the equally important question of the relation between religious data and the non-religious but otherwise comparable data still attracts little attention. Similarly, attention is commonly directed more readily to all that evokes feelings of fascination, admiration, etc., than to its quality. The distinction between the *jinn* and the saint, between the devilish and the divine, between the blasphemous and the holy, has already been drawn by these terms themselves; but there remain the phenomena which are not, or cannot be, immediately evaluated.[1] The difference between the application of the term "sacred" to the *ḳedēshīm* of Israel and the prophets' doctrine of Yahweh's holiness is one of the most striking examples of an *ethical* development vital for the progress of religion; but the early history of the Church at Corinth shows how quickly a "sacred" ceremony can lose spiritual value.

The paradoxical character of religion turns in large measure upon the coexistence of the good and the harmful aspects of "powerful" things. Salt preserves and kills; sun and rain are life-giving and destructive; the blood of women is taboo, but it is effective in magic; blood gives a higher life to those who partake of it, but is highly dangerous to those who are not entitled, or who act heedlessly; the king is taboo, his touch can kill or it can cure; the dead corpse is dreaded as something "unclean," but a relic is an effective charm. The psychology of desire and disgust, of attraction and repulsion, accounts for some paradoxes. Further, there are topics so delicate and "sacred" that, although the discussion of them is necessary, a careless or improper mishandling of them is shocking. The Sacred is double-edged and must be safeguarded. The individual who trespasses here runs the risk of causing serious offence to others as well as himself; and the history of Taboos is, in part, that of the

[1] Cf. the fascination of crime, etc., the unreflecting attitude to genius (perverse or other), and the readiness to distinguish the religious (or mystical) from the non-religious (or non-mystical) rather than to appraise the value (ethical, etc.) of religious (or mystical) data (*e.g.* true or false prophets, Messiahs, etc.).

effort to regularize the treatment of the sacred and holy in ways recognized to be socially beneficial.

Experiences that take men out of themselves have constantly been interpreted as necessarily taking them into the realm of the sacred, or bringing them into communion with supernatural beings (cf. p. 575). In man's ignorance of the world and of himself, when imagination and reality interpenetrated, and such activities as playing, dancing, and other releases of energy could have an at least quasi-divine meaning, the idea of the " sacred " had almost boundless extension. This is now more accurately recognized, and a wider concept has been coined in Rudolf Otto's " Numinous." [1] Here are included all that is uncanny, weird, eerie, awful, fascinating, majestic, sublime, ecstatic. It thus extends into religion, mysticism, spiritualism, occultism, poetry, art, drama, and all else where a man is taken away from the world of the senses and has a vivid consciousness of what is supersensuous but real, and often more real than the experiences of ordinary life. But even as Mana is logically neutral and Religion has its paradoxes, so the *mysterium tremendum et fascinosum* lies behind religion, and not religion alone. Without taking into account the subjective " numinous " states, it would be impossible to understand the presence, persistence, and progressive development of religion. But the " numinous " as such is not religious, even as the " sacred," and much that is placed in the category of " religion " lies outside that more objective estimate of religion which a systematic treatment of the data requires. There are times when " the religious consciousness, bursting its too narrow confines, seems at once to soar upward and to plunge downward " (Cornford, *CAH.* iv. 533 *sq.*). But the main stream of development is more important; and the extraordinary range of data that claim to belong to the " sacred " and the " holy " demand a methodology of the subject. W. R. S.'s conception of the group-system, of holiness as kinship, and of the moral interrelations between the members of groups and their gods, lays the necessary emphasis upon those experiences of the " numinous " which have been valuable for mental, ethical, and social development, and on this account appears to offer the best mode of approach to the profounder problems of religion.

P. 163 note.—See Frazer, *GB.* and *Tot. Ex.* s.v. " Incest," and his *Psyche's Task*[2], on the effect of religious and related sanctions upon the growth of society.

P. 164. CURSES.—The gods, who of their own will are wont to defend the right and punish wrong and thus uphold social order, are also

[1] See Otto, *The Idea of the Holy* (transl. by J. W. Harvey; Oxford, 1925).

besought to curse the evil-doer; and the entreaty sometimes becomes virtually a compulsion, whether through the words or the ritual or the agent employed. But even without gods or any specially named spirits there is frequent resort to a curse, whether with or without ceremonial; and the curse, as it were, sets in motion a process which is believed to be effective. Both blessings and curses, in some of their characteristic forms at least, imply a process which either may be styled an inherent one, or is operated by powers, who, however, are not necessarily specified. The process or mechanism is such that the blessing once uttered cannot be taken back (Gen. xxvii. 33, 38), and the curse of the wise will be effective even against the innocent (Talm. Bab. *Makk.* 11*a*); contrast Prov. xxvi. 2.[1]

P. 167. Life, Living Water.—(1) By " Life " is meant not merely physiological conditions, but the state of being alive and of having that which makes life worth living.[2] The Babylonian gods Inurta (Ninurta) and Gula are gods of healing and " cause the dead to live," and Marduk restores to life. But all the gods could do was to keep a man alive as long as possible (Jastrow, *Rel. Bel.* 365 *sq.*); resurrection of the dead is not meant, but rather a fresh lease of life, and " fulness of days."[3] There is also the hope of continuance in the god's presence.[4] It was enough that a man's name was remembered, or that he was written in Yahweh's " book of life "; for with Yahweh was the " fountain of life," and " life " is essentially the most important attribute of the gods. In Egypt both the gods and the semi-divine Pharaoh have the life-giving breath; the idea recurs in the Amarna Letters and was no doubt familiar throughout South-West Asia, where the divine-kingship ruled.[5] Life and Breath were understood physically. The " sign of life " is given to the Pharaoh on his accession; and on other occasions it is depicted near his face in order that he can inhale or otherwise assimilate the " power " it

[1] See Goldziher, *Abhand.* i. 382, also *ib.* 29, and ii. p. civ; the comparative studies by W. S. Fox, *AJSL.* xxx. 111 *sqq.*, and G. L. Hendrickson, *Amer. Journ. Philol.* 1925, pp. 104 *sqq.*; and the mass of material collected by J. Hempel, " die Israelit. Anschauungen von Segen u. Fluch," *ZDMG.* 1925, pp. 20–100. For Westermarck's views, see below, p. 692.

[2] See Baudissin, 480 *sqq.*, and in *Sachau-Festschrift*, 143 *sqq.*; also Lindblom, *Das ewige Leben* (Upsala, 1914).

[3] Norden, *Geburt d. Kindes*, 120, cites Ammian. xvii. 421 (*βίον ἀπρόσκορον*, life of which one cannot have too much). The hopes of Abgar, priest of Nerab, were for a good name, length of days, children of the fourth generation, and mourners to lament him (Cooke, No. 65).

[4] See C. H. W. Johns, *Cambridge Biblical Essays* (ed. Swete), 40 *sq.*

[5] Knudtzon, *El-Amarna Tafeln*, 1195, 1606; Baudissin, 503 *sq.*; Gressmann, *Baud. Festschrift*, 208.

contains.[1] In certain ceremonies into which the "water of life" enters, the water is depicted with a string of symbols of the sign of life (Blackman, *PSBA*. xl. 87). Purely spiritual or psychical ideas could only be conceived in physical material terms, and in Hebrew, where *rūᵃḥ* denoted the energy of Life as distinct from mere existence, the "idea of personality is an animated body, and not an incarnated soul."[2]

Primitive psychology, as Crawley has shown (*The Idea of the Soul*), could readily conceive of inanimate objects being as animate as trees and animals. Several animating principles could even be recognized (life, soul, etc.); and in the primitive analyses of all that goes to make up a man, relatively complex results emerge, as when in Central Australia a man is born of totem-spirit stuff to which he will return, but yet has an individual soul of his own. The varying ideas of soul–spirit–life are everywhere very differently systematized, and the ability to entertain complex convictions of this sort in material forms holds good of all peoples who have not reached that stage where the differentiation of a tangible body and an intangible spirit has become a presupposition.[3] See p. 676 *sq.*

(2) Water, especially running water, is "instinct with divine life and energy" (p. 173).[4] It is "purifying, consecrating, healing"; "on y vit l'action d'un pouvoir supérieur sans distinguer entre la naturel et le surnaturel." It is the abode of dead souls, and to the significant traditions of gods who were drowned (on which see Eitrem, 114) one must add the well-known sacrifices to water-spirits and the strange superstition that it is unlucky to rescue the drowning—*i.e.* to deprive the water-spirit of its lawful victim (see Gomme, *Ethnology in Folk-lore*, 73). In both Egypt and Babylonia water was life-giving and purifying—the two attributes converge.[5] In Egypt there are "waters of life" in both sky and on earth;[6] in Babylonia water-gods are prominent in incantations, and ceremonies to ward off evil spirits were often held on the bank of a river.[7] Ishtar is sprinkled with the waters of life before her ascent from the underworld. Marduk was

[1] Cf. metaphors connected with breath, odour, and welfare, Eitrem, 212 *sq.*

[2] H. Wheeler Robinson, in Peake, *People and the Book*, 360, 362, 381.

[3] See Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 79 *sq.*, *Tree of Life*, 236; Kreglinger, *Études sur l'origine et le développement de la vie religieuse*, i. 163 *sq.* (Brussels, 1919); cf. *ERE*. art. "Religion," § 23.

[4] See Lagrange, 158 *sqq.* (with criticisms of W. R. S.); Toy, §§ 306 *sqq.*; Moore, *E.Bi.* "Idolatry," § 2.

[5] It is possible that the root-meaning of "holy" (קדש) is pure, bright, or clean (see *E.Bi.* "Clean," § 1).

[6] See, further, Breasted, *Rel. and Thought*, 19; Blackman, *PSBA*. xl. 57 *sqq.*, 86 *sqq.*; and *Arch. f. Rel.* 1904, p. 40 *sq.*

[7] Morgenstern, 60, cf. 29, 84.

lord of the deep (*apshu*, the ocean below the earth; Wardle, *Israel and Bab.* 147), and lord of springs (*bel naḳbe*); and his sacred water healed men. In Zoroastrianism water is full of "glory" (*hvarenah*), and gives might and glory (Söderblom, *Werden d. Gottesglaubens*, 248). Waters are frequently regarded as impregnating, and fertility is caused by drinking or bathing.[1] In Palestine the *weli* is the reputed husband of the barren women who bathe in springs with success (Curtiss, 117). The power of sacred waters is ascribed to some traditional figure (*e.g.* a sheikh) or is explained by a legend; thus, it was in the basin of the Sitti Mariam in Jerusalem that the Virgin once bathed, and certain wells are sacred and have healing properties because once a year their waters are supposed to mingle with the holy well Zamzam (*JPOS.* iv. 65; cf. above, p. 167 *sq.*). The tenth of Moḥarram is an especially efficacious day for bathing, and at Askalon women still bathe in the sea at the festival of Hosain (*JPOS.* l.c.; see v. 198). On this festival, see p. 321 and note 4.

According to W. R. S., the sacred character of waters and springs is to be explained on general principles, the legends or deities associated with them being secondary (p. 184). The main criticisms, on the other hand, start from these; and it is observed, *e.g.*, that waters, springs, etc., have neither temples nor priesthood, and "the superstitions of the Semites have not prevailed against the fundamental principle which made gods, not of animated things, but of the forces which put them in movement" (Lagrange, 166). What is at issue is the question whether the Semites recognized an inherent power in things without reference to personal powers acting upon or in them; and the very history of sacred waters should show that the readiness to believe in their sanctity is more fundamental than the traditional saints or stories, which, however amply they justify the sanctity, are apt to change throughout the ages.[2]

P. 168 n. 1.—See Mordtmann and Müller, *Sab. Denkmäler*, 10; Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Pèlerinage à la Mekke*, 73.

P. 169 and n. 1.—For the Palmyrene inscription referred to, see Lidzbarski, *Handbuch der nordsemit. Epigraphik* (Weimar, 1898), i. 153 n. 7, 476, No. 11: לגדא די עינא בריכתא עב[ד] באסמלוטן תרתן בולנא בר עזיזו . . . די אשלמת על ידוה. Clermont-Ganneau (*Rev. Archéol.* xxviii. 138 *sqq.*) finds a reference to the "guardian"

[1] Farnell, *Cults*, v. 423; Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, i. 23, 66, 80 *sqq.*, 136; Frazer, *GB.* ii. 160 *sqq.*; R. C. Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, 79 *sq.*; Canaan, *JPOS.* v. 193 (water cures impotence).

[2] Lagrange (165 n. 1), among other criticisms, objects to W. R. S., p. 170 n. 1, on the ground that the pool being one of the artificial reservoirs in the Hauran would dry up annually and could scarcely be the object of a cult.

of the well (ἐπιμελητής, reading באפמ'); cf. the "guardianship" (אפמלטות) of Yarḥibol in the Palmyrene inscription edited by Lidzbarski, *Ephemeris*, ii. 300. For Bethesda and its intermittent bubbling springs, see E. W. G. Masterman, *Quart. Statements* of the Palestine Exploration Fund, 1921, p. 93 *sq.*, who refers to the popular belief that a dragon lives beneath the "Virgin's Fountain"; also R. A. S. Macalister, *Century of Excavation in Palestine*, 141 *sq.*[1] On the association of serpents with springs, see Baudissin, 338 (n. 2), and his article "Drache" in *Protest. Real-Encycl.* For temples and springs, see Baudissin 244 (cult of Eshmun), Morgenstern 31 (Babylonia); and for the modern belief that Turkish baths are inhabited by *jinn*, see *JPOS.* iv. 65 n. 4.

P. 169 and n. 3.—The Tigris and Euphrates, as also the rivers of Phœnicia, had their gods (see Lagrange, 160 *sq.*, 165; *KAT.* 359, 525 n. 5). In the treaty between Rameses II. and the Hatti, gods of rivers are among the witnesses (Breasted, *Anc. Rec.* iii. § 386). In note 3 add the reading λιμένων (Grotius), adopted by Stübe (131 n.) and Lagrange (161 n. 5).

P. 170 n. 4.—Cais may mean "husband"; so Winckler, *Altorient. Forschungen*, ii. 321; *Arab.-Semit.-Orient.* (*MVAG.* 1901, iv.) 84 n. It is certainly not connected with Cozaḥ, and doubtfully (so Nöldeke, *ZDMG.* 1889, p. 714 n. 1) with the Edomite Cos, Caus.

P. 176. Sacred Fish.—For Edessa, see also Duval, *Journ. Asiat.* xviii. (1891) 92, 231, and in general see Frazer, *Pausanias*, iv. 153; *E.Bi.* "Fish" §§ 9–11; Garstang on Lucian, § 45; Reinach, *Cultes*, iii. 43 *sq.*, 515 *sq.*; Cumont, *Orient. Relig.* ch. v. notes 36 and 37; and F. J. Dölger, *Der heilige Fisch i. d. antik. Relig. u. i. Christentum* (1922).

P. 180. Ordeals and Oaths.—See Wellhausen, 186 *sq.*; Halliday, *Greek Divination*, 112; Morgenstern, *Heb. Union Coll., Jubilee Vol.* (Cincinatti, 1925), pp. 113 *sqq.* Eitrem (117 n. 1) cites parallels to the omen at Aphaca (above, p. 178 and n. 2). For the story of Hind (p. 180 n. 3), see *Kinship*, 123; and for the ordeal by the "waters of jealousy," see *E.Bi.* 2342 *sq.*; Gray, *Numbers*, 44 *sq.*; Halliday, 105 *sq.*; and, on the text, Bewer, *AJSL.* xxx. 36 *sqq.* In Num. v. 17 ("holy water") the LXX reads "living water." Nöldeke's reference (p. 181 n. 3) is to Lagarde, *Reliq.* 134, and the Mandæan *Sidrā Rabbā*, i. 224, 8. In the Code of Hammurabi (§§ 2, 132) the person accused of witchcraft and the woman suspected of adultery are thrown to the Sacred River or River-god; this was also the ancient German method

[1] Was the spring at 'Artās, guarded by a ram, supposed to be a gateway to the underworld? (Prof. Halliday, in a private communication; see his remarks in *Folk-lore*, 1923, p. 132).

of testing the legitimacy of children (Dareste, *Journ. des Savants*, 1902, p. 519 n. 1). On the quasi-mechanical principle underlying the curse and ordeal, where gods and spirits are not specifically mentioned, see above, p. 555.[1]

P. 182 n. 2.—The text of Amos is retained by Driver, Sir G. A. Smith, etc. In a song at the Nebī Musā festival (Canaan, *JPOS.* vi. 135 n. 2), the way leading to the Sanctuary of the Prophet (*ṭarīc en-nabī*) is called upon to rejoice. But the parallelism and the LXX (ὁ θεός σου) have suggested the reading אֱלֹהֶיךָ (so Dozy), בְּאֹרֶךָ (Wellhausen, Elhorst), and preferably דַּרְכְּךָ, "thy *numen*" (G. Hoffmann, Winckler [*Altor. Forsch.* i. 194 *sq.*]). With the last cf. the name name יְהוֹרוּהוּ (for יְהוֹרָיְהוּ ?), "Yahu is friend (uncle, cousin, patron)," and the parallels in Assyrian (*KAT.* 483), South Arabian (דרכרב, etc.), and the obscure דורה on the inscription of Mesha (Cooke, 11). As regards the meaning of *d–d*, cf. the Abyssinian name *Arka Dengel*, *i.e.* Friend of the Virgin, cited by Nöldeke, *E.Bi.* col. 3289, § 47.

P. 183 n. 2. THE SONG TO THE WELL.—Gray (*Numbers*, 289) cites, *inter alia*, a parallel from Nilus, col. 648. Gressmann (*Mose*, 350) cites Musil, *Arab. Petræa*, i. 298, a parallel from the Arnon district, where the modern sheikh has taken the place of the nobles in Numbers. In Egypt, well-digging was a royal duty; see Breasted, *Anc. Rec.* iii. § 195 (with a prayer to Amon and to the gods dwelling in the well on behalf of Seti I., the good shepherd who dug the well), and § 292 (where the water in the nether world hearkens to Rameses II. when he digs the well).

P. 185 *sq.* SACRED TREES.[2]—On a connexion between the words for "tree" and "god" (*'ēl*)—both involving the idea of "power"—see, besides p. 196 n. 4, Baudissin, 433 *sq.*, who comments on the distinction drawn between human (or animal) and vegetable life, and on the points of contact (personification, etc.). As elsewhere, questions arise, (1) whether there is a sacred life or power intrinsic or "immanent" (p. 194) in the species or single tree, (2) whether this is due to "sacred" life-giving water (p. 192), or (3) whether the tree is an

[1] Otherwise, when lots are cast the actual decision (*mishpāṭ*) comes from God (Prov. xvi. 33), and the guilty may be asked to admit its justice (Josh. vii. 19). Westermarck (*Moral Ideas*, i. 626) gives as one of the reasons for the efficacy of the curses and blessings of fathers the mystery of old age and the nearness of death. That the dying are in touch with the supernatural realm has also accounted for the prolonged torture of unhappy victims from whom knowledge of the unseen could accordingly be extracted (Halliday).

[2] See art. Tree-worship in *E.Bi.* (G. F. Moore), *Ency. Brit.* (S. A. Cook); Lagrange, ch. v. § 2; Barton, *Semitic Origins*, 87 *sqq.*; Toy, §§ 262 *sqq.*; Baudissin, *Adonis* (see his Index, 535); Frazer, *FOT.* iii. ch. xv.

embodiment or a vehicle of some external power, and (4) whether the specific tradition which explains its sanctity is of primary or even secondary value. At the present day it has been computed that about 60 per cent. of the Palestinian shrines have trees; but the more modern *welis* tend to do without them (Canaan, *JPOS.* iv. 30 *sqq.*). Such trees are not to be harmed, and if one is cut down another is planted in its place. The fruit may be plucked to satisfy hunger; but it is safer to recite the *fātiḥah* before one plucks, and it should not be carried away. Branches may be removed for festal purposes, or in order to cook meals in fulfilment of a vow. The practice of hanging rags and other portions of one's personal belongings upon a sacred tree, and of taking away others which have been hanging there and now serve as amulets, implies a belief in the inherent sanctity of the tree. This sanctity is usually explained as due to the *weli*, or there is some appropriate tradition. In early Christian times a sacred tree at Samosata was worshipped, and justifiably, as the wood of the Cross (Chwolson, i. 293); but another tree to which the villagers burnt incense, and which Thomas of Marga condemns, was the abode of a "demon" (ed. Budge, 242; cf. *ib.* 511). At Tell el-Ḳādī, two large trees by the side of a stream shade the tomb of Sheikh Merzuk, who has taken the place of a dog. The "Laurel Lady," with dripping sword, manifested herself in a terebinth in 1917, driving back the British troops in their advance (Canaan, *JPOS.* iv. 71). The olive-tree is especially holy (*JPOS.* vi. 18, 20 n. 3, 138). For a parallel to the acacia (p. 133 above), see *JPOS.* iv. 71 n. 1; and for the belief that the palm-tree is sacred because it was created from the earth with which God made Adam, see Canaan, *JPOS.* iv. 14. Many of the modern sacred trees seem to be survivors of woods or groves (*ib.* iv. 34), and the existence of sacred groves and gardens at Daphne and elsewhere (cf. Frazer, *FOT.* iii. 67 *sqq.*) may explain the tendency of the LXX and Vulg. to translate *ashērah* by "grove" (for details, see Burney, *Kings*, 191). See further next note.

P. 188. The Goddess Asherah.[1]—W. R. S.'s denial (with Wellhausen, Stade, etc.) that there was a goddess Asherah—although he did not deny that "in some places the general symbol of deity had become a special goddess"—was hardly an "arbitrary theory" (Lagrange, 120); and his reasons, even if inadequate, are at least worthy of notice. (*a*) He urged that the tree or stock was the symbol of a *god* (Jer. ii. 27); though the fact that tree and stone (*ēṣ* and *'eben*) are

[1] See Stübe, 145; Lagrange, 120 *sqq.*; Burney, *Judges*, 196 *sqq.* For Kuenen's essay (p. 189 n. 1 l. 8), see the German translation in the volume edited by Budde (1894), and cf. Moore, *E.Bi.* col. 3991. In Micah v. 13 (see p. 188, middle), for "thy cities" read "thy idols" (as in 2 Chron. xxiv. 18).

respectively masculine and feminine may be merely a grammatical point (Baud. 176 n. 2). Next, (*b*) as the Astarte-cult of Ahab's day was Tyrian, the *asherah* which Jehu left standing (2 Kings xiii. 6) was therefore not Tyrian ; and (*c*) there is no evidence for a divine pair in Israel. On the other hand, apart from textual difficulties,[1] the trend of archæological and other contemporary evidence is to obliterate the line which W. R. S. draws between " Israelite " and " Canaanite " religion, between the higher elements of Semitic religion and the popular Yahwism " which had all the characters of Baal worship " (p. 194): though the similarity between the religion of Israel and that of surrounding peoples only enhances the uniqueness of the more spiritual and ethical monotheistic teaching of the great prophets.

Asherah was West Semitic, perhaps " Amorite " ; a dedication on behalf of Hammurabi calls her " bride of the king of heaven," " lady (*belit*) of vigour and joy (*kuzbi u ulṣi*), intercessor, etc. In a cuneiform tablet found at Ta'anach reference is made to an omen by the finger (*u-ba-an*) of the deity A-shi-rat; and in the Amarna Letters her name recurs in that of the great anti-Egyptian Amorite chief Abd-Ashirta (or Ashrat, also written Abd-Ashtarti, with the determinative of deity). Ashirat and Ishtar (Astarte, etc.), though akin in nature, are not etymologically connected, the derivation of Ishtar being quite uncertain, while the name Ashirat possibly connotes ideas of good fortune (like Gad, Tyche).[2]

The *asherah* is the tree or tree-trunk familiar throughout South-West Asia. Sometimes a tree is shorn of branches and lopped off short (Susa ; see Vincent, *Canaan*, 144 *sqq.*), and among the Kissil Bashi of the Upper Tigris a trimmed oak-trunk stands under a tree at the eastern end of the village within a railed-off space into which only the " father priest " can enter (*The Standard* of 19th September 1904). Similar objects of cult are familiar elsewhere.[3] In the Phœnician Ma'sub inscription (" the Astarte in the Asherah ") the object may be a sign-post set up to mark the boundary (Moore, *E.Bi.* col. 332; cf. Cooke, 50, Lagrange, 448 *sq.*) ; compare the stelæ set up as landmarks by Ikhnaton to mark the boundary of the holy city of Akhetaton (Breasted, *Anc. Rec.* ii. §§ 949 *sqq.* ; Baikie, *Amarna Age*, 265 *sqq.*).

[1] See comm. on 2 Kings x. 26 (and Lagrange, 123 n., 207 n.), where what was burnt was presumably an *asherah* and not a stone pillar.

[2] *KAT.* 432 *sq.* ; Sellin, *Taannek*, i. 114, cf. 108 (for " finger," cf. Ex. viii. 19[15]) ; Gressmann, *Altorient. Texte z. A.T.*[2] i. 371 ; Jirku, *Altorient. Kommentar zum Alt. Test.* 118.

[3] See F. B. Jevons, *Introd. to Hist. of Rel.* 134 *sq.* ; Moore, *E.Bi.* col. 30 n. 2 Newberry (*Nature*, cxii. 942) compares the *neter* pole, and Sidney Smith (*Journ. of Eg. Arch.* viii, 41) the *sed* pillar of Egypt.

At all events, the question remains whether the name of the goddess or that of the tree-trunk as her symbol or as her embodiment is the older. For the treatment of sacred objects (*e.g.* royal regalia) as in themselves sacred, that is, virtually as effective as the gods themselves, there are many parallels ancient and modern.[1] Here are to be named the *Ekurrate* deities (*lit.* temples) in Assyrian (Delitzsch, *Handwörterbuch*), and in Mandæan magical texts, where male Ekurs (עבוריא) are mentioned with female Ishtars (Lidzb. *Ephem.* i. 100 *sq.*).[2] Bait-il (Bethel) is also the name of a god. The Nabatæan מוחבה (*CIS.* ii. 198) is named with Dusares as (*a*) his seat or abode (cf. *ZDMG.* xxix. 107 *sq.* l. 135) or (*b*) " his wife " (in a secondary sense; Winckler, *Altor. Forsch.* ii. 62, 321). With this compare the Χααβου (above, p. 56 n.), Zeus Μάδβαχος, the cult of the *βωμὸς μέγας* (see Meyer, *Israel.* 295, and A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, i. 519 *sqq.*), and the widespread cult of the empty throne.[3] On the Jewish usage of the Shechinah (the " abode " of God) for the Deity Himself, see J. Abelson, *The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature*, 79.[4]

P. 191.—On the story of Osiris, see, in the first instance, Frazer, *GB.* vi. 9 *sq.*, 108 *sqq.*, and Baudissin's discussion in *Adonis und Esmun*, 174 *sqq.*, 185 *sqq.* On Adonis, see Baudissin, *ib.*, and Frazer, *GB.* v. and vi. *passim.*

P. 193.—On the Ambrosian rocks at Tyre, see Gressmann, *Mose*, 26; A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, iii.; and S. A. Cook, *Schweich Lectures.* On the Arab belief that ghosts and the like appear in or accompanied with flames, see Goldziher, *Abhand.* i. 205 *sqq.* Stories of trees with mysterious lights or in flames are current in Palestine, *Qy. St. of the PEF.*, 1872, p. 179; 1893, p. 203; Curtiss, 93; Gressmann, *Mose*, 28 n.; the practice of hanging lamps on trees may account for some of the beliefs. In Yemen in the nineteenth century a tree formed by two or three growing into one was regarded as sacred, sacrifices were offered to it, and a voice was heard speaking from its branches (A. S. Tritton,

[1] Frazer, *GB.* i. 362 *sqq.*, iv. 202. Seligman (British Association, Manchester, 1915) reported that in the Sudan, where the great Queen Soba is worshipped as an ancestress, a stone or " throne " is the chair of the kingdom, and rocks associated with her are called after her name; the prayers made to " grandmother Soba " testify to a confusion between the goddess and the particular stone invoked.

[2] Moore (*E.Bi.*, 332) compares the Phœn. names נרהכל, עברהכל, client or servant of the temple (*i.e.* the god); cf. above, p. 531.

[3] Add the divine צלם or " image " (see p. 587) and the Mandæan demon פחכרא or " idol." See Gressmann, *Zeit. f. d. Neutest. Wissenschaft*, xx. (1921) 224 *sq.*; and S. A. Cook, *Schweich Lectures* (on the god Bethel).

[4] At more advanced stages, instead of the cult-object, the attribute, emanation, name, etc., become separate entities; see Farnell, *Evol. of Rel.* 74, on the veneration of the Fravashi or Soul of Ahura and the Θεοῦ Πρόσωπα.

Calcutta Oriental Conference, 1922 [published 1923], 580). On trees that speak, sing, or prophesy, see also M. R. James, *Testament of Abraham* (1892), 59 *sqq.* (the cypress is specially sacred); Marmorstein, *Arch. f. Rel.* xvii. 132. As to what is said of Mamre the old reports differ: Syncellus speaks of the terebinth of Shechem (see Gressmann, *Mose*, loc. cit.; Bacher, *ZATW.* xxix. 148 *sqq.*; Krauss, *ib.* 296 *sqq.*; and Frazer, *FOT.* iii. 57 *sqq.*).

P. 194. Immanence and Transcendence.—The not uncommon view that the Jewish or the Semitic idea of deity was solely transcendent has often been denied.[1] Characteristic differences between Semitic and Greek religion have been emphasized, *e.g.* by Farnell (*Higher Aspects of the Greek Religion*, 132 *sq.*). But although in the former there is what has been styled a slave-temper, the latter has not the warmth and confidence which distinguish Semitic religion. Semitic religion has extraordinary extremes (*CAH.* i.[2] 197 *sqq.*). But the contrast between the exclusiveness of the Semitic gods and the universality of the Indo-European (Meyer, *Gesch. Alt.* i. §§ 557, 582) must not obscure the debt to the Semites for the development of the conception of the intimate relationship between the gods and the members of the group (social, religious, or ecclesiastical). The Semites' conviction of divine supremacy never prevented them from adopting the attitudes they would assume to a powerful ruler to whose good nature—and sense of duty and prestige—they could appeal (cf. Num. xiv. 14 *sqq.*, Josh. vii. 9). In Ezekiel, Divine Transcendence is most prominent; but it is only one aspect of the Divine Nature (W. H. Bennett, *Rel. of the Post-Exilic Prophets* [1907], 30 *sq.*). What was said of a wrathful Yahweh did not exclude the chastening love of a Father. And, to take another case, the insistent demand of Ḥoni (Onias) for rain was denounced as unreasonable and sinful, but God accepted his prayer and treated him—in the words of Simeon ben Shetaḥ—"as a son that acts as a sinner to his father, but he grants his request."[2] See also p. 588.

In both Jewish and Mohammedan prayer there is an element of importunity if not of compulsion;[3] and as a general rule it is frequently difficult to draw the line between propitiation and persuasion and coercion (Crawley, *Tree of Life*, 188). In fact, besides the way in

[1] See, *e.g.*, G. F. Moore, *History of Religions*, ii. 73; C .G. Montefiore, *Hibbert Lectures* (ed. of 1897), 424 *sqq.* (for post-exilic Judaism); J. Abelson, *The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature* (1912); and I. Abrahams, *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels* (2nd Ser. 1924), 149 *sq.*

[2] Büchler, *Types of Jewish Palestinian Piety* (1922), 252 *sqq.*, cf. 246 *sq.*

[3] See Goldziher, *Nöldeke-Festschrift*, 314, who cites the Talm. Bab. Sanhed. 105*a*; "boldness (חוצפא) avails even against Heaven."

which the Egyptians would threaten their sacred animals (Plut. *Is.* 73), gods and saints are often treated badly in order to force them to remove drought or other peril. They will be taunted (cf. 1 Kings xviii. 27); and steps may be taken to irritate a modern *weli*, in order to arouse him to manifest his power.[1] Such evidence indicates that problems of Immanence and Transcendence involve the varying degree of divinity attributed to the gods and spirits. For often these are little more than supermen, doing "easily" what is difficult for men—the Homeric ῥεῖα (Nilsson, 157); while, on the other hand, there are outstanding individuals, supermen, scarcely if at all inferior to the gods, and adequate embodiments of ideas of divinity.

The ideas of Immanence and of Transcendence are complementary. When gods are felt to be remote and no longer in touch with men, they lose their authority. Typically, the sacred beings must not be approached save by the sacred, they must be treated with respect, and intermediaries may be necessary. Such gods will become the gods of a special class or caste; and the nature of the cult, or the myths, or the doctrines, will sever them from the community and make them accessible only to the few. Internal social changes, the movement of thought, or disasters which seem to prove the helplessness of the gods, combine to make them more or less negligible (cf. Zeph. i. 12). When more accessible and more intelligible beings arise, they are nearer at hand, and they, better than the "remote" gods, understand human needs. On the other hand, when gods are felt to be near at hand, and in close touch with men, they may lose their distinctive sanctity and cease to be the gods they once were. They may be easily manageable by prayers and charms, or too well known to be feared; the key of the religious mechanism lies wholly in human hands. The gods then become so completely one with their visible abodes, so entirely comprehensible, that they virtually cease to exist, and need no distinctive term: they are lost in their embodiment.

The history of religion is, broadly speaking, that of efforts to escape from the two extremes: the god who is so remote, so unknown or unknowable as to be negligible, and the god so completely known as to be unnecessary. There are some highly instructive vicissitudes. Contrast, *e.g.*, the popular idea of a Yahweh who could be put to the test with the severe condemnation of such familiarity and lack of faith (see *CAH.* iii. 485). Constantly the god has come to be confused with his symbol or vehicle (p. 562), the metaphor has been taken literally, and the religious system treated as final. It is thus possible to distinguish the more primary and the more secondary developments, and to

[1] *JPOS.* vi. 5 (*e.g.* filth is put on the tomb); cf. *GB.* i. 300 *sq.*, 307 *sq.*

contrast the more creative movements with those tendencies along the extremes, either of Immanence or of Transcendence, which would lead nowhere. Accordingly, the combination of the two conceptions is seen to be of primary significance, and it may fairly be said to correspond to the combination of Mana and Taboo among rudimentary peoples, where man feels that he can utilize a power, but must be heedful (see p. 551 n. 3).[1] In Central Australian totemism the ceremonies for the control or multiplication of the totem species (commonly an edible animal or plant) are conducted as though those processes, which among less rudimentary peoples are usually associated directly or indirectly with the gods, lay within the power of the officiants. Yet at the same time they are in the " sacred " state psychologically akin to that which elsewhere accompanies the consciousness of, and fellowship with, a sacred and transcendent power. Again, special individuals (priests, priestly kings, rain-makers, etc.) constantly act, for the time being at least, as the embodiments or vehicles or representatives of a sacred power; but although the divine and human thus converge, and the divine power is, in a sense, immanent in the man, the difference between the sacred man and the sacred power is not necessarily obliterated (p. 545). The group-system, uniting gods and their worshippers, did not necessarily involve the lowering of the god-idea, although, as W. R. S. points out, there was a tendency in this direction, and, as far as Israel was concerned, it was corrected by the prophets (p. 74). Here it must be recognized that W. R. S. makes a very important point. In the group-system the insistence upon the sacredness of the gods tended to prevent them from being wholly immanent; none the less, the teaching of the prophets shows that even a national religious system could be a dangerously " closed " one because of the inadequate conception of Yahweh and of his " righteousness." The danger lay in the imperfect ideas of the most vital concepts—the " transcendental " concepts, in fact. No actual living system of beliefs and practices is really a closed one; outside it is that which makes for the further development of conceptions of God, Man, and the Universe. Cf. pp. 508, 525.

Whether such terms as Immanence and Transcendence should be used in reference to the simpler and older religions may seem doubtful in view of the absence among them of explicit conceptions of Nature. It was, of course, possible to distinguish between what was felt to be normal, natural, or intelligible, and the opposite. But primitive

[1] Cf. Marett, *Psychology and Folklore*, 166: " It is the common experience of man that he can draw on a power that makes for, and in its most typical forms wills righteousness, the sole condition being that a certain fear, a certain shyness and humility accompany the effort so to do."

man, it may be said, would co-operate with the supernatural world, or would claim to do what elsewhere are the recognized functions of "gods," or are subsequently regarded as "natural" processes. He located the supernatural power where he happened to experience it, and the difficulty for us is to understand, not so much the varying conceptions of the supernatural, but the varying and contradictory interrelations between the supernatural and "natural." In the case of the Semites, pantheism was avoided because material things were symbols rather than realities (W. R. S., *Lectures*, 425). The god was behind or over "nature," his breath animated life; and when a divine power was felt to be "immanent" in sacred hills, waters, etc. (above, pp. 173, 190, 194), this was not derived from a specific belief in a Supreme God which had been watered down and degraded; the explanation lies rather in the subjectivity of the Semite, as W. R. S. had already pointed out in a brilliant essay on the "Poetry of the O.T." (*Lectures*, 400 *sqq.*).

P. 197 n. Adonis Rods.—See Frazer, *GB.* v. 236 *sqq.* Baudissin (87 *sq.*) questions their use as omens. Rods are also used in divination (above, p. 196 n.; see, on the subject, Halliday, *Greek Divination*, 226 *sq.*), or for working witchcraft; cf. the story of Circe, etc., also the pointing-stick of the wonder-worker in Australia and the Torres Straits.

P. 198. Semitic Chthonic Deities.—Chthonic cults are associated partly with earth-dwelling powers and partly, as Baudissin argues (31, 53), with the youthful god who rises and returns to the underworld. A chthonic power is not necessarily limited to terrestrial attributes, and in Greece, thund r, if not also lightning, could be chthonian (A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, ii. 805 n. 6). Besides cults connected with chasms and with tombs (viz. libations poured on the ground, see p. 580), the Rephaim–"shades," were perhaps "healers" (cf. Lagrange, 318 *sq.*), though not all the dead were so regarded (Baud. 343). W. R. S. (in Driver, *Deuteronomy*, 40) agrees with Schwally (*Das Leben nach dem Tode*, 64 *sq.*) that there is some connexion between the Rephaim–"shades" or ghosts and extinct giants (such as were supposed to have haunted the district of Antioch); the Emim are to be connected with the Hebrew *'ēmah*, "terror"; and the Zamzummim are "whisperers, murmurers." W. R. S. compares the Arabic *'azīf*, the eerie sound of the *jinn* (*Heid.* 150). Among special chthonic deities are Nergal, Molek (Milk), and Kronos: on their interrelations, see Lagrange, 104 *sqq.*; but note A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, ii. 1107 *sqq.* Milkat is named on a Carthaginian *tabella devotionis* dedicated to the "Great Ones Ḥawwat, Allat, Milkat . . ." (?)[1] To Allat

[1] . . . רבת חות אלת מלכת שׁ׳סכהא. See Clermont-Ganneau, *Recueil*, iii. 304, v. 87; Cooke, No. 50; Lidzbarski, *Ephem.* i. 26 *sqq.*

(on whom see p. 56) corresponds the Babylonian Ereshkigal, mistress of the underworld and wife of Nergal. The name of Ḥawwat is presumably to be compared with "Eve" and "serpent"; the place of the serpent in chthonic cults needs no illustration.[1] With the threefold invocation Clermont-Ganneau (*Rec.* iv. 90) compares the threefold Hecate and her serpent attributes.

P. 198 n. 2. THE *ZAKKŪRĒ*.—In the passage cited, a young woman shortly about to give birth to a child is hung up and the babe cut out; by means of magic the *zakkūrē* ascend from the middle of the earth, and agree to recognize their co-religionist, the Emperor Julian, as supreme king. More magic is performed by means of the child, which is restored to the body of its mother, who is laid upon the altar. Julian then makes his first ceremonial offering to the ruler of the world and to the powers above and below, and forthwith Satan enters into him as into a temple. For classical parallels, see Halliday, *Greek Divination*, 243 n. 1.

P. 199. CAVES, CHASMS, AND THE FLOOD.—In Palestine caves are sometimes found outside the tombs of saints; but sometimes they are found or supposed to exist within the shrine, and it is believed that the saint's body lies concealed there. Among the famous caves are those of the Patriarchs at Machpelah, Elijah at Carmel and Horeb, Astarte at Kasimīyeh (Clermont-Ganneau, *Rec.* v. 333), and of Ablūn (Apollo) and el-Maḳdūra at Sidon, the former containing figures of Apollo, the latter, *inter alia*, a hideous female figure (Bädeker, *s.v.*). At Gezer there was current one of the not unfamiliar local traditions that the Deluge rose in a *tannūr* or baking-oven (Clermont-Ganneau, *Archæological Researches*, ii. 235, 237, 456, 480, 490); and it is tempting to associate with the story the great tunnel which was discovered there, and which in turn recalls the watercourse or tunnel (*ṣinnōr*) of Jerusalem (2 Sam. v. 8).[2] (On Lucian [references in n. 2], see for discussions and parallels, Torge, *Seelen und Unsterblichkeitshoffnungen*, 134 [Leipzig, 1909].)

P. 200. MEGARON.—The word may be of independent (Cretan? Ægean?) origin (cf. λέσχη, p. 587 below). On the distinction in Greek between the underground cavern and the (Homeric) large hall, see

[1] On Eve as the mother-serpent, see Gressmann, *Harnack-Festschrift*, 37 *sq.* (contrast W. R. S., *Kinship*, 208, Eve as the great eponyma). Note the serpent deity of Dēr who was "lady of life" (*ib.*), and Nin-Azu the deity of healing and of vegetation and lord of the underworld (Morgenstern, 51). On a connexion between creeping animals and the spirits of the dead, see H. P. Smith, *Journ. of Bibl. Lit.* xxx. 55 *sqq.*; *Amer. Journ. of Theol.* 1909, pp. 224 *sqq.*

[2] Vincent, *Qy. St. of the PEF.*, 1908, pp. 218 *sqq.* See R. A. S. Macalister, *Qy. St.* 1903, p. 218 (cf. 241); *Excavation of Gezer*, i. 264.

Frazer, *Pausanias*, iii. 15; Burney, *Judges*, xviii and xix n. The earliest inhabitants of Crete lived in caves, which continued to be used as centres of cult; and at Tiryns the *megaron* of the palace was converted into a temple to Hera (Nilsson, *Gr. Rel.* 12, 23 *sqq.*). With the difference of meaning cf. the צְרִיחַ of the temple of El-Berith at Shechem (Judg. ix. 46, 49), used of an underground cavern or chamber in 1 Sam. xiii. 6, and in Nabatæan inscriptions. Arabic distinguishes between صَرْح, tower or citadel, and ضَرِيح, grave, etc. See further, G. F. Moore on Judges, and Driver on Samuel. At Nablus (Shechem) the Arabic *ḍarīḥ* is used of the holy place built over the remains of sundry prophets, sons of Jacob (Canaan, *JPOS.* iv. 24).

P. 200 *sqq.* SACRED STONES.[1]—Sacred stones include (1) those that have been deliberately and artificially made holy (see below, p. 572), and (2) those that are already so, perhaps because they arouse awe (a sense of the "numinous," see p. 554), or because of some tradition which professes to explain their sanctity (see p. 206). Sacred stones need not be portraits, or representations of any part of the body (on phallic symbols, see p. 687 *sq.*); there is not necessarily any self-evident connexion between them and what they stand for (p. 210). Nor need they have any intrinsic worth, like precious stones. It is remarkable that the cult of sacred stones is found on high levels,[2] and that among lower races the Central Australian *churinga* is of no little "spiritual value" because of the meaning it has for the native.[3] Fetishism is not necessarily "very savage and contemptible" (p. 209; cf. Lagrange, 215). It is easy to understand why certain stones or stone objects have been endowed with sacred power, *e.g.* aerolites and flints; and the black bituminous stones around Nebī Musā, before they are burnt on the fire, must first be addressed: "Permission, O son of Imrām, whose fire comes from his stones" (Canaan, *JPOS.* v. 166).[4] Stones as fertility charms will owe their efficacy, as the "Merchant of Harran" recognized, to the faith of the believer (see p. 514 n. 2); and at the present day women who desire children will resort to stones famed for their power, *e.g.* the Ḥajar el-Ḥāblah near Meirum,[5] or they

[1] See Wellhausen, 101 *sqq.*; Lagrange, 197 *sqq.*; Moore, *E.Bi.* "Massebah."

[2] Cf. Moore, *E.Bi.* 2979, § 2 and n. 9; Conybeare, *Oxford Congress of Rel.* ii. 177 *sqq.*; Frazer, *FOT.* ii. 73; and the oft-quoted modern example in A. C. Lyall's *Asiatic Studies* ("Religion of an Indian Province").

[3] Marett, *Ency. Brit.* xxiii. 66*a*, citing Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 135, 165, *Northern Tribes*, 266.

[4] Prehistoric tools are sometimes treated as sacred on account of their obvious antiquity.

[5] Vincent, *Canaan*, 415 n. Cf. Bädeker, *Palest.* 356; Frazer, *FOT.* ii. 75.

will visit an old Egyptian monument and scrape off a little of the sandstone, which they drink with water (*The Times*, 2nd October 1926).

As an object of cult the stone serves as a place where one can meet the god. When draped, carried about, hung with garments, it is virtually an idol (Wellh. 101 *sq.*). But instead of representing the god, a stone can be erected on behalf of a worshipper, and in this case it virtually represents *him* in the presence of the god. Among the Nabatæans the משנרא seems to be, not so much the place of worship (cf. *mesjid*, "mosque") as the vehicle: it is a stela or column dedicated to a deity; but it may be shaped like an altar and may suggest an altar-table (Cooke, 238). When stones are set up by the childless, or as memorials of the worshipper, the desire to perpetuate the "name" suggests that it is the durability and permanence of the object which is the secret of the practice. It is on this account that the stone serves to commemorate; though, with W. R. S., it is questionable whether this is the true origin of stone-cults.

In Josh. xxii. the original narrative must have been changed ("an altar is a strange erection if it is only to be used as a monument"); and it is more probable that a Transjordanic altar was preserved by devoting it to a more innocent purpose, and through this compromise the narrative succeeds in emphasizing the unity of worship.[1] In Gen. xxviii. 12–22 (Jacob at Bethel) Lagrange (205 and n. 2) well compares the Assyrian practice of anointing foundation tablets. But why were such memorial tablets anointed? They bore the names of the founders; they must be anointed and sacrifices offered to them—to explain the ceremony as a mere act of commemoration seems inadequate (see p. 582 *sq.*) Moreover, the circumstances in Gen. *l.c.* go to show that Jacob's pillar was more than commemorative; the stone which was found to be sacred and was set up is a Massebah.[2] In Gen. xxxi. 44, the stone which commemorates the covenant between Jacob and Laban is regarded by Lagrange (206) as analogous to the Babylonian *kudurrus* or boundary stones. These stones bore the symbols of certain gods, who were not necessarily identical with those mentioned in the accompanying inscription; but in any event, divine powers, through the presence of these stones, were expected to act as a protection against evil-doers. The covenant feast (*v.* 46) recalls Gen. xxvi. 30; and the witness is God (*v.* 50 E), or the cairn itself (*v.* 48 J). The latter view underlies the explanation of the name

[1] Kennett, *Journal of Theol. Studies*, 1905, p. 175; cf. G. A. Cooke, *Joshua*, 210.

[2] See further Skinner, *Gen.* 377 *sqq.* Meyer (*Israel.* 283 *sqq.*) argues that the Bethel stone was the "rock of Israel," and the "steer of Jacob" (Gen. xlix. 24); cf. Jer. ii. 27, Is. li. 1. W. R. S. is guarded (p. 210 n.), presumably because he distinguishes "Israelite" from "Canaanite" religion.

Gal'ēd (Gilead), and finds a parallel in Josh. xxiv. 27 (E), where the stone at Shechem is a witness. Cairns are still built as witnesses of vows (Curtiss, 79 *sq.*), and stones convey ideas of stability where oaths and covenants are concerned (Frazer, *FOT.* ii. 403 *sqq.*). Stones are piled up as a "witness" or "confirmation" by the modern pilgrim when he prays, and on the Day of Judgment such stones will be among the testimonies to his piety (*JPOS.* iv. 75 *sq.*).

But even "commemorative" monuments readily have a sacred meaning, and they were condemned by the Puritan Wahhabites.[1] The *maṣṣebah* on the border of Egypt (Is. xix. 19) was, as Gray conjectured, perhaps an inscribed obelisk celebrating Yahweh's deeds. Boundaries were sacred, and Senusret (Sesostris) I. set up his statue at the boundary of Egypt that the people "might prosper because of it" (Breasted, i. § 660; cf. *CAH.* ii. 344). The treaty between Eannatum and the king of Lagash was commemorated by the "Stela of the Vultures" which was set up to mark the boundary; it refers to the frontier shrines (*i.e.* presumably to the gods who were invoked to preserve the treaty), and the two kings took a solemn oath to respect the frontier, probably at the altars of the gods invoked.[2]

Sacred stones, rocks, and mountains seem to have been more prominent in the old Israelite religion than is commonly recognized (Meyer, *Israel.* 473); and with Lagrange (192 *sq.*) and Baudissin (*ZDMG.* 1903, p. 829) it is tempting to associate the Babylonian *ziḳḳurat* towers and the cult of conical stones with the sanctity of mountains. Elagabalus of Emesa, then, may be the "deified mountain" (cf. Lagrange, 82 n.); and although Nöldeke has objected (see *ZDMG.* 1903, p. 817) that "Gebāl" is too specifically an Arabic word, he himself attributes to the Arab-speaking Nabatæans the name of Gebāl which was given to Mt. Seir (*E.Bi.* 1654), and in view of the constant movement of Arab tribes in Transjordania and the Arab connexions of the dynasty of Emesa the appearance of an El(a)-gabal is not difficult to explain. Further, since Mt. Seir is otherwise called "field of Edom," where "field" (*sādeh*), as in several other places in the O.T., should mean "mountain," like the Bab. *shadu* (Burney, *Judges*, 111 *sq.*), it would appear that Gebāl as a name for Edom corresponds to the earlier *sādeh*.[3]

In general, the various sorts of sacred stones, as also the meanings attached to them, easily shade off into one another (cf. Lagrange, 201,

[1] Hogarth, *Penetration of Arabia*, 73; G. B. Gray on Isa. xix. 19 (p. 338).

[2] L. W. King, *Sumer and Akkad*, 127 *sqq.*; cf. *CAH.* i.[2] 380.

[3] Delitzsch's suggestion that the admittedly obscure title El Shaddai goes back to a "god-mountain" should perhaps be reconsidered. "Great mountain" (*shadū rabū*) is a title of Bel and Asshur; *KAT.* 355, 358.

203). The stone can be an altar (cf. Wellhausen, 141) and at the same time a god, as in the stone at Duma (above, p. 205) and in *Zeus bōmos* (Cook, *Zeus*, i. 520 *sq.*). Gods are readily identified with their embodiments, vehicles, or symbols (p. 562), and even the merely "commemorative" stone can have a deep religious value. In such circumstances, what is absolutely primary and what secondary in the history of sacred stones can hardly be determined by reliance upon the *dates* of our evidence (against Lagrange, 207 *sq.*), especially when the evidence comes in turn from early Babylonia, the O.T., Herodotus, and Arab heathenism. Nor can one rely upon any preliminary distinction between the cults of savages and of civilized peoples (*id.* 215 *sq.*). The inanimate stone differs from the plant and more especially from the animal in that it does not in itself suggest, shape, or direct natural ideas of sacred life in the way that these can. It is on this account the more apt to be made the convenient centre of ideas from the vaguest to the most profound, and at different stages of culture. True, the stone has a certain permanence, the mountain points to the sky, or the environment of the sacred object awakens a sense of the sublime; but by its very nature it stands outside the course of religious development and the growth of ideas of personality, human and divine. That sacred stones have bulked so largely in religion makes it all the more necessary to distinguish between a classification of the data of religion and the criteria by which the development of religion may be estimated.

P. 205. Rites of Touching, Stroking, etc.—Such rites, for the purpose of acquiring or of transferring sanctity, have naturally a certain psychological significance, whether or no they include the special application of blood, oil, wine, fat, or anything supposed to contain some inherent efficacy. On taboos against touching sacred persons or things, see Frazer, *GB.* iii. 131 *sqq.*; on charming by means of stroking, see E. Riess, *Amer. Journ. of Philol.*, 1925, pp. 226 *sqq.*, and for a typical Mohammedan custom, above, p. 461. On touching or pressing against the black stone at Mecca, see Wellhausen, 109, Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 209.[1] For kissing (1 Kings xix. 18; Hos. xiii. 2), cf. the kissing of the threshold and door-posts of churches in Abyssinia (Barton, *Sem. Origins*, 137). In an alignment of stones unearthed at Gezer, in what was evidently a sacred area, was one with small polished spots such as are still to be observed on the stones visited and kissed by pilgrims (R. A. S. Macalister, *Gezer*, ii. 388). On bodily contact with a teacher in order to acquire some of his

[1] The orthodox Palestinian Jew at the wall of Jerusalem presses against what is traditionally regarded as part of Solomon's temple (Jastrow, *Rel. Beliefs*, 266 n. 3).

knowledge, see the Rabbinical and other data by Eiseler, *Arch. f. Rel.*, 1914, p. 666; Kreglinger, 87 *sq.* In Syria men will touch a saint's tomb with their hand, and then wipe it over their face (A. S. Tritton, private communication), or they will rub the oil of the lamps over their hands and face (Canaan, *JPOS.* v. 177 *sq.*). Further, when a sacrifice is offered, he for whom it is made must come into contact with it, *e.g.* he must be marked with the blood of the victim. Or a man will smear a shrine in order to assure the saint that the sacrifice is made on his behalf (*JPOS.* vi. 48). The necessity of some physical or material accessory finds a curious illustration when the church of St. George, near Beit Jala, was connected by a wire with the hospital where the mental patients were kept, in order that the saint's healing power might be transmitted to the unfortunate inmates (v. 202).

P. 206. CONSECRATION, DIVINIZATION.—As distinct from inanimate or animate things already (naturally) sacred are those which are ceremonially made so; and W. R. S. argues that the stage where an object already sacred is sacrificed to a god is prior to that where it is selected and sanctified for the purpose (p. 390). This view is rejected by Hubert and Mauss who, in their important monograph on sacrifice (cf. also Toy, § 1049), are more concerned with demonstrating the stage of "divinization" which W. R. S. considers secondary. For examples of divinization, see W. Crooke, "The Binding of the God," *Folk-lore*, viii. 325–355 (on the practices whereby gods are caused to enter into images); Hartland, *Ritual and Belief*, 55 (supernatural powers transferred by means of feathers); Cumont, *Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism*, ch. iv. n. 61.

In both Egypt and Babylonia there were rites whereby the images became inhabited by their respective gods.[1] In the daily ritual of the Egyptian temple the priest presented to the image of the deity the image of Ma'at, goddess of truth, right, etc., whereby it became, so to say, "truly and rightly" a god, and no longer a mere image (cf. *CAH.* i.[2] 346).[2] Such practices recall the story that Brahma taught a king how to restore a dead boy by painting a portrait, and then endowing it with life. Mohammedan thought is more explicit when the prohibition of making images is justified on the ground

[1] Rameses II. speaks of having performed such a rite (Breasted, *Anc. Rec.* iii. p. 179 note *c*).

[2] On the ceremony of "opening the mouth," see Blackman, *Journ. of Eg. Arch.* x. 47 *sqq.* (Bab.), 53 *sqq.* (Egypt); Zimmern, in the *Nöldeke-Festschrift*, 959 *sqq.*; Sidney Smith, *Journ. of Royal Asiatic Soc.*, 1925, pp. 37 *sqq.*; H. Bonnet, *Angelos*, 1925, pp. 103 *sqq.* On a ceremonial opening of the mouth as a sign that a man initiated into a sacred office has become fully ordained, see the West African example in Frazer, *GB.* v. 68.

that it is a sacrilegious assumption of the creative function of Allah, who alone possesses the life-giving breath.[1] Creation consists in the manufacture of the mould and the gift of life by blowing breath into the nostrils (cf. p. 555); and the Arab conviction reads as the echo of a monotheistic condemnation, which orthodox Jews would have shared, of the older practice of making gods.

In rites of consecration blood was especially used as a vehicle of life, if not as the life itself. Blood makes a stone holy; it brings divine life into it (p. 436 above). An Abraxas papyrus speaks of the strangling of birds before an idol of Eros in order to endow it with life (*Class. Review*, 1896, p. 409). Primitive man feels the need of some instrument or vehicle as an embodiment of a "spirit," and instead of an image a corpse can serve (Halliday, *Greek Divination*, 243 *sq.*). A sacred or powerful man may be put to death in order that his spiritual presence shall benefit a district (cf. Hartland, *Folk-lore*, xxi. 176 *sq.*); and in the days of the Greek emigrations, "it became the established custom for the leader of a new pioneering enterprise to be buried in the market-place of the colony and honoured after death as its protecting hero" (Nilsson, 236). Between the utilization, the reinvigoration, and the construction of an abode for a powerful spirit it is not easy to draw the line, and W. R. S. and MM. Hubert and Mauss are really looking at different parts of the process: the latter made a most important contribution to certain types and uses of sacrifice, but the former goes to the more fundamental problem, *why* there is a desire to establish—or re-establish—communication with the "sacred" realm.

P. 210 n. 1.—The letters to the *Scotsman* are reprinted in *Lectures and Essays* (ed. J. S. Black and G. W. Chrystal), see *ib.* p. 544, and cf. p. 554.

P. 211 n. 1.—The verse cited by Wellhausen[1], 99, reads: "At a time when female children were not suffered to live, and when the people used to stand motionless by the sacred stones, round the *mudawwar*." The *mudawwar* is said to mean "an image which they used to circumambulate." The verse appears in the *Nacā'id*, p. 950 l. 3 (ed. Bevan, Leiden, 1905).—A. A. B.

Pp. 214, 216, and 237 n.—On the terms "sacrifice" and "offering" (Luther, *schlacht-* and *speise-opfer*), etc., see Moore, *E.Bi.* "Sacrifice," § 11; Driver, *Hastings' Dict. Bible*, s.v. "Offer(ing), Oblation"; G. Buchanan Gray, *Sacrifice in the O.T.*, 4 *sqq.* On the derivation of *minḥah* (מנח "give," or נחה a ritual S. Arab. term), see Lagrange,

[1] Sir T. W. Arnold, *Survivals of Sasanian and Manichaean Art in Persian Painting*, 4 (Oxford, 1924); Wensinck, "The Second Commandment," *Mededeelingen* of the Amsterdam University, lvii. A No. 6 (1925).

256 n., 269 n.; Hartmann, *Islam. Orient*, 208 n. 1; Gray, 14 *sqq.*; Hommel, *Ethnol. u. Geog. d. Alt. Orients*, 144, 162; and Dussaud, *Les Origines Cananéennes du Sacrifice Israélite*, 89 *sqq.*

P. 215 n.—Wellhausen's article "Pentateuch," famous in the annals of O.T. criticism, was reprinted in *E.Bi.* "Hexateuch" (with additions by Cheyne on later developments). Of subsequent tendencies (*a*) some (Kennett in *Journ. of Theol. Stud.*, 1905 *sq.*, Hölscher, etc.) place Deuteronomy *in its present form* after the seventh century B.C. (*b*) Others (Kosters, Torrey, etc.) reconstruct the history both of the Return from Exile (holding that there was no considerable return in the time of Zerubbabel) and of the work of Nehemiah and Ezra (in that order, the value of the account of Ezra being also open to doubt). Further (*c*), more attention is paid to the early elements in the law and ritual, especially in view of the antiquity of culture in Palestine centuries before the age of Moses. This latter fact, however, does not affect the problem of the approximate dates when the constituent sources of the Hexateuch and the Historical Books reached their present form, and for what purposes they were written down and combined. Since W. R. S. lays emphasis upon the archaic or primitive features of the priestly ritual, it is to be observed that, whereas on the "literary-critical" theory these appear in documents which are admittedly quite late (post-exilic), on the "conservative" or "traditional" view they are in documents of many centuries earlier, and the spiritual and ethical reforming movements of the great prophets did not prevent their persistence, survival, or re-emergence, and their prominence in post-exilic Judaism. Archaic and even crude features recur in Syria and Palestine in much later times, *e.g.* at the revival of Orientalism before and at the beginning of the Christian era; cf. the cults associated with Elagabalus and Emesa, and see also Cumont, *Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism* (Chicago, 1911). Conversely, relatively high ideas can be traced, not only among the neighbours of the Israelites outside Palestine, but also in Palestine before the age of the Israelite invasion and among the Canaanites amid whom the Israelites settled.

P. 218. For the camel as food, Stübe refers to Imrulcais, *Moall. vv.* 10–12. A particularly minute description of the slaughter of a camel for food is to be found in a poem of 'Amr ibn al-Ahtam (Mufaḍḍalīyāt, ed. Thorbecke, Poem xii. verses 12 *sq.*, Poem xxiii. in Lyall's edition).—A. A. B.

P. 220. Wine and Ecstasy.—Certain abnormal states have readily been regarded as supernormal, and all that took a man out of himself was often supposed to take him into a supersensuous or sacred realm.

There have been many ways of producing the state: music, intonation, and also awe-inspiring noises, notably the bull-roarer;[1] dancing and dreamy rhythmic movement (cf. below, p. 671 *sq.*); tobacco and the inhalation of smoke; eating of leaves (hashish, ivy, etc.); drinking of blood, of wine and other intoxicating liquors. The sacred drink, "sacred" because it is interpreted as bringing one under the influence of or into the sphere of the supersensuous, will owe its discovery to a god (Osiris, Dionysus).[2] The Indian *soma* was itself deified; it conferred immortality upon gods and men, and its appellation *amrita*, "immortal," is the *ambrosia* of the Greek gods. Among other famous drinks in religion are the *kava* ceremonial of the South Seas (*Folk-lore*, xxxiii. 60) and the Mexican *peyote* (see Radin, *Crashing Thunder*, 169 *sqq.*). In Babylonia wine is ideographically the "food (or staff) of life" (*KAT.* 526).

The opposition to wine in Gen. ix. 18 *sqq.* is to be read in the light of Lamech's oracle on the birth of Noah (v. 29), where wine is a relief from the curse of labour; it "expresses the healthy recoil of primitive Semitic morality from the licentious habits engendered by a civilization of which a salient feature was the use and abuse of wine" (Skinner, *Genesis*, 185 *sqq.*, cf. 133 *sq.*). For restrictions on the use of wine in religion, see, besides pp. 220 n. 5 and 485 above, Gray, *Numbers*, 62 *sq.*, and Jastrow, *Journ. of Amer. Or. Soc.* xxxiii. 180 *sqq.* The Egyptians abstained from wine because, on one view, it was the blood, not of the gods, but of the enemies of the gods. Among the Aztecs the native *pulque* was denounced because of the evils done by men under its influence; though, as they were supposed to be possessed and inspired by the wine-god, such men were not to be punished (Frazer, *GB.* iii. 249 *sq.*).[3] Analogous is the belief that mentally abnormal men are—within certain limits—sacred (Canaan, *JPOS.* vi. 10). Among the teetotal gods is the Nabatæan Shē'alḳūm (שיעאלקום; in Safa inscriptions שעהקם), *i.e.* the "protector of the people," who is described as the "good and bountiful god who does not drink wine" (טבא ושכרא די לא שתא חמר). Interpreting this as a protest against the cult of Dusares-Dionysus, Clermont-Ganneau recalls the legendary "anti-Bacchic" god or king Lycurgus who

[1] Marett, *Threshold of Rel.* 156 *sq.* For singing (*carmen*=charm), cf. Gilbert Murray, *Anthropology and the Classics*, 96, 105.

[2] On the "immortality of drunkenness," see further Frazer, *GB.* i. 378 *sqq.*, iii. 248 *sqq.*, v. 52 *sq.*; also *FOT.* iii. 344 *sq.*; Hölscher, *Die Profeten*, 11 *sq.*; and in general, Kircher, *Die sakrale Bedeutung des Weines im Altertum* (Giessen, 1910) J. W. Hauer, *Die Religionen* (Tübingen, 1923), i. 69, 72 *sqq.*

[3] Similarly, crimes committed by the sacred men of the Gold Coast when in a state of frenzy used to go unpunished (*GB.* v. 68 *sq.*).

strove with Dionysus in Arabia.[1] In general, the recognition of the difference between the means of producing exhilaration, ecstsay, and all else that was felt to be sacred, if not sacramental, and the social, ethical, or other consequences of the means employed, is of fundamental importance for the vicissitudes of religion.

P. 221. HONEY.—Honey was used at Harran (Chwolson, ii. 195, 230 *sq.*), in Greek cultus (Eitrem, 102 *sq.*), Egypt (*Journ. of Manch. Eg. and Or. Soc.*, 1926, p. 15), and in Babylonia (milk and honey used in the dedication of a new image).[2] For the explanation of the statement of Theophrastus (Porph. *de Abstin.* ii. 26) that much honey was used at a certain rite by the Jews (*sic*, Idumæans ?), see Büchler, *ZATW.* 1902, pp. 206 *sqq.* Honey was forbidden in sacrifices to "Beelefarus" (Lafaye, *Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel.*, 1888, i. 218 *sqq.*; Dussaud, *Sacrifice*, 261, 324). Milk and honey are apotropaic (Eitrem, 103), divine, and the typical food of the future Golden Age; cf. the heavenly honey and kine of Iranian mythology, and the curds and honey of the infant Zeus.[3] In the *Odes of Solomon* (iv. 7) they are God's blessings for the faithful. For honey as an intoxicant, see A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, ii. 1027 l. 5, and as a special offering to chthonian powers, *ib.* 1142 and n. 4. On milk in mystical rejuvenating and other rites, see Moore, *E.Bi.* l.c., Eitrem, 101, 457.

P. 221 n. SEETHING THE KID.—This much-discussed prohibition has, from Maimonides and St. Thomas Aquinas onward, been commonly explained as directed against some Canaanite or, more particularly, Dionysian rite.[4] There is elsewhere a singular compassionateness, and a sentiment against brutality or even unseemliness (Lev. xxii. 28, parent and young not to be killed on the same day); and Andrew Lang (*Man*, 1907, No. 103), in this connexion, refers to the law of the bird's nest (Deut. xxii. 6 *sq.*).[5] As often with taboos, much that might be considered only undesirable is apt to be combined with much that could justly be condemned or deprecated on entirely rational or utilitarian grounds. But even benevolent and humanitarian injunctions will have their supernatural or religious aspect or origin; *e.g.* the harvest law in Deut. xxiv. 19 (see Von Gall, *ZATW.* xxx. 96;

[1] Cooke, No. 140 B; Clermont-Ganneau, *Rec.* iv. 384 *sq.*, 393 *sqq.*; Lagrange, 507; Lidzb., *Ephem.* i. 345 *sq.*

[2] *KAT.* 526; Zimmern, *Nöldeke-Festschrift*, 962 n. 1; Gray, *Sacrifice*, 27; Moore, *E.Bi.* col. 4193, n. 1.

[3] See Usener, *Rhein. Mus.* lvii. 177–192; Stade, *ZATW.* 1902, p. 321 *sq.*; Guidi, *Rev. Bibl.*, 1903, pp. 241 *sqq.*, and the discussions in the *ZDPV.* 1902–12 *passim.*

[4] Reinach (*Cultes*, etc., ii. 123) thinks of Dionysus Eriphus, and Radin (*AJSL.* 1924, p. 209) finds a trace of the cult at Raphia. See also *ERE.* ix. 905*b*.

[5] Cf. also Marett, *Psychology and Folklore*, 140.

Sir G. A. Smith, *Deut.* ad loc.). Among pastoral tribes in Africa there is a disinclination to boil milk: to do so would react harmfully upon the animals that yield it. Among the Beja tribes milk is something "sacrosanct" and not "common," and should not be mixed with meat.[1] Milk enters into rites of initiation and rebirth (where the "new-born" drinks milk), and essential foods are commonly bound up with religious rites and taboos. Accordingly, the prohibition will range between the denunciation of so monstrous an act as to cook a kid in what is, as it were, its own blood (Calvin; see G. A. Smith), and the avoidance of a specific mystical rite which conveyed a definite meaning to the participants.[2]

P. 221 n. 3. HILLŪLĪM.—W. R. S. disputes the suggested connexion with the new moon (p. 432), and Jastrow (*Rel. Beliefs*, 214, 336), apropos of Bab., Arab, and Jewish ritual at the celebration of the new moon, suggests that the meaning of the word is "joy" (cf. above, *l.c.*). But it is possible that the root meaning is that of inaugurating or beginning. The Arabic *halla* is used of bursting forth, of breaking out into crying, of the child's first cry, of the new moon beginning to shine.[3] It thus denotes some commencement, cf. *tahlīl* as a consecration (p. 279 n. 5 above); and it is unnecessary, with Morgenstern, to read *ḥillūl* in Leviticus and Judges, although the ceremony in each case no doubt marks the transition from the "sacred" to the "profane."[4] On the importance of appropriate formulas or ceremonies when certain actions are done for the first time, see Westermarck, *Morocco*, i. 205 (the saying attributed to Mohammed, "Every matter of importance which is begun without mention of God is maimed"), 304 (water from a spring), ii. 6 *sq.*, 244 (the first corn fetched from the granary), etc., cf. the *bismillah* above, p. 432 n. 1, l. 4.

P. 222. ZÉBAḤ.—The Arabic root is still used of cutting the throat, *e.g.* at Aden, of a man still alive: "Have you seen the man with his throat cut?" (المذبوح).[5] In Assyrian the word, though less common, is used loosely of an offering (*KAT.* 595 n. 4), and in Neo-Punic dedications the verb seems to mean "to offer or dedicate." In

[1] Frazer, *FOT.* iii. 117 *sqq.*, 163; A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, i. 676; C. G. Seligman, *JRAI.* xliii. 654 *sqq.* The Bahimas boil milk only as a solemn rite on certain occasions (J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, 418).

[2] N. Schmidt (*JBL.* xlv. 278 n.) conjectures that the rite was originally a fertility one.

[3] Wellhausen[1], 108 *sq.*, [2] 110 n. 3; see Lagarde, *Orientalia*, ii. 19.

[4] *Journ. of Amer. Orient. Soc.* xxxvi. 328 *sq.* On the meaning of the root *ḥalla*, see p. 482 above.

[5] A. S. Tritton: private communication.

Assyrian *niḳū* " drink offering " has similarly come to have a general meaning, as also has *nasaka* in Arabic (p. 229 above; Wellh. 118 n. 1; Gray, *Sacrifice*, 401 n. 5).

P. 222 n.—For *Ṣ-d* cf. the name Sidon, explained as " fish-town " (Justin, xviii. 3, etc.), and its occurrence apparently as a divine name or title in Phœnician names (Ṣ-d—Tanith, Ṣ-d—Melkart, Ṣ-d—Yāthōn, etc. Clermont-Ganneau conjectures that *Ṣ-d* was the Baal of Lebanon, Adonis (*Rec.* i. 189 *sqq.*). Meyer (*E.Bi.* " Phœnicia," § 12) maintains the old view that Ṣid (as he writes it) is Philo's Ἀγρεύς, the hunter, or his brother Ἁλιεύς, the fisher (cf. Lagrange, 417). At all events, a food-deity seems to recur in Dagon (Dagan), which in place-names is not confined to the old Philistine area, and in personal names is found in South Palestine (Dagan-takala, Amarna Letters, *c.* 1400), and in other West Semitic names, the god himself standing by the side of Anu.[1] The man-fish is found on coins of Arvad and Askalon (cf. the earlier Assyrian Ea-Oannes), but in spite of the Hebrew *dāg* (fish) there is no old evidence that Dagon was a fish-god rather than one of corn (*dāgān*). Words for food easily admit of differentiation or are used interchangeably, and *Ṣ-d* (fish or game) and *D-g-n* (fish or corn) would find analogies in the Arabic *laḥma*, flesh or meat, and Heb. *leḥem*, bread, but also food of men, ants (Prov. vi. 8) and asses (Job xxiv. 5), and sacrificial meat (Lev. iii. 11).[2]

P. 225 n. 3.—Nöldeke (*ERE.* i. 666 col. 1) agrees with Wellhausen (121 n. 1) that these birds were vultures. On the sacred doves at Mecca, see *Kinship*, 229 and n. 1.

P. 226. Egyptian Totemism.—With this guarded statement, cf. p. 301 *sq.* In pre-dynastic Egypt each tribal god was " the articulate expression of the inner cohesion and of the outward independence of the tribe itself, but who outwardly manifested himself in the form of some animal or took up his abode in some fetish of wood or stone " (A. H. Gardiner, *Ency. Brit.* ix. 49 *sq.*). According to Peet, a large number of Egyptian gods were " probably totemic in origin," *e.g.* the ibis Thoth, the jackal (?) Anubis, the crocodile Sebek, the falcon Horus. But by the side of these were nature gods. " In pre-dynastic Egypt the tribes had each its totem animal or plant, and the theory that Egypt passed through a true totemic stage *might* explain why the Pharaoh is represented as a bull, lion, scorpion, or hawk." " In historical times the true totemic stage has passed

[1] See especially Burney, *Judges*, 385 *sq.*, who compares, *inter alia*, Ceres and Cerealia.

[2] The Assyrian deities of the Creation Myth, Laḥmu and Laḥāmu (the Λαχὼ καὶ Λαχώ of Damascius, reading Λ for Δ), are of other origin.

away and we are left with the worship of a god in human form with the head of the totem animal, while the domestication and sacrifice of animals, together with the sacredness of the whole totem species, still remains to testify to the origin of the system (*CAH.* i.[2] 246, 328). Seligman (*JRAI.* xliii. 653, 681 *sq.*) considers that the Egyptians were totemistic, and certainly given to animal cults. On the other side, see Foucart, *Hist. des Religions* (1913), 62 *sqq.*, and E. Meyer (*Gesch. Alt.* i. § 183), the latter of whom makes important remarks on the sanctity of the whole animal species.[1] See in general Wiedemann, *Tierkult d. alten Ägypter* ("Der alte Orient" series, xiv. 1912); T. Hopfner, in the *Denkschriften* of the Vienna Royal Academy, lvii. pt. ii. 328 *sq.*; Gressmann, *Vorträge d. Bibliothek Warburg*, iii. (1923–24) 179 *sqq.* (on the psychological aspect of Egyptian animal cults); and the critical survey by A. van Gennep, *L'État actuel du Problème Totémique*, 179 *sqq.*

P. 226 n. 3.—For the vulture, see Wellhausen, 23. F. C. Burkitt (*Journ. Theol. Stud.* xxv. 403) would read *Dushara* in *Abodah Zarah*, 11*b*, and Addai (Phillips, 24) in the place of the rare Nashra. In any event, Wellhausen (*l.c.*) cites a Syriac name meaning "Nashr-gave"; and, as for Arab cults in Syria, according to Isaac of Antioch (Bickell, xi. 97 *sq.*) the men of Harran, along with the Arabs, worshipped Uzza, and an Arab cult can also probably be recognized at Ḥoms (Emesa); see above, p. 570. On the eagle cult in Syria, see Dussaud, *Notes de Mythol. Syr.* (1903), § 3.

P. 228 n.—It is not clear to what "scholiast" W. R. S. refers in line 7. Perhaps he had before him the explanation of the verse in question in the *Lisān*, vi. 211, 7. But the commentary on the same verse in the *Mo'allacāt* (ed. Arnold, p. 186) says "one sheep in each ten." This explanation, with a slight variation, is given also in Lyall's edition with the commentary of Tibrīzī, p. 136, 12 *sq.* It is difficult to see why Stübe (p. 172 n. 346), in his translation, speaks of the "sacrifice of an old beast." In his translation of p. 368 n. 1 (p. 281 n. 626) he explains *fara'* (firstling) as *Wildesel*, evidently a confusion with *fara'* (Heb. *pére'*). On the sacrificing of firstlings among the heathen Arabs, cf. also *Poems of 'Amr son of Qamī'ah*, ed. Lyall (Cambridge, 1919), p. 21, note on verse 9.—A. A. B.

P. 230 n. 2.—In Ecclus. xxxix. 26 the Hebrew version has דם ענב (in Gen. xlix. 11, דם ענבים). In l. 15 it is wanting. For Arab parallels see Jacob, *Studien*, iv. (1897) 6 *sq.*; and for the "blood"

[1] Just as the divine kingship is maintained, in that every king on his death is replaced by another, so on the death of any of the sacred species the divine spirit is found in another, which is recognized by definite marks, and takes its place as the sacred animal.

of trees, see Frazer, *GB.* ii. 20, iii. 248. For the " juice " of grapes = blood, cf. Isa. lxiii. 3 (*nésaḥ*).

P. 230 n. 4.—Sacrifices were offered to Ishtar on the roofs (Morgenstern, 110 *sq.*, 143); they consisted of cakes (*kamānu*, see *E.Bi.* col. 3992) and bread. Isaac of Antioch tells of the women who, to increase their beauty, went upon the roofs and made offerings to the stars (Bickell, p. 240, l. 439). An inscription from Petra (*CIS.* ii. 354) may refer to a family god set up on the roof (צהות) of a house (see Cooke, 245; Clermont-Ganneau, *Rec.* ii. 370 *sqq.*, iv. 338, v. 290). See generally, on roof cults, Frazer, *Pausanias*, ii. 165; Boissier, *PSBA.* 1901, p. 118 *sq.*; and H. J. Rose, *Folk-lore*, xxxiii. 34 *sqq.*, 200.

P. 231. Libations of Water.—That of David (2 Sam. xxiii. 16 *sq.*) explains itself; the water brought at such risk is too sacred to drink. Samuel's libation at the solemn convention at Mizpah (1 Sam. vii. 6) is accompanied with fasting, confession, and invocation, and Yahweh's thunder discomfits the Philistines (cf. the earthquake in 1 Sam. xiv. 15). The libation is generally interpreted as a pouring away of sin, though this is hardly suggested by the context (Gray, *Sacrifice*, 400 *sq.*). But libations are also made at graves as an act of piety, or more specifically in order to refresh the dead. The dead are thirsty (see p. 235), the liquid disappears into the ground, whereas dry food would be carried away by animals. On Egyptian monuments the prayer of the dead is for water; and in Babylonia he who is properly buried " rests on a couch and drinks pure waters," whereas he whose shade has no rest eats of the pickings of the pot and the food thrown into the street (Jastrow, *Rel. Beliefs*, 358 *sq.*). At the present day it is sometimes believed that the soul of the dead visits the tomb every Friday in the hope of finding water, or water is placed in the cup-like holes, and the birds which drink of it will testify to the merits of the dead (*JPOS.* iv. 27). See further Goldziher, *Arch. f. Rel.* xiii. 45 *sq.* (post-Biblical and Mohammedan evidence); Baudissin, 437 n. 3; and Torge, *Seelen u. Unsterblichkeitshoffnung*, 134 *sq.* (on 1 Sam. vii.).

P. 231. Rain-Charms (cf. p. 211).—On the Feast of Tabernacles, see *E.Bi.* " Sacrifice," § 36; " Tabernacles," § 7; Loisy, *Sacrifice*, 210; J. de Groot, *Theolog. Tijd.* 1918, pp. 38 *sqq.* Thackeray (*The Septuagint and Jewish Origins*, 61 *sqq.*) observes that " with a solemn public disclaimer of sun-worship the ceremony ended at cock-crow," *i.e.* the rising sun at the autumnal equinox. On the rite at Hierapolis and the various parallels, see *Revue des Études Juives*, xxxvi. 317, xliii. 195; Lagrange, 166 *sq.* (who distinguishes the libation as a rain-charm from the " descent " of images to the water in order to purify them); and Rieger, *JQR.* 1926, Jan., 232. According to Mariti,

the Tyrian ritual (see p. 232 n. 3) is called the marriage of the sea water to the land water; he places the rite in October. On p. 231 n. 3, see, besides Wellhausen, 167 (who compares the Roman custom, *Ovid*, iv. 681 *sqq.*), Goldziher, *Muh. Stud.* i. 35, and Burney's discussion (*Judges*, 393 *sq.*).[1]

In the island of Imbros a prayer for the fertilizing dew is accompanied with a recitation of the Baptism of Christ, wherein St. John is the bestower of the life-giving dew.[2] In Palestine Christians, Jews, and Mohammedans take part in processions for rain (*Qy. St.* 1893, p. 218; *ZDPV.* vii. 94, No. 86). A puppet is often carried, and doggerel rhymes are sung to the Umm el-Ghēth, the "mother of rain" (*Qy. St.* 1925, p. 37). Father Antonin Jaussen denies that in Moab the puppet *'arūs* is called the "bride of Allah" (so Curtiss, 119), and Canaan (*JPOS.* vi. 144) could not verify the term "half (*naṣf*) bride" which Jaussen heard in the Negeb. Intelligent opinion, at all events, repudiated the idea of a "bride of Allah" as a rain-maker, and no clear tradition seems to have survived.[3] At 'Ên Karīm a cock is carried round and pinched in order that its cries for rain may be added to the rest.[4] In these ceremonies the head man will sprinkle the crowd with a little water, lack of rain is attributed to the sins of the elders or of specified families, while the younger people protest their own innocence.[5] In bad cases of drought the Imam proclaims a fast, even babes are not allowed to suckle; the people put on their worst rags, they forgive one another and implore divine forgiveness (*JPOS.* vi. 157).

In prayers for rain not all shrines are equally effective, and in Rabbinical Judaism only men of outstanding merit were rain-makers. Among them were Ḥoni (Onias) and Nikodemos ben Gorion. The former of these, it has been said, "reminds one of a magician or a heathen priest praying for rain." A third, Joshua ben Levi, was

[1] An exploit like Samson's in Judg. xv. 3–5 is not always a mythological trait, it is also a device to destroy crops so that invaders should not feed on the district; see Hartmann, *ZATW.* xxxi. 69 *sqq.*, and Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *La Syrie à l'Époque des Mamelouks*, 262 *sq.*

[2] Jane Harrison, *Themis*, 17.

[3] There is said to be also an *Abū 'l-Ghēth* (*JPOS.* vi. 152 n. 5).

[4] On the cock in rain-charms, see Gressmann, *Marti-Festschrift*, 88 *sqq.* In Morocco children are pinched, their tears acting as a rain-charm (Westermarck, *Morocco*, ii. 265). For weeping as a rain-charm, see *GB.* vii. 248, viii. 91.

[5] *JPOS.* vi. 150. For sprinkling as a "survival" of drowning a victim, cf. *GB.* i. 277 *sq.*; Westermarck, *op. cit.* 262 *sq.* The sacrifice of a human victim in order to procure rain is known to the Gemara on Abodah Zarah (iv. 7, f.55*a*), and is explained on the lines of Deut. iv. 19*b* and Prov. iii. 34. On human sacrifice for rain, see also Mader, 32.

successful only in his own town; and where the "merits" of the congregation did not deserve it, even his prayer would be unavailing.[1] As regards the story of Elijah at Mount Carmel, the Phœnician reference (in Menander) to the removal of the drought by the prayers of Ethbaal (the father-in-law of Ahab) suggests that the original Israelite version emphasized the tradition that it was not the priest-king of Astarte, but Elijah the servant of Yahweh who was the real rain-maker (*CAH.* iii. 369 *sq.*). Rameses II., when his sacrifices are accepted by the god, is supposed to be able to give rain to the Ḥatti or Hittites (Breasted, *Rec.* iii. § 426); and it is through Israel and because of Israel that the earth has sunshine and rain (Marmorstein, 129). Hence it is in accordance with the prevailing ideas that (*a*) drought is the result of such offences as the failure to rebuild the Temple (Hag. i.), or to make the accustomed offerings (Mal. iii. 10), or to keep the Feast of Tabernacles (Zech. xiv. 16 *sq.*), and (*b*) that the Temple with its round of festivals has an almost "magical" power. Nature, and in particular rain, can be controlled *either* by special gods *or* by special men or organizations (whether through their influence with the gods or in their own right), and the manner in which the fundamental ideas are shaped and systematized determines their effect upon the development of a group.[2]

P. 232. ANOINTING-OIL.—Oil, besides adding to the pleasure of Oriental life, has medicinal properties and, in certain climates, is indispensable (*E.Bi.* "Oil," § 4). Kings, priests, and prophets (1 Kings xix. 16) were anointed; the king and, later, the high priest being "*the* anointed *par excellence*" (see Gray, *Sacrifice*, 258 *sq.*). To the installation of the king as "Yahweh's anointed" corresponded the anointing of a prince by his suzerain, as when the King of Egypt anointed the head of the grandfather of Addu-nirari (Amarna Letters, No. 51). The anointing of images (and also of priests and worshippers) was both Babylonian and Egyptian custom.[3] The widespread practice of anointing stones (on which see Frazer, *FOT.* ii. 72 *sq.*) has been explained as merely an act of honour. This, however, hardly covers all the facts, seeing that Assyrian dedication tablets,

[1] A. Büchler, *Types of Jewish-Palestinian Piety*, 197 *sq.*, 200, 246 *sq.*, 254; Marmorstein, *Doctrine of Merits in old Rabb. Literature*, 71, 90, 251. On the trumpet-blowing (p. 231 above), cf. Büchler, 232 *sq.*

[2] On the rain-makers among the Nilotic Dinkas, see Seligman's article (*ERE. s.v.*, and cf. *JRAI.* xliii. 671 *sqq.*). On European rain-makers, see A. B. Cook, *Folk-lore*, xv. 371 *sqq.*

[3] Morgenstern, 63. The pure, bright, resplendent oil was valued in Babylonia or certain ceremonies; cf. "oil of life" (*Beiträge z. Ass.* iv. 160 l. 42). Oil was used in Bab. and Jewish divination (S. Daiches on Bab. oil magic; London, 1913), and in Greek (Farnell, *Greece and Babylon*, 301).

which were inscribed with the name of the founder, etc., were oiled and received sacrifices (cf. Harper, *Ass. and Bab. Lit.*, 80, etc.). Here the intention appears to be to preserve the name; and that this is frequently true elsewhere is suggested (*a*) by the application of milk, butter, and of other forms of nourishment to stones, and (*b*) by the belief in the vital properties of oil, fat, etc. (cf. p. 379 *sq.*). Hence, anointing may often be regarded as a mode of transmitting either the sacred power of which the liquid was the symbol or vehicle, or the inherent nutritive and other properties with which it was credited. Indeed, to smear oneself with the remains of the dead, was one way of acquiring the qualities whether of man or animal—to eat the potent thing was another (see *GB.* viii. 162–5). See in general, Crawley and Jastrow, *ERE.* s.v. "Anointing"; Weinel, *ZATW.* xviii. 1 *sqq.*; Wellhausen, *Arch. f. Rel.* vii. 33 *sqq.*, and cf. ix. 140.

P. 241. Firstfruits and Firstlings (cf. pp. 458 *sqq.*).—The parallel between the firstlings and the treatment of fruit-trees (Lev. xix. 23 *sqq.*) is important; see pp. 159 n., 463. The trees are "sacred" and must not be touched; similarly, when Israel is "sacred" to Yahweh, those who harm her suffer (Jer. ii. 3). Special precautions are necessary at the first use of things; so, *e.g.*, at the opening up of new unbroken "virgin" land (p. 158), for which the Talmudic term is *bĕthūlah*, used also of untrimmed sycamores.[1] The conviction that the firstfruits or firstlings do not belong to those who might seem to have the first right takes many forms which are of interest for early ideas of ownership and property rights (p. 638). Usually, offerings must first be made to a god (or the gods), to the priest or the ruler—both primarily as representatives of the god(s)—or to the dead (ancestral spirits); or they are used for communal purposes, and more particularly for the poor (above, pp. 247, 253, 347).[2] Sometimes the firstfruits are eaten by the people themselves, not merely ceremonially but sacramentally; or there are merely vague ideas, as among the Gallas, where the person who milks the cows should not drink of it before a sip has been taken by some one else.[3]

Various explanations of the offering of firstlings, etc., have been suggested. (*a*) It is an act of renunciation; more positively it is the sacrifice of a portion in order to secure the rest. It is to suffer a willing loss in order to escape a worse one; it is to propitiate Nemesis; it is the price of success. . . . Intuitive feelings of this sort appear

[1] On the use of the Arabic *halla*, see p. 577.

[2] At the present day the proceeds of the firstfruits may be devoted to a feast in the name and to the honour of the *weli* (*JPOS.* vi. 25 n. 5).

[3] Miss A. Werner, *Journ. of the African Soc.* xiii. 130. See in general, *GB.* viii. ch. xi., and cf. Gray, *Numbers*, 225 *sqq.*

to be widespread and fundamental, and are too powerful to be ignored (cf. Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 366). More precisely (*b*), it is a thank-offering and thanksgiving, gratitude for the past (see esp. Gray, *Sacrifice*, 94 *et passim*). Yet, in any case, close at hand there lies the hope of continued favours and future blessings; and however natural gratitude may seem to be, not far off are the ideas, however indefinite, of the part played by the supernatural powers. So (*c*) "God gave the increase" (1 Cor. iii. 6); and it is the typical belief that the offerings belong properly to the gods. Sometimes the formula is quite explicit: "What comes of thy hand we give thee" (1 Chron. xxix. 14), or the modern "from thee and to thee" (*minnak u-ilēk*, Canaan, *JPOS.* vi. 130). In these circumstances, to withhold offerings and tithes is to rob (or overreach) God and bring disaster upon the land (Mal. iii. 8–12); the gifts are "sacred" and must not be touched by the people, still less may they be eaten.[1]

The first of a thing, like that which is unused and not as yet profaned, is often believed to have superior sanctity and efficacy.[2] Moreover, the first of any growth is also a guarantee of fertility and continuity. As a "part" for a "whole," as an offering which released the remainder of the produce from the taboo upon it, the practice of firstfruits lent itself to highly developed teaching. Thus Philo spiritualizes the offering of the first sheaf; and the *aparche*, a communal offering for the land, is for all mankind, and what the priest is to the city so the Jewish people is to the whole human race.[3] Again, if the Greek firstfruits are the sheaves, the source of next year's crop, the offering of a part for the whole seems to be intended to secure the continuity of produce.[4] In any event, it is a prevalent belief that a "part" can stand for a "whole," and that through the "part" the "whole" can be preserved or harmed; even as the preservation of the blood of a slain animal preserves the vital essence of the victim so that it is not annihilated (cf. pp. 158, 379).

[1] Judith, xi. 12 *sq.* In Mal. iii. 8, Wellhausen and others read, after the LXX, the verb '-*k*-*b* for *k*-*b*-'.

[2] Cf. the unused animal in Num. xix. 2; Deut. xxi. 3; 1 Sam. vi. 7; and the firstling in Deut. xv. 19; see pp. 464 *sqq.* See also W. Warde Fowler (*Rel. Experience of the Roman People*, 172) on the festival on the Alban Mount, where the flesh of a white heifer that had never felt the yoke was partaken of by the deputies of the cities of the Latin League.

[3] See Gray, 324, 331, who observes that the resurrection of Jesus takes place on 16th Nisan, when the *aparche* was presented at the Temple (388 *sq.*). Lightfoot on Col. i. 18 points out that Christ as ἀρχή was the firstfruits of the dead and also an "originating power . . . the source of life."

[4] See Cornford, *Ridgeway Presentation Volume*, 154 *sq.*, 165; cf. 145 (following a hint of Warde Fowler); Miss Jane Harrison, *Themis*, 292, 306 *sq.*; Nilsson, 92, 123.

The necessity of securing continuity underlies many different practices which in one way or another are felt to preserve from extinction that which is vital. It may be enough that there is a god of whom the hunter must ask permission (pp. 158, 160). But among the Esquimaux of the Behring Straits a goddess preserves the " souls " of the animals that are hunted and killed, only hunters who observe certain taboos will be successful, and as the " souls " are reborn the continuity of the food-supply is ensured and the sanctity of life maintained.[1] This self-supporting system is an unusually interesting example of the widespread endeavour to preserve life by means of (1) some material or physical vehicle (blood, etc.), (2) the relation between it and a " living " deity, or (3) some idea or system of ideas which makes the individual life part of some more permanent whole. In the Esquimaux custom the seals and whales are perpetual reincarnations ; and it is essentially the same when an individual (or an animal) is a member of a group (or species) which remains intact in spite of the death of the individual—or even, what is more significant, is preserved through the death ; cf. p. 579 n.

Even in totemism the individual is born of a stock of " spirit-souls " which he rejoins at death ; and since in this most rudimentary of cults there are both animal and plant totems, the difference between firstborn and firstfruits, between animal and cereal, does not seem to be so important as W. R. S. argues. His distinction between the *zébaḥ*, where gods and men meet, and the *minḥah*, which is made over to the god (pp. 240, 244, etc.), is as well founded as it is natural to regard pastoral religion as earlier than agricultural. On the other hand, to suppose that the latter " borrowed " from the former (p. 243, end of note) seems to go too far ; it would be better, in the first instance, to recognize that similar fundamental ideas recur differently shaped owing to different conditions of life. W. R. S.'s suggested evolution of sacrificial cults has been adversely criticized by those who find that social religious development is too complex a process for simple theories such as he put forward. The differentiation into animal and vegetable life points to a higher stage than that found in totem-cults and in other more unsystematized forms among rudimentary peoples. Moreover, the stages where gods are anthropomorphic, and a similar life-blood runs through men and animals, are more systematized than those where the gods, if any, are scarcely part of the social system. Hence the idea of some essential oneness or unity takes very different forms according to the current convictions concerning men and the world of animal and plant life, even as in

[1] See Frazer *GB.* iii. 207 *sqq.*, who calls it " animism, passing into religion " (213).

mysticism the feeling of oneness with something other than one's self is both shaped and expressed very differently by men differing as regards their particular religion or sect, or as regards their temperament (*e.g.* whether philosophical or nature mystics). But, fundamentally, the individual is part of a larger " whole," though what that " whole " is turns upon his system of thought. See p. 635.

In Australian totemism there are clans which perform ceremonies that are believed to control or multiply the edible animal or vegetable species in question. Although the clan does not eat, or at least only very sparingly, of its totem, on these occasions it is indispensable that it should partake of a little. Each clan controls its own totem animal or plant for the others, and the formal manner in which the officiants eat a small portion of the food is an integral part of what, throughout, is a very solemn ceremony. So, whereas elsewhere firstfruits may be handed over to a god or his representative, here there is no reference to a god, and the relation between the Australian and similar rites, on the one hand, and those where gods are immediately involved, on the other, raises a most important question of priority. Jevons suggests that the latter are primary: the Australian practices belong to a *later* stage, where " the reference to the god who is or was intended to partake of the firstfruits has, in the process of time and, we must add, in the course of religious decay, gradually dropped out." [1] On the other hand, the Australian rites do not resemble those where, as so commonly happens, an earlier god-idea has been washed away. The clan functions as a god might do on the anthropomorphic level, and the All-Fathers or Supreme Beings take no direct part. The clan officiates in a " sacred " condition, the clan and its totem are of the same substance, and to eat a portion of the food would be, so to say, cannibalism and akin to incest, both of which—very significantly—are at times more or less ceremonial acts. To all intents and purposes the very " soul " of the food lies within the members of the clan; they are the sources of its existence and continuity. They alone are the producers of that which is their own. This seems fundamental. It is in other and less rudimentary communities that the question arises whether the firstfruits belong to the community as a whole or the poorer section of them, to the indispensable sacred officiants, to the responsible being, the god of the community, or to his own sacred representative. But, primarily, firstfruits and firstlings

[1] *Introd. to Comp. Rel.* 184; cf. *Idea of God*, 87, 90 *sq.* For general statements, and for discussions of the Australian evidence, see Jevons, *Introd.* 184 *sqq.*, 198 *sqq.*; Toy, § 128, and, in the first instance, Frazer, *G.B.* i. 85 *sqq.*; *Tot. Ex.* i. 104 *sqq.*, 230 *sqq.*, citing Spencer and Gillen, to whom the evidence is due; see above, p. 535 and n. 2.

seem to arise out of the necessity for providing for the maintenance of the most fundamental needs of life.

P. 245 n. 2. TITHES.—In Babylonian religion the idea of tribute involved in offering animals appears to have been of a secondary character (Jastrow, *Rel. Bel.* 148). Tithes, too, are a relatively late institution, and first appear in a highly developed form in the time of Nebuchadrezzar II. (sixth century B.C.). According to Eissfeldt, more objects are tithed, and instead of tithes of natural objects, payments in money are not unusual and even money itself seems to be tithed; and tithing is less a personal and more of a business transaction (*Baudissin-Festschrift*, 166). See further W. R. S., *Prophets*, 383 *sq.*; *E.Bi.* "Taxation" (Benzinger), "Tithes" (Moore); Sir G. A. Smith, *Jerusalem*, i. ch. vi. *sq.*; Eissfeldt, *Erstlinge und Zehnten*, *i. A.T.* (Leipzig, 1917); *PW.* iv. 2306, 2423; and H. Schaeffer, *Social Legislation of the Primitive Semites* (New Haven, 1915), ch. xiii.

P. 247 n. 2.—On the inscription, see *PW.* ii. 2779, and A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, i. 565 n. 2.

P. 248 n.—Duval's interpretation of the Aramaic inscription at Taimā (*CIS.* ii. 113; Cooke, No. 69) is accepted by Lagrange, 503 *sq.* The text speaks of the "grant (?)" (צדקתא) of palm-trees which Ṣalm of Maḥram and Sin-galla and Ashīra (cf. Ashirat, p. 561), gods of Taimā, gave to Ṣalm of Hagam, and the priesthood which was conferred upon Ṣalm-Shēzeb, son of Peṭ-osiri, and his seed after him, ". . . (?) of the field, 16 palms, and of the treasure (שימתא) of the king 5 palms, in all 21 palms every year." Some (*e.g.* Hartmann, 464) explain Ṣalm ("image," cf. p. 562 n. 3) as the *numen*, and שימתא as an endowment. For ordinary endowments of trees, cf. the nut-trees with which a Christian church was endowed (Sir E. Budge, *Thomas of Marga*, 239, 653), and the renting of a vine belonging to a Palestine shrine to a man, the money going to its upkeep (*JPOS.* iv. 35); for Bab. examples see C. H. W. Johns, *Bab. and Ass. Laws, Contracts, etc.* (1904), 208 *sqq.*

P. 249.—On the Deuteronomic law, see Driver, *Deut.* 168 *sqq.* Chapman, *Introd. to the Pentateuch* (1911), 155 *sqq.*; A. H. M'Neile, *Deut.* (1912), 80 *sqq.*; and on the abuses against which the law is directed, cf. also W. R. S., *Prophets*, 98 *sqq.*

P. 254 n. 6.—λέσχη, like μέγαρον (p. 200), πάλλαξ (Heb. *pillégesh*), etc., may be neither Semitic nor Greek, but of some common Ægean origin (see Autran, *Les Phéniciens* [1920], 13, 46). On the use of the Heb. word, see Box, *E.Bi.* "Temple," § 32. The modern shrine (*maḳām*) will have one or more additional rooms for meals or festivals, for a kitchen or a dwelling-place for the attendant, for a schoolroom,

guest-chamber, or for the pilgrims who spend a few days at the shrine. In such cases the building is mostly composed of two or at times of three storeys; and they are dedicated to "Prophets" rather than to the *welis* (Canaan, *JPOS.* iv. 16 *sq.*). Such buildings recall the old synagogues (on which see Peritz, *E.Bi.* 4834 *sqq.*).[1]

P. 258. GLOOMY TYPES OF RELIGION.—Ed. Meyer (*Gesch. d. Alt.* i. § 191) comments upon the sinister note in Egyptian religion. In Babylonia this is much more marked. Babylonia is a land "not of laughter but of gloom and of serious meditation." "The fear of divine anger runs as an undercurrent throughout the entire religious literature of Babylonia and Assyria."[2] Gloom, it has been said, pervades Semitic religion, and distinguishes it from the healthy, happy tone that characterizes the religion of the *Rig Veda* as a whole, the latter in turn recalling, in several respects, the characteristics of the religion of the Viking period.[3] The profound difference between Greek and Semitic religion is strongly emphasized by Farnell.[4] Similarly Warde Fowler observes that in the Roman religion there is "no fear so long as the worship of the gods is performed exactly and correctly according to the rules of the state priesthoods; there is no sense of sin or of pollution, of taboo irremediably broken, haunting the mind of the individual; all is cheerfully serious, regular, ordered, ritualistic."[5] See also p. 563.

To be sure, every religion has its vicissitudes, and Farnell (*Evolution of Religion*, 113 *sq.*) notes the possibility that in Greece the "cathartic legislation emanating chiefly from Delphi and Crete may point to a religion which the intellectualism of Homeric civilization had happily suppressed for a time, but which reasserted itself, with renewed strength, when that civilization was overthrown." W. R. S. himself lays stress upon the changes which political disasters brought upon the old religion (p. 258, cf. p. 78), and Meyer summarizes concisely some typical changes in the history of religions (i. § 67 *sq.*). Further, difference of climate and difference of national temperament are obviously important factors; and they are adduced to explain the fundamental divergence between the old Iranian ethical and practical religion and the pessimistic and mystical developments of post-Vedic

[1] Miss Jane Harrison compares the λέσχη to the "man's house" of the South Seas, etc. (*Themis*, 36 n. 3).

[2] See Jastrow, *Rel. Bel.* 326 *sqq.*, 333, 358; R. Campbell Thompson, *CAH.* i.[2] 533; Langdon, *ib.* 443; Cook, *ib.* 200.

[3] H. M. Chadwick, *The Heroic Age*, ch. xviii., who also compares Homeric Greece.

[4] *Greece and Babylon*, 263; *Higher Aspects of Greek Religion*, 132 *sq.* Halliday, *CAH.* ii. 606, speaks of the "friendliness" of Greek worship.

[5] *Anthropology and the Classics* (ed. Marett), 173.

religion in India.[1] Sensuality and cruelty go hand in hand (p. 415). Ashurbanipal, "the compassionate," after torturing and killing the rebels of Babylon, declares, "After I had performed these acts I softened the hearts of the Great Gods." The fanatical temper which found savage cruelty acceptable to the injured gods is akin to that bold anthropomorphism whereby Yahweh is said to comfort or appease himself by taking vengeance upon his enemies (Isa. i. 24). Not unnaturally, therefore, do men dread the arbitrary gods (Jastrow, 144, 326), even as Islam has an exaggerated consciousness of sin and fear of divine vengeance.[2]

The joyful and happy types of religion are psychologically no less significant; and in Israel "sacrificial occasions were pre-eminently happy occasions" (Gray, *Sacrifice*, 93). This only makes the evidence for fear and gloom the more instructive. Throughout rudimentary religion high spirits and gaiety abound.[3] Shintoism has been described as a religion of happy social intercourse,[4] and among the Warramunga of Central Australia there is a totem of the "laughing boys" (Durkheim, 379 *sqq.*). No doubt the happy type of religion has a carelessness, and its mirth was not always innocent (Ex. xxxii. 6). Moreover, easy confidence in the god, particularly the god of one's own group, was not conducive to any depth of religion, and the light-heartedness of Samaria, denounced by Isaiah (ix. 8 *sqq.*), was, in view of the current conditions, unnatural. When there are recognized ways of maintaining the unity of gods and worshippers religion tends to be taken lightly; and familiarity breeds a *camaraderie*, and an almost contemptuous estimate of the gods (cf. Chadwick, *op. cit.* 418, on Homer and the Viking Age). But while it is tempting to contrast the happy type in Israel with the later gloom and the undoubted timid notes of post-exilic Judaism, it can hardly be supposed that the Syro-Ephraimite wars before the rise of Jeroboam II., or the earlier Philistine and other crises, did not cloud the more cheerful type of religion. The Semitic readiness to pass from one extreme to another—already to be illustrated in the laments of Palestinian chiefs of the fourteenth century in their letters to Egypt—and the great events of early Palestinian history were of a sort to destroy any thoroughgoing optimistic religion, and they forbid simple theories of the development of religion

[1] G. F. Moore, *Hist. of Religions*, i. 359 *sqq.*; for the Vedas, cf. J. N. Farquhar, *Outline of the Rel. Lit. of India* (1920), 13 *sq.*; and for Indian pessimism, cf. Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism*, 2, 4 (1915).

[2] R. A. Nicholson, *Literary History of the Arabs*, 211, 225.

[3] Irving King, *Development of Rel.* 58, 100, 241 *sq.*

[4] King, 114 *sq.*, citing Aston, *Shinto, the Way of the Gods*, 6. Against the criticism that Shinto has no ethics, see Moore, i. 107.

from one absolute type to another. In fact, a fuller knowledge of rudimentary peoples, with their gaiety, cruelty, and irresponsibility, warns one not to read more into the conception of "the childhood of humanity" (cf. p. 257) than the evidence warrants. The data upon which are based generalizations of gloomy and of happy types of religion are derived from different ages, stages, and classes of society. There are the obvious extremes of gloom, fanaticism, and dread, and of confidence, over-confidence, and indifference; and the actual historical development of every religion has lain between them.

P. 263 *sqq.* The Religion of the Individual and of the Group. —W. R. S.'s pages have become classical. The difference between individualism and the conditions where the group is a unit with a "corporate personality" must not be made absolute. Group-unity "does not mean that no individual life is recognized, but simply that in a number of realms in which we have come to think individualistically and to treat the single man as the unit, for punishment or reward, ancient thought envisaged the whole group of which he was part." [1] It means that a man does not exist except as a member of some group, clan, or tribe.[2] Early communities are relatively undifferentiated, there is less specialization of life and thought, and a man has less opportunity for developing along independent lines than in those more complex societies where religious, political, and other groupings do not necessarily coincide, and a man can belong to a number of different groups with group interests, traditions, and aims (see p. 506). In the simpler societies the individual has rights (*e.g.* as regards property and marriage); moreover, religion "is an affair of all in which every one takes an active and equivalent part." [3] What is in one sense a loss of individuality enables a man to find himself in a larger social circle and at another level. But the worth of the individual is subordinated to that of the group, and the security of the whole outweighs the welfare of the individual part. The group protects the individual so far as recognized group interests and custom demand; but it is ready to treat with harshness the man marked out from the rest by reason of suffering, misfortune, abnormality, or some suspected sign of the displeasure of the supernatural powers. Group-religion is "this worldly," and social (p. 263); whereas in individual religion the man treads his own path, and sacrifice may be little more than a private bargain (p. 393). There

[1] H. Wheeler Robinson, in Peake, *The People and the Book*, 376.

[2] Cf. G. C. Wheeler, *The Tribe*, 16.

[3] Malinowski (ed. Needham), 81 *sq.*; for general remarks, see *ib.* 53 *sq.*, where the extent of distinctively individual religious experience among savages is described.

is a tendency to deprecate the personal religion which severs a man from his group; logically, such religion lies outside the system of the group, whether, with his private ideas, he may be proceeding along anti-social lines, or is contributing to the progressive development of his group.[1]

Group-religion is not a water-tight system. The group and its god may be regarded as a unit, but in practice certain individuals, objects, acts, and seasons are more sacred than others, and there is a tendency to specialization in both sacred and secular duties. Men of pre-eminent ability are readily credited with supernatural attributes; men of position and experience become elders, and even among rudimentary peoples they are concerned in preserving or advancing group interests.[2] Specially irksome taboos will not be observed by the whole group, but restricted to and imposed upon a few; and the specially sacred things are no longer for the group as a whole. Certain individuals become representative, and even among rudimentary peoples " individual totems," as distinct from the totems of whole clans, make for personal religion, as also do the sacred animal-guardians or protectors of the North American Indian.

While a group can be spoken of as a single individual, a single individual can for all intents and purposes represent a group. The " part " then stands for the whole, either occasionally, as in cases of collective responsibility, blood-feud, scapegoats, etc., or in the more permanent functions of ruler or priest. In the case of the priestly or sacred king the " representative " individual is the visible embodiment of the people and land, and no less of the god; he represents, in one sense, the god to the people, and, in another sense, the people to the god. He is an intermediary and intercessor, responsible for benefits and evils, and the natural culprit or scapegoat when things go wrong (see *GB.* vol. ix.). In the solidarity of king–group–god the king is *the* individual, and his position and functions so vital that he is the centre of the national cult which grows up around him.[3] The growth of society has been marked by the increase of other significant functioning and representative individuals in religion (national, family, clan, and private cults) and in secular life. Accordingly, in most lands the communities are not a little complex: in

[1] Cf. Marett, *Ency. Brit.* xxii. 258*a*. Even at the higher stages of development silent prayers are discountenanced lest a man pray for that which he would be ashamed for others to know of (Farnell, *Evol. of Rel.* 206).

[2] Cf. Landtman, *The Primary Causes of Social Inequality*, 3 (Helsingfors. 1909); W. Beck, *Das Individuum bei den Australiern* (*Leipzig Instit. f. Völkerkunde*, 1924).

[3] Cf. Jastrow, *Rel. Bel.* 241 *sq.*; Eitrem, 237 *sqq.*; S. A. Cook (ed. Peake), 64 *sqq.*

Babylonia, for example, the line between public and private cults must not be too sharply drawn; there are both family and clan cults, and a man could have his own god who would, if necessary, approach a great god on his behalf.[1]

While the history of religions and the multiplication of sects by fission have recalled biological processes,[2] the vicissitudes of religious and secular groups would be much more intricate and unmanageable were it not for the concept of the group-unit (p. 504). The validity of W. R. S.'s generalizations can be tested by observing the ordinary facts of the history of social groups; and they open up questions of far-reaching interest. Everywhere are tendencies that make for concentration and intensification and ultimate stagnation, and those that make for diffusion, cosmopolitanism, and ultimate weakening (cf. p. 264). One may compare the varying endogamous and exogamous tendencies in societies; compulsory marriage *either* within *or* without a group or constellation of groups obviously affecting very differently the beliefs and customs of the groups involved. Periods of decadence and disintegration of earlier groups or group-systems, excessive individualism, and subsequent periods of organization, integration, and harmony of sentiment, are normal in the history of society. In Israel, at certain periods, as W. R. S. points out, "individuality stiffened into individualism . . . each man's feeling of personal worth asserted itself in refusal to acknowledge the rights of others and the supreme sovereignty of Yahweh."[3] Such a description is typical, and the inner history of the movement of religious and other thought from the decline of the monarchy of Judah to the inauguration of Judaism after the Exile is of supreme significance for the interrelation of the religion of individuals and that of groups, and for the growth of a new unity.

The Sumerian revival under Gudea of Lagash was marked by important religious and social movements, and during a seven days' Saturnalia "the maid was the equal of her mistress, and master and slave consorted together as friends."[4] Saturnalia, with the inversion of social ranks—and even with human sacrifice (*GB.* ix. 407)—are irregular manifestations of equality and unity which temporarily ignore those social conditions where differences in rank, ability, and function are normally recognized, as even among many rudimentary peoples. But, apart from Saturnalia, there are the more ordered social

[1] Jastrow, 300; cf. Morgenstern, 25.

[2] G. F. Moore, *Hist. of Religions*, ii. pp. x, 368.

[3] *Lectures*, 444. He refers to three periods of decay: (*a*) the time of the Judges, (*b*) before the Captivity, and (*c*) before the fall of Jerusalem.

[4] L. W. King, *History of Sumer and Akkad*, 271 *sq.*; Langdon, *CAH.* i.[2] 429.

practices which manifest and cement the unity of the group, the subconscious unity which lies beneath the otherwise recognized differences. Unity is also fostered by the beliefs and rites of a levelling character, such as the absolute and unique supremacy of the god of the group, or of all interrelated groups, by symbols of a universal order (*e.g.* Sun and Sky-gods), by religious ideas which are universally intelligible, by a history which intimately unites all members of the group. Here the history of Israel is of cardinal value on account of the teaching of the great prophets before and at the Exile, and the subsequent reorganization, whereas centuries later at the rise of Christianity a Jewish sect arose from a Judaism which was unable to make a further advance, and the Jews ceased to be a nation. The facts of social and religious reorganization and decay are thus highly suggestive for the relations between groups and their constituent individuals.

When Gray (*Sacrifice*, 43 *sqq.*) remarks that the prophets " do not call the people back to a theory of sacrifice as a means of communion with God," he well observes that " the tenour of their teaching was, not gifts but fellowship," and that the road lay not through " the sacrificial system reinterpreted, but through conduct " (cf. 52). They demanded a self-renunciation, an obedience to a righteous God, not deprivation or the transference of property, or even particular rites whereby fellowship could be periodically manifested and realized in a physical or material sense. In the doctrine of the New Covenant (Jer. xxxi.), " the central truth," says Skinner, " is the inwardness of true religion, the spiritual illumination of the individual mind. . . ." There is a transition to a new individualism, for the Covenant is with each and every member of the community, and " the principle of nationalism is carried over from the Old dispensation to the New." [1] Accordingly in Deuteronomy, " one of the most noteworthy attempts in history to regulate the whole life of a people by its highest religious principle," [2] emphasis is laid upon the fact that Israel has come of age (xxix. 4, 13 ; cf. 1 Cor. xiii. 11), a new stage is inaugurated in the history of the people, and the immediacy and simplicity of the religious demands are the most striking features (Deut. xxx. 11–14). Similarly at the rise of Christianity, the appeal is to the individual, his worth is enhanced ; and, though a yoke must be borne, it is an easy one (Matt. xi. 30). As distinct from the most elemental or impressive or innocent of communion rites, the teachers of spiritual religion in addressing the individual emphasize the simplicity and directness of the new relationship, whether as a Covenant to be written on each man's heart, or as a Divine Presence where two or three are gathered

[1] J. Skinner, *Prophecy and Religion*, 329 (Cambridge, 1922).

[2] Moore, *E.Bi.* " Deuteronomy," col. 1093.

in His name. And the next step has been to apply the teaching to a group or people as a whole.

Long ago W. R. S. emphasized the difference between the Christian "conventicle," the group united only by "similarity of experience in details, identity of individual frames and habits of mind," and the Church as an "organic unity," uniting men of different types of religion and stages of spiritual growth (*Lectures*, 326 *sq.*). The distinction is important, because it is obvious that, where there is or has been regained a group-unity of men and their gods, the social-religious ideas have been systematized afresh. There has been a new co-ordination of corporate and individual habits and practices, a sufficient intelligibility of the most vital ideas, and a common consciousness which, despite all differences within the group, enable it to function as a unit. Whether W. R. S. was influenced by his own earlier ideals of an "organic unity" in Christianity, or not, he made powerful generalizations which are seen to be self-evident. Group-unity or corporate personality is constantly disintegrating, and new integrations are being formed; the movements range from the supreme examples in the history of man to the vicissitudes of small parties and sects, from the most impressive reconstruction to the most casual recovery of social equilibrium. As far back as one can go, one can postulate an alternation between group coherence and incoherence, between the more collective and the more individual moments. In the history of religion there must, in the nature of the case, have been innumerable examples of social-religious reorganization even in the simplest and earliest societies. The farther back one goes, the more impossible is it to conceive the details of such prehistoric systems; one is led, not to isolated beliefs or rites, or to isolated individuals, but rather to social *systems*, inconceivably rudimentary, but of a sort that could evolve ultimately into religion as we know it. Miscellaneous data, such as are still found among many rudimentary peoples (Andamanese, Veddahs, etc.), have of course their value; but, for the systematic treatment of the religious data, the social-religious systems are the more important, even though, as in the case of the totemic systems of Central Australia, they have a history behind them and are no longer in their "original" shape.[1]

P. 270 and n. 2.—SALT is both destructive and life-giving, apotropaic and preservative. Ashurbanipal (Annals, vi. 79) scattered salt over the cities he had laid waste, and salt on the ground is a bad omen

[1] The more clearly the significance of collective religious rites for the social cohesion of primitive peoples is recognized (as by Malinowski, 64 *sq.*), the more necessary becomes the inquiry into the processes whereby periods of disintegration were succeeded by some new reconstruction.

(Jastrow, *Rel. Bab. u. Ass.* ii. 716). In Bab. ritual as in the Israelite it was strewn upon the sacrificial flesh (Ezek. xliii. 24; *KAT.* 598); and salt was among the things taboo to the Babylonian king on certain days of the month: viz. 7, 14, 21, 28, and (reckoned from the previous month) 49 (A. Jeremias, *Geisteskultur*, 170). Salt is impregnating (Eitrem, 329), and a symbol of life; cf. Homer's "divine salt." It is still used in covenants (Landberg, *Dialectes*, ii. 303 *sqq.*; *Arab.* v. 157 *sq.*), perhaps on account of its preservative virtues. It is rubbed into the new-born child (cf. Döller, 31 *sq.*, 282), and in Palestine is offered to the dead, or to a holy saint to enlist his favour (*JPOS.* v. 196). See W. R. S., *Ency. Brit.* s.v. "Salt"; also W. R. S. and A. R. S. Kennedy, *E.Bi.* s.v.; Eitrem, 309 *sqq.*

P. 274. BOND OF MILK.—On the validity of the bond of milk among the Bantu tribes, see Seligman, *JRAI.* xliii. 657. Such a bond unites; but it can also make marriage impossible. A man will suck the milk of the woman who adopts him (*Rev. des l'Hist. des Rel.* liv. [1906], 391); but among the A-kamba, a Bantu tribe, there is "a special curse used for a bad wife. The husband draws a little milk from her breasts into his hand, and then licks it up; this is a curse which has no palliative; after it the husband can never again cohabit with the woman" (Seligman, citing Hobley, *The A-Kamba*, 105). Similarly, a boy and a girl who have been suckled together may not marry (*Kinship*, 196 n. 1). So also in the case of blood, a Palestinian woman will contrive that her indifferent husband drinks in his liquid a few drops of her blood in the belief that this will knit him more strongly to her (*JPOS.* vi. 49). On the other hand, in the Irish Saga of the wooing of Emer, when Cúchulainn wounded his love Dervorgil and sucked the wound, he was unable to marry her because he had tasted of her blood.[1] Cf. p. 506 n. 1.

P. 274 n. 1.—See *Kinship*, p. 39 and n. Among the Kabābīsh *laḥma* expresses a uterine relationship; a man says, "I am the *laḥma* of such and such a tribe," naming his mother's (Seligman, *Harvard Studies*, 114).

P. 279.—"In India it is not the rule for Moslem men and women to eat separately; as far as my observation goes, it is the universal rule in Syria" (A. S. Tritton; private communication). Crawley (*Mystic Rose*, ch. vii.; cf. 376 *sq.*, 379 *sq.*), discussing commensal relations, argues that the custom of not eating together is common even between brothers and sisters, and is due to a taboo between the sexes.

[1] A man who has drunk of the blood of another tribe is bound to support it against his own totem or kin group (Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 461).

P. 290 n. 2.—Besides Prof. J. B. Bury's suggested connexion between Hecate and the dog (for which see Preller-Robert[4], i. 326 and n. 1), cf. that of Dr. H. R. Hall, *CAH.* iii. 309, deriving it from the Egyptian *ḥīke'*, " magic " (on which term, see p. 551 n.).

P. 292 n. 1.—The cylinder (also in Lajard, *Culte de Mithra*, pl. xxix, no. 5) is explained by Hoffner (*Gaz. Arch.*, l.c.) as the representation of a god of the Heracles-Sandon type.

P. 292 n. 2.—To כלבא correspond the Tyrian *χέλβης* (Josephus, *contra Apion.* i. 21 [157]) and conceivably *χάλβης*, the herald slain by Heracles in Egypt (Apollodor. ii. 5, 11); see Lidzbarski, *Ephem.* ii. 10 and n. 1. With כלבאלם (so read) may be compared the New Bab. names Kalab-Ba'u, etc. (*PSBA.* xxi. 133; *E.Bi.* " Caleb," § 1), where the meaning may be " priest or servant " ; cf. in the Amarna Letters, *e.g.* 60_7, *kalbu sha bītishu*, " the (king's) house-dog," *CAH.* ii. 322; see also Lagrange, 221 n. 1; Hommel, *Ethnol.* 91 and n. 2.

P. 295. Commensality and Sacramental Meals.[1]—The difference between (*a*) eating in the presence of a god, (*b*) eating together with him (p. 270), and (*c*) eating the god himself, naturally affects the development of ideas (in myth, theology, philosophy, etc.) which can ensue in each case. But it is not always easy to draw a distinction. In meals for the dead, the dead are commonly supposed to join; and in those before the god, gods and men commonly participate.[2] At a modern Palestinian festival in fulfilment of a vow a prayer will be offered on behalf of the soul of the *weli*, the sacrifice is for him, and the saint is the host, dispensing hospitality; the participants are his guests, and all passers-by may join in. To him belongs the " soul " of the food—a widespread belief when food is offered to supernatural beings.[3] In Deut. xii. 7, etc., the meal is in Yahweh's presence (cf. Driver on Ex. xviii. 12), and there is similar cautious wording in Ex. xxiv. 10 *sq.* (carried further in the LXX); but the prophets preserve the belief that Yahweh prepares his feast, issues his invitations, and sends the cup round among the guests (Isa. xxv. 6; Zeph. i. 7;

[1] Cf. A. Thomsen, *Archiv f. Rel.*, 1909, pp. 464 *sqq.*, 471 *sq.* A. A. Sykes, in his essay on the *Nature, Design, and Origin of Sacrifices* (1748), 59 *sqq.*, already observes that the common meal is a covenant, and that sacrifice is a friendship entered into and renewed with a god. He compares the alliance in *Æneid*, viii. 275 (" communemque vocate Deum," *i.e.* the god common to the two parties). Cf. below, pp. 665 *sqq.*

[2] Eitrem, 475 *sq.*; W. Warde Fowler, *Rel. Experience of the Roman People*, 193 (and Index, *s.v.* " Meals " [sacrificial]).

[3] *JPOS.* vi. 43, 44 *sq.*, 61 *sq.*, 73 and n. 1. Where the food is definitely made over to the gods it may be admittedly used by the priests or distributed among the poor; the story of Bel and the Dragon is ignorant of this.

Jer. xxv. 15 *sqq.*). Similarly, Paul in 1 Cor. x. 18 *sqq.* interprets the sacred meal as communion with the altar, *i.e.* the Deity.[1]

The common meal unites men as kin, or it strengthens or renews an existing union. The food may be " sanctified " for the occasion, like the guests ; or it is already " sacred." The divinity of life-giving food is well attested. The Babylonian Nisaba is both corn and a goddess ; Tammuz (later Ta-uz), like Adonis, was the divine corn in the same way that Ceres and Bacchus were corn and wine, and more than a common figure of speech.[2] In an Egyptian hymn to Osiris the god is invoked : " Thou art father and mother of men, they live by thy breath, they (eat) the flesh of thy body, thy name is Primeval God . . . thou breathest out breath into men's nostrils " (Erman, *Ægypt. Zeit.* xxxviii. 33). Here Osiris is more than a corn-god (for which see *GB.* vi. 89 *sqq.*) ; he is the life of the earth in which he is embedded, his sweat is the water, his breath the air. How readily ideas of divine food and fruit, or of a divine being immanent in the sustenance of life, transfer themselves can be seen when the African Manichee Faustus " claims that he and his held the true Christian doctrine, and that the suffering Jesus is not a Divine Man born from a human mother and the Holy Spirit, but the fruit which is man's food ' hanging on every tree, produced by the energy and power of the air that makes the earth conceive . . . wherefore our reverence for everything is like that of you Catholic Christians about the Bread and the Cup.' " [3] Such a conception finds a parallel in the pantheistic Logion, " Jesus saith, . . . raise the stone and there thou shalt find Me, cleave the wood and there am I," and more especially in a modern Greek (Eubœan) conviction during Holy Week that unless Christ rose there would be no corn that year.[4]

For the sacramental eating of firstfruits and of sacred food, Frazer has collected some evidence (*GB.* viii. 48 *sqq.* ; cf. 86 *sqq.*, 138 *sq.*), the most significant being the cases where the identity of the food with a god is explicit, as in the Aztec ceremony, the resemblance of which to the Christian Eucharist so impressed the early Spanish

[1] Cf. Gressmann, *Ursprung d. israel.-jüd. Eschatologie*, 129 *sqq.*, 136 *sqq.* ; *ZNTW.* xx. 224, 227, 230.

[2] *GB.* viii. 167 ; Lagrange, 240 n. 3 ; and Jastrow, *Rel. B. A.* ii. 670 ; Baudissin, 114, and Index, *s.v.* Tammuz ; for Adonis, see *ib.* 161 *sq.* (cf. Frazer, *GB.* v. 229 *sq.*). See above, p. 578, on *Ṣ-d* and *Dagan*.

[3] F. C. Burkitt, *The Religion of the Manichees* (Cambridge, 1925), 41 *sq.*, citing Augustine, *c. Faust.* xx. 2 (Jesus as a power of vegetation and the Divine Being in the Sun) ; cf. S. A. Cook, *Journ. of Theol. Stud.* xxvi. 387 *sq.*

[4] Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore*, 573. Cf. an article on " Easter in Italy," *The Observer*, April 17, 1927 (association of the awakening of Nature with the Passion).

missionaries.[1] Examples of the ceremonial or sacramental eating of the totem are few: (1) the "leech" and "jute" folk of Assam must chew a bit of the totem (*Tot. Ex.* iv. 298, 319). (2) On certain occasions the totem is eaten in Southern Nigeria (*ib.* ii. 589 *sq.*). (3) Among the Zuni the turtle-ancestor is ceremonially killed, but it is not clear that it is a totem or eaten by the people (*ib.* i. 44 *sq.*, iv. 232). (4) A Bechuana tribe ceremonially kill the porcupine, whose flesh is supposed to have strengthening properties, but it is not eaten (*GB.* viii. 165). On the other hand, (5) the Central Australian evidence strikingly confirms W. R. S.'s totem sacrament theory; although to Frazer and others (*Tot. Ex.* iv. 230 *sq.*) the discoveries of Spencer and Gillen have only added fresh difficulties (see above, pp. 535 n. 2, 586). Thus it is objected that, (*a*) instead of a religious rite, the Australian ceremonies are "magical"—in order to provide a plentiful supply of food; (*b*) the animal is not regarded as divine; (*c*) other clans can kill and eat it; and (*d*) it would seem that the totem-clan itself once partook of it freely.

In reply to such objections it is obvious, in the first place, that whether the totem rites are magical or religious depends upon preliminary definitions of the terms. Sir Baldwin Spencer originally spoke of them as religious, though later he acquiesced in Sir James Frazer's view (*Tot. Ex.* i. 114 *sq.*). Marett (*Psychology and Folklore*, 196 *sqq.*), Durkheim (339 *sq.*), and Jevons (*Introd. to Comp. Rel.* 203 *sq.*) are among those who dissent from the label "magical." "Magico-religious" they may be styled, if necessary, in view of their significance for the group and the solemnity with which they are undertaken. Nor must it be overlooked (1) that the totem is sacred in a way that the members of the clan normally are not—except during the "sacred" ceremonies; that (2) in more advanced stages of development gods are often far from being supreme beings far exalted above men (p. 563 *sq.*); and (3) that practical and utilitarian elements run through all religions. If the totem rites are to be styled "magical" or are examples of "departmental magic" (cf. Malinowski [ed. Needham], 45), one must not overlook the remarkable extent to which it has been believed that sacred rites affect not merely the relations between a group and its god, but even the world in which the group finds itself.[2]

The Australian totem sacrament cannot be severed from the

[1] Brinton, *Rel. of Primitive Peoples*, 189 *sq.*; Frazer, *GB.* viii. 88 *sqq.*; cf. above, p. 225 n. 3 (end).

[2] In reference to objections (*c*) and (*d*), it is not necessary to require that the totem of one clan should be taboo to other clans, or that the particular rites should always have been in vogue. If the totem was once freely eaten, the change is

beliefs elsewhere in the almost cosmic efficacy of sacrifice and sacramental meals. On the Brahman theory of the daily sacrifice, see *GB.* ix. 410 *sq.* (cf. i. 228 *sq.*), Eggeling (*Ency. Brit.* iv. 380*d*), and the monograph of Hubert and Mauss on Sacrifice (with special reference to ancient Indian and Jewish theory). The particular efficacy of a sacred meal is curiously seen in Manichceism, where the elements of Light and Life, which are commingled with the dark and earthy, are one day to be separated. The Elect Manichee will not himself prepare food lest he injure the life contained in the grain, and " a sacramental, indeed an actual physical, benefit accrued to the Universe through his eating it." [1] The sacred " life " was to be found in high degree in the righteous, and by his taking into himself the " Light " that was in the food, there was, so to say, a cosmical effect, so much so that " the Manichees believed that even a couple of the highest class of Initiates would suffice for what the world needed." When such conceptions could prevail in a religion which, though not a social-religious cult, spread widely and was of some influence in the course of its career, other variations of the fundamental belief in the effect of sacred meals and ceremonies upon the cosmos, or some department of it, can be well understood. It became necessary, on the one hand, to safeguard their interpretation and significance and, on the other, to restrict participation in them. So, the most sacred and most important occasions become reserved for the professional sacred caste, or there are periodical mystical sacrifices in which only the members of exclusive guilds were brought near to the heart of things.[2]

It is not necessary to regard totemism as the " origin " of the beliefs and practices which are found elsewhere. Eating " sacred " food or the " divine " essence in food is an intense form of communion [3]; but not only is it a way of acquiring certain benefits, a sort of quasi-magical effect is, as we have seen, often produced, even as in another more elemental and intense form of communion, objective effects are sometimes anticipated (pp. 612 *sqq.*). Certain fundamental ideas

analogous to that from endogamy (marriage within the group) to exogamy; cf. further below, p. 629.

[1] Burkitt, *op. cit.* 47. The Elect disclaims all responsibility for the destructive processes which turn the growing grain into bread (45); cf. the attitude to the killing of animals (p. 602).

[2] Cf. W. Warde Fowler, *op. cit.* 173, on a tendency of the early Roman priesthood to discourage participation in certain sacred rites.

[3] Cf. Chrysostom, *Hom. in Joann.* " He (Christ) hath given those who desire Him . . . to eat Him and fix their teeth in His flesh, and to embrace Him and satisfy all their love." As regards the relation between the Eucharist and the Mysteries, etc., the occurrence of a number of interrelated conceptions, ranging from the crude and sensual (cf., *inter alia*, the Odes of Solomon) to the most refined

can be traced throughout; and a distinction can be drawn between the part they play in the social and moral development of the group and their place in the growth of man's knowledge of his ability to control his environment. That the totem ceremonies have a moral and biological value can be shown (see Malinowski, 46); and when the height of spiritual religion is reached in the doctrine of the "righteousness" which the God of the Universe requires of men, there are implicit therein ideas of the interrelations of social, moral, and cosmic order, the humblest and rudest beginnings of which can be recognized in the religious and magico-religious rites of primitive peoples. See p. 670 *sq.*

P. 296. SANCTITY OF DOMESTIC ANIMALS.—A possible trace of extreme respect can perhaps be found in Assyrian (R. Campbell Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, 210 n. 1). Reluctance to kill neat cattle except on special occasions has been observed in Arabia (Kremer, *Studien*, ii. 86 *sq.*), and cattle-killers was a term of reproach for the men of Jōbar (Wetzstein, *ZDMG.* xi. 488). In Phrygia it was a capital offence to kill a plough-ox (A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, i. 469). On the ox as a kinsman—in Hesiod—cf. Gilbert Murray, *Rise of Epic in Greece*, 62 (1907). In India the cow is regarded as the abode of all deities and sages, as sacred as the earth itself, and giver of all things necessary for man's sustenance (Enthoven, *Folk-lore of Bombay*, 213). Various forms and traces of cow-cult are found in Africa.[1] The case of the Todas (p. 299) is especially important, since, according to W. H. Rivers (*The Todas*, 1906), the dairy ritual is a secondary phase, the older religion has atrophied, and even the ritual itself has become degenerate. The old gods are remembered chiefly for their part in the dairy cult, and the practical religion has its centre in the practical interests of food and means of livelihood (see I. King, *Devel. of Rel.* 117–24, 236 *sq.*). As is the general rule, the effective religion is concerned with the essentials of life, in particular with the uncertainties of the food supply—unless, of course, life is easy; and conversely, where the religion becomes indifferent to the practical, social, and economic problems, the latter tend to become the centre of ideas which have a quasi-religious importance for those concerned. Cf. the problem (*a*) of the local Baalim, givers of food, and the national Yahweh, and (*b*) that of saints and *welis* and the Allah of Islam.[2]

and spiritual, finds a very significant analogy in the coexistence of diverse theriomorphic and anthropomorphic tendencies a few centuries earlier; see p. 629.

[1] See J. Roscoe, *The Northern Bantu*, 10 *sqq.* (the royal cows of the Banyoro tribe); Frazer, *GB.* iii. 247, viii. 35, 37 *sqq.*; Seligman, *JRAI.* xliii. 654 *sqq.* Cf. below, p. 602, and the references by G. W. Murray, *Journ. of Eg. Arch.* xii. 249, to the veneration of the cow and the (grammatical) treatment of the cow as a person among the Beja.

[2] On the economic aspect of religion, see Malinowski, in the *Festskrift* to

On the possibility that totemism may have led to the domestication of animals and plants, see Frazer, *Tot. Ex.* iv. 20 n. 1, who refers to Jevons, *Introd. to Hist. of Rel.* 113 *sqq.*, 210 *sqq.*, and S. Reinach, *Cultes*, i. 86 *sqq.* It is quite possible that the "magical" control of part of nature was a step in social and intellectual progress (Frazer, *l.c.*, cf. *GB.* i. 245 *sq.*), and W. R. S. himself insists that an attitude, not of fear, but of confidence and *rapport*, was indispensable before man could have taken any upward step (see p. 137). A sympathetic *rapport* is, on psychological grounds, essential for any real knowledge of a process which it is desired to understand,[1] and this is precisely what happens when a close, intimate relationship is felt, or is believed to exist, between the one who exercises control over some part of nature and that which is controlled. See pp. 586, 658, 671.

P. 300. The Golden Age (cf. pp. 303, 307).—According to the Gilgamesh epic, Engidu, the wild man, lived in the most intimate converse with the animals; only after he had mated with one of Ishtar's maidens does enmity begin, and the beasts whom he was wont to save from the hunters now flee from his presence (*CAH.* iii. 228).[2] Old Jewish belief told of the age when man and beasts spoke a common language (Charles, on *Jubilees*, iii. 28). The conception of a Golden Age is that of a sympathy with the lower animals and the conviction that the world has passed from good to worse, with, in the Messianic ideas, the hope of the return of the primitive harmony (Skinner, *Genesis*, 35). Prometheus, who destroyed the Golden Age, was also the first to kill an ox (p. 307 n. 5; Roscher, *Lex.* iii. 3055); and sacrifice was inaugurated by him as also by the Indian fire-god Agni. The Phœnician myth of a deluge followed by sacrifice seems to be an echo of the post-exilic narrative in Gen. ix., the anointing of sacred stelæ with the blood of beasts corresponding to the legalizing of the slaughter of animals by the ceremonial restoration of the blood (Gen. ix. 4; see Lagrange, 417; Skinner, 159, 169).

P. 306. The "Murder" of Animals.—For parallels to the Buphonia, see Frazer, *Paus.* ii. 303, *GB.* viii. 5 *sqq.*, and the references in Stübe, 233 n., 501; on the mimic "resurrection," cf. Jane Harrison, *Themis*, 143, 182, who connects it with a rain-charm. For the rite at Tenedos (p. 305 and n. 3), see A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, i. 659, 711. In

Ed. Westermarck (Helsingfors, 1912), 81 *sqq.*, and I. King, *op. cit.*, Index, *s.v.* Food.

[1] Cf. C. Lloyd Morgan, *Instinct and Experience* (1912), 236 *sq.* (One must know "as it were from within," one must "*be* in some measure the object of close attention," etc.)

[2] See C. A. Williams, *Legend of the Hairy Anchorite* (Univ. of Illinois, 1925).

consequence of the sanctity of blood, various measures are as a rule taken to avoid responsibility for shedding blood, whether human or animal.[1] (1) Special care will be taken that blood does not fall upon the ground (pp. 369 n. 1, 417 n. 5).[2] (2) Effusion of blood will be avoided by stoning, forcing a man to leap from a height, pouring lead down his throat, starvation, suffocation, etc.[3] (3) Frequently hunters propitiate the animal they propose to kill and eat, or its death is bewailed; so that in various ways the victim is pacified, appeased, and the risk of vengeance averted (*GB.* viii. ch. xiv.). Or (4) responsibility is shared by the whole community (cf. p. 417 and n. 1). Again (5) the animal procures its own death.[4] Or (6) the victim presents itself as a stranger.[5] (7) The victim is both conscious and willing: before the Khonds of Bengal sacrifice a human victim for the crops they stupefy him with opium or otherwise ensure that he shall not resist and appear unwilling (*GB.* vii. 247). Finally, (8) the task of shedding the blood is entrusted to another: the Shawiya-Berbers will call in a neighbour to kill an ox or a cow (*Folk-lore*, xxxiii. 193), and the Elect Manichee, in whom is the Light element that is also to be found in bread, will neither take nor break it; his food is prepared by a disciple (on whose behalf he prays), and he prays to the bread solemnly, "I neither reaped thee, nor winnowed thee, nor set thee in an oven" (Burkitt, *Rel. of the Manichees*, 23, 45)—vegetable life has also a soul (*e.g.* rice; *GB.* vii. 189).

P. 310 and notes 1–3.—On Zeus Asterius, see Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, i. 44; A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, i. 545 *sq.* For Kuenen's paper (n. 3), see *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, ed. Budde, 207. On the site of Ashteroth Karnaim, see Sir G. A. Smith, *E.Bi.* s.v. The double

[1] So even in the case of criminals, though here it may be lest their blood stain the earth; see Kreglinger, *Études sur l'origine et le devel. de la vie relig.* i. 74.

[2] When a priest was officiating at the Holy Communion at the Church of St. George (el-Ḥadr), between Beit Jālā and the Pools of Solomon, he spilt some of the sacred wine on his foot, thereby wounding it. For his carelessness in handling the Saviour's Blood his wound never healed up and he died, and the stone on which it fell acquired wonderful healing properties, and by supernatural means repulsed every effort to carry it off (Canaan, *JPOS.* iv. 79 *sq.*, citing Hanauer, *Folk-lore*, 59).

[3] *GB.* iii. 243 *sq.*; see also above, pp. 343 n. 3 (on the *Ainos*, cf. *GB.* viii. 183 *sq.*), 374 *sq.* (cf. 417 n. 5), 419, 431, and see Saalschütz, *Mosaisch. Recht*, 457 n., 580.

[4] See p. 309 n. 1, and the refs. in Stübe, 234 n. 505; cf. Wellhausen, *Muh. i. Med.*; a willing victim (16) procures its own death (160). The victim comes unsought (above, p. 309 n. 1), and in Palestine a flock of sheep will be driven past the shrine, and the one that enters "has chosen it" (*JPOS.* vi. 34; a Sinaitic parallel, *ib.* 66).

[5] Cf. Gen. xxii. 13 *sq.*, and the story of Lityerses (*GB.* vii. 217; see *ib.* 225 on strangers, and below, p. 616 n. 4).

peaks have suggested to Schumacher and to G. F. Moore (*Journ. of Bib. Lit.* xvi. 155 *sqq.*) a simpler explanation, so perhaps already the Talmud. For the Punic Saturnus Balcaranensis (*c.* second century A.D.), see Toutain, *Mélanges*, l.c. (n. 3 end), and note that Saturn nowhere has horns; see also *Zeus*, ii. 554 *sq.* The "Ashtaroth of the sheep" (cf. p. 477) is unique. Ishtar as mother-goddess was symbol of creation, protector of flocks, patroness of birth; and *Ishtarāti* means "goddesses." Cf. "Hathors" as a title of goddesses of birth (Rameses II.; Breasted, *Anc. Rec.* iii. § 400 and n. *b*), also ἡ τῶν θεῶν Ἀφροκράτις (*deliciæ deorum*), Pap. Oxyr. xi. 1380 (see Norden, *Geburt d. Kindes*, 112 n. 2); and the Juno as the female counterpart of the Roman masculine Genius. The term may be a stereotyped and perhaps an original cult term for the young or for the dam (cf. Meyer, *Gesch. Alt.* i. § 346 n.).[1]

P. 311 n. 1.—See *Kinship*, 254, where W. R. S. remarks that "the most ancient division of the Israelites is between Rachel and Leah, both of whom are animal names—'ewe' and 'bovine antelope,'" and that among the nomadic population of South Palestine, ultimately incorporated with Judah, the most important is Caleb the dog-tribe. On Leah, see also *ib.* 227 and n. 2. Meyer (*Israeliten*, 426 and n. 3) explains Leah as "serpent" (comparing Leviathan), pointing out that "Leah, like Rachel, is an ancient *numen* in animal shape." The question is complicated by the suggested connexion between Leah and Levi (*Kinship*, 34 n., 227), and between Levi and the Minæan priestly title *lawi'a(t)*, on which see Gray, 243 *sqq.*

P. 315.—Classical parallels are cited by Meyer, *Israeliten*, 556 n. 1; Eitrem, 422 *sq.*

P. 316. Orotal(t).—On Dionysus (Herod. iii. 8), *i.e.* Dusares, see Clermont-Ganneau, *Rec. d'Archéol. Orient.* v. 114. The derivation is quite uncertain: (*a*) οβοταλτ, *i.e.* עבראלת ("servant of Allat"; Cumont, *Rev. Archéol.* 1902, p. 297 *sq.*);[2] (*b*) οροταν, *i.e.* Ruḍa (Wellh. 58 *sq.*), "favour, grace" (see Lidzb. *Ephem.* iii. 90 *sqq.*); the more Aramaic form of which is found in the Nabatæan god אעדא (*aappa*), see Cooke, 239, though Lidzbarski (*Ephem.* ii. 262) would derive the latter from غضر, pointing out that "luxuriant" is an appropriate name for a god of fruitfulness. From a shrine (מסגדא) set up to

[1] How a proper name can become a common noun is illustrated in the use of "Mary" in pidgin-English for the female sex: women, girls, and dogs (C. W. Collinson, *Life and Laughter 'midst the Cannibals in South Sea Islands*, 86).

[2] Burrows, *JSOR.* xi. 77, suggests Obodat, and, explaining the name to mean "husbandman," notes that in an Assyrian list of gods (*ZA.* xxx. 284 *sqq.*), Du-shar-ra (*i.e.* Dusares) is called *uru-a* (=*erish*), which has the same meaning, and that Dusares=Orotal (Obodat).

Dusares—אעראא—on the first of Nisan (see the Nab. inscr., Lidzb. *Ephem.* ii. 262), it is argued by Hommel (*Vogüé Florileg.* 300) that he was a god of light of the Marduk type. He, however, explains אעראא to mean "having a white spot," while Littmann (*ib.* 385) compares the stone-block *ghariy* (cf. above, pp. 201, 210). (c) Meyer (*Israel.* 101 n. 3) rather favours the old view of Blau (*ZDMG.* xviii. 620 *sqq.*), that Orotal conceals the name of the tribe of the Garinda (Gharandel) north of Sinai and of Petra; it was the name (according to Arab legend) of an idol; see Hommel, *Ethnol.* 627 n. 3.

P. 321. REUNION OF GODS AND MEN.—Here the main argument, which is of the first importance, is suspended, to be resumed on p. 336. When, owing to disaster, defeat, etc., the group-unity of gods and men is broken, whatever brings the conviction of forgiveness brings the sense of a new unity. There may not be any intense experience of some immediate "communion" with the deity, but the restoration of the unity is fundamental in religion, and the actual vicissitudes of the history of religions imply that the bond between the worshippers and their gods, constantly weakened or broken, is constantly being renewed. The fundamental idea, as it occurs in Judaism, is thus stated by Abelson, *Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature*, 140: "Repentance is almost a synonym for Shechinah. It is a divine indwelling."

P. 321 and n. 4.—On the commemoration of Hasan and Hosain, see Eerdmans, *Zeit. f. Assyr.* ix. 280 *sqq.*; Goldziher, *Moh. Stud.* ii. 331; Baudissin, 131 *sq.*; Streck, *Sachau-Festschrift*, 393 *sqq.*; all of whom find survivals of pre-Islamic beliefs.

P. 321 and n. 5.—From the Arabic *kasafa*, "cut," *kisf*, "piece, fragment," etc., W. R. S. conjectures that the Hebrew *kĕshāphīm* means herbs or drugs shredded into a magic brew. For Fleischer's derivation from *kasafa*, "to obscure," see Witton Davies, *E.Bi.* col. 2900(2). An exact analogy to the former etymology is התפלל, "pray," which Wellhausen (126 n. 5) explains from the Arabic *falla*, "to rend," *fall*, "the notch end of a sword" (*E.Bi.* "Prayer," § 1; cf. "Cuttings," § 1). That more physical meanings lie beneath the religious terms is seen further in עתר (התעתיר), "make supplication," and Arabic *'atara*, "sacrifice" (Wellh. *loc. cit.*), and possibly in the Hebrew צלה, "roast flesh," Aram. "pray" (so Haupt, *Journ. of Bibl. Lit.* 1900, p. 78, but see the Oxford Heb. Lexicon). Praying is bound up with incense offering (see Eitrem, 229 *sq.*), and prayer and sacrifice are interwoven in early Christian thought (Gray, *Sacrifice*, 173). Between praying for a thing and appropriate sacrificial ritual (whether mimetic, as often in "magico-religious" rites, or other) there is no great gulf; see F. B. Jevons, *Introd. to the Study of Comp. Rel.* 176 *sqq.* (New York, 1908).

P. 323. Mourning Rites.—Often, of course, these may be "merely exaggerated forms of the same emotional outbursts which lead nervous temperaments everywhere to wring the hands and tear the hair in moments of violent grief" (Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, 213). Fear of the dead is regarded by Frazer as "a bulwark of morality and a bond of society," softening and humanizing manners (*Belief in Immortality*, i. 175, 392; cf. ii. 300); "the fear of the spirits of the dead has been one of the most powerful factors—perhaps, indeed, the most powerful of all—in shaping the course of religious evolution at every stage of social development from the lowest to the highest" (*GB.* viii. 36 *sq.*).[1] But W. R. S. disputes the significance of fear (pp. 322 n. 3, 336 n. 2, 370 n. 1); and Malinowski (ed. Needham, 47 *sqq.*), in a critical estimate of the psychological aspects of death, argues that in the mourning ceremonies "religion counteracts the centrifugal forces of fear, dismay, demoralization, and provides the most powerful means of reintegration of the group's shaken solidarity, and of the re-establishment of its morale."

When the Arab erects a tent on the grave of a venerated person and remains there, or the dead are buried in the house or near at hand, or there is resort to the dead and appeal to the ancestors, or there are periodic festivals of the dead (*GB.* vi. 51 *sqq.*, ix. 150 *sqq.*), fear is not the dominant element even though there be awe or respect. And where group or collective responsibility prevails, the living and the dead are virtually parts of one body. On the other hand, in the history of Israel individual responsibility and the denunciation of earlier mourning customs are among the marks of an age of social disintegration prior to the rise of a new reintegration.

In general, death arouses typical emotions which are variously directed by current usage. To-day the evil spirits, the cause of illness, surround the dead body and look for a living one in which to enter (*JPOS.* vi. 46), and the domestic rites are for the soul of the deceased (*ib.* 65). In one Bab. ritual, when a man is dying the room is swept, holy water sprinkled, lights are lit, a lamb is sacrificed, and ceremonies are performed for the family spirits (Morgenstern, 107 *sq.*). In Israel a man went to "his people" (Gen. xxv. 8). On the same principle the member of a totem-clan rejoins his ancestors at death, and sometimes will be buried in the skin of the totem-animal and marked with the clan mark (*Tot. Ex.* i. 35). Some deaths are specially grievous. In Assyria men and women who die prematurely cause harm unless they are laid to rest (R. C. Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, 17 *sqq.*).[2]

[1] Similarly, Marillier (*Rev. de l'histoire Rel.* xxxvi. 355), Wundt, and others.

[2] On the Bab. *ețimmu*-demons, spirits of the dead, see A. Jeremias, *Handbuch d. altorient. Geisteskultur*, 318 *sqq.*

If the mourning is slight, the dead may be suspicious, and take vengeance; hence the survivors will disclaim responsibility (above, p. 412), and otherwise mollify the dead. On the other hand, too much grief will disturb the dead.[1] In Central Australia, as Durkheim points out (391 *sqq.*), mourning is strictly regulated by etiquette; it is a social and pious duty which forms a channel for the emotions, it assures the dead that he is not forgotten, establishes a new relation with the dead who is now a new kind of spirit, and strengthens the social unity which absence of mourning would weaken.[2]

On obligatory mourning (p. 430), see Wensinck in the *Sachau-Festschrift*, 26 *sqq.*; and on the ὀλολυγή, in particular, see Eitrem, 461 *sq.*, and his *Beiträge*, iii. (1920), 44 *sqq.*; also Jane Harrison, *Themis*, 160 (as an apotropaic lament).[3] As regards the blood-letting rites, Frazer (*FOT.* iii. 300) and Westermarck (*Morocco*, ii. 520) question whether they contain any idea of covenant; the object is rather to benefit the dead, who are nourished by the blood (cf. Eitrem, 421). Blood contains, or rather blood *is* the life: Assyrian demons ceaselessly devour blood, and sacrificial slaughter—thought Origen—lures demons to the temples (R. C. Thompson, 195 *sq.*). But no single explanation of mourning rites need be sought. The evidence ranges from purely spontaneous emotion, with more or less vague ideas of death and the dead, to relatively coherent convictions of the efficacy of the rites; and W. R. S.'s theory of the blood-covenant between living and dead gives a precision to the more elemental feelings in which the longing for continued relations does not necessarily come to the surface, but is justified by that unity of the living and dead members of a group which repeatedly expresses itself in many diverse ways.[4]

P. 325. Hair-Offering.—Hair was shorn for rivers (Paus. viii. 41, 3; *GB.* i. 31), as a puberty rite (A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, i. 23 *sq.*), and as an offering for the dead (Frazer, *FOT.* iii. 274; Eitrem, 344 *sqq.*). It was cut for Osiris and other gods (Chwolson, ii. 307 *sq.*), *e.g.* for Heracles,

[1] See Hedwig Jahnow, *Das hebräische Leichenlied im Rahmen der Völkerdichtung* (Giessen, 1923), 48 n. 2 (with references).

[2] Cf. the elegant words of Tzŭ-yu (fourth–third century B.C.): the ceremonial is a check upon undue emotion and a guarantee against any lack of proper respect —the due regulation of the emotions is the function of a set ceremonial (H. Giles, *Confucianism and its Rivals*, 116).

[3] On the "magic" of tears, cf. Canney, *Journ. of the Manchester Eg. and Or. Soc.*, 1926, p. 51.

[4] See, in general, Lagrange, 320 *sqq.*; Oesterley, *Immortality and the Unseen World* (1921), especially chs. ix.–xi. On laceration in particular, see *Kinship*, 77 n. 1 (3); Driver, *Deut.* 156; Frazer, *FOT.* iii. 270 *sqq.*; Scheftelowitz, *Arch. f. Rel.* xix. 221 n. 2, 222 n. 4; Jahnow, *op. cit.* 4 *sqq.*, 12 *sqq.*, *et passim*.

the Tyrian Melkart, at Gades (Hölscher, *Profeten*, 144, citing Silius Italicus, iii. 21 *sqq.*).[1] Cut in honour of Orotal (Herod. iii. 8), this "imitation of the god" finds abundant parallels (masks, skins, etc., see p. 674 *sq.*), and the question why the god wore his hair in a particular way finds a parallel in the question why the gods limped (see p. 672). A man's hair contains his strength, vitality, or vital principle (*FOT.* ii. 484 *sqq.*), hence the various taboos (*GB.* iii. 258 *sqq.*). By means of it an enemy can injure a man by "magical" practices, and by retaining some of a man's hair one can ensure his remaining with one (*FOT.* iii. 254; cf. *GB.* xi. 103 *sq.*, 148; Cook, *Zeus*, i. 343 n. 4). Hence the sacrifice of one's hair is a very real one, no less than that demanded at Byblus (p. 329, see p. 616). While, on the one hand, among the Ewe the priest's hair must not be cut, because the god dwells in it (*FOT.* iii. 189); on the other, one can dedicate one's hair for a sacred person or purpose, in which case it is given to or saved for the god. It is preserved in order that the sacred power may occupy it; or it is renounced, virtually as a sacrifice of oneself.[2] The Nazarite's vow is a dedication of one's self; it being impossible, according to Philo, to pollute the altar with human blood (Gray, *Numbers*, 69).[3]

P. 327. Flagellation and Initiation Ceremonies.[4]—Herein are involved (1) the reluctance to admit a new comer into a privileged circle, (2) the desire to prove his worth, and (3) the psychology of ordeal, pain, and cruelty. Between initiation ceremonies and "hazing" there is ultimately no great gulf (Durkheim, 312 and n. 4). The trial, often a frightful one, is the characteristic feature; and the flagellation and other severities have been variously explained.[5] (1) They are to inspire awe, they are a test of a man's courage and fitness, or they are due to the genuine fear lest the youth should be effeminate (Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 210 *sq.*). (2) When a special scourge or other instrument is used, it may be an actual transference—a "rubbing in"—of its sacred power. Thus among the Kamilaroi tribes the touch of the bull-roarer had fertilizing effects, the very sight of the

[1] On the shaven heads of Egyptians and Sumerians, see E. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* i. §§ 362, 368; and especially Gressmann, *Budde-Festschrift*, 61 *sqq.*

[2] Cf. *Qy. St.* 1893, p. 211: a child whose hair is vowed is under the protection of the saint, and needs no amulet. When the hair is cut and sold the money is given to the poor; or it is for the *maḳām* (the shrine), and the family and relations eat together there.

[3] Eitrem (350 n. 2, 351 *sq.*) would treat hair-offerings as one of the many *rites de passage.*

[4] See Loisy, *Sacrifice*, ch. x.; Hocart, *Folk-lore*, xxxv. 308 *sqq.*

[5] Cf. Anton Thomsen, *Orthia* (Copenhagen, 1902); Miss Mudie Cooke, *Journ. of Roman Studies*, iii. (1913) 161 *sq.*; F. Schwenn, *Menschenopfer b. d. Griechen u. Römern*, 98 *sq.* (Giessen, 1915).

Dhurumbulum (? bull-roarer) imparted manly qualities (W. Ridley, *Kam. and other Australian Languages*, 140 *sq.*, 156). In the Sandwich Islands the newly installed king is struck in order to purify him (Crawley, 94). Nilsson (*Gr. Rel.* 94) holds that the power in the sacred bough passes over into the youth as truly as that of the "sowing cake" which was eaten; it was fundamentally a sort of communion; see also Reinach, *Cultes*, i. 173 *sqq.*, on the mystic virtues of the hazel rod. Psychologically, (3) the ordeal is a ritual purification, a *katharsis*; suffering gives strength, sorrow has a sanctifying value. (4) More crudely, the belief runs that the *jinn* prefer stout and well-fed people, hence violent beating is necessary to drive out the demons (*JPOS.* v. 203). Psychologically again, (5) the ordeal from beginning to end serves to induce a unique state prior to the reception of the novice within the group. He is taught the customary morality of the tribe and learns the tribal legends.[1] He has been prepared for a new stage in life—a "renewal," according to the Kaffir term (Crawley, 271 *sq*). He has experienced the god's presence (Meek, ii. 88). Sometimes he is smeared with blood, or even fed with it (*Tot. Ex.* i. 42 *sq.*, 174). He has been introduced to the god (cf. Durkheim, 285); or there have been rites of death and rebirth, and he has died to live.[2] In Central Australia the boy pierces the veil; he learns that the all-powerful being of the tribe is a "myth"; he handles the bull-roarer and knows and sees the most sacred things (Spencer and Gillen, *Northern Tribes*, 491 *sqq.*; cf. *Native Tribes*, 248). Similarly, in New Mexico the masked men who are representing the gods subsequently disclose their identity (Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, 187 *sqq.*). But the revelation of the mysteries does not necessarily destroy religious belief.[3]

P. 328. Circumcision.—For this practice (not found in Babylonia and Assyria) various reasons have been put forward (see Toy, §§ 153 *sqq.*); and it is necessary to distinguish afterthoughts from possible causes. If it were merely hygienic, it would be difficult to see why it was deferred until puberty—the supposition that hygienic reasons induced the alteration of date from puberty to infancy, like the idea of physical purification (Herodotus, ii. 37), is thought to imply more observation than is usually found. Phallicism (on which see p. 688)

[1] See Haddon on ethics among primitive peoples, *Expository Times*, June 1912; and on the general social value of initiation ceremonies, see Malinowski (ed. Needham) 38 *sqq.*, 60.

[2] Cf. *GB.* i. 76 n. 3; Hubert and Mauss, *Mélanges*, 131 *sq.*

[3] One may contrast the more psychological comments of Marett (*Threshold of Religion*, 157 *sqq.*, 164) upon the effect of the disclosures with those of Loisy (*Sacrifice*, 388 *sq.*).

is certainly an insufficient explanation. The same objection is urged against the later popular belief that it prepares for or facilitates sexual intercourse (Doughty, i. 341, 410; cf. Loisy, *Sacr.* 385). It does not necessarily entail very great suffering, though at times there are fearful ordeals, *e.g.* in Arabia among the Coraish and Hodhail.[1] It has been regarded as a dedication, the sacrifice of a part in order to ensure the safety of the whole (for such practices, cf. Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 136, 300, 309); or it is supposed that by cutting off and preserving a part of oneself, one secures preservation after death, and reincarnation. The shedding of blood seems to be an essential part of the rite (cf. Lagrange, 243 *sq.*), and when, as in Australia, use is made of the skin and blood, or the blood is applied to others, ideas of covenant may perhaps be recognized.[2] So, among the Akikuyu circumcision is necessary before one can be a full member of the tribe and possess property; and the rite was at one time combined with a ceremony of rebirth (*FOT.* ii. 332 *sq.*). In Israel the metaphors of circumcision applied to heart, ear, and lips (Deut. x. 16, Jer. vi. 10, Ex. vi. 12) suggest that it meant allegiance, dedication, and an intimate relation with Yahweh, even as the rite itself was an initiation into the full tribal life.[3] The new prominence of circumcision in post-exilic Judaism, as a sign of the covenant relation (see Skinner, *Gen.* 297), coming as it does after the prophets' condemnation of ritual, will be due to the new social and religious equilibrium after the period of disintegration that had preceded. Cf. pp. 593, 664.

In the story of the Exodus the Israelites are circumcised before they keep the Passover, and eat of the produce of the land which they are about to conquer (Josh. v.; cf. Ex. xii. 43 *sq.*). Uncircumcised, they would be regarded as polluting Yahweh's land (on the analogy of Ezek. xliv. 7, 9). Both Circumcision and Passover mark new stages in the history of Israel, and they are associated in the very obscure story in Ex. iv. where Moses was attacked by Yahweh because the rite of circumcision had not been performed—on himself, or on his son (who is evidently the firstborn). The story is in a context where Israel is Yahweh's firstborn, and Pharaoh's firstborn is threatened with death (iv. 22 *sq.*). Ultimately Yahweh smites the firstborn of Egypt at the Passover, and "passes over" the houses smeared with blood

[1] W. R. S., *Lectures*, 577. Cf. We. [1]215, [2]174 *sqq.*; Landberg, *Dialectes*, i. 485–493, 1777 *sq.* For operations upon Arab women, see Seligman, *JRAI.* xliii. 642 *sqq.*; *Harvard Studies*, 149.

[2] H. P. Smith, *Journ. of Bibl. Lit.* xxv. (1906) 14; see Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes*, 250, 268 *sq.*, *Northern Tribes*, 334, 361, 372; Frazer, *GB.* i. 92 *sqq.*

[3] According to Westermarck (*Morocco*, ii. 433), circumcision is called "cleansing" (*ṭuhr*, etc.).

(Ex. xii.). When the Midianite wife of Moses circumcised her child, she touched his parts, presumably "to connect him with what she had done and to make her son's circumcision count as her husband's" (Driver, etc.). But it has also been suggested (Meyer, *Israel.* 59, Gressmann, *Mose*, 58) that Zipporah was supposed to touch this demon-like Yahweh who had sought Moses' life. Decision is difficult. Popular tradition may have retailed much that was primitive concerning Yahweh's marriage-relationship with his people, and in Gen. iv. 1, Eve "gets a man with Yahweh" (p. 513). With this archaic story may be connected the no less strange story of the wrestling at the Jabbok (Gen. xxxii. 24 *sqq.*), where the passage of Jacob (Israel) and his children over the Jordan is a parallel to the passage of the Children of Israel into Canaan (*CAH.* ii. 360), and the importance of the rite of circumcision is forthwith maintained at Shechem (Gen. xxxiv.). In his wrestling he (*i.e.* Jacob) was "touched" on the thigh, whence the "limping" (*vv.* 25b, 31). But according to Hosea xii. 4 *sq.*, Jacob "prevailed" over his supernatural antagonist, and it has been conjectured that it was he who "struck the socket of his thigh," injuring his adversary (*v.* 25a); see B. Luther, *ZATW.* xxi. 65 *sqq.*, and on the "limping" p. 671 *sq.* below.

P. 329 and n. 1. The 'Acīca and Polyandry.—C. and B. Seligman (*Harvard African Studies*, ii. 148) observe that among the Sudanese Kabābīsh the child's *'am* performed the ceremony of the *'icca* (as they heard the word). He and the mother eat separately, and he makes a present to the mother, which remains her own property. This, in their opinion, supports W. R. S.'s earlier view in *Kinship* (182) that it is a dissolving of the bond of kindred, and indicates a transition from matrilineal to patrilineal descent. According to Lane, the *'acīca* is a ransom, its blood (flesh, bone, skin, hair) being for his blood (flesh, bone, etc.); and in this respect it finds a parallel in the old Assyrian substitution ceremony for the sick—the head (neck, breast) for the head (neck, breast) of the man; see R. Campbell Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, 229; Gressmann, *Altorient. Texte z. A.T.*2, 330.

The bearing of the *'acīca* ceremony upon polyandry is much more dubious since 1880–81, when W. R. S. (*Lectures*, 578), after M'Lennan, arranged exogamy, marriage by capture, female kinship, etc., in a line of development. Polyandry proves to be exceptional among simpler peoples.[1] It is confined to a few areas, or to more or less exceptional classes. The Levirate is not necessarily a survival of it, though there is "some reason to believe that among the Semites blood-brotherhood sometimes implied community of women," which, however, is not

[1] Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, *Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*, 163.

necessarily a relic of polyandry.[1] Strabo's story of the stick which a man left outside the woman's door as a signal for his brothers (*Kinship*, 158) is entirely in agreement with custom in South Malabar and elsewhere (Westermarck, 129, 138, where knives or weapons are left). The " absolute licence " that prevailed (*Kinship*, 206) is not necessarily a survival of earlier marriage customs or of promiscuity, and some (*e.g.* Nöldeke, *ZDMG.* xl. 155) would speak of it as looseness or " mere prostitution." In the South Arabian inscriptions there are cases where a man has two fathers,[2] while at the present day among the Shilluk a man has a qualified right of access to his brother's wife, and among the Bahima there are polyandrous practices among men too poor to get separate wives for themselves (as also in Arabia, see *Kinship*, 151 *sq.*). Hartmann (*Islam. Orient*, ii. 197 *sqq.*) is sceptical of the South Arabian evidence,[3] but C. and B. Seligman (*op. cit.* 141 n.) consider that the evidence for Arabian polyandry cannot be ignored, though it was local and occasional, and it is improbable that it was at all universal in Arabia.

P. 329. The Sacrifice of Chastity.[4]—The compulsory sacrifice by virgins of either their hair or their chastity is, as Hartland has shown, not to be confused with ceremonial defloration, or with ceremonial prostitution, or licentious rites in connexion with a temple, or with prostitution as a recognized means of earning a dowry. This last is one of other indications of the slight value frequently attached to chastity before marriage, often to be followed by the strictest fidelity after marriage.[5] In fact, it sometimes happens that a girl who has been much sought after (and, among the Laplanders, especially by strangers) is the more highly esteemed. But money might be obtained in this way for a temple, and the *hieroi* or *hierodouloi* (see *ERE.* s.v.) dedicated to the temple were employed to work upon the temple-lands or in the manner indicated.[6] It is not clear whether the temple-harlots remained in the sacred precincts; in Gen. xxxviii.

[1] Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage* (1921), vol. iii. ch. xxix. *sq.*, and *ib.* pp. 208, 238.

[2] Cf. *Kinship*, 316; Landberg, *Arabica*, iv. (1897), 255 *sqq.*, *Dialectes*, ii. 367, 845 *sqq.*, 947 *sqq.*; Glaser and Weber, *MVAG.* 1923, ii. 41 *sqq.*

[3] Hartmann (ii. 200) would explain cases of the type, " X son of Y and Z," as Y the father and Z the uncle or some other near relative.

[4] See especially E. S. Hartland, in the *Tylor Essays* (1907), 189–222, reprinted in his *Ritual and Belief* (1914), 266 *sqq.*, also Frazer, *GB.* v. ch. iii. *sq.*; Meyer, *Gesch. Alt.* i. § 10 *sq.*; Farnell, *Greece and Babylon*, 269 *sqq.*; Crawley, *Mystic Rose*; Clemen in the *Baudissin-Festschrift*, 89 *sqq.*; Penzer, *Ocean of Story*, i. Appendix IV.; Briffault, *The Mothers* (1927), *passim.*

[5] On which cf. M. A. Potter, *Sohrab and Rustem*, 164 *sq.*, 167 *sqq.*

[6] Justin (xviii. 5) speaks of the virgins at Cyprus who were sent to the sea-shore

Tamar, the *ḳedēshah*, is in the street. Nor are the relevant Babylonian terms free from ambiguity: *ḥarimtu*, *ḳadishtu*, *ishtaritu*, though the first, unveiled and unmarried, is "of the street," and the second was a hierodule, veiled, and could nurse or adopt children.[1] At all events, as Jastrow suggests, the maidens of Ishtar (herself usually called by the second term) "may well be the prototypes of the houris with whom Mohammed peopled the paradise reserved for true believers" (*Rel. Bel.* 138).

The highly significant law in Deut. xxiii. 17 *sq.*, forbidding the hire of a harlot (*zonah*) or a dog (*kéleb*) to be brought into the Temple, is to be supplemented by the prose appendix to the poem on Tyre (Isa. xxiii. 15 *sqq.*), where the city which once had commerce over the known world (cf. Ezek. xxvii.) becomes a forgotten harlot, subsequently to have fresh commerce with the kingdoms of the world, when her gains will be "sacred" to Yahweh and for the enrichment of his priestly people. The language, occurring as it does in a relatively late addition, is surprising; but it testifies to a well-understood practice which may be interpreted possibly as prostitution on behalf of the funds of the temple, or as a reference to licentious rites at certain religious festivals perhaps due to certain ideas of the efficacy of intercourse with hierodules. Decision will often be difficult; it must suffice to refer to the initial and concluding rites at Mecca (on which see Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 185 *sq.*, 297 *sq.*. 306 *sq.*), the Pallades of Theban Ammon (*GB.* ii. 135), the "wives" of the Dahomey god (ii. 149), and the Tamil *devadasis* (v. 61).[2]

There is much miscellaneous evidence for the exchange of wives, among primitive peoples, as a means of welding together the group (Crawley, 248 *sq.*, 479; Potter, 145 *sqq.*), also to avert some evil, ward off sickness, remove a threat, and more specifically to symbolize an entire change of circumstances and inaugurate a new life (Crawley, 280 *sqq.*, 477 *sq.*). Licentious orgies thus served, on the one hand, to express the manifestation of group unity, the creation of feelings of absolute oneness, and a new strengthening of social ties;[3] and, on the other, to annul existing conditions and initiate a new stage.[4] In Morocco maidens will be sent as a means of compelling a state of

to earn their dowry by prostitution, so as to pay a first-offering to Venus for their virtue henceforth—*pro reliqua pudicitia libamenta Veneri soluturas* (Farnell, 274).

[1] B. Brooks, *AJSL.* xxxix. 187; Jastrow, *JAOS.* xli. 36 n., 34; Campbell Thompson, *CAH.* i.[2] 538 *sq.*

[2] Tamar is spoken of as both *ḳedēshah* and "harlot" (Gen. xxxviii. 15). For references in the Minæan inscriptions to hierodules, see Hommel, *Ethnol.* 143, 603 *sq.*, 683, and the translation in Gressmann, *Altorient. Texte z. A.T.*[2] 463 *sq.*

[3] Durkheim, 216 n., 383 nn. 1, 2; Malinowski (ed. Needham), 61.

[4] Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, ii. 144 *sqq.*, 150, 155, 175.

brotherhood with a family or tribe.[1] Through the woman a unity is established whether within the group itself or between two groups. Ideas of group-unity recur also in those endogamous communities where there is the closest intermarriage in order to preserve and strengthen all that which makes the group a single unit. In certain cases all the male members of a group possess common rights over the women either of their group or of another clearly defined group; thus when one of a Masai "age-grade" marries, the others may claim priority of intercourse.[2] The usage has been explained as a ceremonial access, a survival of original communal rights, or else as a removal of the dangers supposed to attend the first night of marriage (Crawley, 309, 349; see further below). But other ideas may have operated, enhancing the unity of the group of which she was a member.

The belief has prevailed that special benefits are to be derived from intercourse with "sacred" men; *e.g.* with saints (Westermarck, *Morocco*, i. 198); while in childless families among the Karalits the *angekok* will be invited to sleep with the wife (Crawley, 350), and childless women have ever continued to visit the shrines in the East.[3] Of another type is the statement that among the Takhtaji of the Adana district the "high priest" enters any house, and "the owner concedes to him during his stay all rights over property, children, and wives."[4] There are, broadly, two types of cases: in one the efficacy of sacred men (who are primarily in some way representatives of the supernatural powers) is pre-eminent; in the other, such individuals claim special rights which, in fact, are often quite freely granted to them. But ceremonial orgies, group-rights, and the efficacy of sacred men cannot be viewed apart from the utilitarian ideas that rule among primitive peoples as regards the fertility of nature. Sexual language and sympathetic ritual abound. A Sumerian liturgy invoking a flood of waters to bring rain is couched in the language of sexual intercourse (*JAOS.* xli. 143, 148). On beliefs and practices touching the sympathetic fertility of women and of nature, see Hartland, *Prim. Pat.* ii. 115 *sq.*, 151 *sq.*, 171; and on symbolic unions, *ib.* 210 *sq.*, 236 *sqq.*, and Frazer, *GB.* vii. 111.[5] Hence the many obscene agri-

[1] Westerkmarck, *Ritual and Belief in Morocco*, i. 529 *sq.*

[2] *Tot. Ex.* ii. 415 *sq.*; Hartland, *Prim. Pat.* ii. 193 *sq.*, and *Prim. Law*, 64; Crawley, 348 *sq.*

[3] On all this as a story or *motif*, see Marmorstein, *Arch. f. Rel.* xxi. 502 *sqq.*; and O. Weinreich, *Der Trug des Nektanebos* (Leipzig, 1911).

[4] See Sir William Ramsay (*The Expositor*, Nov. 1906, 466 *sqq.*), who observes that he is evidently the old priest king of primitive Anatolian religion, who "exercises in a vulgarized form the absolute authority of the god over all his people."

[5] See also *GB.* i. 140 *sqq.*, ii. 97, v. 67 (marriage of wives to an African serpent-god to make the crops sprout); cf. above, p. 515.

cultural rites, and the modern practice of the fellahin of Upper Egypt of placing in their vegetable patches figures (male, but more often male and female) emblematic of fertility. So, actual ceremonial licentious cults are practised to further the fertility of the soil (*GB.* v. 39 n. 3; Clemen, 95); it may be as part of the marriage of Sun-god and Mother-Earth (near North Guinea, *GB.* ii. 98 *sq.*), or for the general prosperity of the clan (*Tot. Ex.* ii. 602 *sq.*); cf. above, p. 514. And, whereas in departmental totemism certain clans have each a peculiar identity with a particular department of nature, here the ideas are vague and inchoate: man and nature are one, the group and its world form one unit, and the ideas of natural fertility and human welfare are not differentiated.

Yet, as has been seen, the ideas of sanctity and holiness can never be left out of the reckoning; and ceremonial continence and chastity are no whit less conspicuous than sexual excess and orgy. "Contrary to what one would expect, in savagery sexual cults play an insignificant rôle" (Malinowski, 41). There is continence when warriors are at war (*GB.* iii. 164), on visiting a sanctuary, on trading-journeys, in times of crisis—in general there are "taboos" of this sort when the group is in a "sacred" state, or when supernatural help is required. There is abundant evidence for the belief in the superior efficacy of chaste and pure individuals as holders of "sacred" offices, or on occasions that are "sacred" from the group's point of view, *e.g.* when the cattle are at pasture among the Akamba and Akikuyu.[1] The devotee of the deity is chaste and devoted wholly to his (or her) service; on the other hand, the "wife" of a god could be taken by those who served or represented the gods. It would be difficult to argue that ceremonial licentiousness was "earlier" than ceremonial chastity, or the reverse. The chaste individual was the abode of supernatural power, whereas the licentious rites could be regarded as an intensely emotional communion or identity of the individual with the supernatural power immanent in the group. While the licentious cults soon became more than obnoxious, the extremes of chastity have also tended to be anti-social; and between "ceremonial" and "magical" tendencies in each of these, progressive humanity has picked its way. It is a striking fact that, while the licentious cults were typically "magico-religious," viz. for the fertility of nature, chastity and continence were noticeably "taboos" on occasions when food-supply, success of expeditions, etc., were at stake; and the former could not lead—as the latter actually did—to increased efficiency in the non-religious sphere.

[1] *FOT.* iii. 141 *sq.* See Fehrle, *Die Kultische Keuschheit im Altertum* (Giessen, 1910); A. D. Nock, *Arch. f. Rel.* xxiii. 27 n. 11, 28 n. 4, 30 nn. 8, 9, 32 n. 8, 33 n. 1.

Competent observers (cf. Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, i. 170 *sqq.*) agree that among rudimentary peoples feelings of delicacy and bashfulness (whether real or ceremonial) are by no means absent as regards sexual matters. Taboos where women are concerned are in some degree due to a fear both of the transmission of the weaker feminine characteristics and of one so psychologically different from men (cf. Marett, *Threshold*, 94). For a variety of reasons there is a general fear of the marriage night; for example, it is often believed that evil spirits are unusually active at marriages, and accordingly there are ceremonies, especially upon the first night and the following day, in order to ward off evil.[1] The inculcation of continence on the first night, enjoined by the Fourth Council of Carthage in 398 A.D., is in keeping with a practice of abstention found in many parts of the world, and justified on grounds ranging from good manners to the belief that the first night is dedicated to God.[2] In Brittany the first three nights were devoted respectively to God, the Virgin, and the husband's patron saint (*FOT.* i. 503), and elsewhere it has been believed that according to the duration of the continence will be the superiority of the child that is born. The Church of the Middle Ages interwove the inculcation of continence on the first night with the story of Tobit and Sarah in the Apocrypha (*FOT.* i. 497 *sq.*, 517 *sqq.*). But in return for certain payments the Church would allow newly married couples to ignore this rule. The bearing of this on the so-called *jus primæ noctis* is discussed at length by Sir James Frazer, who argues that there is no real basis for the "monstrous fable" that a feudal lord or ecclesiastical dignitary could claim the wives of his tenants or subordinates. There has been, he urges, a confusion of (*a*) the fine which a tenant or vassal paid to his feudal lord for the right of giving his daughter in marriage, and (*b*) the true *jus primæ noctis*, sold to the husband by an ecclesiastical authority, which permitted him to sleep with his wife on the wedding night (530). On the other hand, the former of these, the compensation for the loss of a woman's services, especially when she married away from the manor (493 *sq.*), is at the least a very noteworthy indication of the rights which could normally be claimed under what was known as the *merchet* (*marchet*). If there was room for abuse here, still more was there when chiefs took women with the greatest freedom from among their subjects, and the utmost

[1] Frazer, *FOT.* i. 520 *sqq.*; Penzer, ii. 306 n. 1.

[2] Frazer, *FOT.* i. 485 *sqq.*, on the *jus primæ noctis*. Among the Narrinyeri of South Australia it is a point of decency for the couple to keep apart for the first two or three nights; among earlier tribes of Canada such self-control was a proof that the couple married out of friendship and not to satisfy their passions (Frazer, 506, 512 *sqq.*; Crawley, 344).

claims might be made to all marriageable women.[1] And as regards the Church, in adding her blessing to the ceremony she normally tended to remove from the superstitious all fear of untoward consequences, and the use made of the Story of Tobit goes to show how powerful a part she played in the supernatural ideas (" religious " or " magical ") which were centred upon the first night.

Sir James Frazer's analysis makes it increasingly improbable that the *jus primæ noctis* ever prevailed as a recognized or established custom, but it does not follow that the *jus* in the popular sense was never practised. On the contrary, the rights of overlords and the powers ascribed to or claimed by priests in touch with the supernatural realm would favour the sporadic practice of what would be as much a scandal and an abomination to some as it would be intelligible to others who held cruder ideas of the ways of warding off evil, or of obtaining goodly offspring—for, paradoxically, continence and ceremonial intercourse could seem, each from its own point of view, equally efficacious.[2] Indeed, such have been the feelings and fears touching the first night that for this and other reasons there has been resort to ceremonial defloration.[3] Thus, a man was sometimes remunerated for performing what was a dangerous service (*GB.* v. 59 n. 2); he is " sometimes reported to be a priest " (60 n. 1). Sometimes a stranger would be preferred, and the fact that at the compulsory sacrifice of chastity at Byblus, Babylon, and Cyprus the man is a stranger finds various explanations.[4]

From the foregoing it will be seen that it is difficult to interpret the exact meaning and implication of any single or isolated piece of evidence. It is clear that the sacrifice of chastity was not necessarily valued more highly than that of hair (as at Byblus, see p. 607), and the fanaticism with which the licentious cults were maintained at Baalbek-Heliopolis to the fourth century A.D. (see A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, i. 550, 554)

[1] For this, see Hartland, *Prim. Pat.* i. 123, 132 *sq.*, 188, 202, 240; cf. *ERE.* iii. 815.

[2] On the allegation that when the Jews were persecuted under Trajan and Hadrian every bride was first given to the Roman στρατιώτης or *tiphsar*, see J. Neubauer, *MVAG.* 1919, iii. 59; Krauss, *Rev. d'Études Juives*, xxx. 38; I. Levi, *ib.* 220 *sq.*, 231.

[3] *GB.* v. 57; Toy, § 165 n. 1; *FOT.* i. 534 n. 1; Döller, 75.

[4] Thus, the stranger is less likely to take any further advantage; he would not have the same fear of supernatural consequences; strangers as such are sometimes feared, and sometimes regarded as divinely sent (Budge, *Book of Governors*, 557, a fisherman casts his net into the Tigris in the name of strangers). See Farnell, 274 and n. 4 (note at Iconium the story of the strangers who are slain, 273 [*Et. Mag.* s.v. Ἰκόνιον]). For general ideas concerning strangers, see (besides *GB.* index) Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, ii. ch. xxiv.; *Morocco*, i. 540 *sqq.*

indicates how deep-seated were the tendencies which, *mutatis mutandis*, had long before aroused the Hebrew prophets. Now the rites which the prophets condemn are associated with the cult of the Baalim, to whom was due the fertility of the land. Among the Hebrews religion and sexuality tended to be so intertwined as to become at times almost an obsession (Ezek. xvi.): love of money and love of the beauty of women were the two great dangers for Israel—so wrote the late writer of the *Testament of Judah* (xvii. 2). Hence, in view of the usual relationship between sensuous language, eroticism, and religion (cf. the Song of Songs and its allegorical interpretation), if resort to other gods was harlotry, the cult of Yahweh (or of Baal as Yahweh) would be " marriage." With the god as the " husband " of people and land, and as the direct or indirect cause of birth, the rites which Hosea and other prophets denounce are no mere excrescences easily removed, but an integral part of the old religion. Buchanan Gray (*Sacrifice*, 95) does, it is true, call the offerings in Hosea ii. and iv. " eucharistic," and he comments on the " mirth " (Hos. ii. 11)—hardly an unambiguous word in itself. But if the functions of the " sacred " men and women, and the immoral cults as a whole, are not interpreted as gross immorality, they are to be regarded as in some sense practical and utilitarian from current points of view. Even the very sanctuary which the barren Hannah visited was served by priests of illustrious (Mosaic ?) origin whose conduct with the temple-women led to their downfall (1 Sam. ii. 22); and unless the prophets are to be charged with exaggerating the conditions, the less famous centres of cult of their day were no better.

Late tradition—scarcely an invention—even reports that a seven days' sacrifice of chastity before marriage was an " Amorite custom " (*Test. of Judah*, xii.). This goes much further than ritual licentiousness in connexion with agricultural festivals, and closely unites Palestine with Baalbek, Cyprus, and Babylon. There is no actual evidence that there was such a sacrifice—perhaps the counterpart of the circumcision of the male; but it is tempting with Farnell (281, cf. 279) to compare the consecration of the firstfruits of the harvest in order to remove the taboo, a rite recognizably of the same world of ideas as circumcision (above p. 609). And there is much also to be said for his suggestion that the " sacred " men and women " were the human vehicles for diffusing through the community the peculiar virtue or potency of the (god or) goddess, the much-coveted blessing of human fertility." [1] If this were so, the firstborn would naturally be regarded as more sacred than the rest. And in fact the firstborn were Yahweh's,

[1] Farnell himself (282) confines his suggestion to the temple-women and the mother-goddess.

peculiarly his own, and to be redeemed; and a connexion between the *ḳedēshīm*, etc., and the ideas concerning the firstborn may be suspected. The more spiritual and the more crude types of religion have their own convictions as to the way whereby marriages can be made fruitful; and while the religion of the Old Testament lays emphasis upon Yahweh as the source of his people's increase and welfare, the prophets are an unintelligible phenomenon unless there were deep-rooted ideas utterly repugnant to their convictions of spiritual religion, and to the simpler stories which, with all their naïveté, inculcate spiritual ideas antagonistic to those more " magical " or " magico-religious " ideas which inform the rites and practices of the old religion (cf. *CAH.* iii. 473 *sq.*). The crude rites are the " physical " counterpart (or prototype) of the more " spiritual " conceptions of the interrelation of man and nature. The " sacred " officiants stood for ideas of holiness, and " holiness " means " kinship " (p. 549); these ideas the prophets spiritualized and the Jewish priesthood systematized.

The reformed religion (Judaism) was purged of its earlier grossness and excesses, but the Temple and Priesthood still maintained the almost " magico-religious " convictions of their supreme significance for the world. Rabbinical Judaism inherited them, with important modifications. The ideas were being cleansed; but they go back to rude beginnings—the supreme importance of " sacred " individuals for the social or cosmic system of which they are part (see p. 658). If W. R. S.'s main position is sound, it is to be expected that the essential ideas of communion (fellowship, kinship, identity) were not confined to sacrifices, animal and vegetable, but that there would be an interrelation between the " physical " rites and the " spiritual " ideas (cf. p. 439); there would be strange paradoxes (the sacrifice of chastity, and chastity as a sacrifice), and there would be a fundamental interconnexion of " lower " and " higher " tendencies, although, on the other hand, the evolution is not so simple as he assumed.

P. 331. Hair in Vows.—On the hair-offering by Arab pilgrims (*halḳ*) see Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 291 *sqq.* W. R. S.'s explanation of *pāraʿ*, " let the hair grow loose " (Judg. v. 2; see especially Burney's commentary), revives an old conjecture (so Moore, *Judg.* 138), for which there is an Arab parallel (Bevan, cited by Wellh. 123 n. 2). Gilbert Murray (*Rise of Epic in Greece*, 123 [1907]) compares the description of the Achæans in the *Iliad*, " letting their hair grow long " (κάρη κομόωντες), as a vow to take Troy. On the cult of Ocaiṣir (note 2), see Wellh. 62 *sq.*; Winckler, *Arab.-Semit.-Orient.* 132, *s.v.* In note 3 the Inca sacrifice has not been verified. Frazer (*GB.* i. 318) cites the custom of the Yucatan Indians of pulling out their eyelashes and blowing them towards the sun—but this is in order to stay its course.

For the shaving of the eyebrows, Eitrem (412) cites Roman parallels. In *CIS.* i. 257–259 a man is described as גלב אלם, an indication of the sacred calling of the barber in Phœnician temples. The shaving of the widow (Deut. xxi. 12) is one of various rites symbolizing the end of one stage and the beginning of another; cf. also Wellh.[1] 156 (where W. R. S. adds in his copy references to Rasm. *Add.* 69; Rāghil, ii. 133). Another *rite de passage* is seen in the *iḥrām* (cf. We. 122, Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 170 *sqq.*).

P. 334. Tattoo Marks.—These, when found among primitive peoples, though usually significant, are not necessarily *imitations* of totems, etc. (Frazer, *Tot. Ex.* i. 26–30, iv. 197 *sqq.*). But they will testify to the fact that all individuals similarly marked participate in the same rites (Durkheim, 232), or are members of the same group (social, secret, etc.). On the connexion between a tattoo or distinguishing mark and covenants, see *Kinship*, 250. So, the marks commonly denote devotion to, or possession by, a god, and the Egyptians would brand captives with the *name* of the god, or the (divine) king (Breasted, iii. § 414, iv. § 405). Slaves in Babylonia were tattooed with some name, and in the Elephantine papyri they are "marked" (שנת), apparently with a *yōd*.[1] The priests of Isis had cross-like marks on their foreheads (see Norden, *Geburt des Kindes*, 28 and n. 4), and Syrian Christians who have been to Jerusalem are tattooed with the cross (O. H. Parry, *Six Months in a Syrian Monastery*, 63). See further, p. 675; and for much useful material, Turnbull, *Blood Covenant*, 218; Frazer, *FOT.* i. 78 *sq.*; Pedrizet, *Archiv f. Rel.* xiv. 54 *sqq.*, especially 100 *sq.*, 109, 112, 117.

P. 337.—The rite is called *nagā*, W. R. S., *Lectures*, 583; cf. Curtiss, 191 (an incident near Nablus).

P. 339. "Living" Flesh.—The general principle is that the sacrifice must be eaten while still alive and quivering, before its virtues have left it. Even when sacred food is not eaten fresh, it must not be allowed to putrefy or ferment (pp. 221 n., 387).[2] Though the much-quoted Saracenic rite stands alone, the principle is a simple one, and in Mexico the living representatives of the fire-god were thrown into the fire, taken out, and their still palpitating hearts torn from their bodies (*GB.* ix. 301). W. R. S. points out that either all share in and devour the sacrifice in its entirety (p. 338 n. 1), or there are modifications, some of which are due partly to a softening of manners (p. 342 *sq.*); the most sacred parts are reserved for the more sacred caste, or they

[1] See Code of Hammurabi, § 226 *sq.*; Johns, *Bab. and Ass. Laws*, 177; S. A. Cook, *Moses and Hammurabi*, 159; Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri*, No. 28.

[2] Also the blood brought before the altar was stirred to prevent it from coagulating (cf. also Moore, *E.Bi.* "Sacrifice," § 46 and n. 3).

are otherwise disposed of in some special manner (p. 386), thus the entrails, etc., become the food of demons (see Eitrem, p. 424 *sq.*), who are supposed to eat raw flesh (cf. p. 541).

Properly, the victim must be complete and perfect. Tainted or imperfect victims should not be offered (Mal. i. 7 *sq.*, see *CAH.* iii. 449 *sq.*), and the sacrificial offering should be without blemish (Lev. xxii. 19 *sqq.*). That is to say, " the sacred life should be completely and normally embodied " (p. 361). The priest, too, should be without blemish (Lev. xxi. 17 *sqq.*); similarly in Babylonia.[1] The principle rules throughout that the more perfect is the more potent, and the sacred power resents contact with that which is not sacred. It enters only into the priest or the sacrificial victim, which, like itself, is " sacred." The fundamental idea is expressed in ways that range from the crudest to the most spiritual (Jer. xv. 19; Isa. lvii. 15). It lies at the bottom of liver-divination, where the animal selected for the purpose, pure and complete in every respect, becomes the embodiment of the deity, whose purposes are read by an expert examination of its liver, the organ of thought (Jastrow, *Rel. Bel.* 148, 155 *sq.*). And in the extremes of magic and of mysticism it will be believed that the correct ritual must necessarily secure the union of man and deity.

With the foregoing are bound up three distinct and far-reaching groups of ideas. (1) The conviction is widespread that the *physical* state at death determines the *physical* state in which one is reborn or lives in another existence.[2] Hence (*a*) the endeavours both to preserve intact the body of a dead friend and to mutilate a dead enemy; and (*b*) the spiritual counterpart: the moral state at death conditions the state after death. (2) Men whose physical powers are waning will sometimes desire to be put to death in order to ensure rebirth in a suitable physical condition.[3] (3) The physical condition of men is sometimes believed to be due to the good *or* bad relations between them and supernatural powers—*e.g.* remarkable strength and virility, *or* disease and suffering. And when certain men perform sacred functions (as priests, priestly kings, magicians) their strength is a matter of supreme importance. They must fulfil certain conditions (observe taboos, etc.) in order to be able to function successfully, and their failure or the occurrence of disasters can be ascribed to their impotence and interpreted as a proof that they no longer enjoy the

[1] J. Jeremias, *E.Bi.* col. 4119; Zimmern, *KAT.* 534; Lagrange, 223 *sq.*

[2] In Palestine the sacrificial sheep must be faultless and without mutilation, so that on the Day of Judgment it may reappear perfect and able to save the man on whose behalf it was offered (*JPOS.* vi. 41).

[3] Cf., *e.g.*, Procopius, *Goth.* ii. 14 (cited by Chadwick, *Heroic Age*, 411).

favour or help of the supernatural powers. The slaying of the "sacred king" has become, thanks to Frazer's *Golden Bough*, one of the most remarkable and significant discoveries of anthropological research.[1] The weakness—physical, ritual, or moral—of the "sacred" man is a danger to his group and land, and whatever is interpreted as an indication thereof will be regarded as a warning that his period of usefulness is over; and conversely, steps will be taken to ensure that his condition is not likely to be prejudicial to people or land, hence his reign is a limited one, or he must defend himself against all comers, etc.[2] Theoretically, *all* members of the group are "sacred," and on their fitness depends the welfare of the group and all that is bound up with it; but in *practice* particular individuals, by reason of their functions, have a heavier responsibility. Cf. pp. 549, 591.

P. 342.—On 'Arafa, see Wellhausen, 82; and on the *ifāḍa*, Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 260.

P. 357. Unclean Animals.—On the animals in question, see the Index, also *E.Bi.* s.vv. and art. "Clean," §§ 7 *sqq.* On the pig, see also Baudissin, 142 *sqq.*, 529, and the references in R. Campbell Thompson, *Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia*, ii. p. xlvii; *Sem. Magic*, 208; G. Hölscher, *Die Profeten*, 376 *sq.* In Babylonia the pig was the sacred animal of Ninurta and Gula; and, while eaten at certain special feasts, was taboo on the 30th of the fifth month (Prince, *J.B.L.* xliv. 156). The heart of a pig and of a dog formed part of a sacrifice to evil spirits (Morgenstern, 118, and n. 5). On the dog, see also Baudissin (*s.v.* Hund) and Zimmern in the *Nöldeke-Festschrift*, ii. 962 n. 3 (in the dedication of a new image to the Moon-god). For the Harranian "lord with the dogs" (above, p. 291), see *ZA.* xi. 242 *sq.* At the present day it is sometimes a sin to kill a dog (Parry, *Six Months in a Syrian Monastery*, 71), and the worship of a large black dog with annual licentious rites is found among the Kizil-Bashi (G. R. Driver, *Bulletin of the School of Or. Stud.*, London, ii. 2, 198). On the dog and mouse, see Hölscher, *op. cit.* 378 *sq.*; and on the latter, *ZA.* xiv. 206, 250; Jacob, *Altarab. Parallel.* 11. Camel's flesh is tabooed food (above, p. 283 *sq.*), and it is a great insult in Mosul to say that a man eats of it (Campbell Thompson, *Sem. Magic*, 210 n. 1).

[1] See, in addition, on the killing of the Khazar kings (in South Russia), Frazer, *Folk-lore*, xxviii. 382–407. For the important Dinka evidence, see Seligman, *JRAI.* xliii. 664 *sqq.*, 673, and *ERE.* s.v., and for evidence from the northern tribes of Nigeria, see C. K. Meek, i. 255, ii. 59 *sqq.*; the king must not be ill or grow old.

[2] See also Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, ii. 609 *sq.* (in Morocco a pretender's *baraka* usually lasts only six months), and Landtman, *The Origin of Priesthood* (Ekenaes, Finland, 1905), 41 *sq.*, 64 *sq.*, 143 *sq.* (priests become chiefs through their supernatural powers; losing them, they are deposed and killed).

P. 357. Totemism and Animal-Names.[1]—Besides the references to the sacrifice and worship of animals described in the Deutero-Isaiah and Ezekiel, of particular interest is the appearance, at about the same age (viz. at the time of the discovery of the book of the Law in Josiah's reign), of leading temple-personages bearing the names Shaphan (coney or rather rock-badger), Achbor (mouse), and Ḥuldah (weasel or mole). It is, however, a recognized fact that animal-names *in themselves* do not necessarily imply totemism or any systematized animal-cult. To be more precise, it should be observed that, in general, clans or tribes bearing such names undergo vicissitudes similar to those of groups bearing other names, *e.g.* there will be tendencies to form larger groupings or for the clans to be replaced by local and regional groups. But more significant is the fact that groups with animal-names will sometimes possess stocks of names peculiar to each, so that it is possible to tell from the child's animal-name to which particular group it belongs, even as, on higher levels, names compounded with Marduk, Yahweh, or Apollo would, primarily at least, be an indication of the original *milieu* of the bearer (see Frazer, *Tot. Ex.* ii. 344, 473; iii. 13, 329, 360).

Further, there will sometimes be an appropriate connexion between the animal-name of the group and the names of the constituent individuals; *e.g.* among the Elk clan of the Omahas are such personal names as Soft Horn, White Elk, Stumpy Tail (*Tot. Ex.* i. 58 *sqq.*; iii. 35, 77, 101 *sq.*, 272). Such a practice, with which one may compare and contrast the theophorous names distinctive of Babylonian, Israelite, and other religions, is enhanced when it is a mark of piety to employ the animal-names, as the animal whose name the group bears would be angry if they fell out of use (the Wyandots, *Tot. Ex.* iii. 34 *sq.*). In harmony with this is the fear of uttering the name of a mythical animal-ancestor heedlessly or too often (the Warramunga of Australia, *Tot. Ex.* i. 145; *GB.* iii. 384)—the name is "sacred," neither to be forgotten nor to be too freely used. Totem-animals, like animal-guardians, are often supposed to benefit the men and women of their group, provided they are duly invoked (*Tot. Ex.* i. 532 *sq.*); while, on the other hand, the name is so "sacred" that sometimes the animal (totem or other) must not be spoken of by its true name but by a descriptive epithet (*Tot. Ex.* i. 16; *GB.* iii. 396 *sqq.*), and it is a serious offence for the name of a totem to be publicly pronounced by a man of another clan (the Tinnehs of North-West America, *Tot. Ex.* iii. 352 .

[1] See, in general, Jos. Jacobs, *Studies in Bibl. Archæology*, 64–103 (1894); G. B. Gray, *Heb. Proper Names*, 101 *sqq.*; Nöldeke, *ZDMG.* xl. 157 *sqq.*, and *Beiträge z. Semit. Sprachwissenschaft*, i. 73 *sqq.*; Zapletal, *Totemismus u. d. Rel. Israels*, 20 *sqq.* (1901).

Hence, the more significant the animal-name becomes, the more justly may it be said to function very similarly to that of anthropomorphic deities, though theophorous names, in their turn, constantly tend to lose their earlier force. And since the relation between the animals and the members of the group is essentially a " personal " one it is the more difficult to deny that such cults are religious, albeit of a very rudimentary type of religion. But only in proportion as the animal-name is an organic part of a significant system of social beliefs and practices can one begin to speak of true totemism.

Animal-names usually have *some* significance, for it is a common belief that people can be in some way influenced either by a name given to them or by the one who gives them the name. Animal-names are sometimes given to indicate the nature of the infant; they are supposed to frighten away demons and enemies or persuade them that the bearer is not worth their unwelcome attentions. In the same way, such personal names as " three (or five) cowries " among the Hindus will convince hostile spirits that such infants are beneath contempt.[1] It is true that some names may refer to bodily peculiarities (Meyer, *Israel.* 310 *sq.*; *Gesch. Alt.* i. § 55); but more significant are those that denote some such attribute or quality as strength or swiftness which, it is hoped, the bearer will possess. It is a common belief that animals far surpass men in some useful ability. So, in order to protect a sickly child it will be given the name of a wild beast (Doughty, i. 329), and the name is, within its limits, as effective as is a significant theophorous name elsewhere which is thought to secure for the bearer the aid of a god.

Sometimes the names of both persons and places are those of animals which frequent a locality, and in this way make an impression upon the natives. Such cases might seem to be trifling, but often there are typical beliefs which connect the infant's character or nature with the animal seen by the mother before its birth. In Gujarat, where no totem organization can be traced, an infant may be called by the name of the animal (cat, dog, crow, etc.) which is heard to utter a cry at the time when the infant is born.[2] But with this inchoate usage contrast Central Australia, where the child is supposed to owe its origin to the proximity of its mother to the locality where the spirits or souls of the totem-species and of the totem-group are collected.[3] There is admittedly a wide range of possibilities as regards animal-names, but in the majority of cases the name in some way associates the bearer with the animal in question; while in totemism

[1] Frazer, *FOT.* iii. 173; Clodd, *Magic in Names*, 102.

[2] R. E. Enthoven, *Folklore of Bombay*, 211.

[3] See Durkheim, 167 *sqq.*, 234 (discussion of the theories of the origin of totemism).

man and the totem-animal are of the same substance, even as, when gods and men are akin, some substantial identity is at least implicit in the relationship.[1]

Some writers on the "origin" of totemism hold that the system arose merely from the more or less fortuitous and non-significant bestowal of animal-names and from the mystical and transcendental ideas of a *rapport* between the individual and the animal which were in due course generated.[2] With this association granted, primitive man is supposed to believe that the animal, plant, or inanimate object or natural phenomenon is "in some hidden or mysterious way" connected with him, and this connexion "quite naturally" comes to be thought of in terms of relationship (I. King, 150). In more detail, Malinowski (ed. Needham, 45 *sq.*) points to man's keen interest in nature, the general affinity between man and the animals, the desire to control dangerous, useful, or edible animals, a desire which "must lead to a belief in special power over the species, affinity with it, a common essence between man and beast or plant." Such a belief "implies" certain restraints (*e.g.* the prohibition to kill and eat), and "endows man with the supernatural faculty of contributing ritually to the abundance of the species, . . ." and "this ritual leads to acts of a magical nature by which plenty is brought about."

All such explanations—if they can be so called—are of the greatest methodological interest both for the crucial *a priori* psychical elements which they are compelled to introduce, and for their bearing upon the problem of the relation between totemic (theriomorphic) and anthropomorphic cults. The psychological interrelation between such cults is such as to forbid us to sever them too rigidly; and it is sounder to recognize, not that the "higher" cults have evolved from the "lower," but that they are the more evolved forms of beliefs and practices which appear in a more rudimentary state in totemic and totemistic

[1] Cf. pp. 506, 549. Of Frazer's theories of totemism, the third (the conceptional origin of totemism) is based on the Australian evidence (*Tot. Ex.* i. 157 *sqq.*, iv. 57 *sqq.*). He distinguishes (*a*) the Australian belief that what enters a woman at conception is—in his words—"the spirit of a human child which has an animal, a plant, a stone, or what not for its totem," and (*b*) the possible belief—*not as yet vouched for*—that an animal, plant, or stone entered and was born as that object in human form, a belief which *if it occurred* would be "a complete explanation of totemism" (iv. 58). On the other hand, it seems evident that the totem-species and totem-group are so related that what takes a human form in the group can take the form of the totem before and after its human life, and a clear difference between the two does not exist. The totem does not "become" human any more than totemism "becomes" anthropomorphism; the true formula (that the *x* which appears in *l* reappears in another form in *m*) is a much more general one.

[2] Cf. Andrew Lang, *Ency. Brit.* "Totemism"; *Folk-lore*, xxiv. 159 *sqq.*

cults—and whose still more rudimentary forms in prehistoric times cannot be conceived. That, as apart from problems of evolution or development, the problems of totemism and of theism cannot be ultimately severed is seen in the fact that beliefs in Supreme Beings have been found in totemic and other very simple environments (p. 529), and that the period of—to use W. R. S.'s words—" the re-emergence of a cult of the most primitive totem-type "—though it may be safer to call it totemistic or theriomorphic—is precisely the period which in the Deutero-Isaiah witnessed the high-water mark of Israelite theism.

P. 358. MYSTIC CULTS.—The significance of Ezek. viii. 10 *sq.* was first perceived by W. R. S. in a famous article in the *Journal of Philology*, ix. (1880–81) 97 *sqq.*[1] Ed. Meyer (*Israeliten*, 309 n. 3 [1906]), while rejecting W. R. S.'s early arguments for David's supposed " serpent " connexions, attempts to explain Ezekiel's evidence on the lines of the bas-reliefs or paintings referred to in Ezek. xxiii. 14.[2] But it is clear that Ezekiel has in view more or less extensive cults due to the conviction that Yahweh had forsaken the land. A recent commentary (by Joh. Hermann, 60) recognizes a mystic cult, possibly Egyptian, though the mention of Tammuz could point to Babylon (viii. 14). It is very noteworthy, in any case, that one of the prominent officiants is the son of a Shaphan (badger), the name of one of the unclean animals, on whose Arabic equivalent the *wabr*, see p. 444, *Kinship*, 234, *Lectures*, 480 n. 1.[3] It is conceivable that the *shāphān*, the *'achbōr* (mouse), and the *ḥuldah* (mole) were among the creatures connected with cults of the dead, in which case the prominence of these names in the story of the " Deuteronomic " reform attributed to King Josiah (2 Kings xxii.) is as striking as the condemnation of certain mourning customs in the Deuteronomic law; cf. pp. 547, 605.

Animal-names recur also in the Edomite-Judæan genealogies. They are less marked in the northern tribes; and whatever be the best explanation of their presence and distribution, " the second commandment, the cardinal precept of spiritual worship, is explicitly directed against the worship of the denizens of air, earth, and water " (*Lectures*, 470 *sqq.*). There is little doubt that theriomorphism, at all events, must have been more prevalent and deep-seated than is recognized by those writers who deny that there is any evidence for

[1] Reprinted in *Lectures*, 455 *sqq.* (see especially 479 *sq.*). On the interest—and storm—it excited, see *Life*, 332 *sq.*, 368 *sqq.*, 381 *sq.*

[2] W. R. S. himself never repeated the precarious argument on David and Nahash, even in *Kinship* (1st ed. 1885); and attention was drawn to this fact in a review of Zapletal's criticisms of W. R. S. (*Der Totemismus und die Religion Israels*, 1901), see S. A. Cook, *Jew. Quart. Rev.*, April 1902, p. 416 and n. 3.

[3] The *wabr* must not be killed; see Musil, *Arab. Petræa*, iii. 324.

totemism of the sort that is found among rudimentary peoples of to-day. Further, it is no less noteworthy that Egypt—with which Palestine was in so many respects closely connected—is notorious both at the period under consideration, and later, for the persistence of extraordinary theriomorphic cults (see pp. 226, 578 *sq.*). It is also important to notice that, at this period of the collapse of social-religious systems and of the appearance of individualistic tendencies which naturally accompany and arise out of such conditions (cf. p. 592), we find not only new types of religious societies and mystical cults, but also guilds, unions, and other communities independent of the earlier social, political, and religious organizations, and possessing, in certain cases at least, more or less definite religious features of their own.

Some unions are distinctly industrial or economic, and they can be associated with the Temple of Jerusalem and, no doubt, the Second Temple dating from the latter part of the sixth century.[1] At the same time, there is independent evidence (*a*) for South Palestinian (semi-Edomitic) traditions of the origins of civilization and industry, (*b*) for the (late) Chronicler's interest in the Temple-guilds, and (*c*) for the probability that a semi-Edomite wave left its mark upon Palestine and upon the Biblical sources in and about the same age.[2] Obviously there are gaps between (1) the semi-Edomite and other animal-names, and the Temple and other guilds, and (2) the data in 2 Kings xxii., Isa. lxv. *sq.*, Ezek. viii. ; and for the present it can be regarded only as a coincidence that to the dog as a mystic sacrifice there corresponds the prominent semi-Edomite "dog"-clan Caleb in the constitution of Judah and, even at a late date, in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem.

Evidence of another sort is afforded by the communal festival מַרְזֵחַ in Amos vi. 7; Jer. xvi. 5. W. R. S. regarded it as some sort of atoning rite (p. 430 n. 4); but in the Talmud the term is used of a banquet or meal, and it is now well known from inscriptions.[3] On the Marseilles inscription (*CIS.* i. 165, l. 16, Cooke, No. 42) there are dues

[1] Cf. the craftsmen, potters, perfumers, and workers in linen in 1 Chron. iv. 14, 21, 23 ; Neh. iii. 8, 31 ; and in *CIS.* i. 86 A and B (from Citium) the builders, *velarii* (פרכם), barbers, masons, scribes, etc.; cf. the hereditary guilds at the Temple of Jerusalem, who possessed the secret of preparing the incense, etc. (*Yoma*, iii. 11). See in general P. Foucart, *Des Associations rel. chez les Grecs* (1873); Poland, *De Collegiis Artificum Dionysiacorum* (Dresden, 1895), *Gesch. d. griech. Vereinswesen* (Leipzig, 1909).

[2] See S. A. Cook, *CAH.* vi. 185 *sq.* ; cf. iii. 478–80.

[3] See Clermont-Ganneau, *Rec.* ii. 390, iii. 22, iv. 290, 339 ; *Qy. St. of the PEF.* 1901, pp. 239, 370 ; Gressmann, *Zeit. f. Neutest. Wissens.* xx. (1921) 228 *sqq.* ; and for the Talmudic data, see Dalman, *Neue Petra*, 93 *sq.*

for the מזרח (? the natives, a free society), the שפח the sept (cf. the clan sacrifice in 1 Sam. xx. 6, זבח משפחה), and the מרזח אלם or gathering in honour of the gods. There was a *marzē^{a}ḥ* at Altiburnus (Cooke, No. 55; twelve members and "their companions"), and that at Maktar had thirty-two members and performed various religious duties (Cooke, No. 59; Lidzb. i. 47 *sq.*). In a Piræus inscription (Cooke, No. 33), where a Sidonian community (בר) crown Shama'ba'al president of the corporation (נו), it seems to be the name of an annual festival. Among the Nabatæans it was connected with the divine king Obedath.[1] In the temple of Bel, at Palmyra, nine members erected an altar in Jan.–Feb. A.D. 132 to the gods Aglibol and Malakbel (Cooke, No. 140A; Lidzb. i. 344). Also an image was set up there in April A.D. 118 to a man during his presidency (רבנות מרזחותה) among the priests of Bel (Lidzb. ii. 281 *sq.*). In a bilingual of April 203, the president Shalmā was both symposiarch and *ἀρχιερεύς* (Lidzb. ii. 304); and the well-known Septimius Worod, viceroy of Palmyra in the time of Gallienus, was stratēgos and symposiarch of the priests of the god Bel (Cooke, 288, 303).

Another and more detailed Palmyrene inscription, of October A.D. 243, refers to Yarḥai Agrippa, who in his presidency "served the gods and presided over the divination (קסמא) all the year," and brought forth "old wine to the priests throughout the year from his house, and brought no wine in wineskins from the west." Among the officers enumerated are the scribe (כתובא), the cook (על בת דורא) —corresponding to the *ἀρχιμάγειρος* of the temple of Jupiter at Damascus (Wadd. 2549)—and Yarḥibola, the butler (ממזגנא).[2] Yet another reference to the term has long been found in the place-name *βητομαρσεα* (*i.e.* בית מרזח) on the mosaic map of Madeba (Büchler, *Rev. des Ét. Juives*, 1901, p. 105). According to Musil, the name may survive in el-Mezra', near Kerak. It is tempting to think of the rites of Baal-Peor; and, in fact, *Siphrē*, 47*b*, speaks of the orgiastic banquets (מרזיחים) with which the daughters of Moab tempted the Israelites (see Cooke, 122 n. 1). When Rabbinical tradition refers to the tents and booths which the women set up from Beth-Yeshimoth to the "Snow Mountain" (טור תלגא), it is preferable to read Mount Pisgah with Clermont-Ganneau, who adds that if, following Conder, Baal Peor lay beside 'Ain Minyeh, the adjacent Tal'at el-Benāt, with its old monuments of unhewn stone, bears the suggestive name, "the ascent of the maidens" (*Qy. St.* 1901, p. 372).

[1] עבדת אלהא, Dalman, *op. cit.* 93 *sq.*; Lidzb. iii. 278. On the cult, cf. Cooke, 245.

[2] See further H. Ingholt, *Syria*, vii. (1926), 128 *sqq.*

If Lidzbarski's interpretation of an ostrakon from Elephantine be correct, mention is made of contributions for a מרזחא, whence it would appear that in this Jewish colony the word had no disreputable associations (*Ephem.* iii. 304). Nor is there necessarily any condemnation in Jer. xvi. 5 (LXX *θίασος*), whether the reference be to an occasion of lamentation or, as in Amos vi. 7, of revelry.[1] Some light is thrown on orgiastic cults by Hos. iv. 17–19;[2] and the work of Baudissin, Frazer, and Gressmann combines with the discoveries of curious cult-objects at Beisān (Beth-Shan) to support the probability that there were mystical cults in early Palestine.

In view of this scattered evidence, the statement of W. R. S. that old types of cult would be likely to be prominent in the period of unrest and stress in and about the sixth century B.C. gains fresh force; and cults other than those of the Israelite nobles of Samaria whom Amos condemned, or of the colony of Elephantine, or of the Palmyrene priests can readily be imagined.[3] They would naturally be more in harmony with the internal economic and social conditions; and the guilds, corporations, or brotherhoods, whether connected with the Temple or not, and whether or no they had their patron saints or other religious models, would readily tend to be religious societies with more or less practical aims.[4] As a general rule, the means of life, the food-supply, and all vital pursuits are invariably interwoven with religious or quasi-religious ideas.[5] Especially is this the case among primitive peoples and in periods of crisis. Apart from the usual religious or magico-religious ceremonies of a communal nature (see p. 586), sometimes it is the function of special secret societies to promote fertility.[6] In Central Australia totemism is "economic": Nature is, so to say, subdivided among a number of clans, each of which is responsible for a special department; the whole society is bound together by the economic interdependence of all the parts.[7] Although this is unique, the general principles are world-wide; and with the break-up of the old religious systems in South-West Asia, and in the difficult economic conditions which can be traced, we are entitled to expect that the national and more orthodox beliefs and

[1] The latter interpretation is adopted by Duhm and Cornill; for the former, see Peake. The ambiguity has analogies (see p. 432).

[2] Emended text; see Gressmann, *ZNTW.* xx. 229 *sq.*

[3] The passage in Amos would seem to point to a musical guild, with David as the founder or patron of musical instruments; cf. the South Palestinian tradition of Jubal, etc. (see Meyer, *Israel.* 218 *sq.*; Cook, *CAH.* vi. 185 *sq.*).

[4] Cf. S. Angus, *Mystery Religions and Christianity*, 196 *sq.*

[5] See I. King, *Devel. of Rel.*, Index, *s.v.* "Food problem."

[6] *e.g.* among the Omahas, Hutton Webster, 182 *sq.*; cf. 188.

[7] Cf. Malinowski in the *Westermarck-Festschrift*, 97, 100, 105, 107 *sq.*

practices relating to the care of the great gods for their people and land would give way to others in no degree less practical, but far more unsystematized and rudimentary.

Finally, the transitional period after the breakdown of the early religious systems is of universal importance for the history of religion in general, and in particular for the development in the Deutero-Isaiah of ideas of God and Man which mark an epoch in the evolution of religion.[1] Here, and in the strange Egyptian animal-cults, in the scattered Biblical data for mystic cults, etc., in the exhibitions of spiritual arrogance—of which the tradition of Nebuchadrezzar is only one—there are the most extraordinary extremes. Behind Isa. liii. lies a new era in religion, at a period which found its outlet in the most diverse manifestations, of which the testimony of Ezek. viii. 12, Isa. lxv. 3 *sqq.*, etc., is beyond all doubt. The evidence for theriomorphic, if not totemistic modes of thought, taken as a whole, though varying in value, confronts the sublime conception of the Servant of the Lord; it is as though the deep-reaching disintegration of life and thought opened the way for unique developments in most contrary directions, and that roads led varyingly towards the "lowest" and the "highest" conceptions of spiritual nature. Cf. p. 554.

In both Egypt and South-West Asia the conditions of life and thought had passed far beyond those absolutely rudimentary conditions that characterize totemic societies *such as we know them*. W. R. S. has already pointed out that new cults can arise "at a later stage of human progress than that of which totemism is characteristic" (p. 138). It is now necessary to add that totemism can be seen in the making among the Bantu, and that among the northern tribes of Nigeria, Mohammedan families will venerate sacred animals as the embodiments of ancestral spirits.[2] But even in Central Australia totemism has had a history behind it (*Tot. Ex.* i. 238, 251). Hence, totemic and related phenomena represent tendencies which are not necessarily absolutely primitive, and which will vary in their issue according to the environment in which they emerge; and no one specific totem-system (such as that in Australia) is necessarily to be regarded as the criterion, even as Melanesian Mana is not the touchstone for the many various interrelated forms of "Mana" (see p. 550 *sq.*). Precisely what shall be the criteria of totemism, and how the varieties of totemic, totemistic, and theriomorphic cults shall be classified, are problems of methodology; but W. R. S.'s treatment of the Semitic

[1] Cf. G. F. Moore, *History of Religions*, i. viii *sq.*; Cook, *CAH.* iii. 489, 499. See also pp. 592 *sqq.*

[2] See respectively J. T. Brown, *Among the Bantu Nomads* (cf. *Times Lit. Suppl.* 18th March 1926), and C. K. Meek, i. 174 *sq.*

data has, in any event, led to repeated discussion of the problems along most varied and fruitful lines.

P. 361 *sqq.* HUMAN SACRIFICE.[1]—Its prevalence among agricultural communities as against hunters and pastorals may be due to the association of ideas concerning bloodshed and fertility of soil. Infanticide is more common among hunters (due in large measure to their mode of life), but cannibalism declines as one passes on to settled peoples.[2] Among the reasons for human sacrifice are (1) the use of dead bodies for magical purposes (Mader, 55, 65). (2) Various psychological reasons—the desire to get into touch with the supersensuous, the feeling that the passage from life to death unites the seen and the unseen realm, and the like. (3) More precisely the object is to arouse the gods, to extort their aid (Westermarck, *Morocco*, i. 528 *sq.*); or it is to send a message by the victim to the supernatural realm. (4) It is to secure the presence of a human spirit, a man's *mana* or his sacred influence. (5) While a death is often regarded as something vicarious—on the conviction that another's death has saved one's own, the next step is deliberately to slay in order that another may live, and typically to strengthen or prolong the life of a "sacred" man, a chief, etc. (*GB.* iv. 160 *sq.*, vi. 221 *sqq.*). Here should probably be included the sacrifices to Moloch or Melek, the king-god.[3] That human sacrifice in some way invigorated the supernatural powers —who in their turn sustained human and other life—is a most fundamental idea, in that it is associated, on the one hand, with the belief that gods needed food, etc.—and primarily in order that *they* might perform their functions—and, on the other hand, with the more spiritual convictions of what it is that God really does require from men.[4]

The evidence for human sacrifice proves to be exceedingly impressive, pointing to an early prevalence and, at times, a systematization of ideas uniting men and the supernatural realm. Indeed, Frazer

[1] Wellhausen, 43, 115 *sq.*; Lagrange, 101 *sqq.*; Mannhardt's essay (see p. 366 n. 5) is in his *Mythолog. Forschungen*; H. L. Strack, *Human Blood and Jewish Ritual* (1909); Mader, *Die Menschenopfer d. alten Hebräer u. d. benachbarten Völker* (Freiburg i. B., 1909); Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, i. ch. xix.; Schwenn, *Die Menschenopfer bei d. Griechen u. Römern* (Giessen, 1915).

[2] Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, 242.

[3] See Moore, *E.Bi.* 3187 *sqq.*; Lagrange, 99 *sqq.*, 108 *sq.*; Kennett and Frazer, *GB.* vi. 219 and note.

[4] For foundation sacrifices, see p. 633. The Egyptian kings sacrificed captives that their name might live; on the Arab. *nacī'a*, see p. 363 n. 1, and below, p. 641. On traces of the sacrifice of infants in South Arabian inscriptions, see *OLZ.* 1906, cols. 58–70; *Zeit. f. Ass.* xxix. 184 *sqq.* The supposed Phœnician references (*CIS.* i. 166, 194) are much too uncertain (cf. Mader, 78).

(*GB.* vii. 409) conjectures that there was a homogeneity of magico-religious ideas over a great part of South Europe and West Asia. Human sacrifice stamps relatively advanced and especially decadent peoples, among whom the difference between human and animal life is clearly understood; whereas, among rudimentary peoples the difference is only slightly grasped, and an animal victim might well be deemed a better victim than a man (cf. pp. 361, 623 *sq.*). As W. R. S. points out, the assumption that the animal victim is a surrogate for the human does not sufficiently explain the facts. If the change be due to a softening of manners, the re-emergence of the human victim enhanced religion; thus A. B. Davidson, speaking of the Servant of Yahweh in Isa. liii., well observes that "the prophet has taken the great step of lifting up the sacrificial idea out of the region of animal life into that of human life." [1] Human sacrifice (which became an obsession among certain peoples) and animal sacrifice alike admit of higher and lower interpretations; and any conviction that man was "higher" than the animals betokens a growth of human personality which involves the question of the relation between anthropomorphism and theriomorphism. See p. 670.

P. 366 n. 3.—Cf. Mader, 30. Prof. Peet points out (in a private communication) that the determinative throughout earlier times is simply a knife, with or without the addition of the sign of violent action, and that the determinative of the bound man with a knife at his throat is very late and degenerate. Whether so crude and, as it would seem, so primitive a meaning is to be expected in later times may seem doubtful, unless account is taken of the persistence of human sacrifice among the Phœnicians, and of other barbaric customs elsewhere in the old civilized world.

P. 366 n. 5.—On the possible Phœnician (Semitic) origin of Zeus Lycæus, see E. E. Sikes, *Classical Review*, ix. 68 *sq.*; on the wolf-god, see *Kinship*, 200, Frazer on Paus. viii. 2, 6 (and vol. iv. 189 *sq.*); Farnell, *Cults*, i. 41; A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, i. 63 n. 6.

P. 367. Cannibalism.—There is little evidence for cannibalistic ideas and usages in Palestine (*e.g.* "I slew him with my teeth," *Qy. St.* 1879, p. 85), Morocco (a symbolical practice by the blood-avenger, Westermarck, *Morocco*, i. 515), and Arabia (*Kinship*, 296); cf. also Lagrange, 259 and nn. 6 and 7). But cannibalism was primarily a mystical or sacred rite, and Malinowski (ed. Needham, 48) observes that among the Melanesians of New Guinea the custom of partaking of the flesh of the dead was a pious one, "done with extreme repugnance and dread," and at the same time felt to be "a supreme act of reverence, love, and devotion." Cf., in general, Westermarck, *Origin and*

[1] *O.T. Prophecy*, 430 (Edinburgh, 1903).

Development of the Moral Ideas, ii. ch. xlvi. Probably the most ancient, and certainly not the least interesting reference to it is found in the old "Pyramid Texts" (*c.* 2800 B.C.). These tell how the Pharaoh hunts, lassoes, and slaughters the gods in the celestial regions, makes an evening meal off them, and feeds on their internal organs in order to possess himself of their intelligence, skill, strength, etc. (see Breasted, *Rel. and Thought in Anc. Egypt*, 127 *sqq.*).

P. 372 *sqq.* BURNING THE VICTIM.[1]—For the ceremonial burnings at Hierapolis, see Clemen, *Baudissin-Festschrift*, 104 *sq.*, and cf. the destruction of garments, etc., at the festival of Simeon ben Yochai at Meiron (*Qy. St.* 1878, p. 24; *GB.* v. 178 *sq.*). On the Molech cult, see the references above, p. 630 n. 3; and on the flaming bull-shrines, A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, i. 722, 784 *sq.* Fire has its "spirit" inhabitants (*JPOS.* v. 165); like water, it is a purifying agent in Babylonia (*KAT.* 417 *sq.*; Jastrow, *Rel. Bel.* 315 *sq.*), and a symbol of purity in Zoroastrianism. Passing through fire can thus be interpreted as a cleansing rite (Eitrem, 133 *sqq.*, 169 *sq.*, 174). Similarly, in New South Wales, Dhuramoolan is supposed to kill the youths, cut them up, burn them, and remould them into new beings (R. H. Matthews, *JRAI.* xxv. 297 *sq.*, xxvi. 336). Westermarck (*Morocco*, ii. 199 *sqq.*) explains Midsummer fire-ceremonies as purificatory and intended to remove harmful influences (see also Frazer, *GB.* x. pp. vii, 330 *sq.*). But a magical efficacy is also attached to the burning of animals (*e.g.* of a cock to make the year "white" or lucky, West., 203), and ideas of regeneration and re-creation seem to be fundamental. For the burning of Dido, Heracles of Tyre, Hamilcar, and others, see *GB.* ch. v.–vii.; and as regards the so-called "pyre" of Sandan of Tarsus, see the criticisms of A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, i. 601. What was said of Sardanapalus seems to rest upon a confusion of Sin-shar-ishkun and the well-known fate of Shamash-shum-ukin; unfortunately the British Museum text is illegible at the place where the fate of the former would be described (Gadd, *Fall of Nineveh*, 18 *sq.*; Sidney Smith, *CAH.* iii. 129 *sq.*).

P. 376. FOUNDATION SACRIFICES.—On inaugural sacrifices, see p. 159 n. 1. At the present day, *dastūr* ("permission") is asked on approaching the abode of any supernatural being; and on commencing any undertaking it is usual to call on the name of Allah, the Virgin, and the Prophet (Canaan, *JPOS.* v. 166 *sq.*). The first or beginning of anything is crucial (cf. Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 136, 191, 285), and ceremonies intended to carry one over an initial critical period are as common as they are psychologically intelligible (cf. Marett, *Threshold*,

[1] On burnt sacrifices in general, see G. F. Moore, *E.Bi.* art. "Sacrifice," §§ 12 *sq.*, 26; Lagrange, 261; and on cremation, see Sartori, *Zeit. d. Vereins f Volkskunde*, xvii. 361 *sqq.*

171 *sqq.*). On foundation sacrifices in particular, see especially Sartori, *Zeit. f. Ethnol.* xxx. 1–54.[1] For Malalas's story of Antioch; see A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, ii. 1188. In the Arabic version of the Travels of John the Son of Zebedee (ed. Mrs. A. S. Lewis, 43) it is related that there was a Satanic power in the bath-house of the temple at Antioch; when the foundations were laid, a living girl was buried in the ground and the foundation-stone laid over her, and thrice a year (at dates known to the keeper) this Satanic being would strangle a victim. The belief still survives that certain buildings, especially baths and houses erected near a spring, will not prosper unless the foundation has been erected upon blood; and in the case of a Turkish bath a negro or Sudanese is the victim, whence such sayings as "The bath does not work except on a negro."[2] Of special interest is the evidence of Landtmann (*Acta Academiæ Abœnsis*, 1920, i. 5) on "Papuan Magic in the Building of Houses"—the lives of two old people, selected for the purpose, are forfeited when the building of the "men's house" is completed; the actual cause of death is not clear, "there seems to be an understanding that the endowment of the house, with its various magical properties, has consumed their vitality" (12 *sq.*, 28).

"All sanctuaries are consecrated by a theophany" (p. 436); and in the closely related stories of the altars inaugurated by Gideon and by Manoah, the mysterious messenger who disappears (in xiii. 20 he ascends in the flame; cf. Judg. xx. 40, of a burning city) may be the echo of a tradition of the burning of a sacred human victim (see S. A. Cook, *JTS.* 1927, No. 112). The human sacrifice at Duma (p. 370) to consecrate the altar finds a parallel in the similar sacrifice at the construction of altars of the Indian fire-god Agni (Loisy, 367), and in the Jewish and Christian belief that the souls of the righteous and of martyred saints are under the heavenly altar—martyrs being true sacrificial victims (see R.H.Charles on *Rev.* vi. 9). Evidence for ancient foundation sacrifices, illustrative of the story of Hiel's sacrifice (1 Kings xvi. 34), has been furnished by excavation in Palestine; besides remains of actual sacrifices are figurines of men cut from laminæ of bronze and silver (Macalister, *Gezer*, ii. 426 *sqq.*). It may be remarked that the Babylonian ritual for the dedication of a house names the brick-god (*il libitti*), who, prominent during the work of building, is now expelled (Zimmern, *Zeit. f. Ass.* xxiii. 369). Foundation deposits, however, are found, nails terminating in a female bust, copper male figures

[1] See also Trumbull, *Threshold Covenant*, 45 *sqq.*; Jaussen, 339, 343; Frazer, *GB.* iii. 89 *sqq.*; *FOT.* i. 421 *sq.*; and for the degeneration of the practice and the survivals, A. C. Haddon, *Study of Man*, 347–361.

[2] Canaan, *JPOS.* vi. 63; see also Hanauer, *Qy. St.* Jan. 1908, p. 77 *sq.* (if a man's shadow fall upon a foundation-stone that is being laid he will die within the year).

bearing the builder's basket, clay figures of the god Papsukal.[1] On the other hand, in Egypt the foundation deposits are under the corners of a building or the wall itself, and consist of objects intended to serve the deceased in his future life.

P. 381. VITAL PARTS OF THE BODY.—Among the Semites, as among other early peoples, the psychical (mental, ethical) and physical are one, "psychical and ethical functions are considered to be just as appropriate to the bodily organs as the physiological."[2] For the Bab. liver (*kabittu*) and reins (*kalitu, kalâte*) as seats of the emotions, see Dhorme, *Rev. Bibl.* xxxi. 506, 508 *sq.*, xxxii. 194. On the liver in Syriac and Arabic literature, see Merx, *Florilegium Vogüé*, 427 *sqq.* (citing, *inter alia*, Ibn Ezra, "the soul is in the liver"). The liver is of special interest for its use in divination (hepatoscopy), the pseudo-science which spread to the Etruscans, Greeks, and Romans, and turned on the belief that by appropriate means the liver of a sacrificial victim could be made to reflect the very soul or intention of the god.[3]

Any part of the body that was regarded as vital, indeed anything that seemed to be intimately connected with a man (*e.g.* his name or shadow), could be treated as an integral part of him, part of his personality in fact. In this way any part of a whole (*a*) could be used by an enemy, who would work magic by means of it[4]; or (*b*) it could be used as a charm or talisman, like a saint's relic,[5] and (*c*) it could be placed in security in order to preserve the owner's life.[6]

The "part" sufficiently represents the "whole." The under-

[1] See, further, L. W. King, *Records of the Reign of Tukulti-Ninib*, i. 15 *sqq.*

[2] H. Wheeler Robinson, in Peake's *People and Book*, 353 *sqq.*; for O.T. data, see 362 *sqq.*

[3] For a concise account of Jastrow's researches in this field, see his *Religious Beliefs in Babylonia and Assyria*, 150 *sqq.*; cf. also Halliday, *Gr. Div.* 187 *sqq.*, 198. On the erroneously styled "caul" (the "finger" or "lobe" of the liver), see Moore in the *Nöldeke-Festschrift*, 761 *sqq.*; it was probably as a protest against divination that this significant part (the Roman *caput jecoris*) was commanded to be burnt (Lev. iii. 4; see Jastrow, 172 n. 2).

[4] For magical practices with parts of the body, see *GB.* i. 182–200. The belief in the danger of throwing away one's nail parings is old (see Seligsohn, *Jewish Ency.* "Nails"; Daiches, *Oil Magic*, 32 n.).

[5] Cf. p. 382 n. 1. For the head as a trophy, see G. Jacob, *Das Leben d. vorislam. Beduinen*, 128 and n. 2; and as a relic, M. van Berchem, *Sachau-Festschrift*, 303 *sq.*; Reinach, *Rev. de l'Hist. Rel.* lxiii. 25; *Cultes*, iv. 252 *sq.*

[6] The after-birth (*GB.* xi. 162) was viewed in Egypt as the physical or spiritual double of the child, and is still preserved among Arab tribes of the Sudan. At Kordofan a shrine is said to contain the placenta of a holy man; see C. G. Seligman and Miss Margaret Murray, *Man* (1911), No. 97 (the Egyptian Sed festival and African parallels); Seligman, *JRAI.* xliii. 658; and the *Ridgeway Presentation Volume*, 451]*sq.*

lying principle recurs in ideas of group responsibility or corporate personality where the individual is part of a larger unit, which he can represent as a victim, scapegoat, mediator, etc. It is expressed (*a*) psychologically, in the ideas of preserving or of blotting out a *name*, and (*b*) physically, in rites for the preservation of blood, etc. Material vehicles are commonly required, as when a monument is set up to perpetuate the name, or the Ark and Temple of the Israelites testify to the presence and protection of Yahweh. The life of the people is wrapped up, as it were, in David the King (2 Sam. xxi. 17), but when David's life is bound up in the bundle of life with Yahweh (1 Sam. xxv. 29; Frazer, *FOT.* ii. 503 *sqq.*), the question arises whether there were appropriate symbols (*e.g.* like the Australian *churinga* or other material receptacles of life or soul). Similarly, when souls could be hunted or snared (Ezek. xiii. 17–21; *FOT.* ii. 510 *sqq.*), it is to be noted that among other peoples the belief that the soul has some concrete or material embodiment is a commonplace. In the various beliefs to the effect that (*a*) the individual has a life, soul, or vital principle which can be localized (in the blood, fat, etc.), and (*b*) that the larger group-unit can be represented adequately by a particular individual, are illustrated the ways in which early peoples endeavoured to express certain intuitive convictions of the "whole" of which the individual was a vital "part," and the relation between parts and wholes, whether of groups or of individuals. Frequently, the death or annihilation of a "part" does not affect the "whole." The man has an "external soul" or it is preserved elsewhere, and he is therefore safe (*GB.* xi. ch. x. *sq.*). An animal dies, but the species lives; or it is killed, but certain appropriate beliefs and rites secure the continuity of the animal. The individual is bound up with that which is more permanent than himself—the group (through whom runs one common life), or the "living god," whose attribute guarantees the continuity of the group. The fundamental convictions of some unity and continuity transcend the particular ways in which we find them expressed; and the fact that even in totemism they occur in remarkably systematized forms is far more important than the secondary question whether those are the "origin" of the more advanced forms.

P. 395 *sq.* PROPERTY.—Primitive ideas of property turn upon (1) the relations between the group and its god, (2) the group's land and livelihood, and (3) the relations between the group and the individual. Even among rudimentary peoples there is a certain amount of individuality and—where men have their own fetishes or their own personal totems—of individual religion, and consequently personal property is by no means rare (cf. p. 590). Thus, the Australian native will give away his weapons, tools, or even his *churinga*—the sacred

object with which his soul or spirit is connected—though it is disposed of only according to certain rules (Wheeler, *The Tribe*, 36 *sq.*). Men can even possess dances; there are proprietary rights in other than material objects, although when they are claimed or renounced, a certain reality and substance is given to the procedure by means of symbols; cf. the story of Ruth (iii. 9, iv. 7), and see *Kinship*, 105. Naturally, individuality and individual property are less and ideas of communal or group property are greater among early, unspecialized, or relatively simple societies; and when the religion encourages community of goods, this has sometimes meant, *e.g.* in Fiji, "the privilege of pilfering each other's goods with impunity." [1]

What is intimately connected with an individual is so much a part of him that it can serve as a potent relic or can be used to his hurt by the "magician." This might be his hair or his clothing, and sometimes the personal property of a man is so indistinguishable from him that it is destroyed at his death, not necessarily in the conviction that in this way it could accompany him to his new existence—prevalent though this belief has been—but rather from "the primitive extension of the man's personality to all the objects commonly associated with him in his lifetime." [2]

Among simple peoples, and hunters in particular, there is little divided ownership of land, and rights are shared by the tribe as a whole. But among so rude a folk as the Veddahs individuals will hold land, though they may not alienate it save with the permission of the group. Such a rule is common, and in Babylonia when Manishtusu bought an estate for his son, the leading men of each hamlet were the sellers (Johns, *Bab. and Ass. Laws*, 192). "Private ownership tends to increase in the higher agricultural stages, but partly in association with the communal principle, partly qualified by dependence on the chief, or, in some instances, by something of the nature of 'feudal tenure.'" [3]

The underlying ideas of property are of a semi-mystical nature in that the land belongs to the whole group and its sacred beings; or, as in Israel, both land and people belong to the god (cf. pp. 95 *sqq.*, 536 *sq.*). In Australian totemism the totem-group who own land are virtually the reincarnations of their ancestors, and it is a typical conviction that the place where men are born is their own, and that they have a right to hunt over it.[4] Further, although ideas of property *seem* to lead

[1] J. F. M'Lennan, *Studies in Ancient History*, 2nd series, 217; to a similar effect, see R. A. S. Macalister, *Hist. of Civilisation in Palestine*, 127 *sqq.*

[2] E. S. Hartland, *Primitive Law*, 88 *sqq.*

[3] Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, 246, 253.

[4] Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 322, 325. Cf. p. 536 n. 2 above.

back to an absolute community, analogous to a primary promiscuity (cf. *Kinship*, 150 *sq.*), this is *theory* rather than *practice*, for there are representatives (chiefs, priests, etc.), and they have superior rights and privileges on account of their important functions or duties, which are primarily on behalf of the group. For example, they will receive a larger share of booty, etc. (see above, p. 495 *sq.*). Indeed, individuals may be said to have property-rights only as effective members of the group, and according to an old Arab rule, " none can be heirs who do not take part in battle, drive booty, and protect property " (*Kinship*, 66). However simple and intelligible in itself such a principle might be, it is a natural step from the rule that booty belonged only to the actual warriors (*ib.* 67) to the typical problem whether other members of the group were entitled to share in the distribution (1 Sam. xxx. 24 *sq.*, compared with Num. xxxi. 27 *sqq.*). And here arose the problem of the limits of groups. In general, the members of a group are bound together by initiation and other unifying ceremonies, by a common belief both in the validity of taboos, curses, and other supernatural sanctions, and in the function of the gods.[1] Property rights belonged to the full member of the group; the man outside the group is as such rightless; see further, p. 661.

Writers who suppose that primitive communities would escape the temptations to greed and avarice that beset modern societies, tend to forget that wives, children, and slaves were, in a sense, property. In fact, these certainly evoked early ideas of production and possession, even as the problems of the food-supply inevitably stimulated primitive speculation on growth and ownership. Even marital rights are property rights (*Kinship*, 105; cf. 132); but the rights of men over women are not absolute (cf. Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, i. 631 *sqq.*, 637 *sqq.*). Women are commonly regarded as chattels; but they have limited rights of property, even as slaves may have a right to their own earnings. Neither women nor slaves could dispose of their person; and although their liberty is typically restricted as regards specific functions and duties, the menfolk, too, as full members of a group, are in their turn subject to the restrictions borne by the group. Hence the group-system is, as such, founded upon mutual restrictions which are for its welfare; though in practice there is the invariable question whether such and such restrictions upon the disposal of oneself or one's possessions—in the widest sense—are for the advantage of particular individuals or of the group as a whole.

The feeling that production gives right of possession finds its most

[1] There are well-known gods of justice or righteousness (cf. p. 659 below); and in Senegambia two gods preside over Justice and Property respectively (Frazer, *FOT*, iii, 317). See, in general, Frazer, *Psyche's Task*,

characteristic expression in the question whether children, being gotten by the mother, belong to her kin-group, or, being begotten by the father, should be reckoned to his (cf. *CAH.* i.[2] 207 *sq.*). The difference, which is of the first importance in sociological development, not only involves primitive conceptions of production and ownership, but is also bound up with ideas of the supernatural factor in the processes of growth. As a general rule, much that could be reckoned among a man's possessions was seen to be due not solely to his own efforts; and ideas of production and possession typically involved the supernatural powers as causes of fertility and prosperity, or even as owners and occupiers of the world at large. Thus, waste land had its occupants, it must not be opened up heedlessly; and when the Hebrew *yārash* significantly covers both possession and dispossession, it agrees with the general feeling that things not already possessed by men are not without some possessor who has rights over them, or that they are "sacred" before they are taken by "sacred" individuals or are put to "profane" use after suitable precautions (above, p. 159 n.).[1]

The very practice of firstfruits, firstlings, and votive offerings, and the ceremonies believed to be indispensable for the maintenance and sustenance of the group, commonly reflect the primitive prototype of the later and more explicit conviction that, whatever be due to human activity, the increase is given by God. In the anxiety of primitive peoples concerning the fertility of man and of nature it is possible to perceive the underlying question—Do the gods (spirits, etc.) own, control, or exploit what they bestow upon men, much in the same way as men? Or, as proprietors, agencies, producers, etc., are their activities in some way quite different from man's? In other words, men's ideas of their own powers, and their ideas of what lies within the power of gods, spirits, and the like, interact; and in the ideas of property, possession, rights, and so forth, the human and the supernatural or divine spheres interpenetrate. Moreover, sometimes the gods are obviously thought to possess complete rights over the processes upon which men rely; but at other times they appear to be so immediately one with them as to be "immanent" in them. In either case men expect by appropriate appeal to gain the help of their gods. But, as apart from this, groups or special individuals are constantly performing ceremonies as though these processes were either completely under their control or immanent in themselves. That is to say, the data of religion represent gods and men alike as *controlling* from

[1] Hence, too, when the group-system has come to repudiate the widow and orphan it will be enunciated (as in O.T. religion) that these are under the care of the god of the group, thus extending the idea of the limits of the group and the group-god in question.

outside the processes upon which production, property, and wealth may be said to depend, or as being in intimate and immediate connexion with them, *immanent* in them.

W. R. S.'s fundamental theory is that holy things belong to the holy group and its god; and when they are appropriated, it is by the representatives of the group and for the purposes of the group in its relation to the god (p. 147). This group, bound up with its past and its future, and with the god, is not the visible group limited in space and time; and in agreement with this is his argument elsewhere to the effect that all property belongs to the group, and that individuals have only the usufruct (*Kinship*, 67). The latter view is instructive if only because such a law as that of the bird's nest in Deut. xxii. 6 *sq.* is no doubt meant to be a typical case of the "right of user." Complete possession cannot be claimed, especially by a people who, with its land, belongs to its god; and even the ceremonial treatment of the blood of animals slain for food reflects the conviction that part of the victim must be restored to the giver of all things (p. 584 *sq.*).

W. R. S.'s strong remarks upon the evil effect of ideas of property in the development of religion are in keeping with his entire argument. A wrong notion of property obscures the elementary facts of the relation between the member of a group, his group, and the god. It is true that he seems to some writers to underrate the undeniable psychological value of benevolence and generosity (2 Cor. ix. 7); but he is concerned with the danger of false notions of the value of mere acts of transference, as though divine favour could be bought by payments (p. 396). The prophets condemn the assumption that heavy payments and costly gifts would purchase those practical manifestations of Yahweh's favour and assistance upon which the people's very existence depended (cf. G. B. Gray, *Sacrifice*, 43 *sq.*, 53 *sq.*). To cite Gray, "The prophets held forth the truth that God's favour is found by man's becoming like Himself, just and merciful . . . the tenour of their teaching was, not gifts but fellowship" (44). In other words, their ideal is the *imitatio Dei*, and this is no other than the spiritual counterpart of the primitive ideas that man's life, property, and welfare are secured by the ceremonial rites of communion or of identification with supernatural beings or with "natural" processes, which rites, however "magical" they tend to become, have in their primary stages those valuable characteristics which merit the term "magico-religious." Primitive religion—religion in its primary stages—is predominantly practical (cf. also Matt. vi. 25–33), and although W. R. S. appears to be dealing with abstract and theoretical questions, they are the ideas which are implicit, however imperfectly, in religious cults from totemism upwards.

P. 402. War.[1]—Among primitive peoples the objects of war are mainly blood-revenge and vengeance, rather than booty or territorial gains. At a more advanced stage, where religious, political, and other considerations are interwoven, wars avenge affronts upon the god's representative, people, or land; they carry the god's name where it was previously unknown, and among the old Oriental peoples wars, as distinct from mere forays, will owe their driving force to religious enthusiasm (or fanaticism), and the imperialism is a religious one. Speaking generally, at the opening ceremonies of war means are taken to consult oracles and enlist the gods (1 Sam. xxiii. 2, 4, 11; contrast xxviii. 6, 15; cf. Wellhausen, 132, 136 *sq.*). The familiar mimetic rites of primitive peoples serve partly to concentrate attention upon the coming fight, and no doubt partly also as a rehearsal. The dramatic language of Ezekiel (ch. iv.), symbolizing the certainty of the divine judgment, would find a distinctly "magical" counterpart in the means commonly adopted to ensure, if not rather to compel, the help of the gods; cf. the story of Nectanebus (in Budge, *Alexander the Great*, ii. 4 *sq.*). The mimetic ceremonies and the taboos of the women, when the men are away fighting, have primarily a psychological value; they are "the spontaneous outflow of action along the line of that which absorbed their attention" (I. King, *Devel. of Rel.* 179 *sq.*). But while the knowledge of the women's interest could naturally stimulate the absent menfolk, the activities tend to become regarded as indispensable and automatically helpful, and thus gain a "magical" efficacy. Similarly, the chastity both of the women at home and of the warriors away, and the various taboos and vows, are primarily of psychological value, being "religious," or rather "magico-religious," before they become mechanical methods of hastening victory. That some taboos were likely to defeat their object is evident from what is said of Saul's vow (1 Sam. xiv. 24 *sqq.*) and of the Jews' refusal to fight on their Sabbath day (1 Macc. ii. 32 *sqq.*). Frazer cites cases of abstinence from food, self-mutilation, and even the cutting off of fingers among the Nootka Indians in order to ensure success (*GB.* iii. 160 *sqq.*). Primarily, all such heroic measures are intended to gain if not to force the assistance of the gods, and however "superstitious" or "frivolous" they may seem, it is necessary to recognize that they are psychologically explicable in their origin, and are very important testimonies to the similarity of the religious consciousness everywhere, and to the spontaneous conviction of the efficacy of restrictions, restraints, mortifying practices, and self-inflicted pain.

[1] See Schwally, *Semit. Kriegsaltertümer*; Holsti, "Some Superstitious Customs in Primitive Warfare," *Westermarck-Festschrift*, 137 *sqq.*; Sir G. A. Smith, *Deuteronomy*, 243 *sqq.*; S. A. Cook, *Rel. of Ancient Palestine*, s.v.

The order of encampment in Num. ii.—each tribe with its standard —finds a parallel in the Bedouin encampment "by kindreds" (Doughty, i. 414), and among North American Indians on the march, when "the members of each totem-clan camp together and the clans are arranged in a fixed order in camp" (Frazer, *Tot. Ex.* i. 75). When some Australian tribes go to war, the totem animal is carried, stuffed, as a standard.[1] Not only do the gods frequently accompany the army (p. 37 above), but men fight on behalf of their gods or what their gods stand for; and they will be appropriately decorated with symbols or emblems of their totem or their god. They thus do more than merely imitate their gods: they are filled with a literal "enthusiasm." To warlike peoples correspond gods of war, and Egyptian references to the fierceness of Pharaoh, like "Baal in his wrath," etc., throw light upon the character of the Palestinian god (Hadad, see p. 532 *sq.*)—with which one may compare the attributes of Yahweh as a war-god—and point to the considerable body of relevant beliefs and practices concerning war and the gods which once prevailed (cf. *CAH.* ii. 349; iii. 431). The *hérem* is only theoretically absolute (Doughty, i. 335; Sir G. A. Smith on Deut. ii. 34). The slaughter of prisoners, especially chiefs, was a common practice in Egypt. In Assyria, of evil fame for its atrocities, Ashurnasirpal II. burns boys and girls (Annals, i. 109; ii. 19, 109 *sq.*); Ashurbanipal slays prisoners for the dead (*Keilinschrift. Bibliothek*, ii. 193, col. iv. 70), and kills the king of Elam on a board like a sheep (*KB.* ii. 257). On the *nacī'a*, see pp. 363 n., 491 *sq.*, and cf. the survival in Doughty, i. 452; and for the suggestion of the "eminent scholar," see Wellhausen, 121 n. 2, 127 n. 4. The splitting or rending (p. 491) recalls the use of *shāsa'* of the tearing open of the bird in Lev. i. 17; and when Samson similarly tears the lion down the middle, cf. the act of Engidu, and see further Burney, *Judges*, 358, and plate ii. (4).

The subsequent purificatory rites (p. 491) are on the same principle as those after other cases of bloodshed (see *GB.* iii. 157 *sqq.*, 165 *sqq.*; *FOT.* i. 87 *sq.*, 93 *sqq.*; Gray, *Num.* 243 *sq.*). Men pass through or under something, they wash away the stains of blood, they appease the spirits of the slain, and in one way or another ceremonially mark the cessation of the state of warfare which had been ceremonially inaugurated.

P. 406. Spring Festivals.—In the first lecture of the second series of the Burnett Lectures, "traces of the sanctity of the month of Nisan were shown to exist over a wide area, not only among the Arabs, but also among the northern Semites. The Hebrew Passover was older

[1] M'Lennan, *Studies in Ancient History*, ii. 301; cf. 380 (Aztecs), and Frazer, *Tot. Ex.* ii. 23 (Torres Straits).

than the settlement in Canaan, and preserved antique features similar to those of the most primitive Arabian sacrifices. In the later forms of Semitic religions, as elsewhere among the civilized peoples of antiquity, there gradually arose an elaborate cycle of annual feasts—a sacred calendar which ultimately was fixed astronomically." [1] On the Arab sacrifices in the month Rajab (pp. 227 *sq.* and n. 3, 465), see now Wellhausen, 97 *sqq.*; Winckler, *Altorient. Forsch.* ii. 344 *sq.*; Benzinger, *E.Bi.* "Passover" (especially col. 3594), and Moore, *ib.* "Sacrifice," § 4 *sq.* (on Spring Sacrifices).

Among other spring festivals are those of Harran: the first days of Nisan being a festival to Beltis (pp. 406 *sq.*, 470 *sq.*; Chwolson, ii. 25, 181); Hierapolis: annual holocausts (pp. 371 n., 375, 406, 471); and Cyprian Aphrodite (pp. 291, 470, 472). The Nabatæan and Palmyrene evidence (p. 407 n.) consists in the frequency with which inscriptions are dated in Nisan; cf., for example, the "symposia" (p. 627), and see Lidzbarski, *Ephem.* ii. 304.

For modern spring circumcision festivals among the Arabs, see Doughty, i. 340 *sq.* (sacrifice of sheep, dancing, the young men select wives). The Neby Musā Easter festival, held a few miles to the south-west of Jericho, is a time of music and story-telling, of trading and of contests, vows are paid, the dead visited, and circumcision rites performed (Canaan, *JPOS.* vi. 117 *sqq.*). North Syrian Christians in the course of their solemn Easter ceremonies place food on the tombs (Parry, *Six Months in a Christian Monastery*, 382 *sq.*). At Malta a spring festival of St. John the Baptist seems to have taken the place of an Adonis rite (Baudissin, 129 *sqq.*, citing Wünsch's monograph, 50 *sq.* [1902]). For a spring festival with traces of fertility rites in Algeria, among the Shawiya, and some 150 miles away from the seat of the ancient Ausenses with their festival to Athena (Herod. iv. 180), see Hilton-Simpson, *Folk-lore*, xxxiii. 192, *Geog. Journ.* 1922, Jan., 32. For some traces of Easter vegetation rites in Italy and for a Greek association of the Resurrection with fertility in general, see above, p. 597. In modern Greece certain April dances have very archaic features; see Diels (*Harnack-Festschrift*, 69, 72 n. 4), who cites the condemnation by St. Basil of the shameless Easter dances of his day (Migne, *Patr. Gr.* xxxi. 446).

Possible indications of a spring festival among the Hittites, with horse-racing, etc., have been tentatively pointed out by Ehelolf (*SB.* of the Berlin Academy, 1925, p. 269). But by far the most valuable evidence is that of the Babylonian spring festival of the birth of the year and the union of the solar deity Inurta or (at Lagash)

[1] *Life*, 526. The second course (consisting of three lectures) was delivered from fragmentary notes.

Ningirsu with the goddess Gula or (at Nippur) Bau (*KAT.* 371; Jastrow, *Rel. Bel.* 130, 340 *sqq.*). Traces of specific fertility rites at the New Year (spring) are very ancient, to judge from the Assyrian festival in the garden of Nebo's temple in Assyria, where the king, priests in masks (evidently representing various gods), and Ishtar appear to perform ceremonies connected with the revival of vegetation. From a stela of Ur-Nammu (*c.* 2300 B.C.), it is possible that the ceremonial eating of fruit by the king was a significant part of these or similar rites.[1] Of special interest are the New Year festivals such as were held at Erech in Tishri (autumn) and at Babylon in Nisan (spring). Here, in the sixth and later centuries B.C., there was a celebration of the death and resurrection of Marduk-Bel, wherein the king and the priest took the part of that god and of Nebo respectively. On the evening of Nisan 4 there was a recital of the Creation Epic, with the birth of Marduk, his victory over the rebels, the establishment of the Divine Order, the theft of the Tablets of Destiny, Marduk's fall—Babylon is thrown into confusion in his absence—and his subsequent return.[2] Among the features of importance for this note and the following, are (1) the ceremonial entry of the Babylonian high priest into the very presence of the god on the second of Nisan. Similarly, the Jewish high priest goes behind the veil on the Jewish Day of Atonement, on the 10th of the (autumnal) New Year (Lev. xvi., Heb. ix. 7). To be allowed to see the face of the Pharaoh, the representative of the national god, was a sign of high favour (cf. the Amarna Letters, Nos. 148, 165, 286, etc.; *CAH.* ii. 342). In like manner, it is the privilege of the king to be crowned by the god and to see the god in his holy chamber, and the Ethiopian Piankhi broke the seals and entered the most sacred abode of Re as an assertion of his position as legitimate Pharaoh.[3]

(2) On the fifth of Nisan the Babylonian king makes his first appearance and enters the shrine of Marduk alone. There follows a ritual act of humiliation and abdication. The high priest smites the king; if he weeps, it is a good sign. After a humble prayer, the king is comforted by the priest and receives again the sceptre and other insignia of which he had been ceremonially deprived. It was a fateful time for the king, and omens were taken from his behaviour—if he

[1] See further, Sidney Smith, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies* (1926), 72 *sq.*; *Rev. d'Ass.* xxi. (1924), 84.

[2] See further, Langdon, *Bab. Epic of Creation*, 20 *sq.*, *JRAS.* 1924, p. 69 *sq.*; Zimmern, *Das bab. Neujahrsfest* (*Der alte Orient*, 1926); Pallis, *The Babylonian Akîtu Festival* (Copenhagen, 1926). For the texts, see Gressmann, *Altorient. Texte z. A.T.*[2] 295–322.

[3] Breasted, *Anc. Rec.* ii. §§ 134, 221 *sqq.*, iv. §§ 806, 871; Hall, *CAH.* iii. 272 *sq.*

stumbled, it was unlucky. Certain traces of Jewish prayers for royalty at the spring or at the autumn New Year appear to indicate that the New Year as a time of confirming or renewing kingly majesty was known also in Judaism.[1]

(3) The New Year is a time of judgment. On Nisan 8 and 11 Marduk and the gods assemble in the Chamber of Destiny and decree the fates for the coming months. Similarly, at the New Year festival of the Yezīdis, the god sits on the throne issuing decrees for the year.[2] Survivals of the same belief attached themselves to the period of the Jewish Day of Atonement at the autumnal New Year. Late tradition differed as to whether the world was created in the first month (spring) or in the seventh (autumn). At all events, in the seventh month, on the anniversary of the creation of the world, God determines the lot of each land, whether it be for war or peace, for abundance or famine. According to popular belief, nine days are spent in fixing the destiny of individuals, and on the tenth the angels inscribe it in the book of fate.[3]

(4) It is a well-known belief that the opening day of the year will determine the rest (*e.g.* Nilsson, *Archiv f. Rel.* xix. 65, 69). References to fertility rites at Easter or the New Year have already been made. Their appropriateness at this season is obvious. Further, it is sometimes believed that (*a*) the decrees for the forthcoming year will affect the amount of rainfall, or (*b*) that the rain at the New Year is especially efficacious. Thus, as regards (*a*), it was a Jewish belief that at the beginning of the (autumnal) New Year rain was decreed in accordance with the merits of Israel. If Israel sinned, there was only little; if she repented, the amount could not be increased, but it would fall where it would do most good. If Israel was righteous, much rain would be decreed; if she sinned, the decree could not be revoked, but the rain would fall on seas and deserts, so that men would not profit from it.[4] As for (*b*), in Morocco the rain of April 27–May 3 has *baraka* and cures sterility, and in Palestine rain in Nisan is especially

[1] H. St. J. Thackeray, *Septuagint and Jewish Worship* (1921), 94; on the New Year prayers extolling divine majesty, see Bousset-Gressmann, *Rel. d. Judentums*[3], 371 *sq.* See further, H. Schmidt, *Die Thronfahrt Jahves am Fest der Jahreswende im Alten Israel* (Tübingen, 1927).

[2] Brockelmann, *ZDMG.* lv. 388 *sqq.*; cf. Chabot, *J. As.*, ninth series, vii. 123 *sq.*

[3] *Rosh ha-Shanah*, i. 9; see *KAT.* 515 nn. 9–10; *Jew. Encyc.* "Atonement (Day of)," "New Year"; G. B. Gray, *Sacrifice*, 303 *sq.* On the Hebrew parallel to the Babylonian "tablets of fate," cf. Pss. lxix. 28, lxxxvii. 6, cxxxix. 16, and Bousset-Gressmann, 258.

[4] Contrast Matt. v. 45, and see p. 663. In *Jubilees* xii. 16 *sq.*, Abraham is rebuked for his attempt, on the night of the New Moon of the seventh month, to determine from the stars the prospects of the year as regards rainfall.

valued (Westermarck, *Morocco*, ii. 177 *sqq.*). On a water ceremony at the well Zamzam at the New Year, believed to affect the supply of water throughout the year, see Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 84 *sq.*

Finally, (5) the beginning of the year is a new creation and inaugurates new conditions.[1] The belief that a new stage is introduced underlies both the annual Day of Atonement in the autumnal New Year (see p. 650) and the significance of the spring New Year at great periods in Biblical tradition: (*a*) the birth of Israel as a nation (Ex. xiii. 4), (*b*) the beginning of the return from exile under Ezra (first of the first month, Ezra vii. 9), and (*c*) the return of Nehemiah (Neh. ii. 1).[2]

P. 408. ATONEMENT.—When it is said that in primitive religion "the sense of sin, in any proper sense of the word, did not exist at all" (p. 401), a distinction is being drawn between the modern idea of sin as specifically an ethical, moral, or spiritual failing or offence and that wider connotation of words for sin, evil, wrong, etc., which characterizes early stages of thought. Here the infringement of some recognized custom or rite is very keenly felt; and men, overwhelmed by the fear of the consequences which are expected to follow upon a broken taboo, have been known to sicken and even to die. Early ideas of "wrong" (a convenient term for "sin," in the widest sense) are bound up with unanalysed conceptions of all evil, harm, or distress, and enter into all departments of life and thought—illness, accidents, loss, defeat, drought, etc. A misfortune is the first and surest sign of some defect or offence. Broadly speaking, misfortune will be ascribed (1) to a known or unknown fault of (*a*) the individual himself, or (*b*) of some other member of the group, whose offence reacts upon the whole or some part of the group; (2) to the deliberate malice of another individual who has employed "magic"; or (3) to some supernatural cause. Moreover, apart from all positive ills, even fear, uneasiness, and *malaise* are no less indications that something is wrong, whereas when things are right there is confidence and relief. Hence the problems of sin (wrong) and atonement must be viewed comprehensively along with ideas both of the sacred or holy and all that infringes upon it (pp. 161 *sqq.*), and with ideas of right and righteousness and all that these involve (pp. 661, 663, 670 *sq.*).

Certain taboos and rites of propitiation in war-time have tended to be suicidal (see p. 640); certain fears as to the consequence of destroying

[1] March 25 was the day of the resurrection of Attis (*GB.* v. 273), and a world-birthday (see Norden, *Geburt des Kindes*, 14 *sqq.*).

[2] On the tradition that Joseph was born and was also liberated from prison on the autumnal New Year, see Thackeray, *JTS.* xvi. 194. Ezekiel's vision of the new Israel is on the tenth of the "beginning" of the year (Ezek. xl. 1).

animal and insect life, as found among the Jains, would make life impossible, were they acted on consistently. In Zoroastrianism there are most extreme notions of ritual uncleanness which, as Farnell says, must have been idle thunder, else Persia would have been depopulated.[1] Among the Aztecs there was a profound consciousness of sin (*ERE.* v. 637), and their gloomy and cruel rites are as instructive for the psychology of religion as those current among the Phœnicians (see p. 415). Especially in Babylonia was there a very deep sense of sin, an extreme sensitiveness—amounting almost to obsession—as regards unknown and unwitting offences or oversights. Though ethical ideas are by no means wanting, this consciousness of sin, even among advanced peoples, is that of wrong in a wide sense, and the passionate laments in Babylonian "Penitential Psalms" are, taken by themselves, no clue to the calamity which the penitent bewails.[2] But while the Babylonian hymn may specify the ritual which was overlooked or is now to be performed, the Hebrew psalms are conspicuous for the absence of the ritual note, so that in Ps. li. 18 *sq.* the question arises whether this is a later liturgical addition, or whether such passages have elsewhere been removed.[3]

The various methods of removing "sin" and of gaining relief, however mechanical they may become, must owe their rise, reappearance, and reshaping to their psychological efficacy. Among primitive peoples, confession of social or ethical wrong-doing is sometimes enjoined on critical occasions of illness or childbirth, or when on an expedition or at war.[4] Though not necessarily a systematized rite it affords relief, and it is important testimony to genuine sentiments of moral right and wrong, the absence of which would make the history of ideas of righteousness, sin, and atonement unintelligible. Sin is commonly conceived along physical lines, *e.g.* as filth, dirt, etc., and the remedial measures are directed upon the victim or sufferer, or to the removal of the presumed cause. Among such remedies are a pretended emetic (*GB.* iii. 214), some powerful "medicine" or pungent odour, or the burning of incense (on which cf. Eitrem, 215 *sqq.*)—evil has a bad smell (*ib.* 212 *sq.*). Rites of washing, cleansing, etc., are especially common. In Egypt the deceased Pharaoh was washed by

[1] *Evolution of Religion*, 127 *sqq.* (See *ib.* Lect. iii. on the ritual of purification.)

[2] Cf. Farnell, *Greece and Babylon*, 154 *sq.*; G. Driver (ed. D. C. Simpson), 170.

[3] The fine Babylonian prayer to Ishtar (p. 522) concludes with directions for the burning of fragrant woods, a drink-offering, the offering of a lamb, and the due recital of the prayer thrice, without turning round.

[4] Frazer, *GB.* iii. 191, 195, 211, 215 *sq.*; *Belief in Immortality*, ii. 189; Hartland, *Primitive Law*, 166.

various gods, and the ritual asserted that he was "righteous."[1] In Babylonia the washing with the pure water of Eridu cleansed a man of his evil. The usage is well illustrated in the Syriac story of the woman who, as she washed her body, cleansed her thoughts also.[2]

Water and fire are frequently employed in old Oriental cleansing rites. On gods of light and fire in purificatory ceremonies see Morgenstern, 95. As the sun-god is god of light and life and of right and righteousness (p. 659), the antitheses are darkness and evil; and a man, praying that his sickness be consumed, adds, 'May I see the light" (Jastrow, 316). The fire-god cleanses the patient, making him bright like heaven (R. C. Thompson, *Sem. Magic*, 214). Fire tests and purifies (cf. צרף, and see *E.B.* s.v. Furnace). It expels and destroys evil or the cause thereof; note the use, not necessarily always figurative in its practice, of בָּעַר in Deuteronomy, and cf. p. 632. The "magical" practices in the Bab. *shurpu* and *maḳlu* ceremonies were intended to make a man's troubles disappear as things disappeared in the flames, or, as the magic of wizard or witch (*kashshapu, -ptu*) trembled, melted, and passed away in the fire, so might the sins of man. A demon or other cause of disease, ill, etc., will be gently or forcibly persuaded to leave a human body and enter a dead animal (R. C. Thompson, 180 *sqq.*); and in Palestine the *jinn* who is the cause of a child's convulsions may be induced by the gift of a pigeon to leave its victim (*JPOS.* vi. 46). Rites of transference are well known. In Babylonia a pig or a lamb is employed, especially the latter (Dhorme, 272 *sqq.*; Morgen. 111, cf. 115); in the case of a fever a kid is substituted (R. C. Thompson, 211), or the fleece of a young lamb may be applied to the body of the sick (Morgen. 75 *sq.*). Evil is transferred to something which is destroyed or thrown away; and when transferred to a man, it may be to one who is destroyed (sometimes already a criminal), or to a "sacred" man able to overcome it.[3]

[1] With this "legitimation" or "justification," Norden (*Geburt des Kindes*, 127 *sq.*) compares 1 Tim. iii. 16.

[2] Burkitt, *Euphemia and the Goth*, 156. For Egypt, see Blackman, *PSBA.* xl. 62 *sq.*; for Babylonia, Jastrow, *Rel. Bel.* 306, and cf. Morgenstern, 43. With *salāḫu*, "sprinkle with water, remove uncleanness," cf. Heb. סלח "forgive." C. G. and B. Z. Seligman (*Harvard African Studies*, ii. 155 *sq.*) tell how Kabābīsh women, dancing in front of their master who had sacrificed a sheep and cleansed them of evil, sang a song the burden of which was "You are our soap." See, in general, Farnell, *Evol. of Rel.* 157 *sq.*; Eitrem, 78 *sq.*; and p. 556 above.

[3] For details consult *GB.* ix. (on the Scapegoat); *e.g.* a Brahman embraces a Rajah of Travancore, undertaking to bear away his sins and diseases (*GB.* ix. 423; Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 94); and among the Bori the healer cures a man by becoming possessed by the demon, the cause of his disease (Tremearne, *Ban of the Bori*, 20).

Calamity and suffering are found to be cathartic; hence pain and suffering will be inflicted to compel purgation or to anticipate and ward off some calamity assumed to be impending. The man who has lost one of his flock has perhaps thereby escaped death—it is a "ransom" (Ar. *fidu*, *JPOS.* vi. 62), and by appropriate and periodical sacrifice he may hope to avert doom henceforth. If evil must befall the community, let it fall where it is richly deserved; hence the "wicked" should be a ransom (כֹּפֶר) for the righteous (Prov. xxi. 18). All misfortune has its cause, and the offender can be discovered by lot (Josh. vii. 13 *sqq.*) or by "magic"; or means will be taken periodically to ward off the consequences of evil which has been committed, however unintentionally.

The terminology of forgiveness and the like is instructive (cf. *CAH.* iii. 447 *sq.*). Sin is a burden to be lifted off. The transgressor hides or conceals it, and confession is recommended.[1] One must not "cover" the face of the judge; but God, whose eyes are too pure ("clean," *ṭ-h-r*) to look on evil (Hab. i. 13), may "cover" the sin—and "love covers all sins" (Ps. xxxii. 1, Prov. x. 12). The man who is forgiven has his face "lifted up"; or he "sees the face" of his lord (cf. Driver, *l.c.* 133); or his sin can be blotted out (Jer. xviii. 23), and the tablet upon which it is written may be broken (Driver, 138; Morgen. 129). An action may be "reckoned" (חישב) evil, or the judge will "pass over it." Or the god is regarded as an irate avenger who must be "mollified" (p. 346 and n. 1), or placated with gifts or the smell of an offering; one must hide from his anger (Job xiv. 13), unless he "turn away" from it, or he "return" to the people he had forsaken (cf. the moving entreaty to the absent god, Jastrow, *Rel. Bel.* 322). The god wreaks his wrath, and thus consoles himself (התנחם). Again, one must cause his heart to rest, appease it;[2] and in Babylonia there was a day of rest for the heart of the god, when he was propitiated.[3] Or the god is besought not to accept the offering of the wicked, acceptance being a token of forgiveness.[4]

There are three main types of ideas involved: (1) the anthropomorphic or personal, where there are beings angry or pleased, who avenge evil or can turn evil into good; (2) the impersonal, where there is, so to say, a mechanism such that sin is (*a*) the omission of what should be done, and what necessarily makes for good, or (*b*) the

[1] Prov. xxviii. 13. In the Amarna Letters, No. 137, it is called "opening" (*pitu*=פתח).

[2] נוח; cf. the use of Bab. *nuḫḫu*. See Hehn, *Semaine d'Ethnol. Relig. à Tilbourg* (1923), 291; Driver, 157.

[3] *Um nuḫ libbi*, the 15th of the month; see Wardle, *Israel and Babylon*, 244.

[4] Num. xvi. 15, Gen. iv. 5 *sq.*; see Hehn, *l.c.* 291.

doing of that which is harmful and has necessary harmful consequences. Besides the emphasis laid either upon the supernatural powers or upon the processes, there are (3) intermediate types of idea, where the god works through the process, and the rites are the recognized means of preserving or restoring the relations between people and god. The first is characteristic of popular religion, the last of priestly ritualism; while in the second the god recedes more and more into the background and disappears. "Sin," observes Skinner (*Gen.* 317), "is a violation of the objective moral order." But this is too narrow; among peoples at an undifferentiated stage of thought both sin (or wrong) and right(-eousness) involve ideas of universal or cosmic order. Moral or spiritual wrong is only one side, though the most vital, of the wider conceptions which are at least implicit when convictions of right and wrong become oppressive and men feel their inability to escape from that chain of cause and effect or that entail of deeds which Indian religions so vividly depict.

According to the prophets of Palestine, the escape from the burden of evil, misfortune, and wrong lay in "return" (שׁוּב; cf. the later תְּשׁוּבָה) and *μετάνοια*. A "return" may be said to mark the sterile antiquarianism of Egypt (Twenty-sixth Dynasty) and Babylonia (sixth century B.C.); but whereas on the traditional view of the O.T., post-exilic Judaism is the re-establishment of, or "return" to Mosaism, on the modern standpoint there had been a change in the religious conditions, and instead of a "return" to the past there is rather a reassertion of the old in a new form, and the past has been re-viewed and re-written. In like manner, the continuity in the development from the O.T. to the N.T. and onwards appears not as any "return," but as a change or development in thought.[1] In either case there has been progress, though of progress there is no explicit idea.

When the prophet Ezekiel, calling for a "new" spirit or heart (Ezek. xi. 19, etc.),demands new energy, will, and mind, or when salvation comes in being "born again," it is to be observed that even among primitive peoples there are rites of renewal and especially of rebirth practised at initiation ceremonies and on other occasions when some entirely new stage in the life of the individual is realistically manifested and endorsed. Such practices are of the greatest psychological interest; they testify to the consciousness of some break between old and new. They were developed by the observation of nature. Thus, in Egypt the sun-god was reborn every morning from the waters of the primeval ocean; and the dead Pharaoh who was identified with him was daily

[1] On apparent "returns" in the history of thought, see S. A. Cook, *Study of Religions*, 126 *sq.*

reborn.[1] The return of spring, the beginning of a new year, and finally the birth of a new æon built up ideas of new development in history, and such ideas culminated in the anticipation of an entirely new heaven and earth.[2] In this way men felt able to throw off the past and hope for a new and unstained age. There are simple and naïve practices among primitive peoples to symbolize the removal of enmity and ill-feeling, and there are periodic rites for the expulsion of evil. The Day of Atonement shortly after the beginning of the (autumnal) New Year, and the ideas of creation and the determination of fate at that period, or in the spring New Year, are thus related to sweeping conceptions of restoration and renewal; and not without justice did Franz Delitzsch call the Day of Atonement the Good Friday of the Law (see *E.Bi.* col. 385 § 4).

In view of the supreme, if not cosmic importance of the leading representative individuals, it is intelligible that the Babylonian king, who, in a sense, stood for his land, should undergo atoning ceremonies and make ritual lamentation in order that his land and people should not suffer harm. Such as he are *par excellence* the scapegoats in times of misfortune and calamity. Far more elaborate ideas are found in India, in the Brahman theory of the daily sacrifice whereby the world is daily created afresh by the self-sacrifice of the primordial Purusha out of whom the world was made. Maha-Purusha is the vast cosmic man who both envelops the earth and transcends it; he becomes the symbol of creation, and is also one of the names for ultimate reality.[3] On one view, the world is made of god(s)—Prajapati is creator and produces the world out of himself, upholding it and ruling it, as an immanent divine power. In less detail it is related how the Scandinavian giant Ymir was dismembered by the gods, who created the world out of his own body. In Egypt, Osiris became the principle of life, immanent in the world, and associated with the fertile soil and the life-giving waters.[4] Amid such ideas, the conviction of a renewal or regeneration on a cosmic scale involved the renewal of the life or energy immanent in the world. In this way the Jewish anticipations of a Messiah and of a Messianic age which all creation should enjoy find their later development in the Pauline conception both of a groaning creation longing for regeneration and of a Christ who is not only the Saviour of Mankind, but also the source and sustainer of nature.[5]

[1] Blackman, *PSBA.* xl. 60, 63, 65, 89 *sq.*

[2] See Charles, *Comment.* on Rev. xxi. 5 (pp. 174 *sq.*, 203 *sq.*); Bousset-Gressmann, *Rel. des Judentums*[3], 243, 280 *sqq.*; Norden, *Geburt des Kindes*, 33 *sqq.*

[3] Estlin Carpenter, *Theism in Medieval India* (1921), 43 *sq.*, 187.

[4] Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, 23; cf. p. 597.

[5] See p. 663. For the Messianic king who inaugurates a new age of peace

Such wider and more undifferentiated conceptions of right and wrong and of sin and atonement complicate the work of analysis which the progress of thought demands. But while W. R. S. is considered by some writers to have confused ideas of communion and of expiation or placation, on the other hand there has been a tendency to neglect those beliefs and practices—at times seemingly of a "magical" or "magico-religious" nature—with which the highly ethical and spiritual conceptions of sin and forgiveness have been interwoven. To suppose, with Buchanan Gray (*Sacrifice*, 95), that early sacrifice was more often eucharistic than propitiatory or expiatory is, surely, to overlook both the early undifferentiated and unspecialized ideas of evil and ill, and the fact that early Israel undoubtedly suffered disasters enough to call for apotropaic and other rites. But it does not follow that such rites were precisely those as described in the middle books of the Pentateuch, and it is noteworthy that the most significant of the Babylonian New Year inaugural ceremonies are of the age of Nebuchadrezzar II. (*c.* 605–562 B.C.) and later.

Highly instructive, on the other hand, is Gray's criticism (359) of W. R. S.'s remarks, p. 408 *sq.* above. Emphasizing the fact that חִטֵּא (Ezek. xlv. 18) is to cleanse of sin—to "unsin"—he explains the use of blood as a disinfectant rather than as a tonic. It is not that the altar is, as W. R. S. states, "annually refreshed by an application of blood"; the ritual, asserts Gray, is "to rid what is naturally holy from intrusive contamination, not to impart fresh positive holiness." This, however, is W. R. S.'s meaning: sin breaks the sacred bond—the natural holiness—into which a man is born, and the atoning rites re-establish it and there is at-one-ment: "the holiness of the altar is liable to be impaired, and required to be annually *refreshed* . . ." The difference between the two scholars is possibly complicated by the choice of the word italicized; but it involves a very important point: Does the blood *refresh* and make holy? or does it "unsin" and *restore* the holiness? Elsewhere W. R. S. remarks: "The notions of communion and atonement are bound up together" (p. 320); by partaking of what is holy the impurity of sin is expelled (p. 356); blood "refreshes" the sanctity of the worshipper's life and expels what is impure (p. 427). A more careful analysis may inquire whether the removal of sin thereby makes a man holy (*i.e.* forgiven, etc.), and whether the act of making a man holy thereby removes sin—contrast the medieval double rite: the expulsion of devils prior to baptism (on p. 428). For the study of sacrificial and other rites, these questions

and abundance, see the concise sketch by Hans Schmidt, *Der Mythos vom wiederkehrenden König im Alten Testament* (Giessen, 1925).

are of more than methodological importance.[1] No less important is the question whether such analyses as these are primary. Certain early attempts at analysis can be traced, though the difference between the Jewish sin- and guilt-offerings is not altogether clear (cf. Gray, 57). Moreover, there are complicated ceremonies of consecration, *e.g.* at the completion of an image in Babylonia, which seem to point to attempts to bridge the gulfs between the profane, the sacred, and its antithesis—the pollute. As a general rule, in all such matters as these it is probable that priestly and popular opinion would be at variance: certain rites (with the use of blood, etc.) would be specifically apotropaic: they kept away some power or influence; or they would be distinctively cathartic: they cleansed and purified. But to the ordinary man the act of the removal of sin would mean the entrance of good, and the cleansing ceremony that washed away evil would have sanctifying virtue.[2] Everywhere there has been a tendency for ceremonies to lose their primary significance;[3] but, provided they aroused the appropriate feelings of awe and solemnity, they tended to afford convictions of relief, reassurance, and confidence which were at least subjectively adequate.[4]

[1] In Isa. vi. the occasion that arouses a profound consciousness of sin brings the cleansing act. How far W. R. S.'s treatment of ideas of atonement among primitive peoples may have been influenced, however unconsciously, by his Christology, may perhaps be understood by reference to *Lectures and Essays*.

[2] In the purificatory rite in Lev. xiv. two pigeons are required: one is let loose, the other sacrificed; also in the ritual of the Scapegoat (Lev. xvi.) there are two goats, one for Azazel, the other for Yahweh (see *E.Bi.* "Azazel"). There may be here the explicit removal of impurity and the explicit sanctifying act. Further, since Azazel, in later times at least, was the leader of the fallen angels, *i.e.* in effect Satan, the old ritual may have suggested the antithesis between the prince of life (ἀρχηγός, Acts iii. 15) and the prince of this world (ἄρχων, John xii. 31, xiv. 30) who is to be cast out, and between the sacrificial death of Christ and the entry of Satan into Judas (the διάβολος, John vi. 70) immediately after the communion rite (xiii. 27). That the Paschal victim is a lamb (sheep) or goat is shown by Gray, 345 *sqq*.

[3] *e.g.* at the present day the sacrificed sheep has an atoning value: it will appear on the Day of Judgment and carry the man into Paradise—hence the saying, "Our sacrificial animals are our riding animals" (*ḏaḥayānā maṭayānā*, *JPOS*. vi. 41). Cf. *ZATW*. xxxv. 130, where the sheep or goat sacrificed seven days after a man's death is eaten by the relatives and the bones buried, if possible, in the grave so that the dead may ride (*r-k-b*) on it when the Day comes.

[4] At the annual ceremony of the Holy Fire in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, children are brought in the belief that their presence at the ceremony will preserve them against the ills of life or ensure their entrance to Paradise (*The Near East*, June 24, 1926, p. 716). Similarly, the belief arose that all who kept the Passover would escape death during the year (*Jubilees* xlix. 15 *sq*.). Gray (365, 381 *sq*.) argues that the Passover rite was not an act of communion but of com-

In view of the variation in the meaning and application of sacrificial atoning and other rites, the question of what—in the happy and extremely significant words of Gray (359 n.)—is the "actual creative idea" is one to which, whatever be thought of W. R. S.'s theory, the systematic study of religion demands an answer.[1] To regard the rites as primarily cathartic or apotropaic is unsatisfactory, because the notion of purifying or cleansing a man of evil, etc., or of removing untoward influences or the like, implies some considerable pre-existing body of beliefs. It is difficult to see how blood could be supposed, from any primitive standpoint, to have in itself the cathartic or apotropaic virtues which actually come to be ascribed to it. On the other hand, the assumption that the blood fed supernatural spirits, placating, sating, and otherwise inducing them to act as required, would be in accordance with primitive ideas; but it neither follows nor is probable that this is the primary meaning. What seems to be of undoubted importance is (*a*) the extraordinary emotional significance of blood, and (*b*) the fact that the effect is *either* vague, diffused, though none the less powerful, *or* it is of the most intense significance, *e.g.* because it is the blood of a kinsman. Blood of the kin that is shed for intelligible, practical reasons in ceremonies wherein the life and welfare of the social group are concerned has a world of meaning. Such rites are an organic part of systems of life and thought; and by reason of their very fulness and intensity it is easier to trace their weakening, deterioration, and disintegration than to conceive how any primary cathartic or apotropaic significance of blood could develop into a system.

Group blood-rites are the most elemental of all ceremonies associating men and their gods. On the other hand, spiritual religion—in the teaching of the prophets—treats sacrificial rites as of secondary value, if not, indeed, unnecessary. "Propitiation and expiation are to be wrought by well-doing alone" (Gray, 89). In contrast to the sacrificial ideas interconnecting man, god, and the world, it is enough that man should do his duty.[2] The history of religion in Palestine subsequent to the prophets illustrates the difficulty of determining wherein "well-doing" consists. Confronting a highly developed priestly ritual, the "Wisdom" literature presupposes the identity of divine wisdom and human wisdom, and inculcates reverence for the divine law. Further, "wickedness is folly, the bad man is a fool."[3] Sin

memoration, and was apotropaic; but the popular value of a religious ceremony is not necessarily so specialized as it might seem, viewed superficially (see Durkheim, 386).

[1] On the meaning of the root כפר in particular, see Moore, *E.Bi.* "Sacrifice," § 45, and Gray's discussion, 68 *sqq.*

[2] Cf. p. 663 on the "parallelism" which this implies.

[3] Toy, *E.Bi.* col. 5328, and his commentary on Prov. xv. 33.

is not only wicked, it is unnatural. Contrary to the will of Yahweh, contrary to social order, it was contrary to human nature, if not to Nature itself; for ideas of a "natural order" were spreading in the Greek age. Now when a man felt himself related to or bound up with a righteous god, a moral society, or with Nature, he could be conscious of order and disorder, right and wrong, and of good and evil. But in course of time ideas of what is specifically religious or spiritually wrong fade away, especially when it is believed that the god "could do neither good nor harm" (as earlier, in Zeph. i. 12). Corporate unity and social justice weaken until "righteousness" means merely "almsgiving" (p. 661). Even ideas of an order in Nature—if Nature is something quite apart from Man—do not and cannot *of themselves* move men to well-doing. The actual development of religion, so far as it can be traced in the Bible and in the history of thought that lies behind it, does not belong here; but it is very striking because of the close relation between the atoning death of the Servant of the Lord in Isa. liii. and the death of Christ. For whereas the former is primarily of national import, and for Israel, the latter has also that universal or cosmic significance to which attention has been directed, and of which there is no hint in Isa. liii. It represents a far more comprehensive and undifferentiated interpretation of the Sacrifice, but could only have arisen out of Paul's conviction of the meaning of Christ. The combination, at this new stage in the history of religion, of the personal and of the cosmic meaning of the Sacrifice can hardly be adequately emphasized.

The more or less cosmic significance of Pharaohs and other representative personalities in early religion must arise, not of course from some independent conception of the constitution of the Universe, but from the impression they make upon men who both feel themselves akin to them and are conscious of unity with the world about them. It is through human personality that Nature has a new meaning for us. At once this seems to carry with it the priority of anthropomorphic types of religion. But the difference between the religion of individuals and that of the slow-moving environment with its many practical needs must be kept in mind. Ideas both of Right(eousness) and At-one-ment take more concrete form, especially among rudimentary peoples, where ideas of unity and oneness are not "spiritual" in the modern sense of the word, but are shaped by all that makes for material welfare. See further, pp. 657 *sqq.*, 671, 676 *sqq.*

P. 419 n.—The execution takes place at a time of drought and famine, and the bodies are left until the rain falls. It has been objected that the verb יקע is not used in 2 Chron. xxv. 12, where men are cast over a rock, and that the meaning suggested by W. R. S. hardly

suits the preposition "*on* the mountain" (2 Sam. xxi. 9). In Gen. xxxii. 26, the verb seems to mean "rend"; one may perhaps compare the use of *shāsa'* (p. 641). See Gray on Num. xxv. 4, and Skinner on Gen., and especially Driver on Sam. (Prof. E. H. Palmer, referred to in the note, was put to death in August 1892; see *Ency. Brit.* and *Dict. of Nat. Biog.*)

P. 420 n.—For parallels to Deut. *l.c.* in the Code of Hammurabi (§ 23 *sq.*) and elsewhere, see Cook, *Moses and Hammurabi*, 255 *sq.*; *CAH.* i.[2] 512, ii. 343; for modern usage see also *Qy. St.* 1906, p. 14, and Sir G. A. Smith, *Deut.* 251.

P. 421.—The argument is not affected by the fact that 2 Sam. xxi. 1 should read "on Saul and on his house is bloodshed."

P. 422 n. 3.—See Wellhausen[2], 171, and *Götting. Gel. Nachr.* 1893, p. 455. For an Assyrian parallel, see Jastrow, *Rel. B.A.* ii. 95 (ills removed by means of bird, fish, etc.).

P. 426. Defiling the Hands (cf. p. 452).—See Budde, *E.Bi.* "Canon," §§ 3 *sq.*, 53; Hölscher, *Kanonisch und Apokryph.* 4 *sq.* (Naumburg, 1905). In spite of the natural meaning of *ṭāmē'*, and the fact that the question was even asked whether the unwritten margins and outer covers defiled the hands, other explanations are still hazarded, *e.g.* that the reference is to the Levitical purity of the individual, who must avoid being defiled.

P. 429. Righteousness.—The Semitic root *ṣ-d-ḳ* appears to connote congruence, fitness for purpose, conformity to an expected norm or standard.[1] Arabic derivatives are used of agreement with a conception or a statement; a verbal form denotes earnest fighting, without pretence; and the adjective means "genuine, what is as it should be" (whether of a javelin or of the date-fruit; also of eyes and ears). The objection that such general ideas as being fit, true, *comme il faut*, etc., can hardly be primitive (so, *e.g.*, Skinner, *Hastings' D.B.* iv. 274*a*) confuses the perception of metaphysical facts with the capacity for metaphysical reasoning.[2] There can scarcely be anything more primitive than the intuitive recognition whether persons or things do or do not answer normal expectation or conform to their ordinary or expected behaviour. Again, when W. R. S. (*Prophets*, 389; cf. 71 *sq.*) holds that Kautzsch's idea of conformity "perhaps is too wide, and does not lay sufficient weight on the distinctly forensic element," it may be urged (*a*) that early conceptions of social right and

[1] See Kautzsch's oft-cited monograph on the subject (1881), 58 *sq.*; cf. also Gordon, *ERE.* x. 780 n. 1.

[2] Cf. Momerie's reply to Matthew Arnold's objection that early Israel could have had no conception of the "personality" of God (*Inspiration and other Sermons*, 68), cited by T. H. Sprott, *Inspiration and the Old Testament*, 98 *sq.* (Camb. 1909).

wrong were closely bound up with ideas of what we call "natural" or "cosmic" order, (*b*) that specifically "forensic" conceptions imply a differentiation and a specialization which do not occur at the earliest stages of social development, and (*c*) that even so special a term as the Hebrew *mishpāṭ*, "judgment," is used of what is customary and characteristic. And the same reply may be made to Baudissin, who, in a survey of the distribution of the root, considers that, while it expresses the notion of correspondence to given conditions or expectations, the fundamental meaning is juridical.[1] It is essential, then, to bear in mind in this note that "righteousness" is only one of possible translations of *ṣedeḳ* and other derivatives, and that "right," or "rightfulness" or "rightness" would often be preferable.

In fact, *ṣ-d-ḳ* belongs to a chain of ideas which are so far-reaching that T. W. Rhys Davids urged that a primitive "normalism," an intuitive consciousness of cause and effect, is more significant for early religion than theories of "animism" (*Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1917–18, pp. 279 *sqq.*). He illustrated his argument from Confucianism, with its recognition of a cosmic order (both physical and social), and Lao-Tsze's doctrine of the universal Tao in harmony with which man should live. In the Vedic Rita there is a cosmic order above and before the gods; and in the Buddhist Dhamma lies a normalistic idea, the essence of the Buddhist reformation.[2] These and other interrelated ideas were independently treated by J. Estlin Carpenter, "Early Conceptions of Law in Nature," *Hibbert Journal*, 1923, July, 771 *sqq.* (cf. *Ency. Brit.*[11] xxiii. [1911], 71). Already Carnoy (*JAOS.* xxxvi. [1917], 306 *sqq.*) had observed the points of contact between Rita, the Zoroastrian Asha (Arta), and the Greek Moira; and Eduard Meyer had previously associated Rita and Asha with the Greek Themis and the Egyptian Maʿat or Meʿet (*Gesch. Alt.* i. [1907–9], §§ 75, 587, 590). Maʿat, whom Diodorus Siculus identified with Aletheia, with whom in turn Plutarch equated Asha, was goddess of truth, justice, right or righteousness; the particular meaning varies according to the particular connexion in which it is used.[3] Further, James Drummond (*Hibbert Journal*, 1902, Oct., 83 *sq.*), on the "Righteousness of God," argued that δίκαιος meant properly "conformable to right"; it was not primarily a forensic term, but implied some objective, external standard which righteous prophets and judges declare (cf. *E.Bi.* col. 4103 and n. 1). Δίκη, too, is the established way of things, the way they happen; see Miss Jane Harrison, *Themis*, 516 *sq.* (Cambridge, 1912), who notes, after A. B. Cook, the use of δίκαιος, "breeding true"; her book and that of F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* (*s.vv.* Dike, Rita, Tao [1912]), furnish good evidence for the

[1] See his essay, *Der gerechte Gott in altsemit. Rel.*, in the *Harnack-Festgabe*, 1–23 (Tübingen, 1921).

[2] See Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism: a Study of the Buddhist Norm* (1912), 32 *sqq.*, etc. (on *Dhamma* as moral law, ideal, standard, uniformity of sequence, etc.).

[3] Breasted, *Rel. and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, 116, 225 n.

use and distribution of all these and other interconnected conceptions, and recognize their importance for the early history of religion.[1]

The conception of an undifferentiated cosmic order—moral, social, physical, or natural—which makes things what they are, and as they should be, is perhaps seen most completely in the old Vedic term *Rita*.[2] In the corresponding Iranian Arta (Asha), social and moral order is singled out. But in both there is a world-order, which is partly inherent in things, and partly guarded, sustained, or fathered by specific gods who are of a marked ethical character (Varuna and Mitra; Ahura-Mazda). These and the other interrelated terms have multifarious, but quite explicable, nuances. There are tendencies to make the order or principle an independent authority; the gods themselves are subordinate to it, or it comes to be more or less of a deity in its own right. On the other hand, the emphasis may be laid, not upon the process, but upon the god who controls, contains, or informs it. Thus Ahura-Mazda becomes himself Righteousness and Justice; and although there were tendencies to make the Indian Rita an independent deity, they were not pursued as they were in the case of the Chinese Tao.[3]

A survey of the data discloses a vast range of ideas concerning (*a*) the more undifferentiated or the more specialized ideas of Order—such Order being cosmic, departmental, social, etc.; (*b*) the varying relations between the ideas of Order and the ruling gods; and (*c*) the diverse powers and functions of such gods, who are, in turn, cosmic, departmental, tribal, etc. Certain developments are fairly clear. In the transition from the old Vedic cosmic Rita to the more specialized Iranian Asha, the Zoroastrian prayers are found to reflect a higher conception of righteousness (Farnell, *Evolution of Religion*, 216 *sq.*). Again, when the ideas of cosmic Order were divorced from the ideas of guardian or other gods (like Varuna and Rita), the way lay open for a more objective estimate of "natural" Order, as something distinct from the gods and their relations to man or nature, though the explicit idea of "nature" is late. Further, not all gods had the striking ethical traits of a Varuna; and it was easy to feel that there was a cosmic Law or Order, heedless of man, uncontrolled by benevolent or

[1] For the inclusion of the Semitic *ṣ-d-ḳ* among these terms, see S. A. Cook, *CAH*. ii. 398. To the bibliography (*ib.* 669 *sq.*) may be added Bertholet-Lehmann, *Lehrbuch d. Rel. Gesch.* i. (1924), 80, on primitive ideas of right, law, necessity, etc.

[2] Besides the references already made, see A. B. Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and Upanishads*, i. 83, 246 (Harvard, 1925).

[3] Dikē is personified in Hesiod; see J. L. Myres, *Political Ideas of the Greeks*, 108 *sqq.*; cf. also 100, 103, and his whole discussion of the meanings and fluctuations of Dikē, Themis, Physis, Arkhē, and other interrelated terms in Greek thought.

ethical gods, and without the moral qualities of Asha, and one beneath which man was helpless.

All the conceptions of Order, Norm, etc., were bound up with ideas of cause and effect. Even the most primitive races have a large stock of ordinary empirical knowledge as to how things are done; and as all else belongs to the sphere of the "religious" or "magical," life's difficulties can be met by resort to appropriate "religious" or "magical" beliefs and practices. The question whether the processes necessary for life and welfare were "natural" or otherwise would turn upon the ordinary knowledge and upon the religious or magical ideas of the day; but, throughout, men could only hope for success by conforming with current procedure. There is an Order of Things, a Way such that by the appropriate *Methodos* men can live. There are vital needs (fertility, growth, etc.) which can be satisfied directly or indirectly through the gods, etc.; and men resort to special individuals who are helpful, either through their relation to the gods, or through the powers with which they themselves are credited. On the one hand, there are individuals who, by their influence with the gods or with certain "processes of nature"—as we might say—stand in a uniquely close relationship to all that which makes things act as they should. On the other, such individuals will come to be regarded as in some way responsible for the maintenance of this Order. Salt of the earth, pillars of society, they are in a sense the sustainers of things, and we can distinguish between those who are felt to be generally responsible for human welfare (the old priestly kings, for example) and those "specialists" who have special, not general powers, and are concerned with a special department of nature. But both classes must observe certain taboos—Mana and Taboo are complementary (p. 552). That Social Order (specifically "Righteousness"), the Order of the Universe, and Divine Order are in some way intimately related is the "theory" running through all religion: there are processes to be utilized, controlled, or exploited. So, the evil conduct of a representative *individual* (*e.g.* a king) or of a *people* (Israel) can have a prejudicial effect upon sources of life (cf. p. 537); the later Zoroastrian ritual not only gains the help of the gods but also assists them to work for good,[1] and the Lama whose praying-wheel is in sympathetic touch with the Cosmic Wheel would overthrow the processes of nature were he to turn it in the wrong direction.

Primarily, the conceptions of Order take a social or rather a mythological form. Ma'at, "truth, righteousness," etc., was associated with several Egyptian gods, and pre-eminently the Sun-god Re,

[1] G. F. Moore, *History of Religions*, i. 390; cf. the influence of the Brahman ritual, *ib.* 265.

who was its creator. Ma'at was the daughter of Re—cf. the relation of Dikē to Zeus; and in Babylonia, where both the Moon-god Sin and the Sun-god Shamash have marked ethical traits, the children of the latter are Justice (*kettu*) and Uprightness (*mēsharu*); the first of these was also known as the child of the supreme god Anu.[1] In Babylonia, ideas of inflexible order and fate were interwoven partly with astral ideas, partly with arbitrary gods and spirits. As the old religion broke down, the spread of the ethical cult of Ahura-Mazda hastened the more objective study of the stars; while its dualism, with the conflict of Good and Evil, Truth and Lie, was the natural development and more ethical restatement of earlier ideas of cosmic order and disorder.[2] What uprightness and justice meant from ancient though advanced social standpoints can be seen in the Code of Hammurabi (the "darling" of the Sun-god) with its rigorous *lex talio*, and in familiar Egyptian papyri.[3] While Ikhnaton reiterates his favourite title—an old one—"living in righteousness (or truth)," his age is conspicuous for a naturalism in art which delighted to depict things as they truly and rightly were—though not without some exaggeration (see Breasted, *CAH*. ii. 120; Hall, *ib*. 411). His solar monotheism inculcated a single pervading and benevolent life-giving principle, and of his god Aton he was the beloved son, issuing from the god's body and rays. The Egyptian kings, as earthly sons and representatives of the Sun-god, were sustainers of "righteousness"; and, in view of primitive convictions of the disastrous results of wrong-doing, the "righteousness" of the ruler and representative of the group was vital. In Zoroastrianism the king must reign according to Order (Asha) and Glory (Hvarenah), and the fall of the latter into evil hands would cause desolation and disturbance. It is the Order with which Yima established the world, and confusion resulted when the Dragon carried it away, as also in the old Babylonian myth when the theft of the Tablets of Destiny imperilled mankind.

Of the Semitic uses of the root *ṣ-d-ḳ* the most striking is the term אצדק used in Nabatæan inscriptions enumerating those entitled to be buried in a tomb. A "legal kinsman" of some sort, it is not certain whether the emphasis lies on his *rights* or in the fact that he is one of

[1] Cf. the fine hymns to Shamash in Gressmann, *Altorient. Texte z. A.T.*[2] 244 *sqq.*; also G. Driver in *The Psalmists* (ed. Simpson), 169. The old Sumerian solar Babbar of Larsa was also Lord of Justice. Apart from proper names (*e.g.* Ammizaduga), probably of western (Amorite) origin, the root *ṣ-d-ḳ* does not seem to occur in Babylonian.

[2] Jastrow, *Rel. Bel.* 60 *sqq.*, 252 *sqq.*, 257. For ideas of fate, see Fichtner Jeremias, *Schicksalsglaube bei d. Babyloniern* (Leipzig, 1922).

[3] Breasted, *op. cit.* ch. vii.

the near *kin*: thus Nöldeke compares the Syriac *zādʾḳē* "relations" (Cooke, 226). Similarly, in Phœnician, בן צדק seems to denote a "legitimate" prince, and צמח צדק, which is the "legitimate shoot" in the Larnax Lapēthos inscription, in Jeremiah xxiii. 5 denotes rather the "righteous shoot" to be raised up to David.[1] But when a king of the neighbouring city of Lapēthos bears the name צדקמלך (Cooke, 349; fifth century B.C.), its meaning is presumably, not that the "king (or the god Milk) is legitimate," but rather that he is "right(eous)"; cf. the name J(eh)ozadaḳ, where the attribute is applied to Yahweh.[2] A connexion can readily be found if the derivatives of the root *ṣ-d-ḳ*, like *kin* and *kind*, or *gens*, *genus*, and *generous*, go back to ideas of group-unity and the appropriate behaviour among the members of the group, which, of course, properly included the group-god. Right(eous)ness, then, would be "conformity to the obligations which bind together not merely the social unit, but that organic unit of which the deity formed part."[3] More than *esprit de corps*, it makes the group what it should be, and it involves a standard; the true member is "loyal" rather than "legal," and his "legitimacy" carried with it a superior *noblesse oblige*. Such a view of *ṣ-d-ḳ* would accord with W. R. S.'s fundamental theory of the group (*and* god)-system and its significance for the development of religion. Indeed, while preferring the forensic meaning of righteousness, he himself observes that even "forensic righteousness" involves kindness and truth, which are the basis of society; and he significantly explains *ḥésed* ("loving-kindness") as "the virtue that knits together society," citing the use of the Arabic *ḥashada* to connote combined hospitality.[4]

But *ṣ-d-ḳ* is no abstract righteousness, for all things that are done rightly will turn out right. Things which are normal, right, true to type, etc., have conformed with effective principles, and therefore any action that is effective must meet with its inevitable consequences, or—more neutrally—causes and effects are inevitably interconnected. So תּוּשִׁיָּה, "wisdom," is also its result, "success," and the Syrian *zakkī* "justify," issues in *zākūthā*, "victory"; but no less does "guilt" (עָוֹן) mean "punishment." Yahweh's universal righteousness

[1] Cooke, 86; see Clermont-Ganneau, *Rec.* v. 366, vi. 162; Lidzb. ii. 155.

[2] Similarly, Artaxerxes means the legitimate or true sovereignty.

[3] S. A. Cook, *JTS.* 1908, p. 632 n.; cf. *Expositor*, 1910, Aug., 120. Among parallels, note the suggestion of Scheftelowitz that אריך in Ezra iv. 14 stands for *aryaka*, "as befits an Aryan."

[4] *Prophets*, 408 *sq.* The more Aramaic *ḥesda* means "shame, reproach"; cf. Arab. *ḥasada*, "envy," and the relation between "jealous" and "zealous." The root idea may mean combined or united action, differentiated into (1) hospitality and (2) giving one, so to speak, the "cold shoulder."

made the punishment of an unrighteous Israel inevitable; but her subsequent conviction that she had paid the penalty and was "right(eous)" as against her enemies "constituted a claim on the righteousness of God for the vindication of Israel's right" (Skinner, *Comment. on Isa. xl.–lxvi.* p. 241). Good and evil are quasi-mechanical processes, and things which are felt to be good or evil have their corresponding causes; though in Israel the "righteousness" of Yahweh was the guarantee—so taught the prophets—that there was nothing arbitrary in his treatment of men. Later, the Jewish doctrine of "merits" continues to show how naturally causes and effects tended to be considered in terms of value, and how readily the convictions of inevitable consequences allowed the belief that there was, so to say, an inherent or immanent process which "meritorious" behaviour set in motion, utilized, or controlled.

The judge (*shōphēṭ*) acted in accordance with Yahweh's ordinances, the customary usages and standards (*mishpāṭ*), and the knowledge of what ought or ought not to be done in Israel. But to "judge" the righteous is to "deliver" him (cf. 1 Sam. xxiv. 15); and the "judges" of Israel deliver a penitent people from their oppressors (Judg. ii. 11 *sqq.*). "Righteousness" and "deliverance" become synonymous, and deliverance or salvation (ישׁע) means some "visible delivery and enlargement from distress" (*OTJC.*[2] 441). Righteous acts are those by which Yahweh manifests his "covenant faithfulness" (Burney on Judg. v. 11); he shows his righteousness in the "salvation" of his people (Kautzsch, *Hastings' D.B.* v. 633 n.). Israel's "righteousness" becomes, in effect, her material prosperity in token that her right is "acknowledged and declared by God" (Skinner, 242). In other words, Israel has her "rights," and she obtains them through Yahweh, even as the individual got his through Yahweh's representatives, the judges or *Elōhīm* (see Driver on 1 Sam. ii. 25). It is no mere play upon words, then, to say that a man's "rights" essentially turned primarily upon his "righteousness," *i.e.* upon his behaviour in the group of which he was an organic part (see p. 637). Such variations and developments are intelligible, and it is not surprising that in both Rabbinical Judaism and the Coran "righteousness" should manifest itself specifically in "almsgiving."

It is disputed whether, like the tendencies to deify Tao, Dikē, etc., there was actually a god *Ṣ-d-ḳ*.[1] "Righteousness" is naturally a most essential attribute of tribal or national gods, who safeguard the unity and welfare of their worshippers; and personal names predicate it of Yahweh, El, and the Syrian Rammān (*i.e.* Hadad). It is also attributed

[1] See Burney, *Judges*, 41 *sqq.*; and, in favour of the view, Baudissin in the *Harnack-Festgabe*, 8, 10, 15.

to the god Milk (or the king as the group-representative) and to 'Am, *i.e.* the god of that name, or the "group," or the "uncle" as the representative of the group.[1] The last case is of special interest. The *'am* or group is knit together by a common life—the *ḥayy* (*Kinship*, 44, 46, and commentaries on 1 Sam. xviii. 18); and the corporate life of a group is more recognizably divine when there is a god 'Am, or the group bears a divine name, *e.g.* Gad (pp. 506, 547; cf. Meyer, *Gesch. Alt.* i. § 343). Names indicating that gods are brothers or fathers of their worshippers are also highly significant for that close unity of gods, men, and the world which appears to be implied in the root *ṣ-d-ḳ*. But these names tended to fall out of use (p. 510), the intimate and natural bond between Israel and Yahweh was balanced by the insistence upon his transcendence, and the familiarity and confidence which characterized Israel's relations with Yahweh were checked by the doctrine that Israel had no merits of her own. That is to say, against those tendencies which would have made Yahweh a god immanent in his people, or in nature, a god who was the inherent sustainer of all things, or even a food-god, a vegetation spirit, or a nature-god (cf. pp. 578, 597)—tendencies which one would look for in the Baal cults—there are those recurring and more characteristic tendencies which make him independent of and above men and nature, through whom he works, and his Transcendence and not his Immanence is the dominant note of the teaching of the prophets. If, as the prophets taught, Yahweh was bound by an Order or Law of "Righteousness" uniting people and their god, it was a transcendent principle of which man had only imperfect knowledge. The ethical god Varuna may be compared; but it is to be observed that the Semites had no concept corresponding to the unidfferentiated Rita, and that Yahweh—to the prophets—stood for social righteousness, and was behind and over nature.[2]

In the N.T. the conceptions of Righteousness and the like are at a more highly developed stage. There is a Way—and as such it is comparable to the Chinese Tao—and Christ both *teaches* the way and

[1] In Melchisedek, Adonizedek, Zadok, etc., the *ṣ-d-ḳ* idea is connected with Jerusalem (*CAH.* ii. 397 *sq.*, 400). The connexion is more particularly with the Lord (Ādōn), Yahweh (J[eh]ozadak), Milk or the king (? priest-king), also with the Jerusalem priesthood (Zadokites), and, later, with the "Sadducean" aristocracy (cf. *E.Bi.* 4106 n. 1). That Jerusalem should be the seat of *ṣ-d-ḳ* (Isa. i. 26, Jer. xxxi. 23) is in keeping with the significance attached to Zion as the source of universal right and religion (Isa. ii. 2–4), to the Temple as a mystical centre, and to the Temple ritual.

[2] In Isa. xlv. 8, *ṣedeḳ* is poured down from above and *ṣedāḳah* springs up from the earth; a distinction between universal order and social order has been drawn by Whitehouse (*Century Bible Commentary*).

is it. Christ is also head of the spiritual group, and an elder "brother" (Heb. ii. 11); He is one with the group (John xv. 4 *sqq.*), and kindness shown to the least of the group is done to Him (Matt. xxv. 40). But Christ is also the basis of existence, "the continuous immanent principle of order in the Universe." He is "the principle of cohesion in the Universe; He impresses upon creation that unity and solidarity which makes it a cosmos instead of a chaos." [1] He is also a cosmic power regenerating at once man and nature (Rom. viii. 19 *sqq.*). Further developments along such lines explain the pantheistic Logion and the Manichæan conception of Jesus as virtually a vegetation spirit (above p. 597). But tendencies to a Christ immanent in nature were not developed. On the other hand, such a passage as Matt. vi. 25–33 ("Seek ye first . . . his righteousness") reflects the explicitly spiritual conception which distinguishes Christianity as a social-religious movement. That is to say, spiritual religion with its *imitatio Dei* has all the practical consequences necessary for man's elementary needs, and stands in contrast to those less spiritual and more physical conceptions of the source of life and growth and to the magical or magico-religious ideas which in some way connect, if they do not virtually identify, man and part or whole of nature.[2]

In primitive religion, Mana and Taboo are correlative. Consequently, social disorder, or the failure to be "righteous," is commonly believed to disturb the order of nature upon which men depend. But in advanced spiritual religion there is implied what may be called a theory of "parallelism"—conformity to spiritual laws and the increasing recognition of all that makes for social order corresponding to the order which men find in the Cosmos. The belief that social disorder upsets cosmic order tends gradually to die: the rain falls alike on the righteous and the unrighteousness (Matt. v. 45; contrast Zech. xiv. 17 *sq.*, and see p. 644). Similarly, some centuries earlier, at an age of far-reaching social and political changes and the introduction of refined conceptions of Righteousness, Israel is assured that Yahweh will be true to His covenant and there will be no more destruction (Gen. viii. 21 *sq.*, ix. 11–17; Isa. liv. 9 *sq.*; contrast Gen. vi. 5–7). A less ideal age is foreshadowed; but inasmuch as man is no longer deterred from evil by the fear of catastrophic penalties, the development implies a very striking advance both in knowledge and in conceptions of man's increased free will and correspondingly increased

[1] See, respectively, Bishop Gore, *Reconstruction of Belief* (1926), 378, 389 (on the "activities of the Son of God in nature"), and Lightfoot on Col. i. 18.

[2] Indications of "spiritual" religion can be found in early Egypt: "more acceptable" in the sight of the Sun-god (*i.e.* the god of Truth, etc.) "is the nature of one just of heart than the ox of one that doeth iniquity" (Gardiner, *JEA.* i. 34).

responsibility. Accordingly, it is possible to trace some vital advances in the development of ideas of man's place in the Cosmos, and to contrast this evidence for an absolute development in the history of religious and related thought with the more primitive and persistent convictions of a more or less " magical " interpenetration of man and nature, and with other tendencies away from distinctively spiritual types of religion.

The higher ideal of δικαιοσύνη, which Jesus demanded (Matt. v. 20), marks a creative age with which it is legitimate to compare the prophets' teaching of Yahweh's demands upon his people Israel. Much earlier, at a period of disturbance—approximately the Mosaic age—traces of interrelated ideas of Truth and Order can be recognized in Egypt and South-West Asia (*CAH.* ii. 399 *sqq.*). But what *ṣ-d-ḳ* connoted in the fourteenth century can scarcely be determined; though in one of the Amarna Letters Abdi-ḥiba, king of Jerusalem, assures the divine Pharaoh of Egypt that he is " loyal " (No. 287 *saduk*).[1] Nor, again, can one conjecture how Ammi-zaduga, who lived a century after the law-giver Hammurabi, would interpret his name, " 'Am (my 'Am ?) is righteous." All that need be said is that the interrelated terms of truth, order, righteousness, are such as to admit of continual restatement and reinterpretation.

The period from the age of the prophets and their doctrine of Yahweh's righteousness to the reconstruction of religion which subsequently ensued, is one of transition from social and political disturbance and unrest to what was ultimately a new reintegration (p. 592 *sq.*). The defects of all group-religion are obvious (pp. 256 *sqq.*, 266 *sq.*), and from the weakness of the relationship between Israel and Yahweh one passes—though the steps are far from clear—to a new relationship which at length finds its expression in the Pentateuch and post-exilic Judaism.[2] A fixed social or national group-system is replaced by a legalistic religious system, and in due course the defects of narrow conceptions of " righteousness " again made themselves felt. Conformity to specified requirements, and an exaggerated estimate of the significance of the Torah for the world, induced a religious complacence and arrogance recalling that which the prophets had previously

[1] The king's name can be read Arta-ḥiba, to correspond to Zedek-iah (" Yah's righteousness "); see Burney, *Judges*, lxxxvi, after Hommel (cf. his *Ethnol.* 29 n. 3) and Dhorme (*Revue Biblique*, 1909, p. 72).

[2] The ideas are set forth in the Pentateuchal history of the deliverance from bondage, the discipline of people and leaders, and the inculcation of law and justice (cf. *Prophets*, 40). The *ideas* in this composite history have a value quite apart from the particular views which the writers have of the birth of Israel as a nation in or about the fourteenth century B.C.

condemned. Moreover, the Chinese belief that the study of the old Classics was indispensable for the maintenance of Tao or Universal Order would have found its parallel in Palestine, where Piety spelt Knowledge of the Torah.[1] On the one hand, then, the exaltation of the Torah and the possession of an infallible Way encouraged a false security. On the other hand, the consciousness that the Law was spiritual (Rom. vii. 12–14), but its requirements beyond man's unaided efforts, and that the alternative to group-righteousness was outlawry and expulsion, associates Paul's attitude to the Torah with the primitive and recurring conceptions of the place of the individual *either* within *or* without the group-system of men and their god.[2]

Baudissin (*op. cit.* 16 *sqq.*, 22), observing that *ṣ-d-ḳ* is the only certain early attribute of the gods—it is not applied to goddesses—looks for a social or tribal origin of the fundamental idea, and suggests that it grew up out of alliances. Undoubtedly the consciousness of disorder, injustice, and lawlessness drives home the need for order, justice, and law, and social and religious incoherence arouse the desire for a new state of cohesion. It is proper, therefore, to see in new social alliances, indeed in all new unifying efforts and their immediate results, the more explicit recognition of principles which, though they may have become conspicuously absent, are those upon which all social and religious systems must, as systems, necessarily be founded.

Every new unity is virtually a "confederation," based upon an agreement, rather than a *natio* which has come into being.[3] For in alliances (see above, pp. 316 *sqq.*) the parties are (*a*) the group (*or* individuals) and their god, or (*b*) the group (with or without the explicit inclusion of their god) and another group (*or* individuals). Now there are, as W. R. S. shows, well-known ceremonies whereby communion or fellowship is *either* renewed *or* it is created, the corporate spirit is *either* confirmed *or* it is extended. But while every group has in its possession ceremonies of a unifying character, a distinction must be drawn between the more ordinary and periodic rites and those more intense and impressive occasions when the situation demands some fresher and more effective and more compelling means of indicating its uniqueness, or of making it the inauguration of some new unity or fellowship.

[1] See Bousset-Gressmann, *Rel. des Judentums*[3], 187 *sq.* Tao means "road." "If we were compelled to adopt a single word to represent the Tao of Lao-tsze, we should prefer the sense in which it is used by Confucius, 'the way,' *i.e.* μέθοδος" (R. Douglas, *Confucianism and Taouism*, 189).

[2] In contrast to the "loyalty" of Abdi-ḫiba of Jerusalem in the Amarna Letters is the "curse" (*araru*=ארר, Nos. 179, 193) on those guilty of "sin," *i.e.* disloyalty (*ḫiṭu*=חטא, Nos. 162 *sq.*, 353 *sq.*).

[3] On the use of *bĕrīth*, "covenant," for "nation, people," see *E.Bi.* 931.

Such ceremonies stand out above the rest for their impressiveness and effects. In course of time the impressiveness wears off, the sense of fellowship weakens, and the unity once more becomes impaired. In fact, there recur, not only in the great stages of religion in history, but in the vicissitudes of all social and religious systems, alternating periods of unity and disunity, differing obviously in duration and significance. Hence what may be called a "natural society" (p. 29 *sq.*) is hardly some absolute primary stage in human development, but an abstraction, a legitimate generalization of the normal conditions which have come into being, whose disintergation and subsequent reintegration may be followed, but whose prior stages and their inauguration are unknown or ignored.

W. R. S.'s analysis is concerned mainly with part only of the great recurring social-religious processes in history; and although he starts from the "natural society," every such society has had its earlier inaugural stage. Now ceremonies of union, communion, and fellowship vary generally in significance and intensity, and the question arises whether there is any essential difference between them, or whether the most impressive and vital more closely resemble each other than those that are more normal and regular. The supreme importance of W. R. S.'s problem has always been recognized; its interest is enhanced when it is remembered that it grew naturally out of his earlier years, when the Reformation and the need for a new formulation of Christian theology lay near his heart (see the *Introduction*). Consciously or not, he passed from the essentials of Christian communion and social unity to the more theoretical study of the fundamental ideas in atonement. His concern is with the creative moments in the history of all religion, and the question is whether such moments are more akin to one another than the intervening stages of decay or disintegration, and are distinguished by more primitive, more fundamental features.[1]

It would seem that every new and significant unity typically carries with it the consciousness that an earlier unity had been broken and repaired, or that the earlier unity has been developed further, or that there has been a realization of what was already potential. Nor is this strange, for in mystical and related experiences there is a persistent sense of ultimate unity or oneness which men have been unable to rationalize. Mysticism, with its experiences of a oneness with something pervasive lying beneath all life and thought, crude rites of social unity and oneness, and the ancient and primitive ideas of the interpenetration of man and nature—these reflect a sense of unity, communion, and undifferentiation which ordered thought tends to replace

[1] That is to say, if we assume the recurring series $l^1m^1n^1$, $l^2m^2n^2$, etc., does l^2 resemble l^1 more closely than m^1 or n^1? See p. 499 and n.

by differentiation, co-ordination, correlation, and the systematization of society and of knowledge. All such experiences, which naturally are not confined to any one age or land, are of primary significance; they are by no means necessarily "religious" in any objective sense of the term (p. 554). The experiences typically produce or force an adjustment of one's thought, and must be regarded as logically more primary than the developments they initiate. They are subjectively far more intense than the systematization of life and thought which follow. But their content will be determined by the stage which had previously been reached, and the changes which ensue affect conditions which were already in existence.

It is through these primary experiences that things are "holy" or "sacred" before they become "profane"; and it is simpler to say that the process of "sanctifying" brings out what was already potentially there, than to suppose that there is the absolute addition of a new quality; even as the conviction that something has been sanctified or divinized involves a qualitative change in the mind, and not the mere addition of a new idea. Similarly, a genuine conviction of the physical kinship of men and gods (as brothers or fathers) cannot be understood except as the outcome of genuine psychical experiences of unity which have been shaped by social conditions and by ideas concerning kinsmen (or the terms to denote kinsmen) which already lay at hand. So, in the light of universal mystical and related experiences, it is possible to understand something of the vicissitudes in the conceptions of unity, order, truth, righteousness, and man's place in nature, and to recognize how naturally it would happen that practical social needs would control their development.

In so far as the fundamental idea of righteousness involves some new unity and the confirmation or extension of group-systems, the work of Moses and Mohammed illustrates how unity has been achieved by men who wield divine authority and are obeyed by jealous and conflicting tribes (p. 70; cf. *Lectures*, 617). Unity is effected by a god who becomes the god of a confederation (Yahweh, p. 319 n.), or who receives the veneration of scattered tribes (Orotal and Alilat, p. 316). The great ethical gods Varuna and Mitra, who are mentioned in certain old Hittite treaties, were essentially covenant gods (*CAH.* ii. 400); and the god of the border-city of Kadesh-Barnea, a meeting-place of different clans, was probably a covenant-god like the covenant-Baal of Shechem.[1] Such gods are primarily not narrowly tribal or national, but are more closely associated with the individuals who are

[1] Appropriately enough, the Phœnician gods Suduk (Righteousness) and Misor (Uprightness) are said to have discovered salt, the importance of which in covenant ceremonies is well known (p. 270, Num. xviii. 19; Burney, *Judges*, 42).

responsible for the alliance.[1] The gods that unite are behind or over the gods peculiar to the groups involved; and the relations between local gods and the god(s) recognized by all the groups alike have always constituted a very delicate problem (see *CAH.* iii. 433 *sq.*). These higher gods seem to be less intimately a part of the unifying ceremonies and doctrines which persist after they themselves pass away. Varuna gives place to the more national Indra, and Yahweh found a serious rival in Baal, but was saved by the prophets; Shamash, too, is not a national god in the sense that Marduk or Asshur are. The god of the dominant group tends to conquer the god of a system of groups. W. R. S. observes that when tribes were united in worshipping the same god, each retained its religious cult: "the circle of worship was still the kin, though the deity worshipped was not of the kin" (p. 48), and "they worshipped side by side, but not together" (p. 276). Even in Central Australia, the great gods belong to the larger systems rather than to the constituent groups (cf. p. 529).

It is obvious that to the acuteness and initiation of individuals must be due so remarkable a co-operative system as that in Australia (p. 586). Even among savages, the religion of the individual is a very genuine experience (Malinowski, ed. Needham, 54). Hence it is necessary to emphasize the contrast between men of initiative and of marked personality and their personal religion—whatever it was—and the several totem-clans who perform their own totem ceremonies for the mutual advantage of the whole body. The totem-clan (that is, the clan and the animal or plant totem), with its practical "magical" or "magico-religious" ceremonies, stands on quite another footing from the god(s) found in the tribe or tribal area, however important these may be for the tribe as a whole. But the clan or local cult possessed the machinery for more extensive cults. The clan-ceremonies were eminently practical and reinforced the clan-unity; the collective ceremonies (*e.g.* initiation) strengthen the tribal feeling. Each clan formed a sort of mystical unity—which tended to break up whenever improved economic conditions made its ceremonies less vital—and totemism may fairly be described as a practical and "immanent" system in contrast to the more "transcendent" beings who are associated with the whole tribe and the leaders. The totem and clan are of the same essence; and the totem (species), which is on a more equal footing with the clan, is indubitably more significant for the specific functions of the clan than the Supreme Being or Beings common to all the clans. The antithesis is typical: a group-god—tribal or national—tends to stand in an almost immanent relationship

[1] Cf. "thy God" in the appeal to Samuel, 1 Sam. xii. 19, and the words addressed to David, 1 Chron. xii. 18.

to the group. Even in Israel the national Yahweh, the god of the ancestors, and the deliverer of his own people, on the one side, and on the other the more universal God of all the earth, represent inevitable conflicting tendencies between the exclusive god of a group and the god of two or more groups who are aware that they are not one (p. 268). It is quite intelligible, therefore, that if the national god is to become universal the machinery of the national cult should be employed, and accordingly a universal Yahweh has his seat and his special priesthood at Jerusalem (cf. *CAH.* vi. 189).

There tends to be a correspondence between the nature of the god of the group and that of the group with its peculiar interests, temperament, history, economic conditions, etc. On the other hand, when groups are combined the god's nature must be one capable of uniting different groups; it must go beneath and behind the conditions which sever individuals and groups, and appeal to that which they share collectively and in common (*i.e.* ideas of right, etc.). When the god is a sky- or sun-god it is the more fitted to be universal; and a sun-god was especially appropriate as the symbol of regularity and order, purity and truth, and of hostility to darkness and evil. The consciousness of norm, order, right, etc., is *a priori*, like the experience of unity and oneness: neither is of abstract truths but of concrete particulars. Speculation concerning origins is futile; but whereas analysis takes us back to the group-atom, which nowhere exists alone (p. 507) and we are tempted to build up conceptions of society from the smallest units, in actual history we encounter areas, peoples, tribes, or systems of units—systems which in course of time give place to other systems. Now since the systematizing efforts whereby these new combinations or systems arise must be ascribed to individuals, men of personality, it seems a natural assumption that their religion would be anthropomorphic rather than theriomorphic, and that the ideas of order, righteousness, etc., would be of an ethical character.

Personal religion, in the shape of Personal Totems and Guardian Spirits (see Frazer, *Tot. Ex.* s.vv.), is theriomorphic, but these are on the way to become personal gods of an increasingly anthropomorphic character. At higher stages the individual religion of the Pharaoh, impressive as it so often is, does not exclude striking animal symbolism, which, however, is not of an ethical stamp (p. 533). Further, against the assumption that animal gods could hardly serve to unite groups, could be set the distribution of certain totem-species—which, however, would unite only the scattered members of the particular totem-group; or the extension, *e.g.*, of the Apis-bull of Memphis—though here, again, ethical ideas are missing. On the one hand, the ritual for a system of groups tends to be based upon one already in use among one or more

single groups.[1] On the other, the eminence of the more conspicuous individuals could naturally lead to their being venerated, to the rise of ancestor-cults, and to anthropomorphic conceptions of Supreme Beings (p. 547). That is to say, the *ethical* ideas and ideals come primarily only through men.

Further, on the more exceptional and impressive occasions of some new union, when a sacrifice was required, the human victim might seem far more significant and valuable than an animal (cf. p. 361). An animal *surrogate* is not to be expected, though animals come to be the recognized sacrificial victims instead of man. But primarily, at least, the sacrificial animal must possess an inherent value of its own. In like manner, a " sacred " victim is to be expected rather than one that has been consecrated *ad hoc* (cf. p. 572); and as blood was the most elemental vehicle of life, the blood of one of the kin would primarily carry a profounder meaning than the blood of the victim which had ceremonially been made one of the kin. Here Central Australian totemism is extraordinarily suggestive, because (1) the clan and the totem are of the same kin and substance; (2) the clan-ceremonies are curiously practical and " magico-religious," whereas the tribal system, composed of a number of mutually co-operating clans, owes its existence to the genius of individuals, and is profoundly interesting from a higher social and ethical point of view. In other words, while the cults are totemic—and the details have parallels and analogies on higher (anthropomorphic) levels—the creative factors are due to individuals. The environment always moves more slowly than the individual, and the difference between the gradual development of an environment and the growth of ideas among individuals is so invariable as to be anticipated at all ages and at all stages of human history. For these reasons both W. R. S. and his most convinced opponents are right if it be recognized that social-religious advance has been from the lowest forms, of which modern Central Australian totemism affords only one example, but advances are due to individuals whose private (religious) experience, even on the most rudimentary levels, was other than that of the group-system.

How this bears upon ideas of Right(eousness) and Wrong (sin, etc.) and Atonement (see pp. 654, 658) can now be seen. The fundamental ideas of man's control over nature range from (1) the most specialist, as in the totem ceremonies for the control or the multiplication of the special animal or plant totem, which is of the same substance as the

[1] See especially Durkheim, 384 *sqq.*, where the " multiplication " ceremonies are employed, *though not for their primary purpose*, when the novices are being initiated. A single rite may serve many ends, and different rites may be used to produce the same effect and can replace one another (*ib.* 386).

members of the clan, to (2) the most general and vague—though, as a matter of fact, the priestly kings themselves are more especially controllers of the weather. But in all the beliefs and practices wherein men utilize supernatural power there are conditions and restrictions: Mana and Taboo are complementary, and success depends upon the appropriate conduct (p. 565). In the totem ceremonies the behaviour of the officiants, the solemnity with which the rites are performed, and the atmosphere throughout combine to point to a psychological state which can only be styled a literal at-one-ment. Broken taboos and wrong-doing would frustrate the rites, which are for the benefit of others; and there are implicit ideas of unity, right conduct, sociableness, which were capable of being grasped in their concrete form and extended. "In the O.T.," writes W. R. S., "the experience of forgiveness is no mere subjective feeling; it rests on facts" (*OTJC.* 441). Primitive peoples have no explicit conceptions of Righteousness, Sin, and Atonement in any modern sense of the words. Their various social ceremonies meant (*a*) tribal unity and (*b*) the peculiar unity of each clan with some one department of nature; and although modern Central Australian totemism cannot be supposed to represent actual primitive prehistoric religion, it enables us to understand how an extraordinarily rudimentary social-religious system may contain at least the germs of the great ideas which in the history of thought have been made explicit, differentiated, and developed.

P. 432. The Limping Dance.—Circumambulation is common, but sometimes a limping, hopping, or halting gait characterizes sacred or ceremonial dances; see *Ency. Brit.* vii. 795c (India), Eitrem, 479 (Iceland), Hölscher, *Die Profeten*, 132, and Oesterley, *The Sacred Dance*, 117 *sq.*, citing Heliodorus, *Aeth.* iv. 16 *sq.* (the limping and leaping of Tyrian seafarers in the worship of Heracles of Tyre). For Gunkel's conjecture that the name Manasseh means "[the god] who causes to limp," see H. W. Hogg, *E.Bi.* col. 2921. The Arabic *takhalluj* denotes walking in a loose manner as though disjointed; it is supposed to be the effect of contact with the jinn (Hogg, *ib.*). Here may be compared the place-name Beth-Ḥoglah, Jerome's *locus gyri*, which has been connected with Ar. *ḥajala*, "hobble or hop" (*E.Bi.* col. 557); it was perhaps the scene of a limping dance. Some hopping or limping dance seems to accompany the modern Syrian dirge *mā'id* (Jahnow, *Heb. Leichenlied*, 75 n. 6, citing Wetzstein). Jacob's limping, which is associated with a struggle with a supernatural being (and a victory, Hos. xii. 3 *sq.*), and with a "pass-over," may go back to some traditional limping ceremony at the Jordan (Gunkel, Oesterley); though it is said that the injury to the sinew of the thigh-socket such as he sustained, is a common affection, and causes a man to walk on tiptoe (cf. 380 n. 1, above;

Skinner, *Gen.* 410 *sq.*).[1] But the thigh is a seat of life and procreative power, and was sacred among the North American Choctaws for this reason (Frazer, *GB.* viii. 264 *sqq.*, especially 266); and the limping rite thus seems to connect itself with circumcision, possibly as a puberty rite.[2] See above, p. 610.

When the Elema maskers, a secret society of New Guinea, "hop about as is characteristic of gods,"[3] this comparison is presumably derived from earlier limping dances performed by men who were ceremonially representing or imitating the supernatural beings, and whose peculiar gait became fixed in tradition as that of the gods. In the annual death-dance at Pulu in the Torres Straits, masked performers imitated the gait and actions of their deceased kinsmen (Webster, 162); and among the Kayans of Central Borneo, before the rice is sown, masked men imitate the spirits in order to ensure a good harvest (*GB.* vii. 186). In a variety of ways men have gained their ideas of the gods from those who represented them or embodied them. On the stela with Hammurabi's Code of Laws the Sun-god resembles the king, who in his turn is "the Sun of the Land";[4] and, alternately, the gods are thought of and depicted after the patterns of outstanding individuals, and the accepted teaching concerning the gods subsequently provides the patterns for other men to follow. Accordingly, it is necessary to distinguish (1) the imitation of gods and spirits by men who adopt a certain toilet, wear a disguise, or indulge in certain characteristic actions such as a "limping dance," and (2) the traditions, which have become "canonical," concerning the appearance, dress, gait, and other characteristics and attributes of the gods. See further below, p. 674 *sq.*

P. 434.—Mr. C. G. Montefiore, in his Hibbert Lectures (1892) on the *Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by the Religion of the Ancient Hebrews* (ed. of 1897, pp. 333 *sq.*, 335 *sq.*), took exception to W. R. S.'s remarks here and also on p. 408 (as regards Lev. xvi. 30). Still, as he remarks, the institution of the yearly Day of Atonement "was likely to lead, and did lead, to many fresh superstitions. By the letter of the law, it was seemingly implied that the guilt of all sins . . . would

[1] For the "sacredness" of this sinew Wellhausen (168 n.) refers to Kamil, 552, 13.

[2] N. Schmidt (*JBL.* xlv. 275 *sq.*) conjectures that the *nāsheh* sinew was originally the pudic nerve, or rather the *membrum virile* itself. The Shiahs do not eat the hare because, like the camel, it has "the sinew which shrank" (*The Near East*, February 10, 1927, p. 145).

[3] Hutton-Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, 101 *sq.* (cf. 106 for a limping dance); S. A. Cook, *Ridgeway Presentation Volume*, 397 *sq.* On limping gods, cf. also Fries, *MVAG.* xv. 104.

[4] Similarly, the god Khons of Thebes is represented as an Egyptian prince, possibly Haremheb (Gressmann, *Vorträge*, Warburg, iii. 182).

be wiped out and atoned for by the ceremony of the Atonement-day." He objects also that nothing is said in the Mishnah about " material prestation," and argues that the atoning efficacy lay in the Day itself, and that there was a formal suspension of forgiveness between the act of repentance and the Day. Cf. also G. F. Moore, *E.Bi.* " Sacrifice," § 51 *sq.*, who refers to R. Judah the patriarch, who seems to have maintained that the Day of Atonement expiated sin without repentance, though this was an exception to the prevailing view. W. R. S. (p. 434 l. 3) states that sacrificial rites lay the deity under a social obligation. It is true that the trend of orthodox Rabbinical Judaism was to insist upon the more ethical and spiritual conditions of atonement, but " there are emphatic allusions to the Shechinah countenancing sin and dwelling in contact with it. . . . God dwells in Israel at all costs " (Abelson, *Immanence of God in Rabb. Lit.* 138). Gray (*Sacrifice*, 320) observes that the institution of the Day of Atonement tended to foster the growth of a very mechanical and unethical view of sin. He concludes: " Every ritual of expiation, every symbol of forgiveness, every theory of atonement, is liable to abuse and to foster an unethical and unspiritual conception of God's attitude to sin, and it would not be difficult . . . to parallel from other religions such abuses as we have observed of the Jewish Day of Atonement, and also of such protests in favour of a more worthy one."

P. 434. Fasting Before a Sacred Meal.—See *GB.* viii. 73, 75, 76 *sq.*, 83, ix. 291 *sq.* The practice served to prepare the body for mystical experiences. It was a custom among the Jews of Philo's time to fast during the day or to abstain from food and drink before the Paschal meal, though scarcely for the reason given by some Rabbis—to increase the appetite (so *Pesakh.* 99*a* ; Gray, 376). The early Syrian Christians fasted before receiving the " Holy Mysteries " (Budge, *Book of Governors*, ii. 666), and it was a practice at the Mysteries (cf. S. Angus, *The Mystery-Religions and Christianity*, 85). From the complaint in Isaiah lviii. 3, it would seem that fasting was supposed to ensure divine attention (cf. Jer. xiv. 12); and although " to afflict oneself " (*'innah néphesh*) might have been mainly psychological, it comes to denote fasting ; see Cheyne, *E.Bi.* 386 n. 4 ; Benzinger, *ib.* 1507 (§ 5).

P. 435 n.—In the account of the sale of a priesthood in Babylonia the sacrificial priest receives the intestines, ribs, reins, stomach, etc. ; see further G. R. Driver, *Centenary Supplement of the Journ. of the Royal Asiat. Soc.* 1924, Oct., 43. At the present day the ḳaiyam of the Palestinian shrine generally receives the skin and the *saḳaṭ*, *i.e.* extremities, head, abdominal organs (excluding the large omentum) and the *maḍbaḥ* (the part of the throat where the knife has cut it) ; see Canaan, *JPOS.* vi. 43.

P. 437. Sacred Dress (cf. 451 *sq.*).—Garments frequently serve as an indication of ownership (p. 336 n. 1) or of a claim (cf. Ezek. xvi. 8; Ruth iii. 9),[1] as a token of protection, or as a covenant mark (Landberg, *Arab.* v. 175 *sq.*); in the period of the First Babylonian Dynasty the impression of the fringed border of a man's mantle served instead of a seal or a signature (Thureau-Dangin, *Rituels Accad.* 57 n., 95). At the New Year's Festival in the cities of Bayblonia the king would send his garments to represent himself (Langdon, *Epic of Creation*, 29 n.). The clothes of "sacred" men naturally have a special virtue (*e.g.* Mohammed's; Wellhausen, 196). Special and, in particular, "clean" garments are commonly necessary on sacred occasions, and (usually dark red and purple) were worn in Babylonia both by the priests and laymen (Lagrange, 239 *sq.*; Morgenstern, 145 *sq.*). But such garments, besides being ritually "clean," were sometimes in some way connected with the gods who were being worshipped. A priest is said to wear the clothes of the city of Eridu (Delitzsch, *Handwörterbuch*, 371*b*), and in general "the exorcising priests donned special garments—often in imitation of the god in whose name they acted" (Jastrow, *Rel. Bel.* 316). Centuries later, at Harran, the worshipper who approached the various planetary gods wore a dress appropriate to the god.[2] Presumably it was necessary to resemble —externally, at least—the god to whom one was appealing (it was a sort of identification or communion), and along these lines may be explained the masks and other coverings of the worshippers of the bull-deity in Asia Minor and elsewhere (A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, i. 490 *sq.*). In Egypt, the man who presided over the rite of mummification is called "Anubis the embalmer," and sometimes seems to have worn a jackal mask.[3] But in general, masks are not necessarily to imitate gods, they may also serve, like veils, to hide the face from the vulgar gaze or from gazing upon the sacred. Cf. Exod. xxxiv. 33 *sqq.*

Here may be mentioned the use of skins (see p. 474). The skin of an animal may be preserved as a token of, or as actually containing some vital part of the animal (*GB.* viii. 173 *sq.*). Skins of sacrificial victims are preserved as amulets, or they are used in ceremonies of rebirth (in Kikuyu); *e.g.* a man wrapped in a skin or otherwise identified with

[1] See Wellhausen, *Archiv f. Rel.* 1904, p. 40 *sq.*; Goldziher, *Abhand.* i. 46 *sq.*

[2] De Goeje, *Leiden Oriental Congress*, 1883, ii. 341); cf. the special dress worn when consulting oracles of Trophonius (Paus. ix. 39) and Delphi (Livy, xxiii. 11).

[3] Blackman, *Proc. of Soc. Bibl. Arch.* xl. 66. On masks, see Andrew Lang, *Myth, Ritual, etc.* (1899), ii. 284; Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 114 *sq.*, 330; Hoffman and Gressmann, *ZATW.* 1922, pp. 78 *sqq.*, 94 *sq.* (on the teraphim, see further Sellin, *Alttest. Prophetismus*, 203 *sq.*). On Gregentius, p. 438 n. 2 above, Stübe (note 760) adds references to Migne, *Patr. Gr.* lxxxvi. i. 599, and *ZDMG.* xxxv. 1 *sqq.*, 693 *sqq.*

an animal undergoes symbolically a radical change in his status.[1] Such animals are not necessarily sacred, although, where this is the case, as in sleeping on a ram-skin to obtain a revelation (Paus. i. 34, 5), ideas of communion or identity are involved.

On some Babylonian representations of Marduk and Adad, the robes of the gods are adorned with astral symbols, which, it would seem, are intended to associate them with their celestial realm.[2] The cosmic interpretation of the dress of the Jewish high priest in Josephus (*Ant.* iii. 7. 1), in spite of its lateness, is explicable only if it points back to antique conceptions of the relation between the gods in their heavenly abodes and their human representatives on earth, which persisted (in varying forms) down to a very late period. On this, see Gray, *Sacrifice*, 143 *sqq.* (on the sacrificial service in heaven), and the rather speculative treatment by A. Jeremias in his *Handbuch* (*passim*).

P. 438. IMITATION AND IDENTIFICATION.—The desire to imitate or otherwise resemble a sacred being ranges from the loftiest spiritual injunction to imitate the perfection of a Heavenly Father (Matt. v. 48), or to be "holy" as Yahweh was holy (Lev. xix. 2), to the crudest efforts to imitate externally the animal or other sacred object with whom men felt themselves to be most intimately connected. Thus "Condor clans in Peru who believed themselves descended from the condor, adorned themselves with the feathers of the bird" (Frazer, *Tot. Ex.* i. 26). Among the Thompson Indians of North America, the boy who received a guardian spirit would paint his face with designs symbolic of this spirit (iii. 414). Among the Australian Arunta the newly initiated youth, after being told his secret name (which may be that of one of the famous departed, of whom he is the reincarnation), is painted on face and body with the device of his totem (i. 196). A new-born babe of the Deer clan of the Omaha Indians will be marked with red spots down the neck to indicate that it is a deer; and when one of the Buffalo clan dies he is wrapped in a buffalo robe before rejoining his "ancestors" (iii. 103 *sq.*; cf. the Tlingit practices, *ib.* 269 *sq.*, and those of the Haidas, 289). In all such rites whereby the sacred being is imitated or an identity externally effected, the visible action has, primarily at least, a genuine psychological value. It manifests a communion with the sacred being (cf. Durkheim, 357 *sq.*), however conventional or mechanical this relationship may subsequently become.

[1] On skins in ritual, see Frazer, *FOT.* ii. 6 *sqq.*; Eitrem, 386 *sqq.* (see *ib.* 401 *sq.*, 482 *sq.*, on clothes in ritual).

[2] Cf. A. Jeremias, *Old Test.* i. 106, fig. 33 (cf. ii. 190 n.), and *Handbuch d. Altorient. Geisteskultur*, 42, fig. 25; Gressmann, *Altorient. Bilder z. A.T.*[2], figs. 314, 326 (with description, pp. 90, 93). Sellin, in the *Nöldeke-Festschrift*, 712, conjectures that the priestly shining dress in Babylonia reflects the shining majesty of the god (cf. Ps. civ. 1 *sq.*).

It represents the constantly recurrent stage where "spiritual" ideas are grasped only in a concrete and visible form; and it illustrates the characteristic difference between (*a*) the emphasis upon the outward act, as engendering, maintaining, and revealing a particular inward state, and (*b*) that upon the condition of mind of which the outward act is, at its highest, the natural fruit (cf. A. B. Davidson on Ezek. xviii. 9 [*Camb. Bible*]). But however mystical the rites of imitation may be, they typically serve an essentially practical purpose. In becoming like the god one acquired his powers and gained possession of his ability to control either things or else the processes which he operated. The most striking cases of imitation are those in the Central Australian ceremonies, where certain totem-clans imitate in one way or another the totem in order to make it more abundant (as food) or otherwise control it. The imitation sets in operation, as it were, a "mystic potency" (cf. I. King, 152 *sqq.*). However mystical imitative rites may seem, the religion of primitive peoples is predominantly practical; and the rites which seem to be crudely magical are better described as "magico-religious." For the details, see Frazer, *GB.* i. 85 *sqq.*, *Tot. Ex.* i. 105 *sqq.*, 184 *sqq.*; Durkheim, 351 *sqq.* See above on "limping," p. 672, and on imitation by means of dress, p. 674; also *ERE.* "Religion," § 19.

P. 439 *sq.* The Material and the Spiritual.—In his final paragraph, summing up the whole book, W. R. S. indicates the supreme problem of religion: (1) the real difference between primitive and advanced religions, and (2) the factors of the progressive development of religion. Everywhere there is an invariable tendency for ideas to pass into movements, and attention to any movement readily evokes the tendency to copy it. All primitive types of thought are at the perceptual rather than the conceptual stage: ideas are "bound," and cannot be grasped save in some physical, material, or concrete embodiment. Some material object or action, more or less appropriate to the occasion, is commonly desired in order to give reality to what at higher stages is recognized as essentially mental; and purely psychological processes must be helped out by concrete rites.[1] Primitive man, observes Kreglinger, has no internal life. "Il est réaliste, découvre des réalistés objectives là même où il n'aperçoit en fait que les images subjectives nées dans sa propre pensée: il est matérialiste, tous les concepts se matérialisent dans sa pensée, sans d'ailleurs, cela

[1] Cf. Naaman in 2 Kings v. 10 *sqq.* Canaan (*JPOS.* vi. 38 n. 4) cites a curious case where a mother cures her son of a very bad fright by acting as though he were dead; his alarm and anxiety dispel his fright, but he must eat of a hen which she has been boiling, and the hen is a black or white one according as the man had been frightened in the night-time or the day. See above, pp. 84 *sqq.*

va de soi, que cette matérialisation soit vrai consciente." [1] Primitive religion, accordingly, is intensely practical, and centres on human life and on real human interests (above, pp. 16 *sqq.*; cf. *Lectures*, 412).

The differences between the practical social-religious cults of rudimentary peoples and the more conceptual and abstract stages of thought at the higher levels constitute a common source of misunderstanding, and raise important questions. Misled by the concreteness of primitive religion, it is easy to overlook the ideas that lie behind or are implicit in primitive rites. On the other hand, since ideas of salvation, redemption, etc., would, as W. R. S. remarks, be primarily expressed in some concrete shape, it is often difficult in particular cases, *e.g.* in dealing with the O.T., to determine whether such ideas were reinforced by or expressed in concrete form, or had already become purely spiritual.[2] Ideas of spiritual imitation of a god have their more rudimentary physical counterpart (p. 675); and to spiritual rebirth or regeneration correspond realistic rites of rebirth (p. 649). Primarily, at least, such rites must have been of psychological value; ideas of the kinship and marriage of gods and man, and other realistic modes of thought, must have been a genuine expression of the intimate relationship which men felt to subsist between their supernatural beings and themselves.

Now primitive men not only fail to recognize any essential difference between human and animal life, but can even aver a substantial identity between themselves and their totem (Frazer, *Tot. Ex.* i. 119; cf. above, 88 *sq.*). The Kangaroo man points to a photograph of himself and says, "That one is just the same as me; so is a kangaroo." The explanation of this lies in the meaning his totem has for him; [3] and similarly, on a considerably higher level of civilization, when a Pharaoh, like Ikhnaton, is "son" of the solar disk Aton, it is obvious that the solar body is the embodiment of his god as truly as an image or other terrestrial object can be to its worshippers. So long as physical con-

[1] *Études sur l'origine et le développement de la vie religieuse* (Brussels, 1919), i. 160 *sqq.* Of course this type of thought occurs everywhere. In Rome, "Faunus *is* the wood and Vulturnus *is* the river, the name of the seed is *Ceres*." "Dryads and Hamadryads *are* trees," and "whereas Naiads *are* sources, nixies and hags, and tree-spirits and brownies, are souls that are only bound to sources, trees, and houses, from which they long to be released" (Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, i. 403).

[2] So, *e.g.*, as concerns ideas of the safety of a man's "soul," see Cook in *People and the Book* (ed. Peake, 45 *sqq.*); cf. H. W. Robinson, *ib.* 353 *sqq.*, and for the connexion between "trust" (*b-ṭ-ḥ*) and prostration or throwing oneself upon another, see G. Driver, *ib.* 118, and cf. *JQR.* 1902, April, 447. See above, p. 635.

[3] Cf. Durkheim (188, 206): totemism is the religion, not of such and such animals, men, or images, but of the power found in them, though not to be confounded with them.

crete rites and modes of thought have a meaning which we can only describe as psychical or spiritual, the social and ethical value of much that seems purely ritual or material is psychologically explicable. In point of fact, the extent to which the " spiritual " lurks in seemingly crude and physical forms is astonishing. Ideas of " supernatural " birth, of the " spirits " or " souls " even of inanimate objects, or the ability of " spirits " to eat the " spirit " part of food, taken with the preponderance of religious or magical rites and practices in the life of primitive men, have given the impression that they must have passed all their time more or less in a mystical state. It is, however, truer to say that at the lower undifferentiated stages religious and related ideas permeated the greater part of life, and that through the very scantiness of positive knowledge the " supersensuous " was more immediate. Indeed, the reality of what we should call the spiritual or the supersenuous was such that even at higher stages of development, spirits and souls have concrete form, and spirit and matter instead of being antithetical are different qualities or modes of the same substance, being more refined or more coarse as the case may be. The immediate reality of the spiritual and psychical is the characteristic feature of early thought; the explicit distinction of the psychical and spiritual from the physical and material marks the great advance.

" The early Hebrews did not think about Yahweh, they believed in him and expressed the reality of his sovereignty in the great things which he did for his people " (*Prophets*, 42). The more detached objective and critical attitudes are secondary. It is then that names of things lose their concreteness and a distinction can be drawn between a name or a word and what it stands for, and meanings can be severed from the ways in which they are expressed. Differentiation takes place. In *Lectures*, 224 *sq.*, W. R. S. characteristically illustrates this in the "growth of the religious consciousness" at the Reformation. Rites like that which accompanies the prayer to Ishtar (p. 646 n. 3), or the ceremonial cited above (p. 676), have no real justification for their existence ; none the less it often proves difficult to sever rites from that with which they have no genetic connexion whatever. Similarly, a god will not be deemed to exist apart from the sacred object in which he is embodied, even as at the stage of conceptual thought ideas of a Supreme Being are treated in a quasi-physical way. And when the connexion between idea and ritual is of the closest, as in rites of purification, imitation, and rebirth, both the readiness with which the forms come to obscure the spiritual element which had given them their primary value, and the difficulty of modifying them, can be easily understood. Again, it often happens that the spiritual value of a rite is so slight that, properly speaking, it requires reinforcement which,

however, is not provided for by any other rite; or the rite has implications which, if developed—and there is a tendency to develop them—would impede ethical or intellectual progress. Upon the form in which an idea is clothed, or on the rite with which it is fused, will depend the advance of thought.[1]

The spiritual idea that can be found in some physical dress, *e.g.* the imitation of a god, is neither in isolation nor is it solely spiritual. Primarily, it has some real connexion with its environment. For this and other reasons it is proper to distinguish, where possible, between (*a*) the *magico-religious*, which has an evident value, even though it be interwoven with ideas of nature and the control of nature which are no longer held, and (*b*) the purely *magical*, wherein individuals profess to control nature in their own right, or there are amulets and other objects to which is ascribed an efficacy which is in no way inherent in them. The difference turns upon their psychological and social value. If, for example, the idea of scapegoats arose merely from a confusion between (1) the possibility of transferring actual physical burdens and (2) the supposition that bodily and mental ailments could be as readily shifted (see Frazer, *GB.* ix. Preface), the rise and persistence of the rites would be psychologically inexplicable. Hence, although numerous examples of a purely magical order could undoubtedly be cited, the rites must be regarded—when a long view is taken—as primarily " magico-religious." [2] Moreover, it is misleading to stamp religion at the physical stage as necessarily unethical. Early ideas of the Sacred and Holy had not that ethical or moral value which the Hebrew prophets gave them; they were pre-ethical. They did not necessarily exclude an ethical meaning, but they were undifferentiated, being interwoven with what was non- and anti-ethical. And as the stress was not laid upon their ethical significance, they not only included but even emphasized (as in the *Ḳedēshōth*) what proved to be immoral and anti-social.[3]

[1] G. F. Moore (*Hist. of Religions*, i. 585), referring to the Roman deities Concordia, Spes, Pietas, etc., observes that modern authors often regard these as the deification of abstractions and a mark of advanced religious development; but " it is only the modern who conceives them as abstract: the power which works harmony among citizens is for the antique apprehension no more abstract than the power that works the germination of grain in the earth." One sees how the treatment of ideas of Concord, Wisdom, etc., were hampered by their embodiment. The Semitic divine abstractions, in South Arabia, etc., are merely appellatives: *Ḥukm* is not Wisdom, but " the wise one " (Nielsen, *Handbuch*, i. 195 *sq.*).

[2] Incidentally, it should be noticed that the desire to relate primitive psychology to that of more advanced peoples is itself significant for the science and theory of religion; cf. *ERE.* " Religion," § 12.

[3] Cf. p. 553. In the same way, ideas of " religion " can be at a pre-ethical stage

Differentiation and the development of some particular aspect are the most characteristic features in the history of religious thought, and a distinction has to be drawn between legitimate development, when a spiritual meaning is found in some rite, etc., and the tendencies to find some deeper meaning for which there is no justification—the notorious abuse of the allegorical method of interpretation. Spiritual development does not lie only in making explicit what was formerly implicit, but in processes of transmutation. In a singularly forcible passage, W. R. S. explains the spiritual ideas of Yahweh as a reaction against the passion of Semitic heathenism (*Lectures*, p. 425). Error and aberration will force a recognition of elemental ideas which need reshaping, even as gross evil will compel the recognition of the principles which it violates. Excesses in religion (phallicism, licentious cults, human sacrifice), and all else that is socially destructive, are to be regarded on this account, not as primary phenomena, but as late decadent tendencies. But it is often possible amid certain gross, irrational, and " superstitious " beliefs and practices to recover something germinal which needs transmuting, even as, at the conceptual level, an extreme theory, theology, or philosophy may contain elements which in another form are of permanent value.[1]

It is instructive to inquire why new spiritual teaching, such as that of the prophets, is ultimately assimilated. It may be found that it has developed and made explicit what was already implicit, or it has fitted in with current belief, or it has transmuted or reshaped it. But the spiritual ideas of great figures tend to be, like themselves, isolated and apart from practical life and thought. They need adjustment and systematization. There is always the danger that spiritual ideas will become merely verbal. Spiritual teaching is preserved by being systematized in tangible or concrete form, in individual or social life, in a doctrinal or other system. The teaching of the prophets became embodied in post-exilic Judaism, and " without those hard and ossified forms the preservation of its essential elements would have proved impossible." [2] The example is of the deepest interest as showing that the stage when religion has become " spiritual " (as in the individualistic prophets) is never the final stage. Many interesting points at once arise out of the relationship between the pre-spiritual and later stages. It may be asked, *e.g.*, whether the " priestly " account of the circumcision rite is recognizably post-prophetic, and whether the national history of Israel in its present form represents pre-prophetic or

when attention is directed to the intense subjective meaning that it has for the individual rather than upon its more objective aspects.

[1] Cf. Cook, *Study of Religions*, 211 *sqq.*

[2] Cf. Wellhausen, *Prolegomena*, 497 *sq.*, cited in *Ency. Brit.*[11] xv. 390*d*.

post-prophetic teaching. Moreover, false contrasts are frequently made. The Babylonian psalms, in spite of their many admirable features, *seem* unspiritual because of their material rewards or the absence of higher feelings of love for god or fellow-men. But a living religion is practical and apt to be material, notably that of Israel. The contrast is as misleading as that between the practical life and religion of Israelites and the height of idealism in the N.T.—as distinct from the troubled history of a worldly Christendom.

Religious experience must be made articulate, and therefore needs a theology—as W. R. S. was insisting in his earlier work (*Lectures*, cf. 323 *et passim*). So, too, spiritual religion must be in a system which is in a certain harmony with ordinary life and knowledge. In the development of religion the spiritual part, implicit or explicit, has invariably proved the most essential—conversely, that which has been developed is that which was " spiritual " ; and at the higher stages it must be embodied in order to preserve it, but it must not be suffocated. The " congenital defect inherent in every attempt to embody spiritual truth in material forms " (p. 440) is most obvious in rudimentary religion or in the priestly ritual of a post-exilic Judaism. But when W. R. S.—in the earlier part of his career, at least—reiterates his dissatisfaction with the theology of the day, and looks for a revival of the old Reformation spirit and principles, he is implying that even an explicitly theological system can lose its old spiritual power (see the *Introduction*). The transition from the physical or material stage through some spiritual movement to a new systematization at the conceptual level is not all ; and " spiritual " religion is not merely that which by reason of its terminology stands conspicuously opposed to material or ritual forms.

Gray (*Sacrifice*, 43 *sq.*, 52 *sqq.*) contrasts the spiritual demand of the prophets that men should be like God, with primitive communion rites and the offering of gifts. The root idea of both of the latter belongs, he asserts, to a " grossly material view of religion and of man's relation to God " (*ib.* 54). This is forcibly put. There are many practices whereby a man is taken out of himself into a " supersensuous " realm, and the occasions will be felt to be " sacred " ; but a distinction may well be drawn between those like the use of intoxicating drinks (p. 575 ; cf. also p. 612 *sq.*), and those whose demoralizing effects are less patent, notably material gifts (cf. p. 639). Again, even if man's gift of his own will to God be completely spiritual (Gray), must not this surrender be translated into action ? And if so, the question will arise, When is a man doing or not doing the will of his god ? If to do God's will is spiritual religion, it would seem that a distinction should be made between (*a*) the occasions when the individual is conscious of

alternatives, one of which is definitely " higher," and may be regarded as in accordance with, or in submission to, a Divine Will; and (*b*) all those where he is at least not consciously acting contrary to his highest ideals. There are other cases which need not be considered; and it seems evident that in the latter (*b*) he is, consciously at least, not opposing God's will, though whether he is therefore doing it brings up questions which do not belong here. All that has to be said now is that one of the most characteristic features of primitive religion is not (1) " my will," the will of the all-powerful wonder-worker; nor is it (2) " thy will," an explicit dependence upon and surrender to a higher power; it may be called (3) " *our* will." In the last case men are admittedly or virtually or implicitly co-operating with their gods.[1] They are a " chosen people," or " representative " individuals; they are symbols or vehicles of the recognized god(s), and it is frequently taken as a matter of course that the gods do the will of their adherents. Or men perform ceremonies to procure that for which elsewhere they appeal directly to the gods; they act *qua* gods. This type readily develops, in one direction, into explicit subservience and quietism, and in the other, towards the crudest magical attitudes; and for this reason it can be regarded as primary. " *Our* will " is the typical religion of the narrow group-system consisting of gods and their worshippers; it is religion of an immanental and not transcendental character, and on this account is of the first importance for estimating the nature of " spiritual " religion.

W. R. S. clearly recognized that his researches bore directly on " the great problem of the origins of the spiritual religion of the Bible " (p. 2). Communion or At-one-ment with a Divine Power, as he had previously insisted, was a moral, a personal thing; it is an invisible bond, not an outward sign (*Lectures*, 223, 275, 319). It is enough for us to recall the New Covenant to be written on a man's heart, or the Divine Presence when two or three are gathered together in His Name —in the Talmud when men meet together to study the Torah the Shechinah is in their midst.[2] Now amid the many forms in which experiences and convictions of communion, at-one-ment, or fellowship have expressed themselves, we can distinguish (1) the fundamental experience without which the evidence would be unintelligible, and (2) the various forms which we may attempt to evaluate and arrange in some order of development. The x which we trace in l, m, and n is the " spiritual " element; and ambiguity is caused when with x, the psychological origin of the forms and their primitive expression, is confused l, which, as the most rudimentary of forms, is regarded as the

[1] See *ERE*. " Religion," § 19 (3).

[2] *Bab. Berachoth*, 6*a* (Abelson, 145).

true origin. Moreover, even to say that *l* developed into *m* and *m* into *n* goes farther than to say that *n* can be traced back ultimately to *l* (cf. p. 541, top); and it is obvious that *l* can never represent actual prehistoric primitive data. So, as regards the theory of totem-origins, it is admittedly of extraordinary suggestiveness; it has drawn attention to the potentiality of some very rudimentary cults and to the persistence, recurrence, and constant reshaping of elements—of which the idea of communion is only one—which *for this reason* may be called "spiritual." W. R. S.'s theory of the "totem-origin" of sacrifice is true, therefore, in the sense that in totemism we find the most primitive types of belief and practice that we can well conceive, and that, as Durkheim clearly showed, it contains in rudimentary form some of the significant features which mark the higher religions.

It has been said somewhere that the most ancient religion would be the purest, the most recent the truest: at all events it is an important question whether primitive religion has any real value for or anything to contribute to modern knowledge. Has the "vision" of early types of religion any meaning for mature thought which admits of being rationalized? Now, when Christianity arose, it did not cover the same ground and have the same *milieu* as pre-Christian Judaism; and the same can be said of post-exilic Judaism in its relation to the old religion of Israel. In religious as in other thought a new stage will often be more intensive, but on a narrower basis, more idealist, less catholic. In the history of religions and of sects progress in one direction seems often to be accompanied by impoverishment in others. The development is at the cost of earlier material which had some value. It may be that this material is no longer compatible with the new movement, its interests or its *milieu*; or it is unsuitable for its members, who, it may be, are at a much less mature stage of intellectual growth. There are conspicuous occasions where religion has severed itself from non-religious material which it has not even transmuted, and characteristic of primitive religion is much that is of peculiar interest if only because of the profound gulf between it and modern thought.

The development of religion has been marked by the extension and differentiation of early ideas. What is true of a vital part of a system becomes true of every part, in both cases conditionally. What is true of the supreme representative individual applies—when allowance is made for differentiation of function—to all. We pass—in Egypt—from the eager hope that the great men must surely survive death to the belief that this may be true of all. The cosmic importance of the one or the few, by virtue of their relation to their god, gives way to the supreme value of every individual, and for the same reason.

Properly, everything is conditional, dependent upon a man's place in the system. The divine king and the anthropomorphic god expand conceptions of human personality and of man's place in the Universe. From the pre-eminent cosmic value of a divine king, and from the governance of the world for a Chosen People, we reach the presupposition that man is the centre of the Universe. It was a rationalizing, as it were, of the mystical experience of man's oneness or unity with all reality (p. 666 *sq.*). Further examples are unnecessary; it is enough to say that all early and undifferentiated stages of religious and other thought—the relationship between god and man and nature, the unity of the spiritual or psychical with the material or physical, and so forth—demand on our part a rational formulation of the relation between successive stages in the differentiation of thought and between the subsequently differentiated forms.

There is much in primitive religion that corresponds to " Divine Immanence " : the interrelation of gods and worshippers within the system, the " material reality of the spiritual," and the interpenetration where gods and men are alike one with nature. Where this realism prevails the actual world is both matter and spirit, and it seems probable that it is the origin of the dualist systems which have advanced beyond primitive religion and incorporate the learning and the science—or pseudo-science—of their age. This dualism may be said to mark the transition from ancient religion to the victorious Christianity which (1) was essentially a social religion rather than a theory of God, Man, and the Universe, and (2) explicitly preserved the teaching of Divine Transcendence. But whereas in this dualism the strictly transcendental aspect falls into the background, in early religion it can constantly be recognized. The divine king, in spite of his extraordinary powers, was subordinate to the supreme god (p. 545); the interpenetration of man and nature (man's power over and in nature) did not necessarily exclude the existence of supreme gods (often, no doubt, otiose), or of supreme principles; and in the early ideas of " holiness " moral elements were by no means always wanting. Even in totemism —which can be described as an " immanental " system—there are, as distinct from the clan-totems, gods of the tribe (cf. p. 668). In general, the tendencies that made for Immanence were, properly speaking, balanced by those that made for Transcendence (p. 564). Religion has struggled between a dual and a triple organization. (*a*) The world is physical or material *and* psychical; but the psychical is not necessarily spiritual, even as the " numinous " is not necessarily sacred, or theistic (p. 553 *sq.*). On the other hand (*b*) Yahweh is above nature, and therefore above this psychical principle in nature (cf. p. 662). Similarly, man is flesh (*sarx*) and *psyche*, but the *pneuma* is the trans-

cendent, life-giving source; and without this transcendent element every system ceases to develop, becomes closed, decays and dies.

We must recognize, with W. R. S., that the central fact in religion is its progressive development. The difference between the vicissitudes of religions in general and the continuous explication of ideas up to the present day—no mere subjective conviction—is as vital for the world of thought as is man's place in the world of organic life. The spiritual teaching of the great creative ages is marked by an utter uncompromising insistence upon Divine Transcendence, and upon the futility of all human anticipations that the mere continuity of any religion hitherto is a guarantee that it will survive, should it lack the essential spirituality. True spiritual religion is not necessarily that which is at the conceptual stage, or is mystical, or expresses itself in psychological or spiritual terms—upon this the lengthy history of religion is decisive. Nor is that which is necessarily embodied—in order to make it effective—in practice or rite, in doctrine or system, necessarily physical, material, or mechanical. The spiritual elements are those which prove to be pregnant; upon them depends the further development of that which must have some embodiment and must be at least an implicit system. But outside every system is that which makes for its further growth; and without it progressive development sooner or later becomes impossible. Materialism is so far unavoidable that both the perceptual and the conceptual, the physical and the psychical, may belong to "matter." Even Pure Materialism seems methodologically necessary. But it becomes the closed system devoid of those pregnant elements which are fed from outside the system, and "matter," in this sense, is the fixed concept, the absolutely delimited, the data of the statistician, and—as brute matter—it can be weighed and measured.

Accordingly, the value of primitive religion lies in the fact that it reveals, not the historic origin, but the exceedingly rudimentary forms of the religious and other ideas from which modern thought has been derived. It shows us why they were true and effective for their environment, and how their strength lay in their interrelation one with another. The difference between the most primitive and the most advanced religion is precisely as instructive as that between the lowest and the highest organisms.[1] It is the permanent significance of

[1] Although emphasis must be laid upon the increase of differentiation and specialization in the history of thought—and therefore on the distinction between what belongs to Religion and what falls outside it—the periods of relative undifferentiation, when some real unity is found to lie beneath the differences, no less require emphasis, though the questions that arise therefrom are of a philosophical or methodological nature and do not belong here.

W. R. S.'s work that problems which are usually approached in the light of definite theological, philosophical, or other presuppositions were being treated *de novo* by a man of extraordinary attainments, who had a special knowledge of the area wherein the great progressive movements in religion took place, and who, while intensely religious, and with distinct theological interests, had from the first the conviction that a reformulation of religious doctrine was the need of his age.[1]

P. 445. ELOHIM.—Cf. Phœnician אלם, used of Nergal (*CIS.* i. 119_2) and of Astarte (Lidzbarski, *Ephem.* i. 155), and ηλειμ (Lidz. ii. 89). In the Hittite treaties Mitra and Varuna are *ilānu*, but not Indra, perhaps because he was more clearly individualized as the national god. In the Amarna Letters *ilānu* is used with a singular verb in No. 96_4; and the Pharaoh is addressed as "my god," *ilānu(-ia)*, and by Abimilk of Tyre as *(ilu)Shamshi-ia*, *ili-ia*, *ilāni-ia* (151_1). The plural in Semitic does not necessarily refer to a number of single persons or things (Gesenius-Cowley, *Heb. Gram.* § 124), and the so-called "broken plurals" are "in all probability . . . singular abstract forms which gradually came to be used in a concrete and collective sense, and hence pass for plurals" (Wm. Wright, *Comp. Gram. Semit. Lang.* 148). The plural does not necessarily serve the same function everywhere, and the view that the plural Elohim is derived from polytheism—as though it denoted the Pantheon—has difficulties. In contrast to individualization, tendencies "to pluralize the supernatural" are recurrent: W. Warde Fowler observes it even in the inscriptions of the Empire (*Roman Ideas of Deity*, 16 *sq.*); for Greece, cf. the "gentle gods," etc. (Nilsson, 111 *sq.*, 120). Or the plural is indefinite—"They"—see Meyer, *Israel.* 212 n., who considers the *pluralis majestatis* an inadequate explanation of such cases as Teraphim, *Di Manes*, etc. At certain stages of religion the whole animal or tree species is sacred, and not the single specimen, which, in truth, is as eternal as the species and immanent in it. In such cases there is a very real "deity," though it is without clear-cut personality (Durkheim, 191, on the species-god of Samoa; Crawley, *Tree of Life*, 252). Among the Australian Dieri the name for the supreme god Mura-Mura ("very holy") designates the ancestral beings; and the name Nuralie, the god of the tribes on the Murray River, is sometimes used as a collective expression for the primeval group of mythical beings (Durkheim, 290; cf. Marett, *Threshold of Rel.* 152 *sq.*).

[1] Though W. R. S. passed from being an ardent theologian to one of the most penetrating critics of Semitic religion and sociology, he did not himself attempt the necessary task of reformulating theological doctrine. On the contrary, towards the close of his life he found occasion to declare that he felt he never could have been a theologian (*Life*, p. 535). See the Introduction above.

P. 451. Naked and Unshod.—For nudity in religious ritual, cf. the use at Mecca (Wellh. 110; Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 172); on praying in a state of nudity, see Goldziher, *Nöldeke-Festschrift*, 328; for classical examples, besides the Lupercalia (p. 479 above), see Eitrem, 52, and in general J. Heckenbach, *De nuditate sacra sacrisque vinculis* (Giessen, 1911). At the present day, when Palestinian women implore the help of a god or saint they uncover the breast or go entirely naked as a sign of humiliation (*JPOS.* vi. 15); and in India they strip naked in a ploughing-rite where the rain deity is invoked (*JRAS.* 1897, pp. 475 *sq.*, 478 *sq.*; 1898, p. 195). For other Indian examples, see R. E. Enthoven, *Folklore of Bombay*, 329 *sq.* (nudity in learning and in practising arts of incantation, fertility rites, etc.). In the Rossel island, off Papua, there are districts each of which (called *yaba*) is owned by a person of rank and controls some important process of nature (wind, birth, sago, sun and moon, etc.). Any untoward conduct would prevent the owner from exploiting this power of control, and people who visit the *yaba* always shed their clothing and take nothing with them (W. E. Armstrong, *Anthropos*, xviii.–xix. [1923–4]). Nudity rites are prehistoric, and the nude female image with crossed arms holding her breasts, etc., is taken to be a fertility charm or fertility goddess. In Palestine people at the present day will go in rags when they pray for rain (*JPOS.* vi. 157), and the custom of tearing the garment, laying bare arm or shoulder in mourning, may be interpreted, partly, as a survival of a nudity rite (see Jastrow, *JAOS.* xx. 133–150, xxi. 23–39; *ZATW.* 1902, pp. 117 *sqq.*), and partly and more psychologically as a mere impulsive action.[1]

As regards shoes, the modern peasant will remove them at the shrine of an important *weli* (Canaan, *JPOS.* i. 170, 171 n. 1). The custom was in vogue in Babylonian ritual (see Jirku, *ZATW.* xxxvii. 120); and in the Psalms of Solomon ii. 2 the writer complains that alien nations trample the altar with their sandals. For classical references, see Eitrem, 91 n. 6, 392 *sqq.*; Frazer, *Paus.* v. 202.

P. 456.—Cf. *uṣurtu*, taboo, R. Campbell Thompson, *Demons and Evil Spirits of Babylonia*, ii. pp. xli n. 1, 119, *Semitic Magic*, 126 n. 2. Muss-Arnolt gives the meaning "magical spell, curse."

P. 456. Phallic Symbols.—Various phallic objects have been found in Palestine, *e.g.* at the foot of a pillar at Megiddo (G. Schumacher, *Tell el-Mutesellim*, i. 128), and at Taanach (E. Sellin, *Nachlese auf den Tell Ta'annek*, 1905, p. 9, fig. 7); one rudely carved to represent a man at Zakariya (Bliss and Macalister, *Excavations in Palestine*, 136,

[1] The Assyrian term for tearing off a garment in mourning is *sharaṭu* (see *KAT.* 603; Lagrange, 321; Winckler, *Altorient. Forsch.* ii. 29, 40). On its Arabic equivalent, used of a mark tattooed or cut on the person, see *Kinship*, 250.

plate lxvii. no. 7). They were found in " basketfuls " at the high place of Gezer along with Astarte plaques ; and one of the pillars is evidently itself phallic (Macalister, *Gezer*, ii. 394 ; Vincent, *Canaan*, 113). Besides some phallic objects at Petra, innumerable emblems were found at Nippur (Peters, *JAOS.* xli. 132, 141 *sq.* ; cf. *MDOG.* 1904, June, No. xxii. 26, a phallic-shaped pillar). The phallic origin of the boundary stones (*kudurru*) is doubtful. For the view that the ideogram IM=*rāmānu*=god of the phallus, see Ungnad, *ZA.* xxxvi. 272. Phallic emblems are rare on Babylonian seals (Ward, 65, 153), and they are not prominent in the cult of Adonis (Baudissin, 179). On the whole, indisputable female emblems on stone pillars are, in spite of arguments to the contrary, relatively rare ; and phallicism is a secondary phenomenon in religion. This is not to deny that at times it became extraordinarily prominent ; but phallicism never developed into an organized cult, even as phallic interpretations of religion have not succeeded in presenting any reasonable systematized theory of the history of religion.[1]

P. 465. Firstborn.—There are few traces of birthright in Babylonia (see Meissner, *Beiträge z. altbab. Privatrecht*, 16 ; Johns, *Bab. and Ass. Laws*, 162). For ultimogeniture or junior-right in the O.T. and elsewhere, see Frazer, *FOT.* i. 429 *sqq.*, who discusses some of the causes which may have led to primogeniture. Reasons for the special treatment of firstborn can be found, *e.g.*, when a child is born to a childless couple or in response to a vow (cf. *GB.* iv. 181). Such is the anxiety touching the successful issue of a marriage that sometimes it is only after the birth of a child that a marriage is considered complete (Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, 432, 464). Children, and especially firstborn, have been sacrificed to cure barrenness or, more generally, to ensure health, good fortune, and fertility (Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, i. 457, 460 ; *GB.* iv. 184). There are various savage rites—devouring the firstborn (New South Wales),[2] or killing them outright ; or the firstborn may be sacrificed to ensure the preservation of his successors (*FOT.* iii. 173). Sometimes the first few children are sacrificed (*GB.* iv. 181, Abyssinia). Men, and especially children, are slain by a king to restore to life a friend or to preserve the life of a king (Crawley, 277 *sq.* ; *GB.* vi. 226).

It is often believed that the father is reborn in his child ;[3] for this

[1] See Lagrange, 190 *sq.* ; Spoer, *ZATW.* xxviii. 271 ; Gressmann, xxix. 113–128 ; Sellin, *OLZ.* 1912, col. 119 *sq.* ; Budde, *ib.* 247 *sq.* ; and Ganszyniec, *Arch. f. Rel.* xxi. 499 *sqq.* (on Lucian, *Dea Syr.* xvi.).

[2] Frazer, *Belief in Immortality*, ii. 89 n. (refs.).

[3] In the Laws of Manu the husband is reborn as an embryo in the wife (*GB.* iv. 188 *sqq.* ; see *ERE.* vi. 332, and A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, ii. 294).

reason, at Tahiti and elsewhere, a chief should abdicate when a son is born (*GB.* iv. 190); hence the infant is put to death. The birth of a son may be an indication that the father will die (the Baganda, *FOT.* i. 562). Again, because the son is in some way his father over again, the father's name must not be given to the firstborn, and in Morocco the son is never called by the name of his father (if alive), unless that name be Mohammed. This name is frequently given to the first son, and the first daughter is called after the Prophet's daughter Fatima.[1] By a natural variation of the idea, a man is reborn not in his son but in his grandson. Commonly both have the same name (above, p. 510), and sometimes it is considered a misfortune for a chief to see his grandson (*FOT.* i. 479 *sq.*, 579 *sq.*). Throughout, the fundamental ideas turn upon the perpetuation of the stock.

In some social conditions it would be highly doubtful whether the firstborn was the true child of his mother's husband (C. E. Fox, *JRAI.* xlix. 119). This might be immaterial (*a*) where it was enough that he belonged to the group of which his mother was a member, and (*b*) where " a man is father of all the children of the woman by whom he has purchased the right to have offspring that shall be reckoned to his own kin " (*Kinship*, 132, where the husband calls in another man). Again, (*c*) where ceremonial defloration was practised the legitimacy of the firstborn might be doubtful. Among the Banaro of New Guinea this ceremony " takes place in the spirit or goblin house of the village," and the child is " the spirit-child or goblin-child " (*FOT.* i. 534); and elsewhere the firstborn will be of at least partly " sacred " origin. Does this throw light upon the " sacredness " of the firstborn in Palestine, with its *ḳedēshīm*, and its licentious cults ?[2] The evidence is admittedly incomplete (see p. 617 *sq.*): the firstborn were sacred to Yahweh and must be redeemed ; but infant sacrifice prevailed. The firstborn perpetuate the stock, and Yahweh was the spiritual father of Israel. *Spiritual* religion requires, not animal or human sacrifice, but " the souls of the righteous, and of children who have not yet sinned " (late Jewish ; Gray, *Sacrifice*, 172); and the Agadah of the third century A.D. developed the doctrine of the efficacious merits of pious children (Marmorstein, *Doctrine of Merits*, 95, 163). The new-born found interred in the sacred area at Gezer can hardly be proved, in view of the circumstances, to be sin-offerings (Micah, vi. 7), and it cannot, of course, be proved that they were firstborn; but whether they had died a natural death, or—as is more probable—

[1] Westermarck, *Morocco*, ii. 404. Of the same order is the conviction that the same name cannot be borne by any two persons of the same tribe (*GB.* iii. 370).

[2] Psellus (Migne, 832 *sq.*, cited by R. C. Thompson, *Sem. Magic*, 223) refers to the orgies of the Euchitæ and the sacrifice of their offspring nine months later.

had been sacrificed, the presence of the "spirits" of infants in a sacred locality may be associated with the common resort of women to shrines in the hope of obtaining offspring—a hope the more intelligible if "spirits" of infants were known to be there.

P. 469. SET AND THE ASS.—The "golden" Set is an old misinterpretation of "Set of Ombos" (Prof. T. E. Peet, private communication). Set's animal is uncertain; it was perhaps the okapi, which became conventionalized and, in the Greek age, was identified with the ass.[1] The ass is generally reddish in colour (*E.Bi.* col. 344 and n. 1); and in Egypt the sacrifice of "red" men long persisted (Macalister, *ERE.* vi. 862; also Mader, 32 *sq.*, 120 *sqq.*). In the Sumerian pantheon Esignun, one of the subordinate gods, tended the sacred asses of the great god Ningirsu (L. W. King, *Sumer and Akkad*, 259, 268), and the ass was the animal of the god Labartu. It is possible that the special regard for the ass, in the case of the redemption of the firstling (Ex. xxxiv. 20), was because, as a beast of burden, it performed the work of the gods in the realm of the dead (Campbell Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, 234). In any case, as an older animal than the horse, and on the analogy of the "horses of the Sun" (cf. 2 Kings xxiii. 11), we might expect it to have been no less sacred in its day. But there is little to be said concerning the ass in Semitic lore (C. J. Ball, *PSBA.* xxxii. 64 *sqq.*; cf. also A. B. Cook, *Journ. of Hell. Studies*, xiv. 81 *sqq.*). The Sumerian designation of Damascus as "ass city" can hardly be explained (see, *e.g.*, Haupt, *ZDMG.* lxix. 168; Winckler, *Arab. Semit. Orient.* 171 *sq.*). What Theophrastus (Porph. *de Abstin.* ii. 26) has to say about the ass and sacrifices may refer not to *Judæans* but *Idumæans* (Büchler, *ZATW.* 1902, pp. 206 *sqq.*). On the ass as a symbol of strength, cf. Wellh.[1] 157.[2]

P. 469. HERACLES AND THE QUAIL.—Heracles was slain by Typhon and brought to life by Iolaos; see Frazer, *GB.* v. 111 *sq.* On Iolaos see *Kinship*, 226, 257, and on the "resurrection" of Heracles see Baudissin, 135, 172, Abel, *Rev. Bib.*, 1908, pp. 570, 577 *sq.* The meaning of the name Eshmun has been much discussed (see Lidzbarski, iii. 260 *sqq.*), but remains uncertain. The identity of Eshmun and the Arabic *sumāna* (quail) is favoured by Barton (267 n. 2) as against both Wellhausen (10) and Baudissin (208, 305 *sqq.*). Certainly, the meaning of the root (oily, fat, luxuriant, robust, etc.; see Baud. 207) is not unsuitable

[1] Roeder, in Roscher's *Lex.* iv. 777 *sq.*, cf. 773, 776; see Kees, *MVAG.* 1924, j. 25 *sq.* Newberry (*Klio*, xii. 397) identified it with Ælian's wart-hog (*Phacochœrus africanus*).

[2] Among his numerous manuscript notes to his copy of Wellhausen's *Heidentum*[1] (in the Library of Christ's College, Cambridge), W. R. S. observes that, according to Cazwīnī (i. 377_1), riding backwards on an ass would cure scorpion bite; see also *Heid.*[1] 216.

for a deity of the Baal type (though it does not seem to enter into theophorous names), and fits the quail, which is a fat, plump bird. Like the penguin, the bird when dead is apt to breed worms (*E.Bi.* col. 3991), and a characteristic malady produced by the bird was called *morbus Herculeus* (cf. Hommel, 730). Like the manna of the Israelites in the wilderness, the quail was divinely provided food, and the people, tired of manna and lusting after flesh, were "consecrated" in order to receive it (Num. xi. 18). But whereas the manna was not to be stored overnight (Ex. xvi. 19), the quails were eaten for a month, and with disastrous results. Further, whereas manna continued to be regarded as divine food and belongs to distinctively Israelite tradition, the quails had associations in both Phœnician and Greek mythology (cf. A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, i. 544 n.), and they were perhaps burnt alive to Melkart-Heracles at Tyre and to Sandan-Heracles at Tarsus (*GB.* v. 112, 126 n. 3). It is noteworthy that in another Biblical story (Num. xxi.), where the Israelites complain of the manna and of the lack of flesh, they are thereupon bitten by "serpents," and the bronze serpent set up to cure them recalls the connexion between the serpent and the healing god Eshmun.

P. 469. Additional Note G.—For criticisms, see Stübe, 337 *sqq.* (with references and fuller details); Eitrem, 391 n. 1; Nilsson, *Griech. Feste*, 368; and Baudissin, 129, 144 (who questions whether Lydus knew of any Adonis festival in spring). Prof. W. R. Halliday (in a private communication) suggests that κωδίῳ ἐσκεπασμένον (see p. 473) may be a periphrasis for some term like ἄπεκτος, which meant technically an unshorn lamb less than a year old, and so taboo in Athenian sacrifice (Androtion, 41; Philochoros, 64). He compares ἐπίποκος Ἑκάτι ἐμ πόλει . . . οἷν ἐπίποκον τελέαν, *i.e.* a mature sheep with wool on or unshorn; Paton and Hicks, *Inscriptions of Cos*, 401.[1] W. R. S.'s emendation would then become unnecessary.

P. 481. Covenant Ceremonies.—Two types are to be distinguished; see Meyer and Luther, *Israeliten*, 556 *sqq.* (1) In Ex. xxiv. 3–8, the blood of the sacrifice is sprinkled over the people and over the altar (representing Yahweh). (2) In Gen. xv., Jer. xxxiv. 18 *sqq.*, the distinctive feature is the passage between the severed animal. The former is a familiar type (cf. Trumbull, *Blood Covenant*, 4 *sqq.*), but in the latter the significance of the severance and of the passage is not so clear. Parallels are found in purificatory and in imprecatory ceremonies (Frazer, *FOT.* i. 398 *sqq.*, 407; Meyer, 560 n. 1; Trumbull, 186). For the parallel Assyrian imprecatory ceremony, where the victim is not, however, a sacrifice, see Frazer, 401 *sq.*, *KAT.* 597, and *MVAG.* iii. 228 *sqq.* It has been thought that the passage between the divided

[1] See also Halliday, *Liverpool Annals of Art and Archæology*, xiv. 12.

victim may be a "rite of passage," symbolizing the emergence into a new state (cf. Pilcher, *PSBA*. xl. 8 *sqq.*); Crawley, however, recalls the "split token," the division of an object so that two contracting parties, by possessing each a half, are themselves parts, as it were, of a whole, and are thus most closely united (*Mystic Rose*, 238, 248, 258). On the Scythian custom (p. 402 n. 3), see Frazer, *FOT*. i. 394, 414; and on the origin of the term *bĕrīth*, see *E.Bi.* "Covenant," § 1; Lagrange, 234 *sq.*

Westermarck does not agree that the underlying idea of covenant ceremonies is that of communion.[1] He argues that the blood-covenant imposes duties upon the contracting parties and a penalty for their transgression; and he invokes the Arabic *'ar* and *'ahd* where, in the former case, a ma exerts pressure upon a more powerful individual (or saint, etc.) in order to secure, if not rather to compel, his protection, and, in the latter, a man who undertakes a task "is believed to expose himself to supernatural danger in case of bad faith." As regards both, "their primary object was not to establish communion, but to transfer conditional curses both to the men and to the god." On the one hand, Westermarck rightly draws attention to certain forms of belief and practice which might easily be overlooked. On the other, there are gods who are believed to safeguard treaties and covenants (cf. Baal-Berith, p. 534); and when they are mentioned (*e.g.* in the Egypto-Hittite or the Hittite-Mitannian treaties), their ability to punish any infraction of the conditions is naturally not the only reason for their presence. In covenants and treaties the relationship between the parties and their gods is a more essential fact than the way in which the relationship is used, viz. in imprecations and curses. The very notion of transference of curses implies a relationship, and the object of exerting pressure upon gods (spirits, saints, etc.) is to utilize them in a way that is "magical" rather than "religious." Westermarck's argument involves the theory that the "magical" relation is more primary than the "religious," and that even if some covenant ceremonies are of a "religious" nature—which presumably would not be denied—the "magical" aspect is more essential than the "religious." But W. R. S. throughout argues from the priority of "religion." And if this is only a "theory," it will claim to deal both with the facts and with rival theories more adequately than does the "theory" of the priority of magic, and to provide a philosophy more true to human nature.

[1] *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, ii. 208 *sq.*; *Ritual and Belief in Morocco*, i. 564, 569.

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF PAGINATION

In view of the use made by German and other continental scholars of Stübe's translation of *Religion of the Semites*, this adjustment of his table may be useful to English readers.

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[1] Explained to mean "ibex" (*MVAG.* 1923, ii. 69).

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